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1 Abstract 
After 25 years of transformations of higher education systems in post-Soviet countries, the single Soviet 
model of higher education has evolved into fifteen unique national systems, shaped by economic, cul-
tural, and political forces, both national and global (Johnstone and Bain 2002). International agencies 
such as the World Bank and the OECD have lobbied for a set of policies associated with the Washington 
Consensus (Neave, G. R. & van Vught, 1991). The Bologna Process has created isomorphic pressures, 
supported by EU policies and funding. Many post-Soviet States have responded to these influences, 
albeit with different motivations and unclear outcomes (Tomusk, 2011). Comparative research on these 
developments, however, is scarce and has primarily discussed them in terms of decentralization, mar-
ketization and institutional autonomy (Heyneman 2010; Silova, 2011).  
This PhD thesis aims to  
1) reconstruct the developments of governance of higher education systems,  
2) analyze to what degree the developments represent a convergence towards a “global model” or 
a “Post-Soviet model” and  
3) formulate hypotheses about driving forces and path dependencies at national, regional and 
global level which have driven or impeded these changes.  
Following work by Becher & Kogan (1992), Clark (1983), Jongbloed (2003), Paradeise (2009); Hood 
(2004); Dill (2010) and Dobbins et al. (2011), the research analyzes the object of analysis, the govern-
ance of higher education systems, on five dimensions: 1. Educational Standards, quality assessment, 
and information provision; 2. Regulation of admissions to higher education; 3. Institutional structures, 
decision-making, and autonomy; 4. Higher education financing and incentive structures; and 5. The 
relationship of higher education and the state. Explanatory approaches draw upon perspectives of path 
dependence and models of institutional change drawing on work by North (1990), Steinmo (1992), 
Weick (1976), Pierson (2000) and Witte (2006). 
Three post-Soviet, non-EU, Bologna signatory states were selected to represent a diverse geographical 
sub-sample of the 15 post-Soviet States. The three countries studied in-depth are Russia, Moldova and 
Kazakhstan. The period of analysis comprises the changes taking place over a 25-year period between 
1991 and 2015.  
Methodologically, the study rests on extensive literature analysis of previous academic publications, 
reports by international organizations such as the World Bank, OECD, and the EU, and national strategy 
papers. Building on this document analysis, over 60 semi-structured expert interviews were conducted 
with representatives of State organizations, HEIs and other stakeholder groups engaged in the govern-
ance of higher education. The outcomes of interviews were used to situate developments in the particular 
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social-political and societal contexts and to triangulate policy documents with various stakeholder per-
spectives, in order to reconstruct how and why specific policy changes came about, were implemented 
or abandoned.  
The results show a differentiated picture: The governance instruments promoted by OECD, WB and EU 
are clearly recognizable in the 2015 governance arrangements in all three case countries. On this instru-
ments-level “surface”, a process of convergence towards the “global model” is clearly taking place. 
While these new instruments are being adopted, however, the specific national governance arrangements 
persist and continue to matter. Only in isolated instances are old instruments fully displaced. More com-
monly, new structures are added as additional layers to existing governance arrangements.  
The three countries continue to share a number of unique characteristics which sets them apart from the 
Anglo-Saxon higher education systems, which have inspired the “global model”. The dominating con-
trolling role of the state has remained in place in all countries. This is strongly reinforced by national-
level institutions and mental models which affirm hierarchy as the legitimate principle in governance 
and a lack of trust between actors in the system. In all case countries, the mutual expectation of state 
and HEIs alike remains that the state should be steering the higher education sector. This it does (Russia 
and Kazakhstan) or attempts to do (Moldova). Clearly, the adoption of governance instruments which 
are inspired by the “global model” does in no way equate with a retreat of the state. While the elements 
of university autonomy and stakeholder governance are slowly expanded, even this very process of 
loosening the reigns of the state is in great measure overseen and steered by the state. Shared character-
istics, such as centralized control over admission; a state claim to steer and, in many cases, control the 
system; a hierarchical, authoritarian, personalized style of governance, management, leadership, as well 
as accountability form the discernable core of a common “post-Soviet” model of HE governance. The 
shared institutional past of the Soviet era, as well as common challenges, have facilitated and maintained 
these commonalities.  
As time passes, however, these post-Soviet commonalities are getting weaker. Divergent national-level 
forces and actors are driving or impeding reforms: While in Moldova, political volatility and underfund-
ing have repeatedly undermined substantial reforms, Russia and Kazakhstan have each adopted govern-
ance and management practices from New Public Management in new idiosyncratic ways: Kazakhstan 
has embarked on an authoritarian-driven decentralization program. Russia has created a two-tier system 
of state steering through financial incentivization and evaluation on the one hand, and tight oversight, 
control and intervention on the other. This dissertation sheds light on the developments, driving forces 
and mechanisms behind the convergence and divergence of approaches to higher education governance 
in an under-studied region of the world.  
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2 Introduction 
2.1 Research Topic 
The Higher Education System of the Soviet Union was associated with major achievements such as 
near-universal literacy, the first artificial satellite and the first human spaceflight, and it became the 
blueprint for the entire socialist world. Becoming a new model of a higher education system in its own 
right, since the 1920ies, it had mostly departed from a system of Humboldtian-inspired universities. 
Instead, it had been transformed into a large-scale network of higher educational institutions (HEIs) 
promoting the ideologization agenda of establishing hegemony of party Marxism over rival factions, 
and supporting the industrialization of the Soviet Union through forced integration of HE and industry. 
Burton Clark described the governance of the Soviet HE system as “the purest case of the triumph of 
the state over oligarchical and market interaction” (Clark, B. R., 1983, p. 142). When the Soviet Union 
collapsed, the 15 successor states were faced with a “triple transition” (Offe & Adler, 1991), as they had 
to simultaneously cope with democratization, establishing a market economy, and state- and nation-
building. At the same time as demand for higher education exploded, state funding for higher education 
was abruptly cut. During the early years of independence, the previously state-focused system struggled 
for survival its place in the new political economies. This had tremendous effects on the governance of 
the system.  
This collapse of the old higher education system of the Soviet Union coincided with a world-wide wave 
of public sector governance reforms often summarized under the title “new public management” (NPM). 
These reforms pushed for the use of market mechanisms in steering, greater institutional autonomy, 
quality assurance and accountability in the provision of public services, including higher education, and 
were promoted worldwide by international organizations such as the World Bank or the OECD. In many 
post-Soviet countries, these reform blueprints provided justifications for policy decisions in many areas 
of public policy, including higher education governance. During the 2000ies, the EU and the Bologna 
Process became an additional important external factor shaping the development of the governance of 
higher education systems.  
Even though many different factors influence the development of policies, governance arrangements 
and HEIs, these models coming from outside are not either adopted or ignored. HEIs as well as the 
governance arrangements in which they are embedded are historical, time-dependent systems strongly 
shaped by their national and organizational histories (Krücken, Kosmützky, & Torka, 2007). Silova and 
Steiner-Khamsi state that “how the reforms of the 1990s and the new millennium interacted with insti-
tutions and practices that had been in place is an important question” (2008), yet it is one that has not 
been systematically and comparatively studied in scholarly literature. The changes in higher education 
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governance in countries of the former Soviet Union have received comparatively little scholarly atten-
tion aside from a few authors1 who focused on explaining changes in terms of culture, decentralization, 
marketization and institutional autonomy.  
After 25 years of transformations of higher education systems in post-Soviet countries, the single Soviet 
model of higher education has evolved into fifteen unique national systems, shaped by economic, cul-
tural, and political forces, both national and global (Johnstone and Bain 2002). The question of this 
dissertation thus revolves around how the same set of policy blueprints have interacted with and influ-
enced the approaches to the governance of higher education in different countries within a shared his-
torical, political and – to a certain degree – cultural and linguistic area: the countries of the former Soviet 
Union.  
2.2 Starting point and personal research interest 
The governance of higher education systems is an interesting and highly relevant issue that has gained 
in prominence on the higher education policy agenda. In many European countries this is in no small 
measure related to the inclusion of quality assurance in the Bologna Process. Starting from being a 
student representative at the University of Freiburg, a staff member at the quality assurance department, 
a trainer and student reviewer in Germany’s student QA experts pool and, since 2011, a researcher, 
Consultant and Trainer at CHE Consult, I had ample opportunity to gain first-hand, as well as research 
and consulting exposure to the work of internal quality assurance and university governance, external 
quality assurance through accreditations and audits. My own research for the Input Study to the Report 
from the European Commission on Progress in the Development of Quality Assurance Systems in the 
various Member States and on Cooperation Activities at European Level (Bischof, Gajowniczek, 
Maikämper, & Aerden, 2014) provided a broad macro-perspective on EU Member States within the 
EHEA.  
Since 2009, I had begun to learn Russian out of personal interest. In 2011, I had the opportunity join a 
TEMPUS project aimed at the development of a new quality assurance system for the Republic of Mol-
dova2. I could not help but notice that, even though quality assurance is widely regarded as “one of the 
most successful action lines of the Bologna Process” and has gained greater prominence and specificity 
in each subsequent ministerial communiqué (Bischof et al., 2014), research on the post-Soviet Bologna-
signatory states was notably scarce and often piecemeal. The first comprehensive comparative research 
project on changes in higher education systems across the post-Soviet space was launched only 2014 by 
the Institute of Education of the Higher School of Economics in Moscow (Huisman, Smolentseva, & 
Froumin, 2018). Together with a Moldovan colleague, I contributed a chapter on the developments in 
the higher education system of the Republic of Moldova (Bischof & Tofan, 2018).  
                                                          
1 Examples include Voldemar, Tomusk; Stephen Heyneman and Iveta Silova.  
2 530537-TEMPUS-1-2012-1-DETEMPUS-SMGR 
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Therefore, when the time came to choose my PhD topic in 2014, I decided to try to make my own 
contribution to filling this gap and dedicate my PhD to a comparative study of the governance of quality 
assurance. Soon after delving deeper into the intricacies in which quality is assured in post-Soviet HEIs, 
however, I came to the realization that a narrow study of the use of standards, assessment and infor-
mation provision (Dill, 2010) de-coupled from questions of HEI autonomy, HEI financing and the reg-
ulation of access to higher education, does not provide a meaningful picture. Therefore, half-way 
through the dissertation, I expanded the scope to also address these aspects in order to do justice to 
understanding the wider context of system governance.  
Inspired by Johanna Witte’s (2006) comparative study of the implementation of the Bologna Process in 
Germany, the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom, I was interested to see how historically 
inherited contexts—structural, political, cultural—of the post-Soviet HE systems interact with motives 
and interests of actors within these systems to shape the particular development trajectories that different 
countries.  
My initial research questions can therefore be formulated as follows: 
RQ 1. How has the governance of higher education systems changed between 1991 and 
2015?  
RQ 2. Is there a convergence towards a “global model” of higher education governance?  
RQ 3. Is there a common model of governance of higher education post-Soviet countries?  
RQ 4. What was the relative influence of national, regional and global factors on the de-
velopment of the governance of higher education? 
Table 1: Research Questions 
2.3 Research approach 
Methodologically, by analyzing the changes in instruments and actors of governance of higher education 
systems in multiple country cases this dissertation uses an embedded, multiple-case comparative design 
(Yin, 2003). The international comparative case studies cover the changes in governance approaches, 
instruments and actor relations in the HE systems of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Moldova in the historic 
period between 1991 and 2015. The focus of the case studies is on system-level governance arrange-
ments between governments, other stakeholders, and HEIs. Intra-HEI-governance arrangements are rel-
evant only to the degree that they are defined by the system level.  
To compare and analyze the changing governance arrangements, I have relied on an extensive analysis 
of previous academic publications, reports by international organizations such as the World Bank, the 
OECD, and the EU, as well as of national strategy papers. Furthermore, over 60 semi-structured expert 
interviews were conducted with representatives of state organizations, HEIs, and other stakeholder 
groups that are engaged in the governance of higher education. The outcomes of interviews were used 
to situate developments in the particular social-political and societal contexts, and to triangulate the 
  
page 16 
contents of policy documents with various stakeholder perspectives, in order to reconstruct how and why 
certain policy changes came about, were implemented, or had been abandoned.  
This study maps and analyzes the nature and degree of changes in governance arrangements within and 
across systems. It also investigates to what extent adaptations of national governance arrangements rep-
resent a convergence towards a “global model” or “post-Soviet” model, based on identified commonal-
ities.  
Lastly, this study attempts to analyze how inherited governance arrangements embedded in the institu-
tional context of the respective HE systems are changed by global, regional and national actors in the 
process of national HE policy formulation. To achieve a degree of comparability, five dimensions of the 
governance arrangements in HE systems receive particular attention: 1. Educational Standards, quality 
assessment, and information provision (quality assurance); 2. Regulation of admissions to higher edu-
cation; 3. Institutional structures, decision-making and autonomy; 4. Higher education financing and 
incentive structures; and the relationship of HEIs and the state.  
The theoretical choices and key concepts employed in this dissertation will be explained in chapters 2 
and 3 and the resulting framework of analysis and methodological approach in chapter 4.  
2.4 Relevance to research and practice 
This study seeks to contribute to research and practice in three ways:  
1) by making a relevant contribution to comparative HE research empirically by providing a de-
tailed account of changes and developments in governance in three post-Soviet countries;  
2) by contributing to a theoretical grasp of policy making in the post-Soviet region; and  
3) by improving the knowledge base for the further development of a European HE area.  
2.5 Structure 
The structure of the study is as follows: In chapter 2, I provide an overview of the empirical and con-
ceptual context of the governance of post-Soviet Higher Education Systems. In chapter 3, I will ex-
plain the analytical choices on the way towards a theoretical framework for the study. In chapter 4, I 
will outline the methodological approach. The remainder of the study is devoted to an empirical inves-
tigation of the changes of HE system governance. In chapters 5 I describe the governance of the Soviet 
HE system. Chapters 6-8 are dedicated to the national cases, i.e., Russia, Kazakhstan, and Moldova 
respectively. An international comparative analysis of the country-specific results is undertaken in 
chapter 9 along with a review of the research questions. I conclude the thesis with reflections on the 
contribution of this study for research and practice, avenues for further research, and policy implica-
tions in chapter 10.  
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3 Steps towards a framework of analysis 
3.1 The Governance of Higher Education Systems 
In this chapter, I will develop a framework of analysis to study the governance of higher education 
systems in the post-Soviet space. I will begin by delineating the properties of higher education systems, 
higher education institutions and actors typically engaged in the governance of higher education sys-
tems. The second sub-chapter will provide an overview of higher education system governance, dis-
cussing authority distribution, and the processes and structures which are relevant in the process of gov-
ernance of higher education systems. In the third sub-chapter, we will turn to the instruments through 
which higher education systems are steered. In particular, I will present and discuss the dimensions of 
higher education system governance which I will use for the purpose of comparative analysis, namely 
1. Quality Assurance (Educational Standards, quality assessment, and information provision); 2. Reg-
ulation of admissions to higher education; 3. Institutional structures, decision-making and autonomy; 
4. Higher education financing and incentive structures.  
3.1.1 Higher Education systems  
3.1.1.1 Higher education systems 
In his classic comparative study of national systems of higher education, Clark (1983) describes higher 
education systems in a narrow sense as “a set of formal institutions” or – in a broader sense – as all 
institutions comprising “everyone whose work is in one way or another connected to higher education, 
including inspectors, organizers, workers and consumers”. National higher education systems can be 
defined as the historically, politically and culturally contingent institutions that organize science and 
learning in a national context (David-Fox, M. & Peters, 2008). The conceptualization of higher educa-
tion as a system is a core theoretical perspective in the body of knowledge on higher education. Studies 
of national higher education systems therefore typically follow the definition of higher education sys-
tems as encompassing all institutions of higher education as well as the set of elements for managing 
this whole (e.g., Ministries of Education and Science) (Kuzminov, Semenov, & Froumin, 2015).  
Studies of higher education systems have concerned themselves with trying to develop models through 
different approaches: By identifying levels of systems; by describing different roles of actors within the 
system; by bringing to light values, norms and beliefs defining the rules of the system; or by modelling 
the operations taking place within the system as well as the interplay between all of these dimensions. 
Differences between HE systems began to be analyzed regarding access, with Trow (1973) describing 
a continuum from elite, mass, and universal access. Since the 1900ies, there have been strong pushes to 
analyze HE systems and HEIs according to their (research) productivity, with university ratings and 
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league tables occupying a central position in policy discourses in many countries. Lastly, and most rel-
evantly for this book, higher education research has concerned itself with governance and control (Clark, 
B. R., 1983) and institutional autonomy (Neave, G., 1986) of higher education systems. I will summarize 
some key characteristics of higher education systems for their governance.  
Sectors and tiers 
National higher education systems vary in the number of their sectors (from single, public systems with 
only a single institutional type to private and public systems with a highly differentiated system of dif-
ferent types of HEIs). Systems are further vertically differentiated by tiers within HEIs (from single-tier 
systems culminating in on qualification such as the old German Diplom to multi-tier systems differen-
tiating between BA, MA, and PhD levels with separate organizational structures within the same insti-
tution). Between HEIs, higher education systems are differentiated vertically by hierarchies based on 
sequence (such as the succession from community college to research university) and institutional pres-
tige. As Clark notes: “Whatever the combination of sections and tiers within institutions, and sectors 
and hierarchies among them, the prevailing structure sets many of the problems of control and condi-
tions all important issues of continuity and reform”.  
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Organizational levels of higher education systems 
 
Figure 1: Organizational levels of higher education systems 
As Figure 1 illustrates, higher education systems can be of varying organizational complexity. Starting 
from the smallest units, individual teachers and researchers do their work in departments or chairs, often 
organized by sub-disciplines (e.g. for “social psychology” or “zoology”) in either chairs (in the German 
HE tradition) or departments (in the Anglo-Saxon HE tradition). Departments and chairs, in turn, are 
typically organized by similar disciplines into schools (e.g. “school of psychology”) or faculties (e.g. 
“faculty of life sciences”) which operate under the umbrella and within the structures of higher education 
institutes, such as Universities, Fachhochschulen or other forms of institutions. Adding a further organ-
izational layer, in some higher education systems, there are multi-campus systems which themselves 
represent umbrella organizations for several semi-independent HEIs. Noteworthy examples are the Uni-
versity of California (UC) system in the United States or the Duale Hochschule Baden-Württemberg 
(DHBW) in Germany. Lastly, all HEIs within the same political, financial or regulatory framework form 
the entirety of a higher education system, either at the state/regional or national level.  
3.1.1.2 Higher Education Institutions as institutions and organizations 
As many ideals as there are concerning the raison d’être of higher education institutions, as many con-
cepts are there concerning the way they should function, how they should be organized, who should 
play which role in their governance, by whom they should by financed and to whom they should be 
accountable.  
Universities can be conceptualized as organizations, which have an specific organizational identity and 
goals, which they try to realize as effectively or efficiently as possible, through the use of resources and 
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a certain internal organization. Scholars of higher education have put forward different models and the-
oretical ideas about what kind of an organization universities are, including the ideals of a bureaucracy 
(Stroup, 1966), a community of scholars (Goodman, 1962) or a political system (Baldridge, 1971). Uni-
versities can also, however, be understood as institutions, representing “relatively enduring collections 
of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively 
invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences 
and expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances” (Olsen, 2007). As institutions are 
embedded in the identities of their participants, they justify and legitimize certain behaviors, while re-
stricting others (March & Olsen, 1989). Many authors have argued that in the course of the NPM-related 
reforms (see chapter 3.2.2.4), universities are currently being transformed from institutions into more 
“complete organizations” (Kehm, B. M., 2012; Wilkesmann & Schmid, 2012).  
Whether higher education institutions (HEIs) are understood as organizations delivering certain services 
or as more enduring institutions has a tremendous impact on how governments approach higher educa-
tion policy. While a detailed study of the ideological conception of the universities in the post-Soviet 
space is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the following distinctions should help to highlight the 
specificities and changes of governance within the post-Soviet context.  
3.1.1.3 Actors engaged in the governance of higher education systems 
Many different actors are engaged in the governance of higher education systems forming an complex 
and interdependent network influencing HEIs, but also interacting with it (Dill, 2011). Pressure to adopt 
certain policies on HEI autonomy, quality assurance, and financing is exerted by international organi-
zations such as the OECD, UNESCO, the World Bank or the EU, as well as by various professional and 
managerial groups which have given these issues a powerful presence in the international higher educa-
tion policy discourse (Singh, 2010). Figure 6 provides an incomplete overview of international and na-
tional actors who are engaged in policy-setting and direct and indirect governance of higher education 
in Europe.  
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Figure 2: An incomplete overview of national and international actors in the governance of higher education in Europe 
In this section, I will briefly portray these actors without delving too deeply into the various ways in 
which they interact in practice.  
Ministries responsible for higher education 
Ministries responsible for higher education have the responsibility to formulate and implement the 
higher education policies as mandated by their national parliaments and governments. They almost al-
ways play an important role in regulation, oversight and/or funding arrangements, either directly or 
indirectly (e.g. via delegation of powers to buffer institutions such as funding councils or quality assur-
ance agencies.  
Buffer institutions (e.g. quality assurance or funding agencies) 
In accordance with Temple & Billing (2003) intermediary (buffer) institutions are defined as “structures 
formally established, through due process, to carry out a regulatory or allocatory function in relation 
to all institutions of higher education, or a specified class of them, in the country concerned, on behalf 
of the government or the legislature.” In the context of governance of the higher education system, 
Quality Assurance Agencies (QAAs) represent prominent examples of such buffer institutions, provided 
that there are granted some form of legal recognition and their decisions are linked to regulatory or 
financial consequences for the HEIs they review.  
There is a large degree of variation in the way buffer institutions such as quality assurance agencies 
operate: In some countries, they enjoy a high degree of autonomy to define the scope and type of their 
activities, while in others their activities and procedures are specified in great detail by their pertinent 
legislation. Other differences include the focus of quality assurance (on institutions or programs, or 
both), whether or not the QA agency is invested with the power to grant permission for institutions or 
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programs to operate as well as the degree of influence a government reserves (Bischof et al., 2014). 
Other notable buffer institutions are higher education funding councils (HEFC) which are entrusted with 
allocating funding to HEIs. As such, they play a central and powerful role in the regulation of the HE 
sector. Barbara Romzek (2000) proposes a classification these relationships between a government and 
(subsidiary) public agencies into hierarchical, professional, legal, and political according to their degree 
of autonomy and the source of expectations and/or control by the government.  
National and international stakeholder organizations 
In many countries, HEIs, student unions, employers and even QAAs have formed organizations to rep-
resent them and their interests. For HEIs, these organizations are most often known as rectors’ confer-
ences or councils. While usually not having any formal powers, they are often consulted about develop-
ments pertaining to them and make their voice heard to lobby for policies benefiting them.  
In many regions of the world, national stakeholder organizations have founded international umbrella 
organizations to coordinate and represent their interests. In Europe, all the major national stakeholder 
organizations have their correspondence at the European level. Noteworthy examples include the Euro-
pean Universities Association (EUA), the European Students Union (ESU), the European Network of 
Quality Assurance Agencies (ENQA) and the European Association of Institutions in Higher Education 
(EURASHE) representing non-university HEIs. International stakeholder organizations have played an 
important role in developing the “Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in the European 
Higher Education Area (ESG)” (ENQA, 2005a), the “Guidelines of Good Practice in Quality Assur-
ance” (INQAAHE, 2007) and organizing pan-European platforms such as the “European Quality As-
surance Forum” (EQAF).  
National consultative bodies and think tanks 
Many governments maintain national consultative bodies to advise them on their higher education pol-
icies. An example of such an institution is the German Wissenschaftsrat which regularly conducts stud-
ies into aspects of the higher education system and makes policy recommendations.  
Intergovernmental agencies and international organizations 
Intergovernmental agencies which take an interest in the governance of higher education systems in-
clude the European Commission (EC), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World 
Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO). While these actors do not have a formal role in the 
day-to-day “business” of the governance of HE systems, they are influential in shaping regulation and 
policy by formulating recommendations or financing projects (Dill, 2011).  
The European Commission has become an important actor and indeed one of the main driving forces in 
the Bologna Process and in the development of the European QA architecture (Balzer & Rusconi, 2007). 
In spite of not having formal authority in the area of education, the EC became interested in QA already 
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in the early 1990ies because of its potential for driven harmonization and internationalization of the 
various HE systems (Westerheijden, D. F., 2005) and early-on financed a number of pilot projects in 
this area (Management Group, 1995; van Vught, F. A. & Westerheijden, 1993). The EC was first in 
articulating several of the Bologna Process’ action lines, provides financial support for related activities 
and also funded the independent evaluation of the process (Westerheijden, D. F. & et al., 2010b). 
Through its project funding, the EC has been the driving force behind large number of projects. It is 
noteworthy that the stakeholder organizations gain a substantial amount of funding from the European 
Commission, either directly (e.g. in the case of ESU in form of an operating grant) or indirectly via the 
financing of their projects.  
The OECD is focusing on providing studies, comparative measures and raw data on educational perfor-
mance which is creating considerable pressure for reforms on the thus-assessed countries (Martens, 
2007). The World Bank produces policy reports, provides grants and loans for projects as well as tech-
nical support to improve governance structures in higher education (Salmi, J., Hopper, & Bassett, 2009). 
By formulating recommendations, guidelines and standards on quality assurance, UNESCO and the 
WTO have “played the role of global standardizers” for academic quality assurance (King, 2010).  
A particular case of an international organization indirectly influencing the governance of HE systems 
is the European Quality Assurance Register for Higher Education (EQAR), which was created by Eu-
ropean governments to lists quality assurance agencies which have undergone an evaluation to prove to 
substantially comply with the ESG.  
Associations and not-for-profit organizations  
Institutions of civil society include voluntary and professional organizations engaged in academic qual-
ity assurance activities such as the Centre for Higher Education Development (CHE) and the Accredi-
tation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET); or organizational such as the SOROS foundation 
which are privately funded and pursue the civil-society agendas of their founders.  
3.1.2 Governance in higher education  
Governance is a highly contested concept that concerns the exercise of collective control towards com-
mon goals (Middlehurst & Teixeira, 2012). Its particular definitions vary with the disciplinary back-
ground, the object of governance and which of its aspects researchers chose to study. Nevertheless, the 
term governance has become almost ubiquitous in both academic discourse as well as administrative 
practice when discussing how the public sector and other institutions manage themselves, their relation-
ships with the broader society, and how they are steered by actors in the broader society (Peters, 2014). 
Depending on context, the term “governance” is sometimes used interchangeably with “control” (Hood, 
2004, p. 4), “regulation” (Blackmur, 2007; Jackson, 1997) or “steering” (Ferlie, Musselin, & Andresani, 
2009).  
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Mayntz (1998) observes that the term governance is typically used in one of three meanings. In one 
meaning, it relates to a mode of governing, distinct from hierarchical control and characterized by co-
operation of state and non-state actors (different stakeholders3), which are engaged and coordinated in 
network structures of public and private institutions. A second meaning of the term governance is more 
general and encompasses all different modes of coordinating individual actions, or basic forms of social 
order. At the highest level, “governance” refers to the processes of policy-making and agenda-setting. 
In this perspective, as described by Peters (2014), at its core, governance involves firstly a process by 
which goals for society are set, implying that the many individual goals of relevant societal actors are 
made somewhat compatible with one another in this process. Secondly, it contains the process of finding 
and directing the means – money, organizations, people – by which to carry out the selected strategy. In 
a final step, the implementation must be evaluated, formatively and summatively, both for (public) ac-
countability as well as to learn and improve future governance activities.  
The term “governance” in its broadest understanding is thus an analytical perspective interested in the 
forms and mechanisms of the coordination and regulation of collective issues (Benz, Lütz, Schimank, 
& Simonis, 2007)4. A definition which has taken hold in higher education is provided by Eurodyce 
(2008, p. 12) and refers to governance as “the formal and informal exercise of authority under laws, 
policies, and rules that articulate the rights and responsibilities of various actors, including the rules 
by which they interact”. Several studies on the topic have followed this definition (Boer, H. de, Enders, 
& Schimank, 2007; Braun & Merrien, 1999b; File & Stensaker, 2006). Following this conceptualization, 
governance in higher education can be seen as a structure of relationships and authority which results in 
organizational coherence, authorizes policies, plans and decisions, demands accountability (Gallagher, 
2001).  
Lastly, a meaningful distinction can be made regarding the level of the higher education system, with 
internal governance referring to the intra-institutional arrangements within universities, and external 
governance referring to the arrangements prevalent at the system level, comprising all HEIs, the legis-
lative framework, funding mechanisms and the related supervising and steering actors such as quality 
assurance agencies, funding councils, ministries (Boer, H. & File, 2009).  
Two complementary models have had a particularly strong influence on the study of governance of 
higher education systems which were used to study the distribution of authority and power in a higher 
education system (Clark, B. R., 1983) as well as have provided a systematization of the operational and 
normative functions of different level of authority within a HE system (Becher & Kogan, 1992). These 
which will be presented in the nextsection.  
                                                          
3 Stakeholders are individuals, groups, or organizations with an (legitimate) interest in the subject matter 
4 In this perspective, “forms” refers to the structures in which interaction among individuals, organizations, societal 
systems or States takes place, while “mechanisms” describe the processes which emerge as a consequence within 
the framework of these forms Schimank (2002, p. 155). 
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3.1.2.1 Authority and coordination within higher education systems - Burton Clark’s triangle 
of coordination 
In his seminal book “The Higher Education System”, Burton Clark (1983) describes the functioning of 
the higher education system as the interaction and coordination of three forces: 1) The academic oligar-
chy, 2) state authority and 3) the market (see Figure 3). Through the forces, Clark created a model of 
how the relationships between different actors with differing goals, beliefs and power shape the func-
tioning of higher education systems.  
 
 
Figure 3: Clark’s triangle of coordination (1983) 
In Clark’s model, state authority refers to the regulation, direct management and all other efforts by the 
government to steer the actions of actors in the higher education system according to its objectives. The 
coordination mechanism of the State is bureaucratic coordination and political coordination. Political 
coordination of higher education tends to rise and wane, depending on the centrality of the topic at any 
given time. During times when higher education is on the political agenda, there tends to be deeper 
involvement of political decision-makers, and more reporting and evaluation demands on higher educa-
tion. Often, such phases result in new or changed structures of bureaucratic coordination. Bureaucratic 
coordination relies on centralized planning, planned solutions, implementation, and evaluation. It often 
manifests itself in the establishment of additional levels of governance such as via additional councils, 
supervisory boards or agencies. It can also manifest itself in jurisdictional expansion or rule expansion, 
with the state taking on responsibilities for previously unregulated areas or adding regulations to specify 
previously unregulated procedures. Such changes often go hand-in-hand with an enlarged personnel 
base, a professionalization of staff working in state structures and an accompanying separate culture of 
this new profession.  
The academic oligarchy refers to ‘groups of academic super-barons’ and their power to influence deci-
sions within the higher education system. The coordination mechanism of the academic oligarchy is 
professional coordination, which tends to be is strong wherever professional expertise is required. It is 
articulated through the representation of academics in decision bodies where representatives articulate 
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the interests of the academic oligarchy based on collegiality and academic prestige. Increases in profes-
sional coordination often are reflected in the expansion of professional representation, of disciplinary 
associations, or of rectors’ associations in funding councils or policy-making bodies.  
The Market refers to the degree of influence on decisions in higher education which is exerted by con-
siderations of demand and supply. Market forces in higher education can stem from consumer markets, 
where student demand for study programs influences funding or prestige; in labor markets, where “ac-
ademic stars” or other highly qualified staff chose institutions to work at; or institutional markets where 
the prestige of highly-ranked HEIs motivates others to imitate them. Market coordination thus exerts its 
influence through the aggregation of individual choices, creating situations upon which institutional 
leaders, the state and academic oligarchy are forced to react.  
In a more abstract way, the coordination triangle of governance in higher education can be understood 
as the interaction of the professional/collegial authority of the academic profession, market forces and 
governmental or managerial steering. Clark asserts that these three forces always act in concert, with the 
different poles being of different strength at different times and places. Through the interaction of their 
different beliefs, norms, goals and activities, higher education systems in their entirety are coordinated 
(Jongbloed, 2003), resulting in a dynamic equilibrium of forces which shape and provide direction to 
academic work (Clark, B. R., 1983). In this sense, “coordination is in a large sector is not synonymous 
with administrative hierarchy” (Clark, B. R., 1983, p. 8). Indeed, Clark argues that coordination even 
takes place when actors in higher education systems operate entirely autonomously from one another 
and there are no explicit shared goals. Coordination may take the form of explicit policy-setting and 
planning, but can also consist of conflict, competition, or power struggles actors within a system or of 
actors trying to cope with intended and unintended outcomes of their (prior) actions. What is more, all 
three forces are needed for a high-quality HE system: “governments […] must play an active role in 
higher education. They cannot achieve [their] goals solely by relying on the tools at their disposal, that 
is, financial appropriations and government orders, regulation, information and direct provision. They 
also need to rely on professional expertise, non-governmental business and civil society leaders, private 
initiative and market mechanisms. Thus all of the three sources of authority […] are interdependent.” 
(OECD, 2017) 
 
Sources of authority in the governance of higher education systems 
Nevertheless, as Clark (1983) has shown, HE system vary widely on the degree of authority actors 
command on the various levels of the higher education system. Authority is derived from different 
sources. At the level of disciplines, authority is typically based on the individual status of the chair-
holders derived from their scientific and group prestige, on collegial professorial norms, the status and 
function in the academic community as well as on technical competence and specific expertise. At the 
level of the institution, in addition to the individual personal authority, authority may be derived from 
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the position in the institutional bureaucracy (as in the functions of rector, vice-rector, etc.) or in authority 
of trustees or other supervising agents. Lastly, authority at the system-level lies with the political super-
visory agents such as parliament and the government, in bureaucratic overseeing agencies as well as 
with the organized academic oligarchy (often organized in professional organizations).  
 
 
Figure 4: Sources of authority in higher education systems based on Clark (1983) 
National modes of authority distribution 
Undoubtedly, one of the reasons for the strong influence of “Clark’s triangle” on higher education schol-
arship, has been its use as a typology for national modes of authority distribution. The modes represent 
prototypical cases Clark (1983) found in his comparative research in national higher education systems. 
While they certainly need to be taken with a grain of salt, they have influenced a large body of research 
and may serve to appreciate the model’s applicability to new cases.  
Clark (1983) distinguished three traditions of authority distribution. In a “Continental Mode” – Clark 
mentions countries like Italy, France or Germany as examples – powerful chair-holders and state min-
istries dominate the higher education system. In such systems, funding is often distributed directly from 
the State to individual professors or controlled by their representatives in funding councils, while the 
institutional structures and processes are determined by law. The institutional level is weak and often 
largely ceremonial, making the system top- and bottom-heavy, and making professional-collegial and 
state authority the dominant forces in its coordination. The bottom-heavy “British Mode” is character-
ized by a large degree of institutional autonomy, exercised by trustees and university grants committees 
which distribute the funding granted in lump sums to HEIs. This makes the professional-collegial force 
dominant in its coordination. The “American Mode” is characterized by a strong concentration of power 
in the hands of trustees and the institutional administration, almost no control by governments and a 
culture of department collegiality in which there are no chair-holders. As funding needs to be acquired 
more strongly through tuition fees, market coordination plays a stronger role.  
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Continental Mode British Mode American Mode 
• Strong faculty guild and 
State bureaucracy 
• Concentration of power 
among senior professors 
and state ministry 
• Weak institutional level 
• Funding often bypasses 
institutional level 
• Strong guild and trustee 
authority 
• Funding controlled by 
professors in university 
grants committee 
• Little power at govern-
mental level 
• Strong trustees and HEI 
administration 
• Department collegiality 
• Very little control by the 
government 
 
Table 2: Traditions of authority distribution according to Clark (1983) 
Clark points out that strong identities tend to develop where authority is located in the system, resulting 
in stronger institutional identities in the American Mode and stronger faculty or chair identities in the 
Continental Mode. In addition, authority tends to be diffused in bottom-heavy systems, as powerful 
chair-holders and faculties enjoy a larger degree of autonomy.  
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Criticism of Clark’s triangle of coordination 
Clark’s triangle of coordination is considered one of, if not the, most influential models for analysis of 
governance and authority relations in research on post-secondary education and has spawned an impres-
sive amount of follow-up research. It has been used to describe the move from state control to state 
supervision (Gornitzka, A. & Maassen, 2000; van Vught, Frans A., 1989), to characterize the relative 
power of actors in different national systems (Kogan, Bauer, Bleiklie, & Henkel, 2006), and the way 
marketization policy was being implemented in Dutch higher education (Jongbloed, 2003). Clark’s tri-
angle provides researchers with a simple tool to compare different higher education systems according 
to the relative distribution of authority among the state, market forces, and the academic oligarchy. 
Nevertheless, the model has its shortcomings:  
Moving away from one pole of coordination within the model implies moving closer to one or two of 
the other poles. For example, in a situation, in which the market becomes a more dominating force, the 
nature of the model automatically requires that the state or the academic oligarchy lose some of their 
influence. In this sense, the model proposes a “zero-sum” distribution of power between the three poles 
(Jongbloed, 2003), which may not always be accurate. As shown by Jongbloed (2003), the state may 
not only allow market forces to play a greater role, but simultaneously control, encourage and facilitate 
these forces, thus actually exerting quite a central and powerful role. This criticism is related to an ar-
gument brought forward by Pusser (2008), who points out that the market and the academic oligarchy 
always depend on the State which, to a degree, always establishes the boundaries of the game as well as 
being an actor in it.  
Another criticism is that the model cannot account for fluctuating distributions of relative power within 
the triangle. It is a fixed model useful for comparison between systems at any given point in time, but it 
cannot capture evolution, oscillation or change (Maggio, 2011).  
Christine Musselin (2004) pointed out that different levels of the higher education system (e.g. the uni-
versity, the department, the individual researcher) can be – and typically are – governed by different 
coordinating principles at the same time, which would result in different triangles for each level. Later 
approaches (Dobbins, Knill, & Vögtle, 2011) try to take this into account by differentiating between 
aspects of university governance.  
3.1.2.2 Processes and Structures in the governance of Higher Education systems 
In their seminal book, Becher & Kogan (1992) propose a synoptic model of higher education govern-
ance, taking into accounts levels (individual, basic unit, institution, central authority), Modes (opera-
tional & normative modes, internal & external) and actors in the system (individual academics; heads 
of depts. or schools / institutes; universities (HEIs), national ministers & ministry of education). Ac-
cording to the authors, on each level, actors simultaneously operate in a normative mode – related to the 
monitoring and maintenance of values – and an operative mode, which refers to the carrying out of their 
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day-to-day tasks. Each mode is further differentiated in an internal and an external aspect, which relate 
to dealing with norms and operations from inside and outside of the higher education system, respec-
tively. The following table summarizes their description dimensions of higher education systems:  
Level of authority Operational functions Normative func-
tions 
1. Central authority – National government, 
State (regional) government and other authori-
ties in charge of overall planning, resource allo-
cation & monitoring standards 
Optimization of re-
source use, sponsorship 
of developments 
Overseeing and 
maintaining stand-
ards of quality, rele-
vance and effective-
ness 
2. Institution – HEI, school, faculty as defined 
by law (instruments of governance) and by con-
vention (through its various decision-making 
bodies) 
Internal maintenance of 
institution; forward 
planning; policy imple-
mentation 
Maintaining aca-
demic regulations 
3. Basic unit – institute, school of study, course 
teams, departments with academic responsibil-
ity for identifiable courses; own operating 
budgets; influence on recruitment of colleagues 
and often students 
Student provision; cur-
riculum design and re-
search 
Maintain peer group 
norms and values 
4. individuals – teaching and research staff, ad-
ministrators, ancillary workers, students) 
Performance of teach-
ing/research/service 
roles 
Realizing role ex-
pectations and per-
sonal goals 
Table 3: Levels and functions of higher education systems according to Becher & Kogan (1992) 
The actors on different levels of the system, of course, interact with one another. Higher level actors 
continuously monitor and judge and influence the performance and outcomes of lower levels, negoti-
ate tasks and allocate funds (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: The synaptic model of higher education systems, from Becher & Kogan (1992, p. 18) 
The model allows for the comparative description of changing relationships between the levels in terms 
of evaluative judgements (in the normative mode), in terms of the powers to allocate funding, study 
program offer, or tasks (in the operative mode), and in terms of the professional, social, economic, and 
cultural norms guiding these aspects.  
Becher & Kogan concede that the model may oversimplify the heterogeneity found in higher education 
systems worldwide. The level of central authority may consist of a number of different governing au-
thorities, boards of trustees or agencies acting in concert to fulfill the functions described in the model. 
Likewise, they concede, that there may – possibly even as a rule – more relationships than those between 
neighboring levels: central authorities may regulate in detail aspects of basic units and even individuals, 
just to name one example.  
Lastly, Becher & Kogan stress the importance of the wider societal context for the values and norms 
within the higher education system. A society which highly values its HEIs and academics – because 
they are perceived as match societal needs and preferences – will instill greater self-esteem and self-
confidence in institutions, basic units and individuals, as will the comparability of salary scales to those 
of professionals outside of higher education (Becher & Kogan, 1992, p. 21).  
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3.1.3 Summary: Making sense of higher education governance 
Burton Clark and many others analyze higher education governance in terms of the relative dominance 
of the coordination mechanisms of the State/Hierarchy, the Market and the Academic Oligarchy. Clark 
pointed out that higher education systems are characterized by different distributions of power between 
actor groups. Becher & Kogan propose to analyze the governance of higher education by levels of au-
thority and the respective power on each level in terms of evaluative judgements (“normative mode”), 
in terms of the powers to allocate funding, study program offer, or work tasks (“operative mode”), and 
in terms of the professional, social, economic, and cultural norms guiding these aspects. Both approaches 
are not mutually exclusive but represent different levels of aggregation: Without analyzing the details 
of distribution of authority at various levels of the higher education system, it is hardly possible to iden-
tify among which actor power is concentrated. Most researchers also maintain that the higher education 
sector must therefore always be governed in some form of network-like governance structure, as, in the 
case of HE, “we are not dealing with a hierarchical system, where change can be decreed from above 
but rather with a negotiable one in which individuals, basic units and institutions regard themselves as 
having the right to decide what is best for them” (Becher & Kogan, 1992; Witte, 2006). The combination 
of both models and angles of analysis makes is clear that higher education systems contain multiple 
levels, involve a large number of different stakeholders and can therefore most adequately characterized 
as systems of multi-level and multi-actor governance (Witte, 2006, p. 28).  
In order to make statements about convergence or divergence, a framework of analysis needs to be 
defined that is both specific enough to make substantial statements as well as feasible to work with. The 
next chapter will describe trends in the governance of governance of higher education systems and will 
work out the dimensions of change which can adequately describe the changes taken place in post-Soviet 
countries.  
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3.2 The changing governance of higher education systems 
After having discussed the concept of governance of higher education systems, in the previous chapter, 
I will now turn to the trends and forces shaping changes in the governance of higher education systems. 
In the first sub-chapter, I will begin by reviewing global trends and forces which have been identified 
in the literature as shaping higher education systems around the world and will develop describe ele-
ments of the “global model” of higher education governance. In the second sub-chapter, I will review 
European Integration, the Bologna Process, and their promotion of quality assurance as a regional force 
exerting influence on the post-Soviet Bologna signatory countries.  
3.2.1 Conceptualizing forces of change in the governance of higher education sys-
tems: The ‘Glonacal’ agency heuristic 
With few exceptions, a shortcoming of most studies on policy change is that they fail to reconstruct how 
the changes comes about, which interest groups and the political entrepreneurs bring it to the agenda 
and lobby for it, how problems are identified, are framed as such, how solutions are developed, and 
which narratives are used in their justification (Witte, 2006). “In brief, [studies on policy change in 
higher education] rarely address the wider political economy of HE ‘reforming’” (Ferlie et al., 2009, 
p. 6). This is particularly true in the case of cross-national transfer of ideas. The present study intends to 
analyze the impact of global influences (particularly the Global Model of HE governance and the Bolo-
gna Process) on the development of governance structures in national HE systems in post-Soviet coun-
tries. Since national HE systems usually have a high degree of basic diversity (Meek, V. Lynn, 1996), 
various patterns of convergence can be expected, regardless of how strong the efforts of government are 
to impose systems and regulations (Clark, B. R., 1996). This is why information about path dependen-
cies (such as different types of HE, former governance systems, earlier reforms, the macrosystem) as 
well as a model of the forces driving and resisting change needs to be taken into account for the devel-
opment of the analytical framework.  
In one of the most highly cited articles in the field of higher education research, Marginson and Rhoades 
(2002) criticized that most comparative research on higher education systems focusses on nation-states, 
national markets, and national systems of higher education without appropriately theorizing the effect 
of global forces on national systems. In an ever-closer connected world, the authors argue, national 
developments cannot be studied in isolation. Global economic, cultural, and educational forces act on 
governments and HEIs. Likewise, the political, economic, and educational contours of countries, regions 
and continents are being reshaped by regional trading blocs such as the EU which are driving higher 
education systems to become more similar across national boundaries. National or even local actors, in 
turn, can and do also become actors influencing the global, national and local field. Nation states and 
movements within them to preserve and promote local cultural identity and practices can resist the iso-
morphic pressures and develop their own attraction for others. Higher education is thus shaped by three 
  
page 34 
dimensions simultaneously: the global, the national and the local (thus the term glonacal = global + 
national + local). In order to better understand the complex synchronous communications and networked 
social relations taking place in an open information environment characterized by intensifying cross-
border flow, they propose a “glonacal agency” paradigm to study agency on the global, regional, na-
tional, and local levels, with the purpose to trace the complex reciprocal interactions of actors across 
levels and domains.  
Under the term “agency,”, the authors understand any polities, entities or organizations, at any level, 
which are able to individually or collectively take action. This includes international organizations such 
as the World Bank with a global sphere of activity, regional entities such as the European Union, national 
entities such as Ministries of Education or national legislatures, as well as local entities such as univer-
sities or other organizations. They also point out that organizations at any level – global, national, and 
local – can shape international, national or local policy and practice: The European Universities Asso-
ciation (EUA) which lobbies the both the European Union as well as national governments and also 
conducts projects with individual universities. National groups such as rectors’ unions or business asso-
ciations and sometimes even local bodies such as university senates can endeavor to collectively shape 
policies and practices. The authors stress that no group or any level unilaterally determines other levels. 
Their interaction is rather characterized by the myriad of intersections, interactions, and mutual deter-
minations on and between the different levels.  
Naturally, agencies differ vastly on many dimensions. Their activities and influence have different ge-
ographical and functional scopes (spheres). They are marked by differences in the degree of reciprocity 
of influence they exert on others, the relative strength of influences (how direct or indirect the influence 
is and how many resources are available to exert the influence), and the historical embeddedness of the 
structures on they are exerting influence (Layers and conditions).  
As one example the authors provide, the World Bank has a global scope of activities (sphere). It is 
actively influencing national policies about access and tuition via its structural adjustment policies, it 
performance-based measures, institutional independence, managerial flexibility and market-like behav-
ior of HEIs. The strength of its influence, especially over the developing world, is related to its reputation 
and its ability to issue grants and loans (strength of influence). This influence is considerably less vis-à-
vis richer OECD countries. It exerts its influence mostly on the national level in which it engages with 
governments and policy-makers. The success of its policy recommendations depends not in small part 
on the degree to which the necessary preconditions exist (e.g. sufficient private wealth for cost sharing 
of higher education financing or managerial skills and capacity for greater university autonomy) and the 
degree to which they are compatible with the local culture and traditions (e.g. small peripheral higher 
education systems are more likely to take up recommendations than large ones with their own pro-
nounced traditions (Layers and conditions). Looking at the opposite direction of influence, the policies 
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of the World Bank are much less likely to be significantly influenced by economically little-developed, 
politically weak countries as they are by powerful and prestigious nation states and agencies.  
Within the glonacal framework of analysis in mind, I next provide an overview of global and regional 
(e.g. European) trends that can reasonably be expected to exert influence on the development of gov-
ernance arrangements within post-Soviet countries (as they have in other contexts). It is important to 
stress, however, the limits in explanatory power of such an approach: Firstly, it is only with considerable 
difficulty that influences, driving forces and factors stabilizing the status quo can be clearly discerned 
in any historical processes. The results of any attempt to do so will thus inevitably be limited by an 
observer’s subjective perspective, the necessarily incomplete information he draws his conclusions on, 
and inevitable subjectivity of this data itself. Accepting the ultimate futility of the endeavor, it may 
nevertheless be illuminating to try to discern the factors which have led to the different developments 
in the three studies studied in this dissertation, if only as a device to create new questions for future 
research to investigate more in-depth.  
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3.2.2 Global trends and the emergence of a “global model” of higher education gov-
ernance 
As the OECD observes, rising global competition, the advent and spread of information technology, the 
increased sophistication and knowledge-dependency of developed economies, ever-increasing demand 
for access and the impact of mass participation in the face of limited public budgets have increased the 
demand for broader, more efficient and more effective higher education worldwide (OECD, 2010, 
p. 18). In this chapter I will outline these changes which have contributed to the emergence of a “global 
model” of higher education governance.  
3.2.2.1 Massification of higher education  
A major factor for the changing governance of higher education systems is the growing world-wide 
demand for higher education (Dill, 2010; Trow, 2007). Higher Education is increasingly seen as crucial 
to economical and civil development worldwide (World Bank, 2002, p. 7). With increasing globaliza-
tion, knowledge seems to have become the core of a country’s competitive advantage, much more so 
than natural resources or cheap labor (Porter, 1998). This has led to a strong demand for increased access 
to higher education which, in turn, has led to an unprecedented expansion and massification of higher 
education systems at a scale never seen before. Within a generation, higher education systems were 
transformed from being the preserve of a small elite group to serving large strata of the population. This 
massification of higher education access had a number of impacts on individual HEIs and as well as 
higher education systems in their entirety.  
In many countries, the initial response to the increasing need for a highly qualified work force has been 
the creation of new HEIs to cater to the growing number of students as well as greatly expanding the 
number of students admitted into existing HEIs. In addition, in many countries, new forms of HEIs such 
as Fachhochschulen, Hogeschoolen, open universities and polytechnics were formed to serve students 
with increasingly diverse backgrounds and career motivations. The numbers reflect these changes: Out 
of the 1,854 universities founded between 1200 and 1985, three quarters were established since 1900, 
with 1,101 (59%) having been founded between 1950 and 1985 (Ramirez & Riddle, 1991; Scott, 1998). 
Student participation in HE virtually exploded, both in gross numbers as well as in the percentage of the 
overall population (see Figure 6).  
  
page 37 
 
Figure 6: Gross enrollment of students in tertiary education by region, in millions, UNESCO 2014 
3.2.2.2 Marketization in Higher Education 
The growing demand for higher education led to an increasing strain on governmental and public sector 
budgets, from which the majority of institutions were founded. Starting in the 1980s in the UK and the 
US, a shift away from state funding, regulation and oversight towards to using the market as a means of 
ensuring public purposes took place (Newman, Couturier, & Scurry, 2010, p. 32). In line with the 
“Washington Consensus”5, the neo-liberal pattern was to reduce state subsidization of higher education, 
shift costs to “the market” and consumers, and demand greater accountability for performance (Neave, 
G. R. & van Vught, 1991). This manifested itself in a shift of costs to consumers, organizational reforms, 
enhanced institutional autonomy, a new forms of accountability and quality assurance for HEIs.  
Shift of costs to consumers  
A key argument brought forward by proponents of these reforms, such as the World Bank, UNESCO, 
and the OECD, was that higher education is a semi-public rather than a purely public good and that the 
sources of HE funding should be diversified accordingly (Heyneman, 1994; Johnstone, D. Bruce, Arora, 
& Experton, 1998; OECD, 1990; Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 2002; Salmi, J., 2002; World Bank, 1995). 
This justified both (higher) tuition fees, the rise of private providers of HE as well as new demands for 
accountability of public expenditure on education. Since the 1990ies, the number of private HEIs has 
risen all over the world, while the number of public HEIs has remained constant (UNESCO, 2004). A 
particularly extreme case is the growth of private, for-profit HEIs in the Former Soviet Union (FSU), 
                                                          
5 The term “Washington consensus” was first coined in 1989 by English economist John Williamson to describe 
a set of 10 economic policy prescriptions considered as the "standard" reform package for developing countries in 
economic crisis, which was promoted by Washington, D.C.–based institutions such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the US Treasury Department.  
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which will be discussed in the chapters discussing the country cases. Marketization has also led to a 
realignment of different types of HEIs. While in most countries, traditionally, private institutions would 
be funded mostly from private sources while public institutions would receive their full funding from 
public sources, this division is being blurred. On the one hand private HEIs increasingly receive public 
subsidies (either indirectly such as through the US Federal Direct Loan Program, or directly through 
subsidies to HEIs) and on the other hand, public HEIs are encouraged to generate revenue via tuition 
fees, capitalization of patents, donations, or research and consulting services (Newman et al., 2010, 
p. 107). Rather than distinguishing private and public institutions, in the future, it may be more mean-
ingful to discern between for-profit and not-for-profit HEIs (UNESCO, 2004).  
Autonomy, accountability, and quality assurance 
In a now-seminal paper in higher education research, Guy Neave (1988) coined the phrase of the “eval-
uative state” which describes how governments were shifting from monitoring inputs of higher educa-
tion towards a posteriori analysis of their performance, usually justified by considerations of efficiency 
and effectiveness in the context of mass higher education (Dill, 2007). In summary, there has been a 
“autonomy-accountability trade-off” (Newman et al., 2010, p. 104) by which public HEIs received 
greater internal and organizational autonomy, while governments simultaneously increased the demands 
of external accountability – giving more leeway to HEIs to organize their own operations while at the 
same time increasing the expectation to deliver value for money (Huisman & Kaiser, 2002). At the same 
time, in many countries, restrictions on the market entry of private providers of HE were loosened. A 
“market-like” situation with more autonomous State-funded HEIs and new private providers of HE, 
however, requires fair and objective systems of accountability and external quality assurance. As Har-
man (1998) points out:  
“[…] quality assurance becomes of great importance in countries where, as a result of in-
creased government emphasis on competition, markets and encouragement of private providers, 
there are community concerns about the possibility of quality being sacrificed in the search for 
profits.” (Harman, 1998, p. 347).  
The existence of quality assurance procedures protecting “consumers” thus gains in importance in sys-
tems in which the government retreats from exercising direct control and ceases to be a service provider6. 
External system of quality assurance are a logical consequence of governments as the main “steering” 
agents of the HE system, with universities doing the “rowing”. While quality assurance may not be a 
new idea in higher education, in OECD-countries there was a desire among political stakeholders and 
organizational theorists for a more systematic approach of addressing it within HEIs. Increasingly, 
                                                          
6 To do so, and to create a functioning “market” of higher education, government need to align the regulatory 
environment OECD (2010, p. 22). Regulations may, among other things, affect relevant area such as planning and 
policy leadership; structure and governance of HEIs; financing, state resource allocation and subsidies as well as 
other incentives (monetary and non-monetary); transparency and information requirements (e.g. communication 
and reporting).  
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greater emphasis was being put on external scrutiny by relevant stakeholders such as government, em-
ployers and graduates as well as a greater demand for transparency about quality (Harman, 1998). In 
Europe, another major factor for this development was the creation of the European Higher Education 
Area through the so-called “Bologna Process”, which will be covered in the following section (see chap-
ter 3.2.2.6).  
3.2.2.3 Internationalization and globalization  
Since the days of the first universities in Europe, HEIs were international enterprises. Students and pro-
fessors have always traveled across borders to learn and teach at the best universities. So, too, have 
models of universities traveled across borders, as forms of religious education or to train a country’s 
elites. Colonial empires spread their institutions, and successful universities were emulated elsewhere. 
Just as the University of Berlin became a point of orientation for US research universities and universi-
ties in Central and Eastern Europe in the 19th century7, the American research universities of the 20th 
and 21th century become models for universities worldwide in the current age.  
While the flow of ideas across borders has always shaped higher education systems elsewhere and “glob-
alization” is therefore far from a new phenomenon, the fall of socialism, the formation of political blocks 
such as the EU, and not least the rise in international trade made possible by the internet, have clearly 
accelerated this process and increased its scope. Globalization has promoted the free flow of goods, 
services, ideas, and people. Students with qualifications from other higher education systems move 
across borders to continue their studies. As they do, international recognition of the qualifications 
granted by their home country’s higher education institutions gains in importance (Dill, 2010).  
Internationalization and globalization of higher education are changing the landscape of formerly purely 
national HE systems worldwide (Huisman & Kaiser, 2002). The rapidly growing demand for higher 
education has provided incentives for new HE providers. The number of new private universities, for-
eign universities opening branch campuses, or granting licenses to private companies to award univer-
sity degrees through franchising or validation agreements are on the rise (Brandenburg et al., 2013). 
These new “players” in the market of higher education are posing novel challenges to national systems 
of external quality assurance and have prompted action (Campbell, C. & van der Wende, 2001; Dill, 
2010). The challenges of globalization and its impact on higher education are clearly visible in the debate 
on whether (higher) education is to be regarded as a common good or a service in the context of the 
General Agreement on Trades and Services (GATS) (Altbach, 2001) or, more recently, in the inclusion 
of for-profit cross-border higher education in the service directive of the European Union (Bischof, 
                                                          
7 although very different aspects of the original model were emulated in different systems 
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2014). An inclusion of HE in any of these agreements has far-reaching consequences for higher educa-
tion systems in the years to come, especially for those HE systems in which a central public authority 
has so far played the main role in their governance.  
Improvements in information and communication technology developments are further speeding up in-
ternationalization and globalization processes (Huisman & Kaiser, 2002) and are changing the face of 
HE itself. New modes of delivery such as teaching online are threatening traditional universities (Gib-
bons, 1998). Due to the spread of technology, knowledge is no longer confined to “brick-and-mortar” 
universities or other traditional places of formal education. Instead, new formats of formal education 
appear, among them online universities, for-profit colleges, open universities, franchised degree pro-
grams, offshore branch campuses or Massively Open Online Courses (MOOCs). These developments 
are changing the face of previously more homogeneous cultural and normative expectations about what 
constitutes higher education and force law-makers to develop a legal and policy framework to deal with 
these new developments.  
In summary, growing public demand for HE, more diversified and faster-changing labor markets, rising 
costs, and a growing number of competing providers of HE have created a more competitive and faster-
changing environment for HEIs. In the eyes of many regulators, the traditional practices in the govern-
ance of higher education systems are in need of an overhaul . In many countries around the world, this 
overhaul drew upon the ideas of New Public Management (NPM).  
3.2.2.4 The Spread of New Public Management 
Over the course of the 1980s, a number of OECD countries implemented a series of reforms in public 
sector governance which have been summarized under the umbrella lable “New Public Management” 
(NPM). The tenets of NPM have been strongly influenced by the perspective of new institutional eco-
nomics: Concepts such as transaction costs, principal-agent relationships, surrounding uncertainty, ad-
verse selection, and moral hazard are drawn upon to argue for greater operational autonomy, transpar-
ency and accountability in the provision of public services. Christopher Hood (1991) traces the devel-
opment of NPM to the following four megatrends:  
a) attempts to slow down or reverse government growth in terms of overt public spending and 
staffing  
b) a shift toward privatization and quasi-privatization and away from core government institutions, 
with renewed emphasis on 'subsidiarity' in service provision  
c) the development of automation, particularly in information technology, in the production and 
distribution of public services; and  
d) the development of a more international agenda, increasingly focused on general issues of pub-
lic management, poky design, decision styles and intergovernmental cooperation, on top of the 
older tradition of individual country specialisms in public administration. 
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Hood (1991) identifies the seven doctrinal components of new public management as follows:  
No.  Doctrine Meaning Typical justification 
1 ‘hands-on professional man-
agement’ in the public sector 
Active, visible, discretionary 
control of organizations from 
named persons at the top, 
‘free to manage’ 
Accountability requires clear 
assignment of responsibility 
for action, not diffusion of 
power 
2 Explicit standards and 
measures of performance 
Definition of goals, targets, 
indicators of success, prefera-
bly expressed in quantitative 
terms, especially for profes-
sional services  
Accountability requires clear 
statement of goals; efficiency 
requires ‘hard look’ at objec-
tives 
3 Greater emphasis on output 
controls 
Resource allocation and re-
wards linked to measured 
performance; breakup of cen-
tralized 
bureaucracy-wide personnel 
management 
Need to stress results rather 
than procedures 
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4 Shift to disaggregation of 
units in the public sector 
Break-up of formerly ‘mono-
lithic’ units, unbundling of 
uniform management systems 
into corporatized units around 
products, operating on decen-
tralized ’one-line’ budgets 
and dealing with one another 
on an ‘arms-length’ basis 
Need to create ‘manageable’ 
units, separate provision and 
production interests, gain ef-
ficiency advantages of use of 
contract and franchise ar-
rangements inside as well as 
outside the public sector 
5 Shift to greater competition in 
public sector 
Move to term contracts and 
public tendering procedures 
Rivalry as the key to lower 
costs and better standards 
6 Stress on private-sector styles 
of management practice 
Move away from military-
style ‘public service ethic’, 
greater flexibility in hiring 
and rewards; greater use of 
PR techniques 
Need to use ‘proven’ private 
sector management tools in 
the public sector 
7 Stress on greater discipline 
and parsimony in resource 
use 
Cutting direct costs, raising 
labor discipline, resisting un-
ion demands, limiting ‘com-
pliance costs’ to business 
Need to check resource de-
mands of public sector and 
‘do more with less’ 
Table 4: Doctrinal components of new public management (Hood, 1991) 
The spread of New Public Management in higher education 
Starting in the UK in the late 1980ies, traditional governance structures in HEIs began to be reformed 
in the spirit of NPM in Western Europe (Leišytė, Boer, & Enders, 2006). The Jarratt report8 prepared by 
the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (CVCP, 1985) called for a greater responsiveness of 
UK HEIs to the market, a professionalization of the university leadership, the introduction of managerial 
techniques in HEI administration, the introduction of unit costs and efficiency measures of resource 
utilization as well as an evaluations of university performance using qualitative and quantitative perfor-
mance indicators. In the US, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 allowed universities to patent and commercial-
ize the results of publicly funded research (Newman et al., 2010, p. 61).  
The formal justification for the adoption of NPM in HE of this model was twofold. On the one hand, the 
pressures of the global context of higher education and above all the much greater scale of higher edu-
cation systems (see chapter 3.2.2) was argued to make an increase in effectiveness and efficiency im-
                                                          
8 Named, after its chairman, Sir Alex Jarratt 
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perative for HE systems for reasons of cost alone. On the other hand, collegial, disciplinary and demo-
cratic organization and individual autonomy, were increasingly perceived by proponents of NPM as ill-
suited for the task of timely reaching informed decisions and good performance (Olsen, 2007). Indeed, 
they are increasingly seen by policy-makers as hindrances to an effective management of higher educa-
tion following similar argumentations to the pointed criticism by Sir Eric Ashby, former master of Clare 
College, Cambridge, of his professoral colleagues:  
“All over the country, these groups of scholars, who would not make a decision about the shape 
of a leaf or the derivation of a word or the author of a manuscript without painstakingly assem-
bling the evidence, make decisions about admission policy, size of universities, staff-student 
ratios, content of courses, and similar issues, based on dubious assumptions, scrappy data, and 
mere hunch” (Ashby, 1963, p. 93) 
By the 1990ies, all Western European countries were implementing reforms aiming at transforming 
HEIs into more “complete organizations” (Hüther & Krücken, 2007, p. 28). All over the Anglo-Saxon 
world and Europe, these reforms shared a number of features: A shift of power to the level of HE lead-
ership (often framed as increased “university autonomy”9) was hoped to make possible a more effective, 
goal-oriented management. External oversight by governing boards with representatives of external 
stakeholders was intended better align the goals and priorities of HEI leadership to the needs of univer-
sities’ external stakeholders. External accreditation and new oversight mechanisms were introduced to 
assess and evaluate university performance (Brennan & Shah, 2000). University administrations’ free-
dom to appoint, evaluate, reimburse and dismiss academic staff was enlarged with the hope to bring a 
greater degree of competition to bear on the behavior of academics, increase staffing flexibility and to 
“incentivize” academics to increase their productivity, and the quality or relevance of their work. New 
funding arrangements such as lump-sum budgets, and greater discretion over spending was intended to 
make HEIs more agile. The introduction of tuition fees, the possibility to capitalize on patents and was 
supposed to make HEIs more responsive to market-demands and more entrepreneurial in finding and 
attracting income from non-state sources. Governments reduced the prescription for administrative pro-
cesses and direct intervention in HEI activities. Instead, HEIs were obligated to formulate institutional 
missions. Goals for HEIs were agreed-upon in performance contracts (often tied to funding).  
A number of larger-scale comparative studies within Western European countries confirms this trend:  
Kogan et al. (2006) studied the changing role of the state in higher education governance in the United 
Kingdom, Sweden, and Norway. The study by Kehm and Lanzendorf (2006b) compares four European 
countries on the degree of changes in five major components of university governance (state regulation, 
stakeholder guidance, academic self-governance, managerial self-governance and competition for re-
sources). The book “University Governance: Western European Comparative Perspectives” (Paradeise, 
                                                          
9 At the expense of autonomy of individual units such as professors, faculties, departments or chairs. 
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2009) compares developments in the governance of higher education systems in seven Western Euro-
pean countries. All of these studies point out how there is a clear trend towards greater managerialism, 
through developments such as the promotion of strategic planning in terms of 3-4 year plans and uni-
versity missions, increasing formal and actual autonomy of universities in defining their internal gov-
ernance structures, increased authority of HEI presidents or rectors, an appointment of rectors and pres-
idents by boards rather than election, the introduction of management instruments which enhance the 
role of senior management, greater jurisdiction of HEIs over their own resources, over human resources, 
over real estate and over equipment, a diversification of funding via tuition fees, funding from enter-
prises, regional authorities, more competitive distribution of funding, decrease of itemized budgets and 
introduction of global budgets and more cost accounting and internal audit systems, and a decrease in 
civil servants in universities, with an increasing number of temporary positions. However, while observ-
ing a general trend across countries, the authors also point out that each national case bears its own 
particularities and path dependencies, sometimes leading to contradictory development patterns.  
3.2.2.5 The changing relationship of higher education, the market and the state 
Scholars have tried to conceptualize higher education governance and its changes from many different 
vectors. At the level of higher education systems, the most frequent starting point has been to investigate 
the locus and balance of power on Clark’s (1983) ‘triangle of coordination‘ between the State, the Mar-
ket and the Academic Oligarchy. Building on his work, various studies have explored the changing 
relationship between state and HEIs (Gornitzka, Å., 1999; Kogan & Hanney, 2000; Salter & Tapper, 
2013) and have proposed different labels for the changing relationships such as Van Vught (1989) and 
Goedegebuure et al. (1993) who observed a shift from a ‘state control’ vs. a ‘state supervising’ model. 
Other scholars have explored how the state itself has created more market-like conditions for higher 
education systems and how it retreats from its direct role in the management of higher education, but 
still is ‘steering from a distance’ (Marginson, 1997; Meek, V. Lynn, Goedegebuure, Kivinen, & Rinne, 
1996) by setting incentives and standards for relatively autonomous HEIs. In the same line of research, 
authors such as Neave (1998) and De Boer et al. (2007) demonstrated a shift in state influence from ex-
ante to ex-post control, with the state focusing on outputs and performance indicators rather than on 
managing inputs.  
Other scholars have studied the changes of authority and power taking place within HEIs, such as Sporn 
(1999) who argues that governance has become more shared, with a greater involvement of external 
stakeholders in setting goals and delivering accountability. Others have stressed how, as HEIs have 
adopted models of corporate governance and strategic management, professional authority vis-à-vis 
managerial authority in HEIs is declining (Currie & Newson, 1998; Marginson & Considine, 2000; 
Rhoades, 1998) Braun and Merrien (1999a) and Braun (2001) highlighted how New Managerialism is 
being adopted as the main model for steering HE systems in many OECD countries.  
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In one of the most influential papers on the changing governance of higher education, Gornitzka and 
Maassen (2000) analyzed changes in governance and steering approaches in higher education in the 
1980s and 1990s in eight European countries. Building on a more generic framework by Olsen (1988), 
they proposed a typology of state steering approaches in higher education (sovereign rationality-
bounded steering, institutional steering, corporate-pluralist steering and supermarket steering models) 
which they used to study changes in public administration and governance. Ferlie, Musselin & An-
dresani (2009) delineate three typical conceptions of state intervention in HE as which can be summa-
rized as state protection of HEI autonomy, state interventionism to serve the public good and the state 
utilizing market forces. Each of these types of steering has as their point of departure a specific under-
standing of the nature, the role and the function of higher education, as well as the role of the state. 
Using the work by Gornitzka and Maassen (2000) as a structuring principle, I have summarized these 
different steering paradigms and their justification:  
Role of State Role of HE Type of Steering Justification 
1. The sovereign state: 
mediates interests of 
society and HEI and 
orients the develop-
ment of HE; drives, 
commands and con-
trols activities of HEI 
higher education is seen 
as a governmental in-
strument for reaching 
political, economic or 
social goals. 
Tight control 
over universities 
and colleges, 
with a strong em-
phasis on them 
being accounta-
ble to political 
authorities 
The HE system is vulner-
able to producer capture 
(Paradeise, 2009). The 
government needs to 
counteract this and 
champion powerless con-
sumers. HE is no differ-
ent than any other public 
service (health care of 
justice).  
The role of knowledge 
becomes more important 
in the knowledge-based 
society. The state invests 
more and is entitled to 
know that the investment 
is well-spent. 
2. The institutional 
state: should protect 
the autonomy of HEIs 
and their academic 
freedom 
HE is a separate sphere 
of society. Its own aca-
demic values and tradi-
tions allow it best to 
store and transmit 
knowledge, secure future 
Institutional self-
governance, col-
legial 
Only academics as pro-
ducers, owners, and us-
ers of academic 
knowledge know can 
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independent pursuit and 
transfer of knowledge, 
and act as a carrier of 
culture 
judge quality and reason-
able costs which laymen 
cannot possibly judge.  
3. The corporate-plu-
ralist state: should or-
ganize the articulation 
of stakeholder interests  
Different stakeholders 
with different legitimate 
interest formulate HE 
mission 
Via the articula-
tion of interests 
by different orga-
nized interest 
groups in a cor-
porate network of 
public boards, 
councils and 
commissions. 
Only the interaction of 
different legitimate stake-
holder interests may lead 
to adequate goals and 
oversight in a complex 
field.  
4. classical liberal 
state (state supermar-
ket model): The State 
should stimulate the 
strength of market 
forces (encourage stu-
dents to behave like 
consumers to spur 
competition and qual-
ity) and detect, prevent 
or repair market fail-
ures 
Deliver services such as 
teaching and research 
for which there is a de-
mand  
Minimal.  
State only needs 
to make sure that 
market mecha-
nisms in higher 
education run 
smoothly 
Services such as teaching 
and research are com-
modities, rather than 
public goods.  
The market is the most ef-
ficient coordinating 
mechanism.  
Table 5: State steering paradigms in higher education based on Gornitzka and Maassen (2000)  
Gornitzka and Maassen (2000, 283) identify a ‘general move towards the supermarket steering model’, 
but stress that most real cases are best characterized as hybrids between several models. 
3.2.2.6 European integration, the Bologna Process, and the governance of higher education 
systems 
Regional forces have also influenced the development of governance models. At the European level, at 
least three political agendas have shaped the development of governance of higher education. These 
include the European Union’s (EU) growth and innovation strategies (formerly the Lisbon Strategy), 
which seek to capitalize on HE and research to strengthen knowledge economies, the ‘Modernization 
Agenda’ of the European Commission (EC) through which it promoted the use of New Public Manage-
ment (NPM)-inspired tools for the modernization of HEIs and thirdly, the ‘Bologna Process’, a series 
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of intergovernmental ministerial meetings and agreements aiming at creating a single European Higher 
Education Area (EHEA). While the first two concern only EU Member States (which the countries I am 
studying are not), the Bologna Process has had a strong impact especially on the quality assurance in 
post-Soviet countries.  
Indeed, the Bologna Process (BP) has established itself as the central platform for the integration of 
European HE systems (Knill, Vögtle, & Dobbins, 2013, p. 17). Since the signing of the Bologna Decla-
ration in 1999, 48 countries have joined the Bologna Process and are therefore considered to be part of 
the EHEA (see Figure 7).  
 
 
Figure 7: Member countries of the European Higher Education Area as of 2017 
The Bologna Process includes strategic objectives (the establishment of a European area of higher edu-
cation and the promotion of the European system of higher education world-wide) and operational ob-
jectives (Westerheijden, D. F. & et al., 2010b). The latter are formulated as nine “action lines” designed 
to increase the competitiveness and attractiveness of Higher Education in Europe: 
1. Establish a three-cycle system of higher education within a qualifications framework 
2. promote mobility 
3. develop quality assurance  
4. increase employability 
5. develop the European Higher Education Area in a global context 
6. promote joint degrees 
7. develop the recognition of qualifications 
8. promote the social dimension of higher education 
9. promote lifelong learning 
 
It is interesting to note that the Bologna Process never declared the uniformity of national policies as its 
goal. The ministerial communiqués are not legally binding. Instead, the process follows the open method 
of coordination (Ruiter, 2010) and uses the voluntary identification of common goals and benchmarks 
as well as of instruments to reach them. Once identified, however, regular stocktaking exercises lead to 
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“naming, blaming, and shaming” which can create considerable pressure to produce progress (Enders, 
J. & Westerheijden, 2014).  
The Bologna process is moved along by biannual conferences as transnational platforms in which Min-
isters responsible for higher education meet to discuss progress and next priorities. Between these meet-
ings, national delegations and stakeholder groups come together in “Follow-Up-groups” to develop 
strategies to realize the objectives of the Bologna Process. Several European non-state actors are also 
engaged in the Bologna Process. These include the European Commission, which in 2001 became a full 
member of the process, as well as the Council of Europe, and a number of umbrella organizations of 
universities (EUA), students (ESU), non-university HEIs (EURASHE), quality assurance agencies 
(ENQA), UNESCO, Education International, and BUSINESSEUROPE, as well as others try to influ-
ence the process by making policy recommendations themselves.  
The role and relevance of the Bologna Process for quality assurance  
There is a point to be made for why the goal of improving mobility for studies and work creates a 
necessity for greater transparency of quality of higher education: The quality of an individual’s educa-
tion is inherently difficult to gauge for HEIs or employers. In this context, an individual’s higher edu-
cation qualification (e.g. degree diploma) acts as a signaling device for his or her acquired knowledge 
and skills. It can serve this function because employers or HEIs have trust in the institution that issued 
it. Within a national context, employers and HEIs are usually familiar with domestic qualifications and 
know how to assess the value of a specific qualification. When it comes to qualifications acquired in 
another country, however, this is not necessarily the case. For the recognition of qualifications, it is 
therefore essential that there be mechanisms to establish trust. This is a major justification for a trans-
national framework of “accountability-type” quality assurance of HE qualifications, both for credit mo-
bility (student mobility within a certain study program, e.g. through programs such as “Erasmus”) as 
well as for degree mobility (student mobility to study an entire degree abroad, e.g. doing a Master’s 
Degree in another country).  
While in the beginning of the Bologna Process, there was only a vague reference to QA, the topic has 
since gained greater prominence and specificity with each subsequent ministerial communiqué (Bischof 
et al., 2014). While the Prague Communiqué (European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education, 
2001) only mentioned the dissemination of best practice and unspecified “evaluation and accredita-
tion/certification mechanisms”, the Berlin Communiqué (European Ministers Responsible for Higher 
Education, 2003) became more specific by calling for:  
• A definition of the responsibilities of the bodies and institutions involved. 
• Evaluation of programs or institutions, including internal assessment, external review, partici-
pation of students and the publication of results. 
• A system of accreditation, certification or comparable procedures. 
• International participation, cooperation and networking. 
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Since its humble beginnings, quality assurance is now widely regarded one of the most successful action 
lines of the Bologna Process (Bollaert, 2014). Between a number of instruments and networks were 
developed and endorsed by the European Ministers responsible for Higher Education and promoted by 
the European Commission. By 2014, the European QA architecture consisted of: 
• jointly adopted European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance (ESG) for HEIs 
and QA agencies  
• the European Quality Assurance Register (EQAR) for QAAs operating according to the ESG 
• the Qualification Framework for the EHEA (QF EHEA) and the European Qualifications 
Framework (EQF) 
• The first multidimensional tool for information provision on the quality (or rather “qualities”) 
of individual HEIs u-multirank 
• a large number of stakeholder organizations working on issues ranging from on quality assur-
ance to financing and governance of HEIs (e.g. ENQA, EUA, ESU, EURASHE, Business Eu-
rope, Educational international) 
While certainly not an exclusive consequence of the Bologna Process, quality assurance systems in the 
European Higher Education area proliferated at an impressive pace in the decade following the Bologna 
declaration (Schwarz & Westerheijden, 2004). Quality assurance as a policy instrument of higher edu-
cation has become nigh universal (Westerheijden, D. F., 2007) and has exerted a strong influence on 
higher education policy (Dobbins & Knill, 2009; Jakobi, Martens, & Wolf, 2010; Westerheijden, D. F. 
& et al., 2010a; Witte, 2006). In the early 1990s less than 50% of the European countries had quality 
assessment activities in place at the supra-institutional level (Schwarz & Westerheijden, 2004). In the 
period from 1999 to 2010, almost all European countries adopted some form of quality assurance 
scheme: 22 countries established new national agencies for quality assurance, with half of these being 
set up since 2005 (Eurydice, 2010). The vast majority of countries opted for the implementation of an 
accreditation-based system of quality assurance (Stensaker, 2011).  
3.2.3 Instruments of Governance of Higher Education Systems 
After a general overview of authority distribution, processes, and structures which are relevant to the 
governance of higher education systems, we will now turn to the instruments by which HEIs within 
higher education systems are steered. These are Quality Assurance (Educational Standards, quality as-
sessment, and information provision); 2. Regulation of admissions to higher education; 3. Institutional 
structures, decision-making and autonomy; 4. Higher education financing and incentive structures.  
3.2.3.1 Quality Assurance (Educational Standards, quality assessment, and information pro-
vision)  
3.2.3.1.1 Quality in higher education 
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Before turning to the instruments of quality assurance, it seems pertinent to briefly consider what is 
meant by the term “quality” in the context of higher education.  
According to Kluge & Seebold (2011) in an overview by Bernhard (2011, pp. 44–45), the term “quality” 
dates back to ancient philosophy where, in Aristoteles’ ontology, the term defines the essential feature 
of a matter which makes it unique. The term derived from the Latin noun qualitas (consistence, charac-
ter) and the adverb qualis (how made? of which manner?). In the 17th century, the French term qualité 
started to be used in the language of trade and developed various scientific meanings (Pfeifer, 1997, 
p. 1065). The American Society for Quality (American Society for Quality, 1993-2014) defines “qual-
ity” as a  
“subjective term for which each person or sector has its own definition. In technical usage, 
quality can have two meanings: 1. the characteristics of a product or service that bear on its 
ability to satisfy stated or implied needs; 2. a product or service free of deficiencies. According 
to Joseph Juran, quality means “fitness for use;” according to Philip Crosby, it means “con-
formance to requirements.”  
After the notion of quality had appeared in HE in the 1980ies, there were a number of original attempts 
to contribute to defining quality in higher education (Harvey, L., 1995, 2006; Harvey, L. & Green, 
1993b). The most-often cited overview of competing philosophies of quality is provided by Harvey and 
Green (1993a) and distinguishes to following approaches to defining quality: 
1. Quality as Exception: distinctive, embodies in excellence, passing a minimum set of standards. 
2. Quality as Perfection: zero defects, getting things right the first time  
3. Quality as Fitness for purpose: relates quality to a purpose, defined by the provider. 
4. Quality as Value for money: a focus on efficiency and effectiveness, measuring outputs against 
inputs.  
5. Quality as Transformation: a qualitative change; education is about doing something to the 
student as opposed to something for the consumer. Includes concepts of enhancing and empow-
ering democratization of the process, not just outcomes.  
The last definition, in particular, recognizes that students are not only customers in higher education but 
also its object as they are being transformed. However, as Jethro Newton (2007) pointed out, all defini-
tions of quality lack a solid theoretical foundation. In summary, quality in higher education is a goal-
dependent, stakeholder-relative category with “(at least) as many definitions of quality in higher educa-
tion as there are categories of stakeholders […], times the number of purposes, or dimensions, these 
stakeholders distinguish” (Brennan, Goedegebuure, Shah, Westerheijden, & Weusthof, 1992). As a con-
sequence, the concept of quality cannot be understood detached from its context and the particular pur-
poses assigned to it by the political actors, which makes the concept of “quality” is ultimately a political 
one (Westerheijden, D. F., 2005). Depending on the specific explicit or implicit understanding of qual-
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ity, QA can be aimed at social accountability, academic improvement, institutional performance effi-
ciency and effectiveness, ‘value for money’ or ‘consumer’ protection. Any reflection about quality as-
surance would, therefore, be well-advised to take this into consideration. For the purpose of this disser-
tation, the analysis will be restricted to the quality of the teaching and learning function of HE. 
3.2.3.1.2 Quality Assurance in higher education 
In most publications on quality assurance (QA), the question about its nature is answered from a histor-
ical perspective. The term “Quality Assurance”, originally developed in manufacturing industries and 
promoted by seminal figures should as W. Edwards Deming (2000) and Kaoru Ishikawa (Ishikawa, 
1985), referred to processes of systematic verification against predefined standards, monitoring of pro-
cesses and associated feedback loops. The aims were to create a framework for systematic improvement 
in order to reduce process variation focusing on customer needs. In higher education, quality assurance 
appeared as a result of an overall change in governance, society and the educational system over the 
course of the 1980ies and 1990ies. The decisive factors behind the emergence of quality assurance are 
seen by Henkel and Little (1999) as the massification and diversification of higher education on the one 
hand, and on the implementation of practices of new public management on the other. Most authors on 
quality assurance follow this view, which is explained in further detail in this chapter.  
The term “quality assurance” in higher education refers to all “policies, procedures and practices that 
are designed to achieve, maintain or enhance quality as it is understood in a specific context” (EACEA, 
2012a, p. 62).  
A common distinction in quality assurance is the distinction between external and internal quality as-
surance. External Quality Assurance (EQA) relates to the relationship between governments and HEIs 
while Internal Quality Assurance (IQA) describes the policies, procedures and practices within individ-
ual HEIs. Internal quality assurance often relies on cyclical evaluations using internal or external peers, 
stakeholder representation in advising or decision-making bodies, the use of surveys (e.g. to assess 
teaching quality, satisfaction with services), the collection and analysis of statistical data and perfor-
mance indicators, and defined processes of internal quality review and control. While IQA is not a focus 
of this study, it is often an object of EQA. A review of existing research and policy-documents on inter-
nal and external quality assurance illustrates that both may be intended (by different stakeholders) to 
serve a wide array of possible functions for the HE system: 
Internal Quality Assurance  
1. Increasing internal coupling of higher edu-
cation institutions, leading to a stronger in-
stitutional leadership in higher education 
(Askling, 1997). 
External Quality Assurance 
1. Linking external stakeholder and government 
priorities perspectives to the strategy formu-
lation of higher education institutions 
(Westerheijden, D. F. & Leegwater, 2002b) 
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2. Improving information on internal perfor-
mance and goal achievement brought about 
by increasing centralization of information 
and clearer lines of responsibility (Stensaker, 
2008) 
3. Improving internal steering of HEIs (Wester-
heijden, D. F. & Leegwater, 2002b) 
4. Enhancing teaching and learning, research 
or the services of the universities administra-
tion 
5. Integrating students and other stakeholders 
by providing a more legitimate role (Har-
vey, L. & Knight, 1996) 
 
2. Delegating authority from the state to HEIs 
(Stensaker, 2003) 
3. Increasing accountability of the use public 
funds (Stensaker, 2003) 
4. Increasing transparency of input and output 
of HEIs (Maassen, P. A.M, 1997, p. 117) to 
better link cost and quality (Salter & Tapper, 
2000).  
5. Increasing legitimacy, credibility, and inter-
national recognition of degrees and diplomas 
to facilitate student and alumni mobility 
(Stensaker, 2003; Westerheijden, D. F., 
2003; Westerheijden, D. F. & Leegwater, 
2002b)  
6. Protecting students, employers and society 
from sub-standard educational programs 
(Westerheijden, D. F., 2003)  
7. Enforcing consistency in degree nomencla-
ture and structures (Westerheijden, D. F. 
& Leegwater, 2002b) 
8. Enhancing the quality of higher education 
provision (Stensaker, 2003) 
9. Stimulating self-regulation capacity and 
competitiveness of HEIs (Jeliazkova & 
Westerheijden, 2002; Stensaker, 2003)  
Table 6: Functions of internal and external quality assurance 
The most heavily debated distinction of function of QA systems is the distinction of accountability 
versus improvement. Accountability as discussed in the context of quality assurance, refers to notions 
of efficiency, effectiveness and the maintenance of (academic) standards (Harvey, L. & Knight, 1996, 
pp. 72–74): Efficiency relates to the aspect of economic planning (what is spent) and to institutional 
efficiency (per unit-costs). Effectiveness is concerned with outputs or outcomes (such as the number of 
graduates or their academic performance). The maintenance of academic standards is usually used as 
the main justification for accreditation systems. The improvement function of QA relates to providing 
HEIs with necessary information, impetus or governance structures to support institutional learning. A 
number of authors have pointed to the inherent tensions between accountability and improvement as 
goals of QA (Blanco Ramírez, 2013; Danø & Stensaker, 2007; Meade & Woodhouse, 2000; Thune, 
1996; Vroeijenstijn, A. I., 1995) and the introduction of QA has been resisted by academics as wholly 
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illegitimate or unfit to attain its intended purposes. The famous “egg-laying wool-milk sow”10 of quality 
assurance has not been found yet.  
3.2.3.1.3 Profession, state and market in quality assurance 
Considering the multitude of functions that quality assurance is intended to serve as well and the many 
different levels it addresses (e.g. the level of the higher education system, the level of institutions, the 
level of individual study programs), it is not surprising that a myriad of external and internal quality 
assurance instruments has been developed, each with their particular focus11. The organizations which 
conduct, coordinate or oversee QA are diverse, as are the different arrangements concerning the relative 
roles of HEIs, agencies and governments in the process. Some patterns are visible though.  
Building upon the seminal work by Burton R. Clark (1983), Dill (2010) distinguishes three approaches 
to regulate the quality of higher education: A European model in which state educational ministries 
exercised QA by means of central control, a US-American model combining limited state control with 
market competition of universities and QA agencies, and a British model in which the state essentially 
ceded responsibility for QA to self-accrediting universities. Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht ge-
funden werden. illustrates these models with representative external QA practices organized by the 
locus of authority over QA and which will be explained below.  
 
Table 7: QA practices organized by locus of authority over QA. Taken from Dill (2010) 
Professional Self-Regulation 
Professional self-regulation relies on the professional identity, academic norms and values of the aca-
demic community for assuring the quality of academic provision. In QA schemes, a professional body 
or association is charged by the academic community with conducting QA practices. An example for 
                                                          
10 In German-speaking countries the “eierlegende Wollmilchsau” (literally, an “egg-laying, wool and milk-pro-
ducing pig”) has become a popular symbol for a product or a solution that meets all requirements perfectly and 
only yields benefits in all regards.  
11 It should, however, be noted that most of the academic debate and literature on quality assurance in higher 
education primarily focuses on the quality of teaching and learning as opposed to the quality of research. This may 
be explained in part because there are already well-established quality assurance mechanisms in research such as 
peer-review procedures in refereed journals, quantitative measures such as citation indices or research funding 
allocation is often based on the assessed quality of proposals. These mechanisms have developed prior to the 
widespread use of the term “quality assurance”.  
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such a model is the US-American accreditation system, in which regional accreditation bodies are rec-
ognized by the state, but enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy in defining their processes and quality 
criteria (For an in-depth description of this model, see Crow (2002).  
State (direct) regulation 
State (direct) regulation of academic quality describes approaches in which the state plays a pivotal role 
in defining and assuring quality. Examples are the gosudarstvennyye obrazovatel'nyye standarty (“State 
Educational Standards”) in Russia or the former Rahmenprüfungsordung (“framework examination reg-
ulation”) in Germany. Usually, standards are developed involving the academic community but are le-
gitimized and enforced by the State. Other QA-instruments in which the state plays a central role are 
performance funding and contracts as well as any quality-related regulations the state puts in place and 
which HEIs are obliged to comply with.  
Market Regulation 
Finally, market regulation as an approach to QA works via competition and “consumer choice”. A pre-
requisite for quality-based informed choice is adequate, understandable and accessible information 
about quality. The coordination and steering of HE systems thus requires well-defined essential perfor-
mance information that universities would need to provide and maintain up-to-date (Dill & Soo, 2005). 
The most widely used instruments for which it has been argued that they may serve a market regulation 
mechanism are university rankings.  
In Christopher Hood’s cross-country, cross-sectoral study on controlling public services, Hood and col-
leagues (Hood, 2004) describe four primary means of control as “Contrived Randomness” (control of 
corruption by a degree of unpredictable elements), “oversight” (control through government regulation), 
“competition” (control through rivalry) and “mutuality” (control through peers). It is evident that the 
latter three categories correspond to Dill’s three types forms of regulation described above12. It is im-
portant to note that there are no “pure forms” of these approaches. Instead, in any HE system, a combi-
nation of these mechanisms will be at work. In addition, Dill (2010) points out that any given instrument 
of quality assurance (such as program accreditation) can represent a form of professional, state or market 
regulation, depending on who conducts it, what its legal status is and what the consequences are. Dill 
also argues that, because professional self-regulation or market mechanisms can only be adequate mech-
anisms of protecting the public interest if they are made compulsory or highly advisable by the State13, 
any effective form of professional or market self-regulation should be understood as an alternative form 
of state instruments for regulating academic quality. Dill follows that the real question for designing 
                                                          
12 Hood and colleagues (2004, p. 199) find that in higher education, contrived randomness does seem to play only 
a relatively minor role as a distinct governance mechanism, although it does appear in combination with other 
mechanisms.  
13 The example given by Dill (2010) is US-American accreditation which is, albeit not compulsory, a prerequisite 
for students applying for federal financial aid – a source of income that no HEI would want to miss.  
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effective regulation for governments is therefore not, whether or not they want to play a role, but rather 
which combination of mechanisms they can employ to most effective and efficient in assuring academic 
quality within a given context.  
3.2.3.1.4 Instruments employed in quality assurance 
Dill (2010) distinguished three principle instruments of (external) quality assurance: Qualifications 
frameworks, quality assessments and provision of information. The three types are closely linked: Qual-
ification frameworks are used to define the expected outcomes of the educational process. Quality as-
sessment is used to ascertain to what degree these outcomes have been reached. Lastly, provision of 
information (e.g. through university rankings) are employed with the hope that making the “perfor-
mance” of higher education transparent, market mechanisms will pressure HEIs to improve this perfor-
mance. In this chapter, I will use Dill’s framework as a basis for presenting various instruments used in 
QA.  
1. Qualification standards and frameworks 
A qualification “is a device whereby an individual can, with credibility (i.e. without further assessment) 
and at relatively low cost, signal/assure/convince others that he/she possesses certain types of 
knowledge, skills, intellectual capacity, competencies and so on” (Blackmur, 2004b, p. 108). Standards 
defining curricular contents leading up to formal qualifications have been around ever since professions 
organized themselves in the guilds of medieval times. To this day, professional, statutory and regulatory 
bodies commonly play a role in defining the necessary standards for holders of certain qualifications 
(most notably in the medical, law and engineering professions).  
In the past, these standards most commonly focused on the contents of the training program leading up 
to a qualification and paid little heed to the relationship between qualifications. Increasing student and 
graduate mobility, the exponential growth of private and public HEIs and the advent of cross-border 
providers of HE, the possibilities of distance learning have made it clear that the great variety of different 
qualifications in different countries can be an obstacle to cross-border collaboration and student mobil-
ity. Within HE systems, the political goal of life-long learning makes it necessary to define possible 
pathways through different branches of the educational system (e.g. to make a transition from vocational 
to higher education possible).  
Qualification Frameworks (QFs) describe qualifications by defining learning outcomes associated with 
them. They also usually situate qualifications on a continuum of agreed levels of education (such as the 
competences to be achieved at the Bachelor, Master and PhD levels in the QA-EHEA). The OECD 
(2006) defines QFs in the following way: 
A qualifications framework is an instrument for the development and classification of qualifica-
tions according to a set of criteria for levels of learning achieved. This set of criteria may be 
implicit in the qualifications descriptors themselves or made explicit in the form of a set of level 
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descriptors. The scope of frameworks may be comprehensive of all learning achievement and 
pathways or may be confined to a particular sector for example initial education, adult educa-
tion and training or an occupational area. Some frameworks may have more design elements 
and a tighter structure than others; some may have a legal basis whereas others represent a 
consensus of views of social partners. All qualifications frameworks, however, establish a basis 
for improving the quality, accessibility, linkages and public or labour market recognition of 
qualifications within a country and internationally. 
Qualifications Frameworks thus indicates equivalence of different qualifications situated on the same 
level and show how learners can progress from one level to another (Tuck, 2007). An important rationale 
for the development of such frameworks is to facilitate international recognition of academic degrees, 
thus facilitating student mobility and employability in a globalized economy (Dill, 2010). Besides na-
tional qualifications frameworks, there are also regional and sectoral (such as the UK subject bench-
marks program or the German Rahmenprüfungsordnung) frameworks. On the European level, the Qual-
ifications Frameworks in the European Higher Education Area (QF-EHEA) and the European Qualifi-
cations Framework for Lifelong Learning (EQF) were developed.  
QFs can define qualifications in reference to achieved learning outcomes or competences or in terms of 
packages and courses. By defining quality in terms of outcomes, qualifications frameworks provide the 
basis for their assessment though external quality assurance (McInnis, 2005). National qualifications 
frameworks and subject benchmarks are intended to regulate the fitness-of-purpose of higher education 
(Williams, 2005). Various methodological problems and questions of the overall fitness-for-purpose of 
QFs are raised by observers (Allias, 2007; Blackmur, 2004a; Williams, 2005), which will not be dis-
cussed here.  
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2. Quality Assessments 
The advent of the evaluative state and the ideas of new public management (see chapter 3.2.2.3) have 
led to increased government attention towards the measurement of outcome relative to the control of 
input- and process factors. Approaches to quality assessment have become the instrument most closely 
associated with the term “quality assurance”, much more so than qualifications standards or rankings. 
Indeed, in a substantial part of the literature on quality assurance, the various schemes of assessing 
quality have become synonymous with “quality assurance” per se.  
In the vast majority of cases, external quality assurance methodologies follow a “general model” first 
described by van Vught and Westerheijden (1994). The four steps of this model are a self-review by the 
unit or HEI under scrutiny in which it provides information on the relevant criteria of the assessment in 
a self-evaluation report. Based on this report, a peer-review with or without a site-visit takes place, in 
which external (peer) experts verify and deepen their judgment of the assessed object. The peer review, 
in turn, is followed by a report which may or may not result in a formal decision and/or recommendations 
for improvement.  
Quality assessments can follow a Standards-based Approach (SBA) which is associated with the com-
pliance to a norm of predefined standards, regardless of institutional diversity (Al-Hassnawi,  2010). 
The standard may take on the form of a measurable benchmark or a professional judgment. Assessments 
that follow a Fitness-for-purpose Approach (FFP) take the stated purpose of an HEI or an academic 
program as their point of departure (sometimes also asking whether or not this purpose may be deemed 
acceptable in a given context). The assessment then judges to what degree the stated purposes have been 
achieved.  
For external quality assessment, the following three instruments are most commonly used: 
1. (Academic) accreditation is a standards-based approach used to certify that study programs, 
quality management systems (or other subunits) comply with certain (minimum) standards, 
thereby awarding them the right to exist, a greater degree of autonomy or other benefits. Inter-
national accreditation leading to internationally recognized quality labels are a particular form 
of accreditation.  
2. Evaluations/subject assessments are used to provide study programs, organizational units, 
projects or institutions with informed external feedback based on a systematic, criteria-oriented 
approach to data collection. Depending on their focus, they may be Standards-based or follow 
a Fitness-for-purpose Approach.  
3. Academic (Quality) Audits are evaluation mechanisms that investigate the (internal) quality 
management arrangements of an HEI. Depending on their focus, they may be Standards-based 
or follow a Fitness-for-purpose Approach. 
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The most comprehensive overview of approaches to quality assessment (labeled “Approaches to Quality 
Assurance Management”) is provided by Grant Harman (1998) and is reproduced in Fehler! Verweis-
quelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. to illustrate the variety of forms which quality assessments can 
take on:  
3. Information Provision 
A third category of instruments used in quality assurance is information provision. While information 
per se does not influence quality directly, making performance transparent can be a powerful tool to 
motivate stakeholders such as academics, students or politicians to take action. Providing valid infor-
mation about the quality of HE is tricky business, however. As Dill (2010) points out, the benefits of 
higher education to society, while many in number and scope14, they are notoriously difficult to assess. 
Gauging the relative contribution of any particular HEI to society is even more difficult. To do so, proxy 
indicators based on a causal theory of the effects of HE need to be developed. The validity of information 
instruments is thus directly related to their ability to measure or closely approximate the relevant out-
comes of higher education (Dill & Soo, 2005).  
Such indicators may include immediate outcome measures such as graduate placement, salaries, and 
their retroactive satisfaction with their education, macro-level process indicators such as student test 
scores, completion rates, and marks; or micro-level various process measures such as student engage-
ment (McCormick, 2013).  The biggest challenge in using information as a tool for quality assurance 
are developing valid and reliable indicators. Common problems of indicators used as a proxy for quality 
in higher education are that they are 1. backwards-oriented (such as the number of Nobel prize winners 
as a proxy for excellence in research), 2. of questionable construct validity (such as an Employer repu-
tation survey to gauge the quality of applied training and research), 3. of doubtful reliability (e.g. in the 
case of very low response rates on surveys) and 4. the fact that some indicators present the danger of 
turning into self-fulfilling prophecies (such as any academic reputation survey) (Federkeil, 2013).  
The first systematic instrument of information provision was the annual report of statistical data col-
lected and published by the Commission of the US Bureau of Education in the late 19th century in the 
US, which also led to first “official” classification of institutions (Rauhvargers, op. 2011, p. 19). Perfor-
mance indicators collected by public authorities had been initially developed to help policy-makers 
make informed decisions and, since the 1990ies, to be used in steering instruments like performance-
based funding or university performance contracts (Dill, 2010).  
For the most part, however, indicators are being gathered and published by a wide range of public au-
thorities, academic, nonprofit, or commercial organizations. In 1957 the Chicago Tribune was the first 
                                                          
14 A study by the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (2013) cites greater social cohesion, less crime, 
greater social mobility, healthier lifestyles, longer life expectancy, more civic engagement, and better overall life 
satisfaction as only some of the positive effects of higher education on the individual, society and economy at 
large.  
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newspaper that published a ranking of HEIs, followed by outlets such as US NEWS and others. Having 
been confined to the US in the 20th century, the era of global rankings started when the Shanghai Jiao 
Tong University published its first ‘Academic Ranking of World Universities’ in 2003. These rankings, 
such as the Shanghai Ranking, the Times Higher Education, the QS World university rankings or the 
CHE/u-multirank subject-based rankings, collect and present data that makes certain quality dimensions 
visible and comparable to interested stakeholders. However, in addition to methodological difficulties 
in developing good indicators, most university rankings face a number of further problems and short-
comings. As Gero Federkeil (2013) points out: The existing (global) rankings  
1) are biased against other fields than the (bio-medical, natural) sciences,  
2) focus on research (or web appearance - but users usually believe they show university perfor-
mance in general),  
3) have severe problems with regard to validity / reliability, are biased against non-English-speak-
ing countries,  
4) make only the profile of comprehensive research universities transparent,  
5) measure what is measurable instead of what is relevant,  
6) are sometimes driven more by reputation than by actual current performance,  
7) have in some cases non-transparent methods,  
8) do not highlight disciplinary differences and show only institutional averages,  
9) exaggerate small differences in league tables and  
10) are often not focused on specific target groups, without necessarily helping prospective students.  
Using a limited set of defined indicators over a longer period of time creates strong incentives to act in 
order to improve performance on the indicator, rather than improvements in quality. This fact is aptly 
stated in “Campbell’s law” “The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-
making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and 
corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor” (Campbell, D. T., 1979).  
To the degree to which student choice has an impact on university funding or reputation, however, it 
can act as a powerful incentive for HEIs to improve their performance (Dill, 2010). This holds particu-
larly true for students of high ambition and achievement, as the majority of students typically choose an 
HEI or degree programs for diverse educational, social, and personal factors (Dill & Soo, 2005). How-
ever, policymakers and academic staff often pay great attention to publicly available information on the 
quality of “their” HEIs. Because of the importance that is assigned to rankings internationally, they may 
become a common benchmark for what constitutes quality in higher education (Dill & Soo, 2005). This 
way, ultimately, the international standard definition of “quality” may suffer from the very methodolog-
ical limitations cited above, give undue power to the producers of international rankings and may have 
a detrimental steering effect on the entire HE system. Illustrating the last post, it has been argued that  
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“League tables […], while used primarily by a select group of students, may shape public opin-
ion about what constitutes a quality education in ways that negatively affect both student con-
sumers and institutional behavior. […] Further, there is some evidence that the focus of US 
league tables on reputation and the particular indicators used to measure reputation may be 
contributing to the continually rising costs of US higher education as well as providing incen-
tives for colleges and universities to invest in actions and strategies that actually detract from 
the social benefits traditionally provided by higher education.” (Dill & Soo, 2005, p. 523) 
Dill & Soo (2005) argue that in these cases, governments should make sure that appropriate consumer 
information will be available provided on higher education. The new European ranking “u-multirank”, 
which is funded by the European Commission, is justified on the same grounds.  
3.2.3.2 The role of the institution in the governance of higher education systems – Institu-
tional Governance and University Autonomy 
Institutional Autonomy 
To the degree to which the State or other actors in the higher education system level regulate the oper-
ation of HEIs, it determines the degree of autonomy that HEIs enjoy. The interplay of external influ-
ence and regulation and autonomous actions by HEIs therefore form the whole of higher education 
system governance. For all practical purposes, “institutional autonomy” thus refers to the relations be-
tween the state and higher education institutions and the degree of control over certain aspects of its 
operations that is exerted by the state. It follows, also, that university autonomy therefore has as many 
different aspects as does its governance.  
Secondly, autonomy as a concept differs based on the historical and cultural settings, legal traditions, 
norms and understandings. In other words, what is perceived as greatly enhanced autonomy in one 
context, would still be perceived as an inacceptable restriction of academic freedom in other HE tradi-
tions.  
In the context of new public management, institutional autonomy is of central importance and calls for 
greater autonomy have been on the agenda not only of government hoping for greater self-steering, but 
also of university representatives. The Magna Charta Universitatum, a document summarizing univer-
sities’ (or their rectors’) understanding of their place and role in the 21st century, drafted for the occa-
sion of the anniversary of University of Bologna by the European Rectors' Conference (now EUA) in 
198815, states that HEIs “expect their respective States and legislatures to recognise their autonomy 
and independence from every form of power, the freedom of their faculty members in teaching and re-
search, and freedom for students, who are entitled to an effective education” (Monaco, 2002).  
                                                          
15 In 2000, the European University Association and the University of Bologna jointly created the Magna Charta 
Observatory, to monitor academic freedom and university autonomy. By 2017, the document had been signed by 
805 universities from 85 countries 
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Many authors have proposed concepts of institutional autonomy (Berdahl, 1990; Dill, 2001; Ester-
mann & Nokkala, 2009; Fielden, 2008; Neave, G. & Van Vught, Frans A, 1994; Volkwein & Malik, 
1997). Among these definitions, the most widespread definitions may be Berdahl’s (1990) differentia-
tion of substantive vs. procedural autonomy as “the power of the university or college in its corporate 
form to determine its own goals and programs” (substantive autonomy) and “the power of the univer-
sity or college in its corporate form to determine the means by which its goals and programs will be 
pursued” (procedural autonomy).  
A recent large-scale exploratory study in 33 countries by the European University Association (Ester-
mann & Nokkala, 2009) has also received a lot of attention, breaking down university autonomy into 
the four component parts Organizational, Financial, Staffing, and Academic Autonomy. In a follow-up 
project (Estermann, Nokkala, & Steinel, 2011) created a scorecard and rated different countries on 
these four dimensions (see Table 8).  
 
Organizational  
Autonomy 
Financial autonomy Staffing autonomy Academic Autonomy 
The ability to decide 
on organizational 
structures and institu-
tional governance – in 
particular, the ability 
to establish structures 
and governing bodies, 
university leadership 
and who is accounta-
ble to whom 
The ability to decide 
on financial issues – in 
particular the different 
forms of acquiring and 
allocating funding, the 
ability to charge tui-
tion fees, to accumu-
late surplus, to borrow 
and raise money from 
different sources, the 
ability to own land and 
buildings and report-
ing procedures as ac-
countability tools 
The ability to decide 
on staffing matters – in 
particular the capacity 
to recruit staff, the re-
sponsibility for terms 
of employment such as 
salaries and issues re-
lating to employment 
contracts such as civil 
servant status 
The ability to decide 
on academic matters – 
in particular the capac-
ity to define the aca-
demic profile, to intro-
duce or terminate de-
gree programs, to de-
fine the structure and 
content of degree pro-
grams, roles and re-
sponsibilities with re-
gard to the quality as-
surance of programs 
and degrees and the 
extent of control over 
student admissions. 
 
Table 8: Four Dimensions of University Autonomy (Estermann & Nokkala, 2009) 
The results show a clear trend towards greater autonomy in all of these areas, reflected in greater free-
dom in the recruitment and appointment of staff, and setting salary levels, academic matters allowing 
(and encouraging) universities to develop their own institutional strategies and academic profiles, as 
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well as greater financial autonomy and the use of block-grant funding, being accompanied by a trend 
towards competition-oriented funding policies and encouraged third-party funding.  
It is important to note, however, that even countries, where HEIs have a large degree of autonomy, are 
hardly unitary as the power within the institution may be rather diversely distributed between the insti-
tutional level, the basic units and individual professors.  
For the purpose of this study, changes in organizational, financial, staffing and academic autonomy 
will be studied.  
3.2.3.3 Regulating access to higher education systems 
From the perspective of academics working in higher education institutions, it is highly desirable to 
teach the best prepared students. Prior knowledge is the key determinant of learning effectiveness and 
general productivity. From the perspective of the academic process and the academic profession, access 
to higher education should therefore be as selective as possible, as the best-prepared will gain most from 
participating from higher education, are least demanding in terms of counselling and support, and have 
the greatest likelihood of making contributions to research and service.  
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From a societal and an economical perspective, on the other hand, wide participation in higher education 
is highly desirable, as it yields a multitude of private and public benefits. The following figure from 
McMahon (2009) provides an overview:  
 
Figure 8: Private and public short, mid- and long-term benefits and impacts from higher education (From McMahon, 
2009) 
Both from the perspective of the individual seeking to gain the private benefits of a higher education as 
well for society benefiting from the positive social externalities, it is thus highly desirable to assure 
access. A caveat of this assumption is that the public benefits only materialize if and when higher edu-
cation is in fact taking place. Because of the fact that the presence of higher education is “certified” by 
having a university degree, and because some of the private benefits of a degree (such as access to 
certain professions, higher salary, social mobility) can be attained just with having the degree, there is a 
clear incentive for fraud. Individuals may try to attain a degree without the investment in time, resources 
and effort, while dishonest HEIs may, for many reasons, be willing to be less rigorous in their standards 
or even issue a higher education degree against a fee (“diploma mills”). The question of regulating 
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access to higher education, then, becomes a crucial component in safeguarding the trust in higher edu-
cation credentials as well as in assuring the quality of a country’s future highly qualified specialists.  
Exerting control over admission to higher education furthermore represents control over the overall size 
and selectivity of the higher education system. In systems in which the size of the enrolment determines 
the level of financing (which is the case all tuition-based HE systems and almost all publicly funded 
systems), it furthermore represents control over the viability of those HEIs catering to certain groups of 
students. The nature of the mechanisms by which access to higher education is regulated (or their ab-
sence) and who has the authority these processes (typically the central government, individual universi-
ties or schools via access-granting school-leaving certifications) is therefore a central component in the 
governance of higher education systems.  
3.2.3.4 The role of financing in higher education governance 
As all organizations, HEIs require funding to operate. Salaries need to be paid, infrastructure maintained 
and expanded and research projects sometimes require considerable expenditures on equipment and 
consumables. Higher education institutions, especially research universities, are very costly enterprises, 
and have only increased to be so during the 20th century. This is related to several factors: 
From an economic point of view, the difficulty of reducing unit costs through the substitution of capital 
for labor has not been possible in education in the same way as it has been in other industries. „Baumol‘s 
cost disease“ (Baumol & Bowen, 1968) describes the phenomenon that rising salaries in other industries 
and the rising costs of living, in turn, require personnel-intensive enterprises16 to offer competitive sal-
aries to attract enough highly qualified individuals, thus driving up the costs for the services these en-
terprises provide. Compounding this effect has been the expansion and massification of higher educa-
tion, which has led to surging enrollment, increasing overall expenditures for higher education even 
further. The rise in higher educational costs in excess of public revenues is a worldwide phenomenon 
(Johnstone, B., 2015), as have been the patterns of policies, even in countries with very dissimilar po-
litical-economic systems and higher educational traditions, and at extremely dissimilar stages of indus-
trial and technological development (Johnstone, D. Bruce et al., 1998).  
Governments have responded to this challenge either on the cost side or on the revenue side, resulting 
in austerity and impacting the quality and capacity of HE systems, and/or efforts to increase private 
contributions to financing HE (Johnstone, D. Bruce & Marcucci, 2010). The most common of income-
side solutions is cost-sharing, meaning a greater participation of parents & students through tuition fees 
(most common), and philanthropists through donations (far less common outside of the US). This can 
take on different forms such as a higher share of tuition-funded study places relative to state-funded 
places (a so-called dual-track model), increases in the volume of tuition, a conversion of grants to loans, 
                                                          
16 Baumol & Bowen first discussed the problem for the performing arts 
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co-payments to study-subsidized study places or the creation of a new tuition fee-dependent private 
sector of higher education. Increases in public (taxpayer) higher education expenditures also happen, 
although they have usually been time-bound and have focused on supporting certain institutions to 
achieve certain missions. The most notable of such initiatives were the various “excellence initiatives” 
to promote research productivity of the strongest universities. Examples include the Chinese 211 and 
985 Projects, the South Korean Brain Korea 21 Program, the Japanese Global 30 Project, the French 
and the German Excellence Initiatives, the Russian Academic Excellence Project 5-100.  
As faculty and staff compensations amount generally amount to between 70 and 90 percent of university 
operating budgets (Johnstone, B., 2015), efforts have been made to lower salaries or move from fixed 
to variable (and – in average – lower) staff remuneration schemes, substituting lower cost part-time 
faculty for higher cost full-time faculty or to increasing class sizes and teaching loads (Johnstone, B., 
2015). Further institutional cost-reduction strategies, such as deferring maintenance or discontinuing 
less profitable study programs are also possible, often as decisions taken within expanded financial and 
operational autonomy of HEIs and the shift from line-item funding to block grants (or lump sums), 
effectively relegating the task of prioritizing expenses to institutional leaders. The latter has significantly 
increased as frameworks inspired by New Public Management have spread around the world and have 
increased the authority of HEI leadership over the deployment of the HEI’s resources (and have de-
creased the rights of staff, be it from tenure, from civil service privileges or union contracts).  
In general, the reform agenda in the area of higher education financing since the 1990s can be charac-
terized as an orientation to the market rather than to public ownership or to governmental planning and 
regulation, ideologically framed by the principles of neo-liberal economics (Johnstone, D. Bruce et al., 
1998).  
The relevance of financing for the governance of the higher education system 
As having sufficient funding to operate is a conditio sine qua non, HEI leaders must ensure a steady 
stream of funding, whatever source it may come from. For the purpose of this dissertation then, financ-
ing, or, more concretely, the mechanisms by which funding is distributed are highly relevant as they 
create powerful incentives for institutional behavior. A number of key questions can help to shed light 
on this aspect: 
- Which sources do HEIs draw upon to fund their operations? 
- Who controls the flows of funding that is accessible to HEIs?  
- Which mechanisms dominate in the distribution of these funds? (market coordination, politi-
cal, bureaucratic, collegial?) 
- Who has the authority to control how funding is distributed among the many competing activi-
ties and interests within HEIs? 
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- Does HEI the leadership have the authority to employ and fire staff, hire part-time or tempo-
rary workers, carry over unspent funds from one fiscal year to the next, shifting available 
funds from one budget category? 
- Who controls the “rules of the game” and might potentially intervene? 
These issues will be explored in the case studies and will help to answer the questions on the changing 
distribution of authority within the governance of the higher education system.  
3.2.4 Conclusion: A global model of HE governance? 
As these ideas and principles of governance are not only being adopted in the majority of Western Eu-
ropean and Anglo-Saxon countries but are also strongly being promoted by international organizations 
like the OECD, UNESCO and the World Bank around the world, it seems legitimate to state that they 
now constitute a form of „global model of HE governance” dominating the international discourse, if 
not practice. Summarizing the previously identified trends, the following table displays the characteris-
tics of the global model on four dimensions:  
Changes in the relationship between HEIs and the state 
a shift away from ‘‘state control’’ model and towards ‘‘state supervising’’ (Van Vught, 1989; 
Goedegebuure et al., 1993);  
steering from a distance” (Marginson, 1997; Meek, V. Lynn et al., 1996) by setting incentives and 
standards for relatively autonomous HEIs 
shift in state influence from ex-ante to ex-post control, with the state focusing on outputs and perfor-
mance indicators rather than managing inputs, increasing their demands on HEIs for accountability 
(Neave; 1998; de Boer et al., 2007) 
Quality Assurance Institutional Governance and 
Autonomy 
Financing higher education 
External assessment and con-
trol of performance by evalua-
tion and accreditation 
 
Greater organizational auton-
omy, discretionary control over 
collective resources, more 
clearly defined boundaries to 
the environment, greater self-
perception as an organization, 
hierarchies and internal man-
agement as well as ‘rationality’ 
(understood as having defined 
more competitive distribution of 
funding based on performance 
measures 
decrease of itemized budgets 
and introduction of global 
budgets 
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goals and measuring perfor-
mance) (Braun & Merrien, 
1999a; Brunsson & Sahlin-An-
dersson, 2000; Kehm, B. 
& Lanzendorf, 2006b; Pa-
radeise, 2009) 
Greater decision-making power 
to HEI leadership; Greater 
power to appoint, evaluate, re-
imburse and dismiss academic 
staff 
Adopting models of corporate 
governance such as appoint-
ment of rectors and presidents 
by boards rather than through 
election 
Involvement of external stake-
holders in university govern-
ance (Sporn, 1999) 
Promotion of strategic planning 
and strategic management 
(Braun, 2001) 
diversification of funding via tu-
ition fees, funding from enter-
prises, regional authorities 
 
Table 9: Characteristics of the “global” model of HE governance  
The model will be used to determine the degree and direction of convergence vs. divergence vis-à-vis 
the global model (Research Question 2) and whether there is such a thing as a “Post-Soviet Model” 
(Research Question 3).  
3.3 State of research on the governance of higher education in post-Soviet 
countries 
After having defined and operationalized the concept of governance of higher education systems and 
having conceptualized a model for change, I will now present available comparative research on the 
state of governance of higher education in post-Soviet countries.  
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Figure 9: Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
For Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which are EU Member States or belong to the 
former Yugoslavia, the attention they have received from EU agencies has resulted in a fairly good base 
of information. In particular, for the 38 countries participating in the Erasmus+ program17, data on higher 
education systems and their governance is regularly researched and updated by the Eurydice network18, 
which provides a comprehensive online Encyclopedia on national education systems, as well as specific 
studies and reports including on topics such as governance, financing, or quality assurance.  
While a fairly comprehensive body of research exists on the changes in the governance of HE systems 
of Western Europe, there is significantly less published research on the governance of higher education 
in the post-Soviet space. Existing research focusses predominantly on single countries, typically in the 
form of dissertations and research papers by scholars from the countries being described). Most of this 
research is largely descriptive and is often formulated with a policy setting intention. In their vast ma-
jority, these studies take on the shape of commentaries and do not try to methodologically analyse and 
compare countries. In the following section, I will summarize the existing research that was available at 
the time of writing of this dissertation.  
Data and reports  
In contrast to higher education systems in EU Member States, data on the post-Soviet space is far less 
available. On the level of reports and policy briefs on higher education systems, such are periodically 
produced by the EU’s TEMPUS / Erasmus+ program (Ruffio et al., 2011, 2011; Ruffio, Philippe: 
Heinämäki, Piia, Tchoukaline, Manthey, & Reichboth, 2011), and, infrequently, by the Higher Educa-
tion Support Program of the Open Society Institute (HESP/OSI), which is funded by the American 
                                                          
17 28 Member States, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland and Turkey 
18 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/mwikis/eurydice/index.php/Main_Page  
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philanthropist George Soros in the early 1990s which is affiliated with the Central European University 
(CEU) in Budapest, Hungary (Soros Foundation, 2012). There are also infrequent reports on individual 
countries by international organizations and foundations such as the OECD series “Reviews of National 
Policies for Education” on Russia (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development & Centre 
for Co-operation with Non-members, 1999) and Kazakhstan (World Bank & OECD, 2007). The 
UNESCO-European Center for Higher Education (CEPES), which had been set up in 1972 in Bucharest, 
Romania, published a series foundational pieces between the 1990ies and the early 2000ies, such as the 
Higher Governance in the Soviet Union (Yagodin, G. A., 1990).  
Commentaries 
Unfortunately, there is only a small number of researchers working on higher education in the former 
Soviet Union. Those who do typically have affiliations to international organizations active in the re-
gion. Among, those, prolific writers include Valdemar Tomusk and Iveta Silova, both former members 
of the Open Society Foundation, both of which have worked extensively on higher education reforms 
in Eastern Europe since the 1990ies.  
Topics of overview commentaries include highly informative discussions on the inadequacy of compet-
ing discourses of modernity and modernization in CEE and the Bologna process in this Central and 
Eastern Europe (Tomusk, 2008), on myths and realities of Post-Socialist transition (Tomusk, 2006) and 
on the role of the World Bank in policy reform in CEE (Tomusk, 2002). Stephen Heynemann, and Mark 
Johnson, who both worked for the World Bank, reflected the impact of the Bank’s policy on the post-
Soviet higher education and justify it as supporting inevitable and inherently positive developments 
(Heyneman, 2010, 2011) or challenge their value for the specific context of the former Soviet Union 
(Johnson, 2008). Nick Clark (2005) discusses differences and commonalities in higher education admis-
sion’s regimes.  
Comparative research  
While comparative research on public policy and governance of higher education systems in CEE coun-
tries is rare, comparative research on the post-Soviet space is even scarcer. The comparative work which 
does exist on the region often takes on the form of edited collection of essays with different focuses and 
methodologies. An example is the book “Globalization on the margins” (Silova, 2011a) which unites a 
number of essays on higher education reforms in Central Asia. In it, Stephen Heynemann (2011) pro-
vides an overview of reforms, noting how policies such as standardized testing for university admission, 
a move away from sectorial ministerial control, diversification of provision, decentralization of govern-
ance are similar across the region. Tomusk provides a commentary on the role of the Bologna Process 
as an economic and political tool for Europe and Central Asian governments moving Central Asia from 
the periphery closer to the (European) core (Tomusk, 2011). The first international comparative project 
encompassing all 15 post-Soviet states was started only in 2015 by the Higher School of Economics in 
Moscow, with support from the World Bank (Huisman et al., 2018). This project united researchers 
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from all 15 post-Soviet and several Western countries and will result in a book summarizing the changes 
in higher education systems, their institutional development and policy changes in each country, follow-
ing a common framework of vertical and horizontal differentiation.  
Systematic comparative work on the governance of higher education systems includes the World Bank 
report “Higher education in Central Asia: The challenges of modernization” (Brunner & Tillett, 2007) 
holds case studies from Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan and addresses 
presents an overview of organization (Management), Planning and Regulation of HEIs, Access, oppor-
tunities and Equality, Quality and Quality Control, Labour Market and Higher Education, System of 
Financing HE, Role of HE in Conducting Scientific Research and Innovation Development (R&D), and 
Globalization and Access to International Market. Next to the individual country case studies, the report 
also includes a comparative overview of policies and economic indicators.  
Dobbins & Khachatryan (2015) compare the changes in the regulatory framework, funding policy, and 
QA in Georgia and Armenia and show that European integration has had a strong impact on higher 
education policy and its governance and that these countries are moving (albeit at different speeds) 
towards ‘‘market-oriented governance’’. Todd Drummond and Sergij Gabrscek (2014) analyzed the in-
troduction of higher education admission regimes in Azerbaijan (1992), Uzbekistan (1993), Kazakhstan 
(1999*), Russia (2001*), Kyrgyzstan (2002), Ukraine (2004*), and Georgia (2005). Silova (Silova, 
2011b) summarizes experiments with other models of higher education, which often take place in the 
form of cooperation with Western (such as the Kazakh-British Technical University or Nazarbayev Uni-
versity in Kazakhstan, the American University of Central Asia in Kyrgyzstan) or Turkish institutions 
(in Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, or Turkmenistan). In many cases, the intensification and scaling-back of 
such activities reflect the changing geo-political orientations of States and their relationships with Rus-
sia, the European Union, Turkey, the United States and the wider world.  
In general, however, since the 1990ies, the Soviet model was increasingly thought of “the good old 
times” (Tomusk, 2008), which, considering the under-funding, lack of adequate infrastructure, and low 
standards is understandable. This picture gains further strength from in a World Bank study on higher 
education systems in Central Asia, which could identify no significant changes in the practices of teach-
ing, learning and research or the governance HEIs in Central Asia since the end of the Soviet Union 
(Brunner & Tillett, 2007).  
3.3.1 European Integration in the post-Soviet space 
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Central and Eastern European countries such as Russia, the 
newly independent republics of the Baltics, but also the Caucasus and Central Asia needed to redefine 
their political, cultural, and economic orientation vis-a-vis each other and the world (Silova, 2011b). 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Baltics states and other EU accession countries participated in a 
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wide range of EU-funded educational programs, which were specifically designed to help these coun-
tries prepare for accession to the EU (e.g., SOCRATES, LEONARDO da VINCI, TEMPUS/TACIS). 
Together with project funding from foreign governments and private charitable foundations such as the 
Ford Foundation, the MacArthurs’ Foundation, or the Soros Foundation, international organizations are 
estimated to have spent an amount exceeding half a billion Euros on projects intended to foster and 
support higher education in transition societies since the break-up of the Socialist block and 2005 (To-
musk, 2006).  
The HE systems of post-Soviet countries, just like Western ones, have increasingly become embedded 
in a transnational environment framed not only by organizations such as the OECD or the World Bank, 
but in particular, the European Union (Bleiklie, 2001; Martens, Rusconi, & Leuze, 2007). In the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe, in 2009, the so-called “Eastern Partnership” was launched with the countries of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, through which these countries received 
financial additional support for HE reforms to implement the EU architecture of quality assurance, to 
which they needed to commit. Since the late 2000s, the force of “European Integration” is visibly grow-
ing also in Central Asian countries driven by the Bologna Process. In 2007, the EU launched its EU-
Central Asia Education Initiative as part of a wider agreement to work together on an interregional basis 
(Council of the European Union, 2007). This initiative was to combine high-level meetings, technical 
working groups, national level dialogue with funding for specific activities such as TEMPUS projects, 
Erasmus Mundus cooperation, events related to promoting the Bologna Process, and projects by the 
European Training Foundation (EFT) and the Central Asia Research and Education Network (CAREN). 
Kazakhstan became an official part of the European Higher Education Area in 2010. Kyrgyzstan, Ta-
jikistan, and – at least on the rhetorical level Uzbekistan - who, while officially not eligible to join, have 
started implementing Bologna-related reforms on their own. This Process is supported through different 
cooperation vehicles with the EU, which has steadily increased its spending on education in the area 
since the launching of the EU-Central Asia Strategy in 2006. Central Asian countries hope that mem-
bership in the Bologna process will improve their reputation and visibility on the world stage, as well as 
attract more fee-paying students, especially from Asian countries (Jones, P. D., 2011).  
The literature’s overall assessment of the impact of European Integration on the post-Soviet higher ed-
ucation is mixed. Some experts perceive the public sector reforms undertaken in preparation for EU 
accession as well as the Bologna Process as particularly powerful factors for the transformation of HE 
systems in CEE countries (Bouckaert, Nakrošis, & Nemec, 2011; Silova). While the pull of European 
integration has been shown to have had a strong impact on higher education policy and its governance 
in countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Romania (Dobbins, 2009), Lithuania, 
(Dobbins & Leišyte, 2013) and Dobbins and Knill (2009) showed that CEE systems in general are mov-
ing (albeit at different speeds) towards ‘‘market-oriented governance’’, there remains a large heteroge-
neity in the governance of post-communist HE systems (Dobbins & Khachatryan, 2015). Tomusk (To-
musk, 2008) argues that, contrary to Central and Southeastern Europe, the Central Asian Republics did 
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not have an alternative mental model to the Soviet system of higher education, which still represented 
the primary internal point of reference for reforms. In the post-Soviet states which did not have a highly 
developed higher education system before the Soviet Union (such as all of Central Asia, the Caucasus 
and parts of Ukraine), Silova (2011b) noted a more pronounced trend to hold on to, preserve and event 
re-create Soviet-type educational structures and practices. According to them, although features of the 
“Post-Socialist Reform package”19 (Silova & Steiner-Khamsi, 2008) have become part of official policy 
discourse in almost all countries, they are often not implemented in practice (Silova, 2005). Particularly 
in Central Asia, the “traveling policies” promoted by international organizations are said to have clashed 
with the desire of policy-makers to maintain Soviet education legacies (Silova, 2011c). Countries like 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan may even have come to use the rhetoric of Western education reforms to 
legitimize their authoritarian regimes and the return to Soviet models in education (Dailey & Silova, 
2008; Silova, 2005).  
  
                                                          
19 Consisting, among others, of student-centered learning, the introduction of curriculum standards, decentraliza-
tion of educational finance and governance, privatization of higher education, standardization of student assess-
ment, liberalization of textbook publishing  
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4 Framework of Analysis and Research Design  
4.1 Research Questions and Scope of Analysis  
Based on the prior research and the theoretical framework outlined above, the research questions posed 
at the outset of this study are 
RQ 1. How has the governance of higher education systems changed between 1991 and 
2015?  
RQ 2. Is there a convergence towards a “global model” of higher education governance?  
RQ 3. Is there a common model of governance of higher education post-Soviet countries?  
RQ 4. What was the relative influence of national, regional and global factors on the de-
velopment of the governance of higher education? 
Table 10: Research Questions (repeated) 
As we have seen in the above sections, the issue of governance in higher education is a complex and 
multi-faceted one. In order to capture the complex nature, any framework of analysis should satisfy three 
conditions: Firstly, an analytical framework needs to be broad enough to accommodate the large variety 
of instruments of governance of higher education. Secondly, it needs to be lean enough to be able to 
describe and analyze developments in a meaningful way that retains their comparability across HE sys-
tems. Lastly, it needs to be able to take account of context and the relevant actors who are involved in 
and drive the changes.  
Thematic scope: To satisfy the first requirement, in this dissertation, I will study the governance of 
higher education systems by analyzing the changes on five dimensions:  
1. Educational Standards and Quality Assurance 
2. Regulation of Admission to higher education 
3. Institutional governance, decision-making and institutional autonomy 
4. Financing of higher education 
5. Relationship of HEIs to the state 
To address the second requirement, I will provide first a historical account of the changes in each country 
case in chapters 5 through 9. In chapter 10, I will conduct a cross-national comparison and conclusion.  
Time scope: The time scope of the study focuses on the changes in the governance of higher education 
systems during the time frame of 1991-2015.  
Geographical scope: The study sets out to retrace the development of governance of higher education 
systems in those post-Soviet countries, which have joined the Bologna process but are not part of the 
European Union.  
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Ivar Bleiklie focuses on both the methodological and conceptual development of international compar-
ative research. In the first part of his article, he develops a typology of five different strategies for inter-
national comparative research drawing on previous work by Page (1995), Kogan et al. (2000) and 
Skocpol (1980): (1) single country studies, (2) juxtapositions, (3) thematic comparisons, (4) identifying 
causal regularities, and (5) grand theories. My research juxtaposes developments (2) in different post-
Soviet countries and conducts a thematic comparison (3) in order to (4) identify causal regularities (with 
the caveats that causality can only be approximated, not proven).  
Due to feasibility constraints, I have chosen three country cases from among the post-Soviet states, 
which signed the Bologna Declaration but are not EU member States. In selecting cases from among 
the above-mentioned sample, I am following a Most Different Systems Design by picking cases with 
the greatest possible variability of post-Soviet countries in terms of their population, their economic 
development, as well as of regional representation. The selection was based on statistical indicators from 
2012, the latest complete data of data available from UNESCO and UNDATA. The selection of cases 
was not only based on theoretical considerations. Russia was chosen owing to its status as the largest 
post-Soviet state and possibly a model for others. Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian country which 
is a member of the EHEA. Moldova is the South-Western-Most successor-state of the USSR and its 
geographical and cultural proximity to Romania, an EU Member State creates an additional transmission 
vector of institutional change that is worth exploring.  
4.2 Research Methodology, Case Study Design, and Data Collection 
The present dissertation represents an embedded, multiple-case comparative design (Yin, 2003) by an-
alyzing the changes in instruments and actors engaged in the governance of higher education systems in 
multiple country cases. The case studies are based on an analysis of various data sources: official statis-
tics, legislation, organizational documents and websites, media publications, and original interviews 
conducted between in 2015–2017 in Moldova, Russia, and Kazakhstan. Interviewees included top ad-
ministrators of Universities (from the level of an administrative department head to the university pres-
ident), current and former Ministerial and government officials, student activists, education researchers, 
and other experts such as renowned consultants on higher education. To provide anonymity of my in-
terviewees, I will conceal their institutions, names and titles.  
4.2.1 Case Studies and data collection 
The present study sets out to investigate how has the governance of higher education systems changed 
(“what”), what the driving forces were for these changes (“why”) and how these changes by driven by 
and changed the relative importance and power of different actors (“who”). Case studies are an adequate 
research methodology when the main research questions refer to the “how and why” of events, which 
can still be considered as contemporary (Yin, 2003, p. 5). “The essence of a case study [..] is that it tries 
to illuminate a decision or a set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and 
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with what result” (Schramm, 1971). Case studies as a research strategy are particularly useful where 
context plays a crucial role and the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.  
Case studies rely on the triangulation of multiple sources of evidence as well as on theoretical proposi-
tions to guide data collection and analysis in converging lines of inquiry (Yin, 2003). The present study 
is exploratory in nature and therefore does not have specific propositions or prior hypotheses. Rather, it 
aims at a complete portrayal of the developments in terms of the framework of governance of higher 
education systems described in chapter 3.1. The following sources of information will be used to develop 
the case studies.  
 
 
Figure 10: Data sources for case studies 
4.2.1.1 Document Analysis: Analyzing prior research, laws, and policy documents  
Data from primary sources and secondary data was analyzed for the purpose of this study, most of which 
was of a qualitative nature. Primary sources, such as legal documents, government white papers, policy 
recommendations, reports of national advisory bodies and secondary literature such as published aca-
demic texts, international studies and reports, and policy-related studies were collected and analyzed. 
To a degree, although not systematically, I have studied national coverage in national newspapers. I 
gained access to these documents through online sources, data bases, and direct contacts. Based on the 
analysis of this data I reconstructed the national policy processes, the evolution of national regulation 
and developed an initial draft of my understanding of the changes in the overall governance approach.  
These preliminary drafts were shared with higher education experts from the respective case countries 
(e.g. representatives from the Ministries, academics) for confirmation and/or comment. The finalized 
overviews have formed the basis of information and were used to inform the development of semi-
structured interviews. The information collected from document analysis was further used to corroborate 
the data from semi-structured interviews and to follow-up in case of contradictory information.  
Case 
Study
1. Analysis of 
prior research
2. Analysis of 
laws and
policy
documents
3. Semi-
structured
interviews with
key experts
4. Direct / 
participant
Observation
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4.2.1.2 Semi-Structured Interviews with key experts 
Since policy-making is a “messy” process, knowledge about the process is usually privy only to those 
involved in it. This is why expert interviews form the second essential data source for this study, both 
for corroborating the information gathered from document analysis, as well as gathering additional in-
formation on the process. In order to minimize biases and distortions, experts known to hold different 
perspectives were deliberately sought out. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. Altogether, I 
conducted 51 expert interviews, 16 in Russia, 13 in Moldova, 22 in Kazakhstan. An overview of con-
ducted interviews is provided in Table 11.  
 Russian Federation Kazakhstan Moldova 
Number of conducted 
expert interviews 
16 22 13 
Number of organiza-
tional actors covered 
9 15 11 
HEIs Ufa State University; 
Rossiyskiy Noviy Univer-
sitet; Higher School of 
Economics; Rossiyskiy 
Universitet Druzhby 
Narodov 
Nazarbayev University; 
Eurasian National Uni-
versity; German-Kazakh 
University;  
Ablai Khan University;  
Narxoz University;  
Turan University Astana; 
Turan University Almaty 
 
Universitatea Pedagog-
ică de Stat din Moldova; 
Universitatea Liberă In-
ternațională din Mol-
dova; Ion Creanga State 
Pedagogical University;  
Technical University of 
Moldova; Academia de 
Studii Economice  
State Institutions Ministry of Education 
and Science; Russian stu-
dent ombudsman; Roso-
brnadzor 
Ministry of Education 
and Science; Bologna 
Process and Mobility 
Center 
 
Ministry of Education; 
former Direcţia Acredi-
tarea Învăţămînt Supe-
rior ; Moldovan Academy 
of Science; ANACIP; 
CNEAA; former CNEAA  
Other institutions Russian Student Union; 
National Center for Pub-
lic Accreditation;  
European Accreditation 
Agency; Information-An-
alytical Center; Kazakh-
stan's Rectors' Union; 
IQAA; IAAR; World Bank 
Office, Kazakhstan 
 
National Rectors' Coun-
cil of Moldova 
 
Table 11: Expert interviews in the three HE systems 
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4.2.1.3 Direct observation  
Since governance arrangements are not purely historical but play a role in the operation of higher edu-
cation institutions, direct observation of some components of the governance system is possible. Be-
tween June 2016 and August 2017, I have stayed at the Institute of Education at the Higher School of 
Economics. This has allowed me to attend and observe faculty meetings, as well as meetings of a quality 
assurance body. Tacit observations from such occasions contributed to a deeper understanding and fur-
ther refinement of questions for expert interviews.  
4.2.2 Comparing the governance of higher education systems and assessing conver-
gence 
Previous empirical research done on the role of the state in HE falls into two broad lines (Ferlie et al., 
2009): The first focusses on reforms, analyzing their contents and describing the nature of the change 
they aim at. Such examples include Kaiser et al. (2014) and Teichler (2005). The second line of inquiry 
falls into the category of implementation analyses which intend to measure the effect of reforms in terms 
of the quality of change that has taken place. Examples of such kind of studies include Cerych & Sabatier 
(1986), Kehm and Lanzendorf (2006a), Witte (2006), and de Boer et al. (2007). While previous com-
parative research has done a lot to describe ongoing phenomena at higher education by focusing on 
varying aspects of governance, they often do not provide a systematical comparison of the degree and 
direction of change (Dobbins et al., 2011). In addition, a lot of academic studies, as well as country 
reviews of educational policies published by international organizations, portray technical and structural 
trends in higher education systems, without appreciating the historical context, political considerations 
or issues of power (Padure, 2009b).  
In order to make the governance of higher education comparable among countries, Dobbins et al. (2011) 
put forward a framework of empirically observable dimensions of HE governance and policy change 
based on those dimensions addressed in the key literature20 (Clark, B. R., 1983; Estermann & Nokkala, 
2009; Jongbloed, 2003; Neave, G., 1998, 2003; Olsen, 2007). I a second step, building on Olsen (2007) 
and Clark (1983), they formulated three ideal types of higher education governance, defined as ‘‘the 
market-oriented model’’, the ‘‘state centered-model’’ and the ‘‘academic self-rule model’. The authors 
contend, that it the existence of mixed-types is to be expected, such as HE systems, which have evolved 
into hybrid forms of Humboldt or state-centered and market-oriented governance, which are especially 
prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe (Dobbins & Knill, 2009) or that different sub-systems may exist 
in single countries.  
                                                          
20 The dimensions used by Dobbins et al.(2011) are: Institutional structures of the university; Patterns of control 
and quality evaluation; Relations to the state and society; Economic and employer stakeholders; Higher education 
funding mechanisms; Personnel autonomy; Substantive autonomy 
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While initially working with this model, analyzing the degree of convergence of different Higher Edu-
cation systems to three ideal types of governance models failed to capture the nuances of the post-Soviet 
models of higher education governance. I therefore reduced the dimensions of comparison to the five 
categories presented in the following table: 
Relationship between HEIs and the state 
… 
 
Quality Assurance Institutional Governance and 
Autonomy 
Financing higher education 
… … … 
Regulation of access to HE 
… 
Table 12: Compared dimensions of governance models  
4.2.3 Discussion of validity and reliability of the chosen case study design 
Four tests have been commonly used to establish the quality of any empirical social research (Yin, 2003). 
These include construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. In the following par-
agraph I will discuss how I have tried to take them into consideration for this research.  
Construct validity 
Construct validity refers to whether the research adequately represents reality or to what degree the 
researcher’s subjectivity or his choice of data sources distort the results. Case studies which rely to a 
strong degree on the interpretation of data by the researcher are especially vulnerable to this problem. 
To address this challenge, Yin (2003) recommends being specific as to what is to be studied, use multiple 
sources of evidence, and have key informants review the case study drafts. In my dissertation, I have 
tried to do this by combining document analysis with semi-structured expert interviews, and by triangu-
lating the perspective of various experts who each have their own interests and position in the system. 
In order to improve construct validity, I have tried to identify the experts with diverging assessments 
and interests regarding the situation and have discussed my preliminary findings with them.  
Internal validity 
Internal validity is concerned with causal relationships and thus with explanatory rather than exploratory 
case studies. Due to the complexity of the research question and the wide scope of time, internal validity 
is the most challenging aspect of the study. To improve internal validity, I have discussed my reasoning 
and arguments with a wide variety of experts and at scientific conferences.  
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External validity 
External validity refers to the degree to which the findings in one case can be generalized to others. Lack 
of external validity is a general problem of case studies due to the – necessarily – small number of cases. 
While the present study is exploratory in nature and does not aim to develop generalizable theory, the 
identified factors driving the changes in governance in the case studies may help to develop hypotheses 
that be tested and verified in other countries by future research projects.  
Reliability 
The reliability of a research approach lies in its replicability. If, therefore, another researcher was to 
conduct the same case study, he should arrive at the same results. Even though this goal is theoretical, 
since repeating an identical case study would be hardly possible for a number of reasons, the reliability 
criterion is a reminder to minimize researcher biases and errors and to document the procedure in a 
transparent way as will be done in this study.  
4.3 Limitations of the study 
The interaction of agencies of different levels, their respective strength, spheres of influence and local 
embedded structures can help to explain how ideas and concepts travel and get transformed as they are 
implemented in different contexts. While these developments are challenging to portray in text form. I 
will try to address this issue as good as possible by choosing a story-telling approach, reconstructing the 
events, actor interactions and motivations which lead up to the key policy developments, necessarily 
falling short of both objectivity as well as completeness, but trying my best to strive for both.  
A methodological challenge is that the available sources are necessarily biased. Information from expert 
interviews are retrospective assessments of the years 2015-2017, which are distorted by a) self-serving 
biases, b) selective memory, c) the specific individual situations in which interviewees were during the 
time periods discussed, and d) their positions at the time of interviews. In the case of Russia, a particular 
difficulty emerged because serving government officials were barred from meeting with foreigners with-
out explicit permission from their superiors and, in some cases, the security organs. No current official 
of either the Russian Ministry of Education and Science, Rosobrnadzor or Rosakredagenstvo responded 
to my enquiries for an interview, which meant that I had to rely on recently retired officials for their 
views. In Moldova and Kazakhstan, I did not encounter such challenges.  
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5 The Point of Departure: The Soviet Union 
5.1 Introduction - Key features of the Soviet Higher Education system 
At the center of this study is to reconstruct the developments of governance of higher education systems 
over the course of 25 years and to analyze to what degree the developments represent a convergence 
towards a “global model” or a “post-Soviet model”. For this purpose, it is indispensable to describe the 
common point of departure for all post-Soviet higher education systems. This common point of depar-
ture is the higher education system and its governance during the period of the Soviet Union. This chap-
ter will portray this system and highlight its key elements.  
The Soviet Higher Education system was remarkable for a number of reasons. Looking at its historical 
development, the speed and scope of its growth in the first half of the 20th century was impressive. The 
communist project of building a new social structure and converting the backward Russian economy 
into the most advanced economy in the world required tremendous changes in social, economic, and 
cultural institutions, a feat which was impossible without a populace that was properly educated and 
ideologically orientated. Michael David-Fox (2008, p. 75) points to three overlapping agendas when the 
new system of higher education emerged in the 1930ies: The first, driven by the economic goals was 
one of industrialization, putting the needs of the economy above other concerns. The second was a 
“proletarization agenda” focusing on access of previously underprivileged strata, while limiting the in-
fluence of nonparty intelligentsija. Linked to the latter, an ideologization agenda aimed at establishing 
hegemony of party Marxism over rival factions. This agenda produced certain characteristics which 
impacted the development of the higher education system of the Soviet Union and all of its successor 
states.  
Integrated role for higher education in the planned economy 
The Soviet economic development plan executed by the state was the main driving force governing the 
higher education system. The function of the higher education system was to serve the needs of the 
national economy, in particular for the “production” of qualified staff, as well as (to a lesser degree) the 
scientific support to industries and the basic social and economic infrastructure (Kuzminov et al., 2015). 
As higher education was considered as an integral part of the overall planned economy, this had decisive 
impact on its governance (Kuzminov et al., 2015). State planning of production volumes in the economy 
was extended to the number of students, the number of graduates per discipline and the spatial distribu-
tion of disciplines across HEIs in the Soviet Union. The planned number of specialists by discipline, in 
turn, determined the funds available for their training. State control did not end at HEIs though. In the 
same way that the capacity of the HE system was planned based on the projected needs of the economy, 
graduates were assigned to jobs for which they had been trained according to the plan (raspredeleniye). 
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Not complying with the government job placement could lead to criminal charges (Froumin, I., Kou-
zminov, & Semyonov, 2014). In return, companies were required to offer internship placements and 
allocate some of their funding to contractual research and development conducted in HEIs.  
The organizational logic of the Soviet HE system was described by Burton Clark as “the purest case of 
the triumph of the state over oligarchical and market interaction” (Clark, B. R., 1983, p. 142). The HE 
system was set up to serve the goals of the Soviet planned economy and the social engineering objectives 
of the state ideology. It was designed to produce ‘new people for new society’ and was considered and 
conceived of and organized as a part of the socialist economy. The Soviet economy was to resemble a 
‘single common factory’ (Lenin, 1932) and education was an important part of this machinery. Froumin, 
Kouzminov & Semyonov (2014) thus also disagree that the essential characteristic was state-control of 
the HE system per se, but rather that because the state controlled supply and demand for higher educa-
tion, the Soviet HE system represented a “quasi-corporate” higher education system, not unlike corpo-
rate education programs run by large companies. The tight coupling of the HE system to the planned 
economy allowed massive investments and a fast scaling up of the system: In 1915, the Russian Empire 
had a total student enrollment of 127,400 compared to 160 million inhabitants. By the beginning of 
WWII, enrollment has risen to 800,000 and by 1990, to five million students with about 850,000 students 
graduating annually (Yagodin, G. A., Savelyev, Zuyev, & Galagan, 1990, p. 7). In 1990, there were 896 
Soviet HEIs (Avis, 1990).  
Compulsory allocation of graduates 
As the planned economy, which the higher education system was considered a part of, based the number 
of study places in certain disciplines and regions upon the predicted number and nature of needed grad-
uates for jobs in the economy, the manpower planning system contained an element of mandatory allo-
cation of graduates to these jobs. Typically, upon graduation, graduates had to work for three years at 
their assigned place of work.  
 
Political influence 
During the 1920ies, significant steps were taken towards opening access to higher education: tuition 
fees and entrance exams were abolished and families of formerly less-represented classes were given 
privileged access to HEIs via “workers faculties” that were open to everybody. Democratization and 
positive discrimination of this type went hand in hand with ideologization. Party-members were placed 
in teaching and research positions, local Party and Komsomol chapters were opened at every university 
and party representatives had the right to veto any decision made by the rector or university council and 
new obligatory subjects such as “The History of the Communist Party,” “Marxist-Leninist Philosophy,” 
and “Scientific Communism” were introduced (David-Fox, M., 2008; Zaretskiy, 2012). By the mid-
1920s, after universities’ opposition to the state control had been broken through purges and arrests of 
students and professors strict subordination to the government had been reestablished and reinforced 
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(Chanbarisov, 1988, p. 202). The organizational and academic control over universities made universi-
ties highly susceptible to a number of ideological interventions from within the Communist Party (Gra-
ham, 1993). Especially in the first half of the 20th century, interventions into teaching and research was 
most often directed at suppressing intellectual dissent to the basic tenets the State ideology relied upon 
such as Marxism-Leninism, alleged ‘‘bourgeois nationalism’’ from national minorities, and any at-
tempts of religious or private higher education (Johnson, 2008). The social sciences such history, soci-
ology, political economy, economics, or philosophy were most restricted but during the 1940s and 
1950s, political influence was also exerted into areas such as linguistics, botany, and genetics (Jacoby, 
1971; Krementsov, 1997).  
High specialization and fragmentation 
Organizationally, the HE system took on its shape in the 1930ies in an explosion of new HEIs primarily 
caused by the separation of specialized institutes from comprehensive universities into small separate 
institutions which were to educate thousands of technicians and engineers, within shorter time frames 
to work in the industrial sector while more theoretical disciplines and the humanities should be aban-
doned (Chanbarisov, 1988, 193–194, 197). These “new”, relatively small and highly specialized HEIs 
were then organized under the jurisdiction of sectoral ministries (in a process called “otraslirovaniye”). 
As a consequence, almost every sectoral ministry had its own specialized universities.  
One basic organizational principle of Soviet higher education was the strict separation of elements 
(Froumin, I. et al., 2014). This included the separation of teaching, which took place at universities and 
subject-oriented educational institutes, from research, which was organized in a wide array of special-
ized Industrial research institutes, defense laboratories, and the Academy of Sciences. This arrangement 
facilitated close coordination and subordination under the economical or national security interests, but 
left universities bereft of access to the latest research results (Johnson, 2008). For one specific type of 
HEI, so-called industrial universities, the alignment to the needs of the economy was even closer. These 
universities were attached to specific factories and qualified students not for a specific function in a 
specific industry but for a specific role at a particular factory (Ushakov & Shuruyev, 1980, 2014). This 
led to the coordination between higher education and industry, but also to parallelism, inefficient uses 
of financial and human resources, and barriers to movement within the system (Johnson, 2008). In 1990, 
896 Soviet HEIs fell under the remit of over 70 different organizations (Avis, 1990). This had obvious 
consequences: Knowledge was scattered. The necessary critical mass for academic excellence was 
reached but in a few academic centers (mostly in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and specialized military 
research facilities). While the government made efforts to “rotate” staff from teaching and research fa-
cilities to other HEIs and research institutes, the system depended heavily on the state.  
Relative isolation 
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A fear of endangering the legitimacy of the social order and “intellectual contamination” by Western 
ideas on the one hand, and the important role the defense industry in research and development con-
tributed to a relative isolation of the Soviet HE system from the global scientific community. The de-
fense industry determined the priorities of higher education and research priorities to a considerable 
degree and related spending accounted for nearly 70% of research funding (Johnson, 2008). Research 
institutions that were deemed important to national security were often sealed off from all outside con-
tact, some even located in ‘‘closed’’ cities to which access was severely restricted (Dezhina & Gra-
ham, 2002). Overall, only very few students and staff had the opportunity to work or study outside the 
Soviet Union. Often travel abroad were given as “prizes” for good service rather than an investment in 
human capital (Jacoby, 1971, p. 39). Visa for participation in international congresses were granted 
preferably to older researchers who had already passed the most productive phases of their careers. 
“Unregulated” international travel for academic purposes was not permitted to researchers and stu-
dents (Avis, 1990).  
5.2 Structure of the HE system 
After the October revolution, the Soviet government did a series of quick changes to the scale of HEIs, 
their number and internal structure. A number of new universities were established in 1918. In 1919, 
competing departments in several universities were closed as “inefficient duplication of effort” (Kuzmi-
nov et al., 2015). Social sciences and humanities departments were merged and more engineering de-
partments were opened. Research laboratories were split from universities and became their own HEIs 
and new HEIs were being founded at a high pace, while others were being closed down. Two concepts 
drove the boom in the number of HEIs: otraslirovanie meant the dividing up of the entire higher educa-
tion sector into industrial categories and the subordination of universities under the respective sectoral 
ministries. Vtuzirovanie related the conversion of different institutions of education into (technical) HEIs 
and the growth of highly specialized industry institutes21 (David-Fox, M., 2008). As a consequence, 
between 1929 and 1990s the number of HEIs rose from 152 in 1929 to 579 in 1930 to 701 in 1932 
(Chanbarisov, 1988, pp. 193–194). In addition to the expansion of on-site HEIs, part-time and distance 
education programs were increasingly being offered by correspondence offices at established universi-
ties as well as by independent evening and correspondence universities (Kuzminov et al., 2015).  
Types of HEIs 
As a result of this processes of reorganization, by the 1950ies, a vertically and horizontally differentiated 
system emerged. By the end of the Soviet Union, higher education was offered by universities, institutes, 
                                                          
21 Kuzminov, Semenev & Froumin (2015) describe the sometimes bizarre specialized outcomes of this differenti-
ation process, including an “institute of horse breeding”, “Institute of Fur Farming”, the “Moscow Engineering-
Technological Institute of Baking” and others. 
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academies, factory-sponsored higher technical institutions, and other institutions of higher learning (Ya-
godin, G. A. et al., 1990, p. 25). Since this formal designation of HEIs masked rather than clarified 
differences in scope and quality, Froumin, Kouzminov & Semyonov (2014) distinguish the following 
three main types of HEIs during the Soviet period, a structure that remained in place until well after its 
demise (Froumin, I. et al., 2014):  
1. Regional infrastructural HEIs: These were geared to serve regional qualification needs in spe-
cific sectors, such as teacher training, medical, polytechnics, etc. They were usually special-
ized on their field and were clustered around a few regional ‘leader’ HEIs. These ‘leaders’ 
were usually located in the regional capitals and benefited from support from other (research) 
institutions in the same field. 
2. Specialized industrial HEIs focused providing qualifications for a specific sector of industry 
on a national scale (e.g., transport engineering universities or aviation universities in the re-
gions) and for particular factories (enterprises). Like regional infrastructural HEIs, these HEIs 
were part of a network of similar HEIs associated with methodological and research leaders in 
their field 
3. Classical (comprehensive) universities were smaller in number and were responsible to train 
teaching staff for other HEIs (especially in the basic sciences), staff for research institutes and 
personnel for local managerial elites (economics, history and law). 
It should be mentioned that except for some research activities in classical comprehensive universities 
the vast majority of HEIs were pure teaching institutions. Research was conducted at the research in-
stitutes belonging to the Academy of Science. The following table gives an indication of the quantita-
tive scope of the HE system in 1987: 
 Number of HEIs Number of students enrolled 
Universities 69 583,000 
Engineering and Technical Institutes 280 2,149,00 
Agricultural Institutes 100 520,300 
Economics Institutes 52 336,000 
Institutes of Law 5 98,000 
Medical Institutes 83 311,000 
Institutes of Art and Cinematography 61 50,000 
Teacher Training Institutes 200 912,000 
total 850 4,959,300 
Table 13: HEIs by type and number of students based on Yagodin et al. (1990) 
Types of study programs 
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Participation in higher education was possible in full-time, evening (part-time), and correspondence 
(distance learning) programs. During the 1987-1988 academic year, 53.2 per cent of the students were 
enrolled in full-time HE, 11.6 per cent in evening programs (part-time), and 35.2 per cent in correspond-
ence (distance learning) programs (Yagodin, G. A. et al., 1990).  
5.3 The governance of higher education in the Soviet Union 
5.3.1 Actors and their capabilities 
5.3.1.1 The State Planning Committee – Gosplan 
The State Planning Committee (Gosplan) was the agency responsible for centralized economic planning 
in the Soviet Union. Its main responsibility was the creation and administration of five-year plans gov-
erning the economy of the USSR on the basis of which finances were made available to branch ministries 
in the form of itemized budgets. In this function, it was of central importance for resource allocation and 
the overall size of the HE sector.  
5.3.1.2 Ministry of Education and Branch Ministries  
HEIs were subordinated to and financed by different « branch ministries » depending on their speciali-
zation. The ministry of education created overall rules and a model university charter as a sample for 
individual universities and oversaw the development of curricula and the publishing of authorized uni-
versity textbooks.  
5.3.1.3 Higher Attestation Commission (Vysshaya attestatsionnaya komissiya – VAK).  
The VAK was the government agency responsible for overseeing and regulating the awarding of ad-
vanced academic degrees. Its responsibilities included the coordination of the Dissertation Councils 
(dissertatsionnyy sovet) which were set up in all Russian universities and research institutes, promote 
the regulations concerning awarding of academic degrees; award the degrees of Candidate of Sciences 
and Doctor of Sciences (upon the recommendation of the Dissertation Council in the university or re-
search institute where the defense of the dissertation took place); and make decisions on the equiva-
lence of foreign degrees awarded to Russian citizens. Until 1987 the VAK also was responsible to as-
sign the titles of professor and assistant professor to teaching staff at HEIs. Since 1987, these responsi-
bilities were transferred to the State Committee for Public Education or, in some cases, to the universi-
ties themselves (Yagodin, G. A. et al., 1990, p. 54).  
5.3.1.4 Professional Unions (profsoyuzy) and Komsomol 
Since the 1930ies, student participation in university governance had been limited. It was organized 
either in the form of narrowly industry-related professional student unions (profsoyuzy) who lobbied 
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for welfare benefits like food, housing, vacations and scholarships for their members, and the youth 
organization of the Communist Party, the Komsomol, which ideologically prepared students for roles 
in party and state but also organized social and sporting events and socially beneficial activities like 
student construction teams (stroiotryady). Their internal governance structures were strongly hierar-
chic, with leaders often not being students but Civil Servants. Students had no say in the academic 
governance of the university (Chirikov & Gruzdev, 2014). The structure of profsoyuzy and the Komso-
mol was almost identical all over the Soviet Union and they represented the only way to receive gov-
ernment welfare as a student (Chirikov & Gruzdev, 2014). This dual model operated until the end of 
the 1980s when the Komsomol was disbanded although profsoyuzy continued to exist in many post-
soviet countries.  
5.3.2 Educational Standards and Quality Assurance 
According to Kouptsov & Tatur (2001) the quality assurance system of the Soviet Union rested on five 
pillars. These were 1. professional qualification requirements, 2. standard course programs, 3. the qual-
ification and attestation of academic staff, 4. state final certifications of graduates and 5. periodic eval-
uations and controls by ministry commissions and other state agencies.  
5.3.2.1 Professional qualification requirements 
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of 
the USSR formulated ideological and ethical qualities that graduates of higher education should meet 
(Kouptsov & Tatur, 2001). These intended outcomes of higher education were complemented by 
norms of the USSR ministries, such as the Ministries of Labor, Agriculture, Transport, Communica-
tion, or Public Health, which described in great detail, knowledge and skills criteria, which an appli-
cant should meet for employment. These requirements served the orientation point for HEIs to develop 
their study programs. Since 1982, these intended learning outcomes were specified for each “spe-
cialty” (study program) in a set of over 400 standards (Kouptsov & Tatur, 2001). These standards in-
cluded minimum requirements for the professional knowledge and a description of the kinds of prob-
lems graduates should be able to solve.  
5.3.2.2 Standard study plans 
In the Soviet Union, the contents of educational programs were centrally defined by Ministry working 
groups to which leading researchers were appointed by the Ministry and – since 1987 - by so-called 
academic and methodological councils of HEIs engaged in that field of training. These councils devel-
oped standards course programs (“study plans”), curricula, and even fieldwork for each specialty 
(Kouptsov & Tatur, 2001). These standard programs were adopted by the USSR Ministry of Higher 
Education and were mandatory for all HEIs in the USSR. Individual HEIs had the freedom to change 
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up to five per cent of the contents or to change the ratio of academic hours devoted to the study of in-
dividual sections of disciplines (Kouptsov & Tatur, 2001). Course programs, textbooks and instruc-
tional materials were regularly updated every five to six years. In this sense, teaching staff in the pe-
riphery had a quite small degree of autonomy while the most renowned academics had considerable 
influence upon what would be taught all over the country. As one former rector remembers: 
“There was a book […] which was called “higher school of USSR” […]. In it, there were all 
study plans of all specialties which existed at the time. Now of course there are significantly 
more. […] In a study plan, there was defined how many hours, let’s say, for this or that subject. 
Which subject should be studied in which semester. How many practical, how many laboratory, 
how many theoretical teaching hours there should be, etc. Everything was described and ac-
cording to this plan everybody studied, beginning in Vladivostok and ending in Moldova or the 
Baltics. […] Later, when the Soviet Union collapsed, they gave us freedom and there was free-
dom, and everybody did what they wanted. And this was an ugly mess. In this “whatever they 
want” called for the establishment of a system to limit and orientate the direction of development 
for HEIs” (Interview MD No. 12, 2016)  
There were a very limited number of textbooks for subjects which were in use in all such programs in 
the Soviet Union, which further added to the uniformity of study programs. The benefits of the highly 
centralized Soviet plan are clear in reminiscences of older academics: 
There was academic mobility: A student from the (Russian) Far East could move to the west-
ernmost city in Kaliningrad and they would teach him fishery without difficulties. […] The 
most important thing that I now understand is that this was the optimal time saver for HEIs: 
The HEI received a ready study plan, it did not have to break their heads because the study 
plans were prepared on the basis of the qualification requirements of the ministry […] Spe-
cialists had prepared it in advance, the greatest specialist: Members of the academy of sci-
ences, scholars from the academy of science, leading professors – they make the study pro-
grams amazing programs, and the HEI received a ready program. […] But today, the HEI 
draws is all up themselves and we just suffocate in paperwork. […] Now nothing is regulated 
anymore and every HEI fantasizes by itself.” (Interview RU No. 5, 2015) 
5.3.2.3 Qualification and attestation of academic staff 
An important milestone in academics careers was the completion of doctoral studies (aspirantura) after 
which aspirants were awarded the “Candidate of Sciences” degree (kandidat nauk). Doctoral studies 
consisted of research work as well as compulsory pedagogical training. Doctoral theses had to be sub-
mitted to the Higher Attestation Commission (VAK). The VAK controlled the awarding of advanced 
academic degrees and academic ranks in all of the USSR. Academics had to submit their theses and 
apply for recognition of their degrees and academic titles which specialized committees of academics 
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within the VAK verified and accepted or rejected. To update the academic and didactical competences 
of teaching staff, Advanced Training Institutes for university teachers offered pedagogical training. Once 
every five years university teachers could choose to participate in these trainings or opt for research or 
practical training at research institutes or enterprises at their average monthly salaries for up to three 
months (Kouptsov & Tatur, 2001).  
5.3.2.4 State Final Certification 
At the end of their studies, students were assessed by the State Examination Commissions. These com-
missions were composed of internal as well as external professors as well as representatives of other 
concerned organizations, such as firms, enterprises, or factories that employed graduates in the rele-
vant specialty (Kouptsov & Tatur, 2001).  
5.3.2.5 Evaluations by the State Inspectorate of Higher Education Institutions 
In 1967, the State Inspectorate of Higher Education Institutions was founded within the USSR Minis-
try of Higher Education. HEIs were submitted to periodical assessment of their compliance with state 
standards. These assessments verified HEIs adherence to the centrally mandated processes (e.g. lesson 
plans, documentation, study plans, study programs, etc.). The inspectorate could conduct evaluations 
of individual HEIs, to the verify compliance with state regulations. These evaluations were carried out 
by groups of experts in the field in question and their reports highlighted shortcomings and formulated 
recommendation.  
5.3.3 Regulation of admission into higher education  
At the beginning of the Soviet experiment, in order to promote access of formerly disenfranchised clas-
ses of workers and peasants to higher education, all entrance examinations were canceled by decree of 
the Soviet government in 1918.  
Student numbers grew rapidly but the Soviet government eventually understood that the new students, 
many of whom had until recently been illiterate, were badly wanting of the basic requirements needed 
to succeed in higher education. The opening so called “workers’ departments” (rabfak), was indented 
to get young workers and peasants to the minimum level of literacy in order to study at university, which 
did change the social composition of the student body. While workers’ departments were abolished 
before World War II, though they were revived in 1961 in the form of preparatory departments (Kuzmi-
nov et al., 2015).  
Between 1921 and 1936, the class principle of student admissions was introduced to limit the number 
of students from “socially and politically alien” (=bourgeois) elements.  
Since the 1950ies, access to HE was limited by the requirement of having successfully completed sec-
ondary general education as well as on passing an admission selection process. The admissions process 
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involved a single application by students to a single university, travel on-site, and admissions exams 
developed by the university, sometimes accompanied by oral exams (Clark, N., 2005). According to 
Jacoby (1971), this test consisted of written entrance examinations conducted by the university depart-
ments to which they had applied. The requirements varied depending on the field of study but generally 
admittance was granted to those applicants scoring highest on a competitive entrance examination, alt-
hough good school grades, extracurricular activities and membership in party organizations such as the 
Komsomol, having working experience, and being children of peasants and blue-collar workers also 
played a role in admission. Winners of science competitions could sometimes enter HEIs without having 
to pass an entrance examination (Yagodin, G. A. et al., 1990, p. 36). In actual reality, HEIs likely had a 
large degree of influence over which students they accepted. In addition, access to agricultural and med-
ical institutes was open to applicants with relevant work experience in these fields. The central govern-
ment would monitor the quotas of which students were admitted and a trust in the fairness of the system 
was usually given (Winter, 2014). The detailed procedures and criteria for these entrance examinations 
were regulated at the Union-level (Yagodin, G. A. et al., 1990, p. 36), although the actual weighing of 
these criteria was described as rather nontransparent by Jacoby (1971, p. 36). Already in the 1960ies, 
corruption was reported in the university admission process. Jacoby (1971, p. 37) describes tutoring 
rackets with access to admission test questions and outright bribery at the admissions’ office themselves.  
5.3.4 Institutional governance, decision-making and institutional autonomy  
Prior to the October Revolution, Russian universities had had relatively individualized statutes and while 
government and university management had long tried to suppress any form of participatory govern-
ance, the free expression of political opinion or even freedom of assembly (Chirikov & Gruzdev, 2014), 
universities had had relatively individualized statutes. Between 1921 and the mid-1930ies, a strict form 
of control with a high degree of centralization and party-control of all aspects, including the organization 
and the contents of the curriculum was put into place (David-Fox, M. & Peteri, 2008). In 1928, the 
Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR created a General Directorate of Higher and Sec-
ondary Technical Schools (Glavvtuz), which, in order align HEIs closer with the needs of the planned 
economy, transferred their oversight to the respective people’s commissariats (ministries) and depart-
ments: Many ministries such as the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Education, and the Min-
istry of Railways (Yagodin, G. A. et al., 1990, p. 30) maintained and supervised their own specialized 
HEIs which were supervised by them. In order to create some degree of uniform standards, the People’s 
Commissariat for Education (later: Ministry of Education) was tasked with methodical and didactical 
support of all HEIs, as well as with the oversight of teaching and artistic HEIs and (comprehensive) 
universities.  
The higher education system was thus treated as any other state-owned enterprises within the confines 
of the Soviet command administrative economy which resulted in a rather limited institutional auton-
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omy. University rectors were appointed by the respective Federal Ministry to whom they were respon-
sible for the implementation of the central plans. The number of students by specialty (major) was de-
termined by the respective branch ministry in coordination with the State Planning Committee (Gos-
plan). Organizational changes, such as creating a new chair or department required consultation with 
and approval from the Ministry. 
However, in the late 1980ies, the link between HE and the actual needs of industry was perceived to be 
insufficient. While by the end of 1987, 500 branches HEI departments had been established in various 
enterprises, Yagodin et al. (1990, p. 15) criticize that only one percent of the total number of departments 
of HEIs in the USSR maintained such links, which the authors see crucial for a better integration between 
HE and industry.  
5.3.5 Financing of HEIs 
Prior to 1987, funding to HEIs was allocated according to the overall State plan formulated by “Gos-
plan”, the State Planning Commission of the USSR. Funding was calculated according to a number of 
factors. Finances were made available exclusively by the respective branch ministry in the form of item-
ized budgets. Universities (as opposed to institutes and academies), most of which were located in the 
capitals of Soviet republics, were funded by the national budget and their staff received higher salaries. 
All other HEIs in the Soviet Union were divided into three categories (1st, 2nd, 3rd), which directly related 
to their level of funding. The biggest set of expenses were salaries for teaching and service staff which 
were remunerated according to government-determined rates. The number of staff members, in turn, 
depended on the planned number of students. The second-largest item of expenditure were the stipends 
paid out to students enrolled on the state budget. Thirdly, HEIs received additional subsidies for research 
equipment and construction. The funding of these HEIs depended on the finances their branch ministries 
could provide. HEIs related to military research and development were thus generally better funded, had 
better infrastructure and could pay bonuses to (generally centrally tariff-bound and seniority-oriented) 
staff salaries. There was rather little transparency in this matter.  
Central control over the State’s resources undoubtedly helped the rapid expansion of the Soviet HE 
system. The creation and rapid expansion of “worker faculties” in the 1920ies (Yagodin, G. A. et al., 
1990, p. 10) or the rapid expansion of correspondence education (zaochnoye obucheniye) programs were 
arguably only possible because opening a new HEI or program could be mandated centrally (Johnson, 
2008; Rosen, 1963). In another example, the deficit of professors and qualified scientific personnel to 
train engineers in the Eastern regions of the USSR was addressed by setting up “science cities” (nau-
kogrady) in Novosibirsk, Irkutsk, Kemerovo, and elsewhere (Rosen, 1963). Likewise, a system of di-
dactical and research exchanges was established centrally between HEIs within the USSR and abroad, 
to disseminate knowledge and research findings.  
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In 1987 it was decided that central planning would be eased and the financing of HEIs should be routed 
via direct contracts between businesses and HEIs, research contracts in addition to state funding for the 
training of a certain number of students. Centralized financing of HE by the State was foreseen to be 
limited to the social and cultural spheres as well as to certain strategic fields of scientific and technical 
development (Yagodin, G. A. et al., 1990, p. 65). In all other fields, companies and other organizations 
were to take over the financing of HE of future employees.  
5.4 The HE Reforms of 1987  
The issue of insufficient quality in education and in manufacturing was heavily debated during the 
1980ies in the Soviet Union. The first conferences on the management of educational quality were or-
ganized in the early 1980ies (Kouptsov & Tatur, 2001). In the last years of the Soviet Union (1986-
1991), “the quality of education became the core issue of educational policy” (Kouptsov & Tatur, 2001). 
Avis (1990) argues that the key problem resulted from shortcomings of central planning: Political pri-
orities favored the number of graduates over the quality of their education, which was conducted by 
under-funded HEIs which lacked properly equipped laboratories and relied mostly on formal lecture-
course-style didactics. On a more fundamental note, the central planning of educational capacity sys-
tematically overestimated real demand and the mandatory placement of graduates to secure jobs created 
little incentive for genuine motivation for their professional studies. 
In 1987, the final edition of the “Basic Guidelines on the Restructuring of Higher and Secondary Spe-
cialized Education” was published in Pravda of 21 March 1987. They contained a number of fundamen-
tal changes to the contents, forms of delivery and the governance of the Soviet HE system. The over-
arching aim was to improve the quality and the relevance of higher education. The Guidelines foresaw 
a number of changes to the organization of higher education in the Soviet Union:  
Foundation of State Committee for Public Education of the USSR 
At the State level, the Ministry of Education of the USSR and the State Committees for Vocational 
Training and Technical Education of the USSR were abolished and replaced by a new State Committee 
for Public Education of the USSR (Yagodin, G. A. et al., 1990, p. 14). Among its tasks were the formu-
lation of a uniform policy for the quality of education, a strategy for the development of HE and to 
provide guidance of sectoral HEIs (Yagodin, G. A. et al., 1990, p. 30). In addition, in 1988, a special 
“All-Union Council for Public Education” was formed as an advisory body for the development of pub-
lic education.  
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The State Committee for Public Education proposed to fundamentally change the internal governance 
of HEIs, most notably introduce the election of rectors22, and defined the powers of vice-rectors, deans, 
vice-deans as well as various HEI councils (Yagodin, G. A. et al., 1990, p. 33).  
Integration of HEIs through regional centers for higher education 
13 regional centers for higher education were established in the USSR23 in order to improve the intra-
regional coordination of HE activities. These centers were intended to coordinate the activities of all 
HEIs in the regions, regardless of the branch ministries they were subordinated to. The activities of the 
regional centers were to be determined “on a democratic basis” by the council of rectors of the higher 
education institutions of a given region (Yagodin, G. A. et al., 1990, p. 31).  
Educational and methodological associations 
As part of the 1986-87 reforms, the idea of university autonomy was strengthened. The definition of 
curricular contents was decentralized through the creation of several “educational and methodological 
associations”. These associations were grouped around disciplinary specialties and were funded by the 
HEIs involved in training of specialists in those domains (Yagodin, G. A. et al., 1990, p. 31). The task 
of the associations was to improve didactics, link teaching closer to research and to the needs of industry. 
The associations themselves were to be supervised by special councils made up of the “rectors […], 
leading professors […], distinguished specialists employed in the national economy” (Yagodin, G. A. 
et al., 1990, p. 31). The associations were established both along disciplinary (“e.g. engineering educa-
tion” as well as regional lines (“HEI of the city of Moscow).  
Integration of HEIs through UNPKs, SECs, and MNTKs 
HEIs were asked to improve their link to industry via branches, the formation of “Educational, Scien-
tific, and Industrial Complexes” (UNPKs), “Scientific and Educational Centers” (SECs), “intersectorial 
and interdisciplinary higher education-industry”, and “scientific-technical complexes attached to higher 
education institutions” (MNTK) (Yagodin, G. A. et al., 1990). As an incentive not to overstate their 
staffing and training needs, enterprises were asked to financially contribute to the training of specialists 
at HEIs which, in 1990, had already borne some fruits (Yagodin, G. A. et al., 1990, p. 19).  
Quality Assessment of HEIs 
At the level of individual HEIs, a review process was started. All HEIs should be visited by state inspec-
tors who published detailed appraisals of their work (Avis, 1990). As a result of these inspections, those 
HEIs that were not found satisfactory were to be warned, faced repeat inspection or were closed down 
                                                          
22 As a result of perestroika, HEIs were allowed to elect their own rectors since 1987 as determined by the “statute 
of elections of rectors of higher education institutions” 
23 Regional Centers were established in Moscow, Leningrad, Minsk, Kiev, Rostov, Dnepropetrovsk, Chelya-
binsk, Tomsk, Penza, Voronezh, Sverdlovsk, Kharkov, and Gomel 
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or merged with other institutions (Vestnik Vysshei Shkoly, 1988a, 1988b). The reforms intended to 
broaden the curricula, diversify and individualize teaching methods, cut the number of students admitted 
to HE and creating additional incentives for high-performing students. On the other hand, they intro-
duced stricter student assessment and removed incentives to graduate students regardless of their per-
formance. In HEIs annual assessments of teaching staff by students was to be introduced, with conse-
quences for salaries and jobs, which were to be distributed in open competitions every five years.  
Prior to the 1980ies, there had been little to no experience with external assessment of educational in-
stitutions, so examples from other countries, most prominently USA and Great Britain were studied and 
taken into account (Interview RU No. 3, 2015).  
Competitive Recruitment of Staff Members 
Until 1987, HEI staff serving in academic positions (such as department heads, professors, assistant 
professors, senior teachers, and assistant lecturers) could continue their employment without a compet-
itive assessment of their performance. Since 1987 these contracts had to be re-announced on a yearly 
basis (Yagodin, G. A. et al., 1990, p. 55).  
Greater institutional autonomy 
A significant step towards institutional autonomy of HEIs was the decision that every HEI should be 
governed by to its own charter (Beliakov, Lugachyov, & Markov, 1999). The guidelines for these char-
ters included the provision that rectors were to be elected by university academic councils or senates 
rather than directly appointed by the Ministry. 
Unified list of study programs 
The offer of possible study programs was regulated by the responsible ministries via lists of specializa-
tions. The contents of curricula as well as syllabi were defined at the Union level and specified the 
content and the sequence of all courses for each study program offered within the Soviet Union (Ya-
godin, G. A. et al., 1990, p. 41). The standards were very detailed and included provisions detailing the 
number of teaching hours foreseen for groups of individual subjects, individual projects, the different 
types of classes (lectures, seminars, laboratory work, practical work, etc.), and the numbers of tests, and 
examinations They determined the order of courses which were grouped in “general education subjects” 
(fundamental sciences and humanities), “general professional subjects” (fundamental subjects relevant 
for the discipline or profession), and “specific subjects” (courses on specific current issues of the pro-
fession).  
A certain amount of teaching hours was left at the discretion of the individual institutions who were 
expected to allocate them in coordination with the needs of particular employers’ or regional needs.  
Model curricula 
Curricula had become highly specific with specializations such as “locomotive-building”, “the technol-
ogy of transport machine-building and repair the rolling stock”, and “diesel-locomotives and the diesel-
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locomotive industry” existing as separate study programs (Yagodin, G. A. et al., 1990, p. 41). The par-
allelism of ministries resulted in considerable duplication and overlap as well as likely a high degree of 
non-transparency for students and employers. As part of the 1987 reforms, a list of 300 specializations 
was defined which considerably reduced the previous list. In additional HEIs could develop “model 
curricula” which had to be submitted to and approved by the State Committee for Public Education of 
the USSR as well as by the ministries and departments involved (Yagodin, G. A. et al., 1990, p. 43).  
The 1986-87 reforms certainly marked a clear distancing from orthodox ideas about the organization 
of both the economy as well as the higher education system, which suffered from growing inefficiency 
caused by the rigidities of the Soviet public administration system. In the end, however, while ambi-
tious, the reforms failed to be widely implemented and have a significant effect on universities before 
the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 (Zaretskiy, 2012).  
5.5 The break-up and transition of the Soviet higher education system 
After a series of crises and reforms, the declaration of independence of the Baltic States, and a putsch 
of senior officials against Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, who had become the first directly elected President 
in Russian history, arrested the putschists after three days, banned the Soviet Communist Party in Russia 
and seized its assets. By recognizing the independence of the Baltic republics and declaring Russia itself 
as independent of the Soviet Union, the Union itself de facto ceased to exist and was officially dissolved 
on December 26, 1991 by the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. As a consequence, 15 countries 
gained their independence, some voluntarily (Georgia, Moldavia, Belarus, the Baltic States, Russia and 
Ukraine) and some involuntarily (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan).  
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the victory of the “Western values” of liberal democracy and 
capitalism was celebrated in political as well as academic circles. Francis Fukuyama (1992) famously 
argued that the advent of Western liberal democracy was not only inevitable but signaled the endpoint 
of humanity's sociocultural evolution and the final form of human government. At the surface, during 
the first years of independence this seemed to be indeed happening, as governments across the former 
“Socialist block” revised their constitutions, laws and policies pronouncing market economy, demo-
cratic pluralism and the respect for human right as the pillars of their new institutional fabric. Expecta-
tions of the future were rosy. Enthusiastic proponents of free markets expected that over the course of a 
year or two, the countries’ economies, freed from the shackles of central planning, were to enter an 
unprecedented economic boom.  
Reality, however, set it rather quickly. The breakup of the Soviet Union had brought countries into being 
which never existed as independent entities and which had close to no experience in self-governance. 
As the old planned economies ceased to exist, and the expected “blooming countrysides” failed to ma-
terialize, supplier-relationships ceased to function, economies crashed, and unemployment skyrocketed. 
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The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about dramatic changes eroding the economical basis for 
reforms (Linn, 2004): 
• collapse of the integrated payments system and formal and informal inter-enterprise links 
• end of budgetary and investment subsidies from Moscow 
• Price support or subsidies, such as energy, eliminated 
• Formal customs and trade barriers introduced 
• Transport prices raised and transport services re-oriented, particularly the regularity of air and 
rail services 
• Integrated power grids, including water systems, collapsed 
• Migration of ethnic Russians from the new republics to Russia  
• Collapse of Union security framework without replacement 
The reality for the vast majority of the populations was grim. While the transition did lift the “slavery 
of communism”, for most it was replaced by the “unfreedom” of poverty (Tomusk, 2006). The new 
countries were faced with a “triple transition” (Offe & Adler, 1991), as they had to simultaneously cope 
with democratization, establishing a market economy, and state- and nation-building. On a whole, as-
suring the immediate physical needs of the population took a priority before developing the education 
system. For higher education, this ‘‘simultaneous transformation’’ meant having to transform higher 
education systems at the same time as moving from a planned to a market economy. Policy choices 
added to the challenge: In the early 1990ies, state funding for higher education was abruptly cut. At the 
same time, economic enterprises were chaotically privatized. In this situation, universities not only 
struggled with the same issues of underfunding, lacking transparency and international competitiveness 
as did their Western European neighbors (Neave 2003: 20), but also with rapidly contracting public 
budgets, inflation, an often-precarious socio-economic condition, and political instability.  
In many post-Soviet States, where ethnic identity had played an important role in their struggles for 
independence and the education policy of the first post-independence years was dominated more by 
the goal restoring of the place of national languages in the educational system ahead of considerations 
of quality, funding, and sustainability.  
Common developments in Post-Socialist higher education 
Under these conditions, HEIs needed to assure their own survival, liberate themselves from ideological 
control, develop new or restore old organizational forms, as well as coping with the rapidly expanding 
private HE sector (Dobbins & Khachatryan, 2015). Those countries, where there had been a tradition of 
higher education, such as in Central, Northern and South-Eastern Europe, tried to get rid of the heritage 
of their socialist higher education systems (Tomusk, 2004) reestablish their pre-war cultural legacy of 
democratic, academic self-rule and research-oriented universities (Dobbins & Khachatryan, 2015; 
Padure, 2009b). Most successor countries of the former Soviet Union, however, had only developed a 
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noteworthy higher education system after the October Revolution (Bischof & Tofan, 2018; Padure, 
2009b), which made a “return” to a supposed status ex-ante impossible.  
The lack of institutional autonomy and professional networks had left higher education unprepared for 
the disappearance of central coordination by the State. While the old components of systems were often 
thrown into disarray, entrepreneurial actors seized the moment. The lack of the public resources neces-
sary for sustaining and reinventing the HE system and the disappearance of oversight and accountability 
mechanisms opened the doors to corruption. In the legislative vacuum in most post-Soviet States, en-
treneurial professors and businessmen created new public and private their own universities, ranging 
from a few legitimate high-quality universities24 to an array of under-regulated legal and business ‘‘acad-
emies,’’ as well as blatantly commercial and often low-quality ‘‘affiliates’’ (filialy) of public and private 
universities across the region. Cuts to state funding for higher education and market liberalization led to 
a mushrooming of private higher education virtually in all Post-Socialist countries. The absence of the 
State and mechanisms for political accountability further contributed to corruption and an erosion of 
standards.  
Some authors even argue that because of run-away massification, under-funding, semi-privatization, 
growing corruption, brain-drain and over-aging of the impoverished academia faculty, the knowledge 
taught in higher education has become increasingly outdated and has all but lost its function to create 
new knowledge or develop critical thinking and problem-solving skills in its students (Tomusk, 2006). 
Instead, according to Tomusk, in many countries higher education has become primarily a social insti-
tution, re-creating social order and societal hierarchies, devaluating the content of higher education cre-
dentials and leading to a sell-off of dubious certificates by impoverished academics or private higher 
education entrepreneurs. On the other hand, new high quality HEIs did appear as well, mostly in the 
capitals and major urban centers25. Demand for new curricular content in economics, law, business, 
religious studies, history, and sociology created a boom for such study programs and faculties and the 
new universities were also often the first to pioneer “new” curricular contents, which under the Soviet 
system of higher education had not existed. The lack of state funding, however, led to plunging salaries 
and the chronic inability of higher education or research institutions to afford the purchase of publica-
tions or new equipment. This not only forced many public HEIs to seek out new sources of funding 
                                                          
24 Among them, such institutions as the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, the European University of St. 
Petersburg, and the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences in Russia; Khazar University in Azerbaijan; 
the American University of Armenia; the Kyrgyz- Turkish Manas University and the American University of 
Central Asia in Kyrgyzstan, the Russian State Humanities University and the State University Higher School of 
Economics in Moscow, the University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in Ukraine, and the Kazakhstan Institute of 
Management, Economics and Strategic Research. 
25 Examples include the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, the European University of St. Petersburg, the 
Khazar University in Azerbaijan; or the American University of Central Asia in Kyrgyzstan, the Kyiv-Mohyla 
Academy in Ukraine, or the Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics and Strategic Research 
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(typically through the introduction of tuition fees). While some academics stayed on, under-funding and 
opportunity led to a large scale ‘‘brain drain’’ out of the profession and out of the country.  
Johnson (2008) argues that the structure of the Soviet system of HE, its close integration with profes-
sional and economic spheres in particular regions and industries, its reliance on state funding and coop-
eration with other HEIs and industries in the planned-economy system of the Soviet Union left it partic-
ularly exposed to the dramatic changes the collapse of this system caused. When the system collapsed, 
the Soviet-era separation of teaching, research, and advanced professional training into different organ-
izations which were governed by different branch ministries left them without a coordinating mechanism 
when central coordination by the State suddenly ceased to function. Johnson (2008) argues that the ideal 
of “pure” (basic) research, which was deeply rooted in the Academy of Science research institutes, and 
a general bias towards theoretical, rather than applied research additionally may have represented addi-
tional obstacles to using new ways to conduct research, exploiting economic and technological innova-
tion (Schweitzer, 2000) or implementing new approaches to higher education management, which HEIs 
without the means to proactively address the challenges the new environment represented for them. The 
prior lack of institutional autonomy and proactiveness in establishing, maintaining and coordinating 
inter-institutional relationships made it difficult for HEIs to take over the coordinating functions so sud-
denly abandoned by the State. The reforms thus dismembered a highly integrated and (relatively) func-
tional HE system, without warning and without a deeper understanding of what was coming.  
The macro-context of the political-economic system influences the values and capacities needed for 
successful governance of higher education. As a report by the World Bank and the OECD (2007) high-
lights:  
“If a planned economy required from HEIs the management capacity to achieve the goals set 
for them from the outside, a market economy required the capacity to set their own goals and 
to achieve them. If a planned economy required a culture of compliance from HEIs, a market 
economy required initiatives from them. If, in a planned economy, HEIs received resources to 
deliver the goals set by the government, in a market economy HEIs were also responsible for 
mobilizing the resources to meet the goals set by themselves. If, in an authoritarian political 
regime, HEIs have been tightly controlled by administrative authorities, an open society re-
quires more autonomy, accompanied by accountability to all stakeholders including students, 
teachers and employers” (World Bank & OECD, 2007) 
Without doubt, the end of the Soviet Higher Education system, also brought opportunities. Perhaps 
most importantly, scholars and students across the former Soviet Union were able to travel more 
freely. They were free from explicit censorship and a whole array of new international exchanges and 
grant programs appeared from which the more entrepreneurial and internationally-minded could profit 
for research and study mobility. In general, however, well-intentioned as they may have been, the pol-
icy intentions of the early 1990s were “were so wildly beyond the capacity of the post-Soviet systems 
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to implement that they constituted a sort of academic (and public policy) malpractice“ (Johnson, 
2008).   
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6 The Russian Federation 
6.1 Introduction 
The Russian Federation became the official successor State of the Soviet Union in 1991. It represented 
the core and the heart of the Russian Empire as of the Soviet Union. Even after independence, Russia 
remained the world’s largest country by area, covering more than one-eighth of the Earth's inhabited 
land area. In 2015, Russia’s total population was 144,096,000. In 2015, the Russian economy ranked as 
the twelfth largest by nominal GDP. The State language is Russian. In several regions, different minority 
languages also have official status. Within the post-Soviet Space, the territory of the Russian Federation 
(along with Ukraine) had been the seat of the first pre-revolutionary universities and it hosts on its ter-
ritory the largest number and most significant of universities and research institutions.  
6.2 The development of the governance of the higher education system in 
Russia 
Elec-
toral pe-
riod 
President’s Party/Coali-
tion 
President Prime Minister(s) Minister(s) of Edu-
cation (Since 2004: 
Education and Sci-
ence) 
1991-
1999 
Independent; Our Home-
Russia; Fatherland-All 
Russia, Unity 
Boris Yeltsin Boris Yelstin (91-92) 
Yegor Gaidar (92) 
Viktor Chernomyrdin 
(92-98) 
Sergey Kiriyenko (98) 
Viktor Chernomyrdin 
(98) 
Yevgeny Primakov 
(98-99) 
Sergey Stepashin (99) 
Vladimir Putin (99) 
Boris Saltykov (91-
92) 
Evgeniy Tkachenko 
(92) 
Vladimir Kinelev 
(96-98) 
Alexander Tikhonov 
(1998) 
Vladimir Filippov 
(1998-) 
1999-
2008 
Unity, Independent Vladimir Putin Mikhail Kasyanov 
(00-04) 
Mikhail Fradkov (04-
07) 
Viktor Zubkov (07-08) 
Vladimir Filippov (-
2004)  
Andrey Fursenko 
(2004-2008) 
 
2008-
2012 
United Russia Dmitry Medvedev Vladimir Putin (08-12) Andrey Fursenko 
(2008-2012) 
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2012-
2017 
United Russia Vladimir Putin Dmitry Medvedev 
(12-17) 
Dmitry Livanov 
(2012-2016 
Olga Vasilyeva 
(2016- 
Table 14: Overview of ruling parties and cabinets in the Russian Federation 1991-2017 
6.2.1 De-regulation and marketization of higher education (1991-2000) 
The changes in governance of higher education of the 1990ies can be characterized with the terms de-
centralization, liberalization and marketization (Adrian et al., 2000; Bain, O. B., 2003). The proclaimed 
goals of democratization and the establishment of a market economy in post-Soviet Russia quickly made 
itself feel in the educational sphere. Marxism as the official ideology was renounced immediately and 
universities replaced the compulsory Marxist subjects with presumably non-ideological substitutes.  
Partially in response to the budgetary crisis, and partially due to the market-liberal ideology of the early 
1990ies, the government assumed a laisser-faire attitude towards the regulation of the HE system. Two 
laws, “On Education” (1992) and “On Higher and Postgraduate Education” (1996) established a new, 
market-liberal framework of higher education. The increase in university autonomy compared to the 
Soviet era was enormous. The government let go of a lot of regulation and micro-management of HEIs. 
If, during Soviet times, the State had controlled the operations of all HEIs to a deep level, the State 
defined the contents, the structure, the salary, the nomination of rectors and other key personnel, then 
the 1992 and 1996 laws brought unprecedented autonomy to Russian HEIs: While curriculum autonomy 
was still rather limited by relatively rigid State Standards, although unlike as during Soviet times, as 
HEIs now had the freedom so use any textbook they liked. HEIs received the right to enroll students on 
a tuition-fee basis and to open new study programs. The opportunity to generate their own money rep-
resented one of the most significant departure from the Soviet governance framework (Interview RU 
No. 9, 2017). Educational institutions, among them HEIs, received considerable financial autonomy 
from the state. They were permitted to engage in entrepreneurial activity and to reinvest possible reve-
nues even into areas not directly related to their educational mission (Beliakov et al., 1999). As the state 
withdrew considerably from financing higher education, the Soviet-system of predetermined staff tariffs 
depending on seniority, function and academic degrees could not be maintained any more. HEIs became 
free to define their internal organization, to employ their own staff and set their own salaries, to rent and 
lease assets, and to establish new legal such as branches (Beliakov et al., 1999) and even to change their 
status from institute to academy or university. Because of the budget contractions, during the 1990ies, 
the majority of HEIs used their new organizational autonomy mainly for economic survival, rather than 
for innovation (Interview RU No. 9, 2017).  
One of the most significant changes regarding the governance of HEIs was that rectors were now elected 
by academic councils (Interview RU No. 9, 2017). While formally corresponding to western models of 
academic self-governance, in fact, this arrangement gave rectors a significant degree of power, because 
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the internal governance of HEIs did not change. Since rectors ex-officio chair academic councils and 
other ex-officio members such as vice-rectors, and directors of institutes are nominated by the rector, 
the rector controls the agenda for meetings and dominates the decision making-process (Beliakov et al., 
1999). Their high degree of power over staff decisions and allocation of finances, the considerable sta-
bility in HEI leadership and high turnover of teaching staff (who did not enjoy the same degree of job-
security and privileges as in most Western countries), the new arrangement de-facto put rectors firmly 
in charge of universities, with relatively little accountability and oversight. In Russia during the 1990ies, 
the rectors of the most prestigious HEIs such as Moscow State University became powerful actors, 
sometimes on a par with ministers of education (Drummond, T. W., 2011).  
The idea of decentralization was strongly expressed in the 1992 Law. Municipal and private higher 
education educations were legalized, the number which soon mushroomed26. The law assigned general 
policy, legal framework and evaluation of the functioning of the higher educational system as a respon-
sibility of the federal government, while other decentral, regional bodies would be responsible for im-
plementation and formulating regional specificities, while municipal bodies would be responsible for 
the day-to-day management of local institutions (Adrian et al., 2000, p. 111). For a short time between 
1992 and 1996 even the Russian regions gained the right to license new HEIs.  
On the other hand, the federal government, remained the owner of all institutions of the public higher 
education and the affiliation of HEIs to various branch ministries continued. The Ministry of education 
retained its right to grant licenses, accredit institutions, and assign admission quotas. The branch minis-
tries, which are considered as potential employers or have intimate ties with production units, finalize 
the admission quotas just in a formal way (Adrian et al., 2000, p. 115).  
  
                                                          
26 Private HEIs underlie the same requirements regarding quality assurance of their study programs, teaching staff 
and their management structures and must submit to the same monitoring instruments as government-owned HEIs. 
They have a different legal status and must follow the tax code of private enterprise. 
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6.2.1.1 1992-1997: A new framework of quality assurance  
In order to assure the quality of more autonomous HEIs as well as to maintain a unified educational 
space in Russia (Interview RU No. 4, 2015), the 1992 Law On Education established a new framework 
for quality assurance. State Educational Standards would define common standards for the operation of 
higher education institutions and the contents of study programs, while a system of State licensing, 
attestation, and accreditation (litsenzirovaniye, attestatsiya i akkreditatsiya) would certify that HEIs 
complied with these standards, which were the same for both State as well as private HEIs. The first set 
of the SES was developed between 1992 and 1996 and entered into force in 1994-95. It contained over 
600 state standards for every education program being taught at HEIs at the time in Russia. The system 
of state standards, licensing, attestation and accreditation entered into force in full between 1995 and 
1997. This meant that the quality assurance system changed from a model of state-set targets, control, 
and inspection into one based on a set of rules within which private initiative in this sector became 
possible, something that had never existed in Russia previously (Motova & Pykkö, 2012).  
Under the new system licensing was a procedure to verify whether an HEI had sufficient facilities 
(premises, equipment, information and library resources, and teaching staff) to carry out educational 
activities. Attaining a license meant that HEIs are authorized to deliver instruction and benefit from 
certain tax benefits (EACEA, 2012c). Licensing needed to take place before any students had started 
their studies. Attestation consisted of verifying graduate’ performance on the dimensions outlined in 
State Educational Standards (SES). The State Inspection Service (gossudarstvennaya inspektsiya) was 
charged with examining every State HEI every five years for compliance with the SES. Since the process 
required graduates, it could only be conducted five years after the first cohort of students started their 
degree. Non-compliance could lead to a closure of the HEI. Accreditation was a process focusing on 
the institution leading to formal recognition of an HEI’s status by the State. A positive result granted the 
accredited institution the right to award nationally recognized diplomas of the state format and made it 
eligible to participate in state budget funding mechanisms. Successful accreditation granted HEIs a sta-
tus as either institute, academy or university, depending on their performance on a number of statistical 
indicators and the results of licensing and attestation. As opposed to licensing, which was mandatory 
for both private as well as public HEIs, accreditation was formally mandatory only for public HEIs. 
However, as only studies at accredited HEIs exempted male students from obligatory military service, 
all HEIs there was a strong incentive for private HEIs to apply for accreditation. In case of a positive 
decision, the HEI was granted a Certificate of State Accreditation with a supplement which lists the 
accredited educational programs the HEI had the right to offer. The certificate was granted for the period 
of five years.  
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In order to administer the procedures, in 1994, the Department of 
Licensing, Accreditation and Nostrification was founded within 
the Ministry of Education. Subordinated to the department, spe-
cialized centers were founded to provide statistical information 
(Research and Information Centre of State Accreditation, founded 
in 1995 Yoshkar-Ola) to administer reviewing expert panels (Main 
Expert Centre of the Ministry of Education, established in Mos-
cow), and to verify the compliance of study programs with the SES 
within the framework of the attestation process the (Information 
and Methodological Centre on Attestation, founded in Shakhty). 
The Department of Licensing, Accreditation and Nostrification it-
self coordinated the relations between HEIs and the special-
ized centers. Decisions on state accreditation were delegated to 
the Accreditation Board at the Russian Ministry of Educa-
tion. The decisions on licensing, attestation and accreditation were taken by the same commission and 
were often taken simultaneously (Motova, 2015). The board was composed of heads of HEIs, and rep-
resentatives of associations of HEIs and sectoral ministries (Chistokhvalov, 2007). The first 20 accred-
itations were conducted in April of 1997.  
Motova & Rykkö (2012) argue that “objectivity, openness, transparency and availability of information 
were put forward as the main principles of state accreditation”. They argue that the Russian state ac-
creditation methodology is based on the US model of institutional accreditation, it was actually relatively 
liberal in allowing different types of HEIs to apply for State Recognition and establishes clear standards 
and a transparent procedure to attain it.  
6.2.1.2 1992-2000: Economic crisis, boom and growth of autonomy of HEIs 
At the same time, however, the economic and above all industrial base of Russia collapsed. Between 
1990-2000, some estimates place the contraction of the Russian GDP at almost 50% (Adrian et al., 2000) 
This decline went hand in hand with a massive loss of employment, most pronounced in industry (36%), 
followed by agriculture (20%), construction (23%), transport and communication (16%) (Gimpelson, 
Kapeliushnikov, & Lukyanova, 2007). While employment numbers stayed relatively constant in educa-
tion, inflation reduced real-salaries often to poverty-levels and there were times, when payment of even 
these meager salaries was several months late. While employment numbers went down, the demand for 
specialists with higher education rose, especially in the areas of economics, law and other “new” disci-
plines. The drive for higher education was further strengthened by students aspiring to higher education 
due to a lack of other options on the labor market.  
Figure 11: Institutional arrangement of 
the 1992-2004 system of accreditation 
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This situation led to a colossal growth of enrollment into HE and likewise of the number of HEIs. A 
number of new government HEIs appeared. An even greater growth appeared in the sector of non-gov-
ernmental HEIs. Both State and non-State HEIs founded new departments, new branches in other cities. 
This growth followed its own, market-driven logic, not government planning or strategy. Indeed, the 
government tried to curb the quantitative growth and the transformation of institutes and academies into 
universities (who could apply for more funding and could participate in special government investment 
programs), but by the end of the 1990ies, the majority of state HEIs had the status of universities.  
When State HEIs received the right to accept students on a fee-paying basis (those who had not been 
successful at securing a state-funded place), their number rose so quickly that there were attempts to 
curb their enrollment, in particular in the social sciences and some humanities fields, at least somewhat. 
In 1996, the government introduced a quota of 25% on the number of fee-paying students at state HEIs 
for these fields. Such 'private' enrollment was not supposed to exceed state supported enrollment in 
absolute numbers, but the quota was frequently ignored by HEIs. The rising demand for university stud-
ies also made university entrance examinations much more competitive. In 1999, the number of appli-
cations surpassed by the number of study places in public universities by a factor of two overall, by a 
factor of as many as 12 to 14 for each place at prestigious institutions (Smolentseva, 2010). The combi-
nation of high competitiveness, a sometimes low level of preparedness for the examinations, and the 
high cost of private tutoring, led to a situation in which the transition interface between school and 
university had become particularly ripe with corruption (Smolentseva, 2010).  
The 1990ies can be characterized as a period of market-liberalization in which HEIs received substantial 
institutional autonomy. As a former vice-minister for education remembered, “We cannot give you 
money but we can give you freedom” was a prevalent understanding between HEIs and the Ministry of 
Education during the 1990ies (Interview RU No. 14, 2017). During this time, there was very little in the 
way of state “signaling” to HEIs what they wanted them to do (Interview RU No. 9, 2017)27. The quality 
assurance framework of licensing, attestation and accreditation and the State Standards represented 
some barriers and structure to the HE system but essentially, HEIs were “on their own” and the Govern-
ment did not have a strong policy agenda and was not actively pursuing a development strategy (Inter-
view RU No. 9, 2017). The reasons for this “laissez-faire” attitude were multiple. On the one hand, US-
American economic liberalism dominated the ideological agenda in many areas and it was assumed that 
market forces would eventually counteract early negative side-effects. Secondly, the budget crisis also 
effected the government institutions which limited the capacity of the state to effectively intervene. 
Thirdly, Motova argues (2015) that the massive expansion of the HE system indeed served to ensure 
social cohesion: Given the difficult economic situation, in the absence of jobs, higher education was to 
be made available to all parts of the population, even at the expense of quality.  
                                                          
27 The interview partner is a senior Russian researcher on higher education 
  
page 105 
6.2.2 Renaissance of state control, internationalization and renewed investment into 
higher education (2000-2004) 
During the 1990s, Russian HEIs had struggled to adapt to the new conditions with “one economic foot 
in the private market and another in the inherited Soviet economic model” (Forrat, 2015). In the begin-
ning of the 2000s, the government began to reassert itself and its steering capacity for the higher educa-
tion system. Political conditions for policy reforms had changed in Russia. Rising oil-prices and the 
ruble-depreciation of 1998 contributed to rapid economic growth thereafter. This economic boon in 
connection with the end of the second Chechenian war contributed to significant popular support for the 
new president Vladimir Putin. A pro-presidential majority in the State Duma had been established in 
1999, which approved almost all of the Kremlin’s initiatives (Remington 2006). The “Strategy for socio-
economic development of Russia 2000-2010”, known also as “Strategy 2010” or “Gref Program” was 
developed in 2000 by experts of the Centre for Strategic Research (Tsentr strategicheskikh razrabotok—
CSR) with contributions of experts from the Higher School of Economics outlined a roadmap towards 
financial stabilization and re-centralizing state control and oversight in many areas (Gel’man & 
Starodubtsev, 2016). A clear success of this program was the reform of the tax code which, between 
1998 and 2004, established unified rules of taxation and fiscal governance and introduced a flat-tax of 
13%. This significantly increased state revenues from taxation. A new of progressive taxation for oil 
exports in combination with climbing oil prices brought the government a further windfall of revenues.  
Among other areas which profited from the upturn in state finances, since the beginning of the 2000ies, 
education was re-identified as a priority, if not the main priority (Platonova & Semyonov, 2018). The 
Gref program represented a watershed in official rhetoric (Interview RU No. 16, 2017). Already in 1997, 
a group of experts from the Higher School of Economics and government officials had been appointed 
by the governmental council on Economic Reform to develop a program of education reform. The group 
had concluded that, aside from under-financing, the key problem of the Russian education system was 
its governance system, which had remained an island of the Soviet planned economy, defended by pow-
erful and active interest groups that benefitted from the status quo (Starodubtsev, 2017). Inspired by this 
analysis of the status quo, the Gref program proposed a number of liberal reforms, such as a major 
change in the funding model based on competition between schools and universities for students, and 
the introduction of a centralized national admission exam. This provoked a coalition of opponents to the 
liberal reforms (of university rectors speared of Moscow State University Rector Viktor Sadovnichiy 
and communist members of parliament) to develop an alternative policy document, the National Doc-
trine for Education (2000) which argued that there was little need for structural reform if only the un-
derfunding of the education system would be remedied. Formally endorsing the document, with the 
approval of the president, the MoES then adapted it further until its contents closely corresponded to the 
original CSR proposals, which it began to implement in 2000 (Starodubtsev, 2017). Backed by rising 
oil prices, the government stopped the downwards trend in funding and again increased its investment 
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into higher education and approached a number of governance reforms. The Ministry of Education under 
Vladimir Filippov (1998-2004) increasingly saw itself as an actor, that could actively set and pursue its 
own policy agenda, rather than just regulate a laisser-faire market (Interview RU No. 9, 2017).  
 
Figure 12: Public expenditures on higher education per student. Source: (Platonova & Semyonov, 2018) 
6.2.2.1 1999-2009: Development of the Unified State Exam 
The massive expansion of the higher education system during the 1990ies had led to an intensive dis-
cussion among policy-makers, in the media and in the wider society about the quality of and access to 
higher education institutions. Especially the question of admittance to HEIs was seen as deeply cor-
rupted. Since Soviet times, HEIs had admitted students on the basis of entrance examinations which 
they themselves administered. Critical issues of this system were perceived to be the low level of pre-
paredness of school leavers and the high level of corruption which had become normal at the stage of 
entering universities. Because especially regional high schools failed to prepare students adequately for 
university entry examinations, a parallel tutoring system had emerged, for which parents needed to pay 
private teachers out of their own pockets. In addition, in many public universities, budgetary funded 
study places were increasingly being allotted not based on merit, but on the grounds of connections 
(through relative or friends among the HEIs’ administration and academic staff) or on the basis of bribes, 
which could be comparatively cheaper than paying for tutoring sessions. The result was an erosion of 
entry requirements for HE (Motova, 2015).  
The idea of introducing a centralized state exam for university admissions with the goal of making access 
to higher education more transparent, more merit-based and less corruption-prone was hardly new. It 
had been discussed since the early 1990ies and had already been implemented in the post-Soviet state 
of Azerbaijan (1992), Uzbekistan (1993), Estonia (1997), and Kazakhstan (1999) and was being planned 
in others. International organizations such as the World Bank and the OECD had recommended the 
introduction of centralized testing for years (Gounko & Smale, 2007).  
12,10
26,50
49,80
2000 2005 2010
Public expenditures on higher education per student, 000 
rub.
  
page 107 
In January 2000, a new “national doctrine of education in the Russian Federation” was passed into law 
by Parliament, guaranteeing tuition- free professional and higher education for 50 percent of students 
and tuition-free graduate education, provided students pass the respective entry examination. In order to 
help to bridge the preparedness gap, reduce corruption and make university-admission more transparent 
and merit-based, it was decided to introduce a system of centralized national testing. The plan to imple-
ment this new centralized state exam in Russia was first articulated in “The Concept of Modernizing 
Education in Russia by 2010”. In 2001, the Ministry of Education launched the Unified State Exam 
(Edinyi gosudarstvennyi ekzamen - EGE) with financial support from the World Bank as an experiment 
in 16 regions of Russia. The exam was taken at the end of school and consisted of a set of written exams 
and formalized tests on different school subjects in accordance with the secondary school curriculum. 
The results were part of school leaving qualifications and a number of HEIs started to accept the EGE 
results as a replacement for its entrance exams. This was attractive because the EGE increased the 
chances for young people from the Russian provinces to be admitted to leading universities in Moscow 
and St. Petersburg (Smolentseva, Evgeny, & Natalya, 2015). The EGE’s application across regions in-
creased year by year. This approach reduced the opposition and allowed the operational refinement of 
its application.  
From the outset, there was strong resistance against the EGE among academics across Russia. Rectors 
fought to have their HEIs exempted from having to accept EGE results for admission. Most criticism 
focused on the methodology of using multiple-choice tests and the “foreignness” of the approach (Kish-
kovsky, 2011). To a degree, the corruption that had characterized the admission process into universities 
seemed to move to the level of schools where issues like leaked tests and answer keys, teachers assisting 
students to take the tests, and suspiciously positive results from North Caucasus Republics compared to 
the rest of the country cast doubt onto the objectivity of the exam. However, by 2005, according to a 
report by the Ministry of Education and Science and the Moscow School of Economics (Clark, N., 
2005), some students were paying the equivalent of five years of tuition in bribes to get into top Moscow 
universities and the higher education was seen as the most corrupt sector of Russian society with over 
half of all families paying bribes to instructors and college-admissions officials (Drummond, T. W. 
& Gabrscek, 2014). Victor Bolotov, the head of Rosobrnadzor pointed to the fact the most HEIs were 
using the same multiple-choice approach to entrance examinations, against which they were arguing on 
the basis of objections of objectivity (Drummond, T. W. & Gabrscek, 2014).  
In 2008, despite the strong opposition of university rectors and academics, and despite the media scan-
dals that had surrounded the EGE, it was made the mandatory exclusive28 requirement to enter higher 
education in Russia. With the introduction of the EGE, the State had reasserted its own power over 
regulating access to higher education. Resistance against the EGE in the form of allegation of corruption, 
mismanagement in its execution, and fundamental unsuitability of its methods continued. As Drummond 
                                                          
28 Exceptions were granted only to winners of national science olympiads 
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& Gabrscek (2014) point out, however, “In a volatile political environment where the stakes are high, 
it can be difficult to determine the veracity of reports, claims, and counterclaims. […]. Many students 
and their families, remained dissatisfied with the EGE, because of the considerable time and money they 
need to invest to prepare for the exam, as tutoring for the EGE had turned into a booming private market 
(Smolentseva et al., 2015). The EGE gave the state a powerful instrument to regulate the size of the HE 
system and the minimal level of skill of university students by defining the minimal passing grade. It 
also provided it with valuable information about the educational attainment in different schools and 
regions of Russia. Data on the average EGE grade of students are used as an indicator of the attractive-
ness of individual HEIs.  
6.2.2.2 2000-2002: Reforms to the quality assurance system: New generation of SES and 
merging of attestation and accreditation 
The year 2000 marks the turning point also for the quality assurance system in Russia. The quality 
assurance system was streamlined for the entire higher education sector. The 2nd generation of the SES 
was prepared in 2000-2001 which allowed HEIs to determine up to 20% of their educational program 
content themselves. Attestation and accreditation were merged into a single procedure. Accreditation 
became compulsory for all HEIs (before, it had been only for state HEIs) and a common set of indicators 
and statistical parameters were defined by which the performance of all HEIs would be measured. Con-
siderations about joining the Bologna Process, the spread of information technologies which allowed 
cost-effective information gathering in Russia facilitated these changes (Motova, 2015). Since 2000, the 
accreditation procedure rested on three pillars: The results of an HEI’s self-evaluation; an external eval-
uation by an expert panel (komissiya po otsenke sootvetstviya trebovaniyam obrazovatel'nym standar-
tam); and an assessment of quantitative indicators of an HEI’s activity.  
Emergence of independent accreditation 
In 2002, the first non-state accreditation agency was the accreditation center established by the Russian 
Association for Engineering Education (Akkreditatsionnyy tsentr Assotsiatsii inzhenernogo obra-
zovaniya Rossii, ATS AIOR), which was joined in 2004 by the Agency for Quality Assurance and Career 
Development (Agentstvo po kontrolyu kachestva i razvitiyu kar'yery - AKKORK) and, in 2009, by the 
Association of Law Schools of Russia and the Association of Legal Education and the Association of 
Lawyers of Russia.  
In 2002/2003, related to Russia’s ascension to the Bologna Process, proposals within the Ministry of 
Education were discussed that Rosobrnadzor would certify public professional accreditation agencies 
and recognize their accreditation as equivalent to state accreditation. The planned certification was never 
implemented, however. A former key official of Rosobrnadzor identified resistance among high-ranking 
officials as the key reason that this was never implemented:  
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“To civil servants, this was not advantageous. You know, the more rights a civil servant has, 
the more opportunities he has to get some kind of profit out of it. They always came up with 
some grounds of why not give these rights to this organization or to that. After 2009, nobody [in 
Rosobrnadzor] took up the subject again” (Interview RU No. 14, 2017) 
Demand for independent accreditation remained low, however, and the agencies offering it did not gain 
a significant role in the overall governance of the higher education system.  
Promoting Quality Management within HEIs 
In 2000, the MoE organized the first competition for the best quality management systems within uni-
versities and ordered rectors to implement “objective measurements of the work of faculty and students” 
(Forrat, 2012a).  
6.2.2.3 2002-2005: Promoting market-mechanisms in financing through student vouchers 
and university rankings 
The aborted reform of higher education financing (2002-2005) 
During the 1990ies, State funding for HEIs had been calculated based on assumed line item costs for 
faculty salaries, maintenance, libraries, etc. by the Ministry, often following discussions, negotiations 
and agreements with the individual rectors.  
In 2002, an experiment on higher education financing was launched in the form of so-called educational 
vouchers, officially dubbed “state financial obligations to individuals” (gosudarstvennye imennye fi-
nansovye obyazatel’stva—GIFO). The idea originated in 2000, was developed by experts at the Higher 
School of Economics and became part of the "Gref Program". The objective was to increase the effi-
ciency of use of public funds, create incentives for students to study and for universities to compete for 
the best students. This was to be realized through a grant system for students, which would receive a 
grant of a size depending on students’ scores on the Unified State Exam which they could then use at 
any Russian HEI. Depending on their scores, students would be endowed with a certain amount of public 
funds to study at an HEI of their choice. It was assumed that high school graduates with high EGE scores 
would flock to the best universities, which would benefit from the funding these students carried, while 
weaker universities would receive less. This mechanism was intended to promote competition between 
universities for the best students, further differentiate the higher education landscape in Russia, stimulate 
a fee-paying model of higher education in Russia, and promote the use of the EGE (Klyachko, T. 
Lvovna, 2002).  
The GIFO experiment lasted only for three years, however, and never grew beyond a limited number of 
regions. When Andrei Fursenko became the new minister in 2004, he decided to end the experiment. 
The reasons for this were negative feedback from universities’ representatives and the State Duma. The 
same step-by-step implementation as for the EGE had been planned, but the GIFO system could not 
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demonstrate positive effects without a country-wide implementation (Stetligov, 2009). Gel’man & 
Starodubtsev (2016) argue that the reason for ultimate failure of this initiative was the lack of support 
from the Presidential administration. After the GIFO experiment was canceled, a new model of “nor-
mative financing” (normativnoe finansirovanie) was developed. Since 2011, all public institutions 
(HEIs, hospitals, kindergartens, etc.) received their budget in the form of a formula-based lump sum. 
This greatly increased transparency of financing (Interview RU No. 12, 2017) and allowed gave HEIs 
the autonomy to create their own financial planning, independent of ministry interference (Interview 
RU No. 12, 2017).  
Promotion of University rankings 
Prior to the 2000ies, a university’s reputation was perpetuated through word of mouth and “common 
wisdom” placing certain state HEIs in Moscow and St. Petersburg at the top of the reputational ladder. 
The first ranking of Russian universities was published by the Kar’era magazine in 1999. In 2001, the 
Ministry of Education issued its own public HEI ranking29 which it continued to produce until 2009 
when it contracted the development of rankings out to the Interfax Group and Radio “Ekho Moskvy” 
(Forrat, 2012a). Other organizations ranging from media to professional and student associations, and 
the universities themselves launched various rankings of their own during the 2010ies. 
6.2.3 Asserting state control and promoting differentiation of the higher education 
system (2004-2012) 
In 2004, Vladimir Filippov was succeeded by Andrey Fursenko as minister of education. Under 
Fursenko, the consolidation and differentiation of the HE system became state policy. While Filippov 
(Minister between 1998-2004) had been rector of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia (RUDN), 
and had coordinated his policy initiatives to a relatively close degree with the academic community in 
the form of the Russian Rectors’ Union, his successor, Fursenko (who would be in office from 2004 to 
2012), pursued a higher education policy increasingly independent of and often contrary to the opinion 
of rectors and the academic community (Interview RU No. 9, 2017). The overall approach was guided 
by the concept of so-called pivot points (tochki rosta), upon which public resources in HE should be 
concentrated. The idea was that selected universities should play the central role in driving the Russian 
HE system. In interviews Fursenko gave in 2004 and 2005, he argued that there should be 20-50 leading 
HEIs as well as 150-200 HEIs of second rank to provide highly qualified specialists to the economy 
(Fedyukin & Froumin, 2010). Forrat (2015) summarizes the discourses employed in justifying this goal 
                                                          
29 See Decree of the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation N 631 “O reitinge vysshikh uchebnykh 
zavedeniy (vmeste s vremennoy metodikoy opredeleniya reitingov spetsial’nostey i vuzov)” (On the ranking of 
higher education institutions [together with the temporary methodology of programs’ and institutions’ rankings]). 
February 26, 2001. Minobrnauki RF. (Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation) Reitingi vuzov 
Rossii 2001- 2009. (Ranking of Russian higher education institutions.) Access date: May 30, 2011. http://rat-
ing.edu.ru/Old.aspx. 
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as 1) economy of scale, (2) giving back to the economy and society, and (3) international competitive-
ness: Resources should be focused in a smaller number of high-quality HEIs which actually had a good 
track record in the fields they were offering, rather than being wasted on supporting a large number of 
small, low-quality HEIs, for quality assurance by the Ministry of Education was difficult to conduct. 
Resources should be invested in leading HEIs so that these could pay competitive salaries, invest in 
facilities and equipment, and as a consequence provide better education results and thus better value-
for-money for the State, and improve international competitiveness. Especially during the first half of 
the 2000ies, better integration into the European and international higher education system and attracting 
more international students were also used as justifications for reforms (Tomusk, 2007), although this 
faded in the second half of the 2000ies.  
Starting from the mid-2000s, a number of government programs appeared which were intended to move 
the HE system in the direction of this vision. It was also evident, that the demographic “bump”, which 
had driven enrollment to record highs was over and that demand for higher education would start falling 
from 2009. This may have reduced the pressure on the government to prioritize wide access over quality.  
6.2.3.1 2004-2009: Russia and the Bologna Process 
Galina Motova (2015) described the period between 2004-2009 as the phase of "Europeanization" of 
quality assurance. The Bologna Process, which was launched in Russia before the country-wide imple-
mentation of the EGE, was the first really significant system-wide reform that was implemented top-
down by the Government against strong opposition of universities. While the government had regulated 
HEIs since the 1990ies by defining common state standards and the system of licensing, attestation and 
accreditation, none of these instruments had touched the structure of the higher education system. When 
the government had increased licensing requirements, it was painful to some universities, but did not 
really affect the vast majority of them (Interview RU No. 9, 2017). When the government had granted 
universities more freedoms, this had been generally welcomed by universities, although it generated 
criticism from other stakeholders who feared that a lessening of government control would lead to cor-
ruption and declining standards. The Bologna Process was a shock to the academic community because 
it represented a strong intervention into the practices of academia which the State – although it formally 
regulated these areas – had not touched since the 1960ies. With the Bologna Process, the government 
was for the first time criticized for doing something, rather than for doing nothing (Interview RU No. 9, 
2017). Although the government’s decision to join the European Higher Education Area was heavily 
debated and faced strong opposition among university leaders and administration, students, and their 
parents, Russia joined the Bologna Declaration in 2003. The ministry’s success in passing the Bologna 
Process was considered a big victory for the Ministry. As a former advisor to Fursenko pointed out, 
university rectors suddenly realized that the ministry could have not only a laissez-faire agenda, but an 
active reform agenda of its own (Interview RU No. 9, 2017).  
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After Russia joined the Bologna process in 2003, Russia launched a number of legislative initiatives and 
regulations regarding the introduction of a two-tier system of degrees, introduced a new generation of 
educational standards granting greater freedom to HEIs to define their own contents of study programs 
as well as a number of provisions on quality management within HEIs (Motova, 2015). Between 2005 
and 2007, a third generation of SES was prepared, featuring a competence-based approach (Fomin & 
Reznikova, 2006) and changed their concept and structure to focus more strongly on outcomes and to 
allow a greater degree of academic freedom in adapting curricula to regional labor market needs 
(EACEA, 2012c). The Ministry of Education also formed a “Coordination Council on Quality Provi-
sion” which discussed different models of quality management for HEIs which resulted in a set of rec-
ommendations on the creation and implementation of quality management systems in the universities in 
2005 and made the effectiveness of internal quality management systems one of the indicators for ac-
creditation (Forrat, 2012a). The Bologna Process certainly contributed external legitimacy as well as 
some of the models for these policy initiatives, even though they encountered massive resistance both 
within as outside of the government.  
6.2.3.2 2004-2012: Shifting power in the quality assurance system 
Reforming the QA infrastructure (2004-2008) 
In 2004, the entire infrastructure of education and research system was reformed. To begin with, the 
Ministry of Education was merged with the Ministry of Science to reflect the idea of integration of 
higher education and research. Also in 2004, the new ministry merged several agencies into the “Federal 
Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Education and Science (Rosobnadzor). The function of the 
MoE Department of Licensing, Accreditation and Attestation Ministry were transferred to Rosobrnad-
zor. Director of Rosobnadzor became Victor Bolotov, who had already served as vice-minister of edu-
cation between 1992 and 2004 and who had co-authored the Unified State exam.  
In 2005, following the ascension to the Bologna Process two years earlier, a number of changes were 
made to the quality assurance system. As a clear signal of alignment to the Bologna Process, the Infor-
mation and Methodological Centre was renamed into National Accreditation Agency “Rosakkreda-
genstvo. The several, formerly semi-independent institutions participating in the process of quality as-
surance (Research and Information Centre of State Accreditation and the Main Expert Centre) were as 
well as “Rosakkredagenstvo” became dependent organizations of Rosobnadzor to which it delegated 
most of the practical operations and which, in practical terms, is responsible for operating the entire state 
accreditation procedure until the preparation of the analytical report to the Accreditation Board. The 
publication of self-evaluation reports became mandatory for state-accredited HEIs. A public register of 
accredited Russian HEIs in Russian and English was set up on a specially designed website and was 
distributed to schools in book form yearly since 2007 (Motova & Pykkö, 2012).  
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In addition, since 2004, a number of measures were implemented to improve stakeholder involvement 
in quality assurance. After Russia joined the Bologna process in 2003, work on a third generation of 
SES began, featuring a competence-based approach (Fomin & Reznikova, 2006) and allowing a greater 
degree of academic freedom and better adapting curricula to regional labor market needs (EACEA, 
2012c). By decree of the Russian Ministry of Education and Science no. 152 of 30 December 2004 the 
Council on State Educational Standards of Professional Education was created which now included 
representatives of employer associations as well as academics30. Since 2007, review panels in state ac-
creditation needed to consist of experts, which needed to have undergone training and certification. 
Students and employer representatives were now to be included in the reviews and campus visits. A new 
generation of State Educational Standards following a competency-oriented approach was developed 
and published in 2008. As incorporated professional associations in Russia were weak and tolerated 
only in the form of state-public organizations, development of standards and the final decision over 
accreditation stayed under the control of Rosobrnadzor, however.  
Centralization of state accreditation (2009-2012) 
In 2009, by decision of the new head of Rosobrnadzor, a staff reshuffle took place at the National Ac-
creditation Agency (Rosakkredagenstvo) and almost all of the staff left due to disagreements over the 
role and functioning of the agency (Interview RU No. 4, 2015). The centralization was completed when 
the seat of Rosakkredagenstvo was moved from Yoshkar-Ola to Moscow in 2011 where the agency now 
shares offices in the same building as Rosobrnadzor to which it is subordinated. At the same time, the 
approach of conducting accreditation changed.  
From 2009/2010 a yearly demographic decline in the number of students of around 10% had set in. The 
government saw the need to reduce the number of HEIs and study programs, preferably in the segment 
of lowest quality and selectiveness. As a former leading official of Rosakkredagenstvo remembers, li-
censing and accreditation were transformed from a fairly bureaucratic yet predictable process into a 
powerful instrument of state steering and control in the hands of Rosobnadzor and – by extension – the 
MoES:  
 […] The government did not have the luxury anymore to educate 80% of school leavers. Be-
cause it cannot, the system needs to be shrunken, and to shrink a system is incredible difficult. 
This is why, as one of the mechanisms, it was decided to use the mechanism of accreditation, 
meaning, the refusal to grant accreditation. And the decision was taken to turn accreditation 
implicitly but de-facto into a strict control mechanism” (Interview RU No. 4, 2015) 
An important change was that Rosobnadzor received the right to revoke a license at any time based on 
their own, not in all cases objective criteria. Whereas earlier, Rosobrnadzor needed to go to court to 
                                                          
30 Decree of the Russian Ministry of Education and Science no. 152 of 30 December 2004 
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withdraw a license or accreditation in case of a violation, now, Rosobrnadzor itself received this right. 
As a former leading official from Rosobrnadzor explains:  
 “The assessment and accreditation of HEIs is a prerogative of Rosobrnadzor. This is a very 
strong instrument of power. You give to some, you don’t give to others. A very powerful function. 
Even though there are more than 3000 HEIs and branches in Russia, it is clear that the loss of 
a license or of accreditation, this is a really big loss [..] Therefore, there is an infinite number 
of issues related to the objectivity of decision-making” […] Now there will be a trial of the 
European university, a good university. They will sue Rosobrnadzor. This is not the first attempt 
[to close a university]. There were many attempts in this direction, but earlier we decided these 
issues though the courts, as we could not decide on accreditation ourselves. [..] The courts are 
in favor of the government, but this is a long, tedious process, a large machine which accompa-
nies these things. [..] now it is easier, Rosobrnadzor cancels [accreditation] and [the universi-
ties] need to go to court and try to protest […] For many this already means a loss of reputation, 
a loss of students, and you will go to court? You already have nothing.” (Interview RU No. 14, 
2017) 
Many experts of the higher education system share this view and point out that Rosobrnadzor does not 
even have to base their decisions on academic shortcomings:  
„Rosobrnadzor can close practically any HEI. Because, well, taking into consideration the 
safety requirements of the educational process […] Rosobrnadzor does not come and say, 
“Putin does not like you, I am closing you”. It comes and says “you do not comply with the fire 
safety requirements, you do not have the correct safety equipment or “in your buildings, the 
electrical cables are made of aluminum, but according to the new requirements, they must be 
made of copper”. In these cases, they do not care that the building was constructed when the 
standards allowed aluminum instead of copper.” (Interview RU No. 8, 2017).  
This change of character of the accreditation process was clearly felt in the higher education system. As 
one expert explains: 
Accreditation was inefficient for a number of reasons. Part of it was certainly corruption. An-
other reason was that the government did not have a formulated policy on [education] infra-
structure. In this sense accreditation was arbitrary, depended to a great degree on the subjective 
assessment of those who participated in that process. It was very formalized and highly central-
ized and the professional and local communities [stakeholders] did not participate in the pro-
cess. [After 2009, accreditation] started to be used a lot more effectively. Whereas a withdrawal 
of accreditation used to be a highly unusual event - on the contrary, in fact, everybody who 
underwent accreditation received it - now, this is fairly widespread. In this sense Rosobrnadzor 
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raised its requirements, hardened its activity. In general, we can say that today this [Rosobrnad-
zor] is a very active organ of state power, which takes very hard decisions which it did not do 
earlier” (Interview RU No. 8, 2017) 
6.2.3.3 Targeted government programs to differentiate the Russian HE system:  
Innovative education programs (2004) and Federal Universities (since 2005) 
When the first international university rankings appeared in the early 2000ies, Russian academics and 
policy makers were shocked to find that – in stark contrast to the popular expectation of them being 
among the world’s leaders, Russian universities were almost non-existent in them (Froumin, I. & Pov-
alko, 2014). Partly because of the brain drain during the 1990ies, but in strong part owing to the tradi-
tional Soviet separation of teaching from research (research being conducted in institutes of the academy 
of science, graduate students at universities did not participate in research projects at research institutes, 
university professors had very high teaching loads), only 10-15% of university faculty were active in 
research at all (Froumin, I. & Povalko, 2014). In 2004, a series of programs were prepared to invest into 
the leading higher education institutions of the country.  
Since the early 2000ies, the MoES and the Russian government had experimented with targeted financ-
ing (programmy proektnogo finansirovaniya) through which HEIs could apply for funding for the real-
ization of specific goals, investment in infrastructure, support for research, internationalization and other 
reforms. In the fall of 2005 the President of Russia announced several “National Priority Projects” (pri-
oritetnye natsionalnye proekty) in public services, including in Education. The most visible impact of 
the national priority project framework was probably the 2006 across-the-board increase in wages in 
healthcare and education and investment into infrastructure. For higher education, these included sup-
port for “universities implementing innovative education programs” (IEPs) and the “Federal University 
Program”.  
Foundation of Federal Universities 
Two new Federal universities were to be created in the Russian regions with more to follow. After 
intense deliberations and public discussion, it was decided that these new universities were to emerge 
by merging preexisting HEIs on territories were Russia’s strategic interests were present and where it 
was seen critical to improve the quality of life (Froumin, I. & Povalko, 2014). These universities were 
designated to supply highly professionals for the macro-regions as well as provide a basis for a strong 
research component (Froumin, I. & Povalko, 2014). Federal Universities were to implement innovative 
study programs, modernize higher education, offer training and skills development for the socio-eco-
nomic development of the region, carry out basic and applied research, and bring it into application. 
Federal Universities were the first Russian HEIs who had to prepare a strategic development plan, have 
an advisory board, and develop their own education standards (Froumin, I. & Povalko, 2014). In addi-
tion, the development plan needed to be approved by the government of the Russian Federation and the 
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rector was appointed by the Government. Between 2006 and 2015, a total of nine federal Universities 
were established by mergers of over 40 smaller universities31 (Froumin, I. & Povalko, 2014). Federal 
Universities received substantial financial resources from the state budget: 2007: 6 bln. RUB; 2007-
2009: 13,4 bln. RUB; as well as co-financing by businesses and regional administrations. Funding for 
federal universities ended in 2014.  
While participation in these programs represented a significant financial boon for universities, it also 
limited their autonomy as from 2009, rectors of Federal Universities started to be appointed by the gov-
ernment. Simultaneously, all Federal Universities were obligated to establish “boards of overseers” (na-
blyudatel'nye sovety). These boards, composed of representatives of federal and regional authorities and 
administrations, business associations, and significant local employers, were intended as collegial or-
gans supporting the implementation of strategic development plans by providing input from local and 
regional realities, while also increasing the transparency of the HEI and help it to diversify its financing 
sources. They did not receive any decision-making powers.  
The results of the Federal university program are considered to be mixed in Russia: The preparedness 
of their students (measured by their EGE scores) is relatively low, there are few graduate programs, 
underdeveloped cooperation with local enterprises, limited research performance, and limited interna-
tional cooperation activities (Froumin, I. & Povalko, 2014). By and large, the Federal Universities had 
failed to meet the high expectations set for them. They had been established too quickly without proper 
preliminary environment analysis and without sufficiently engaging external stakeholders, resulting in 
unimplementable strategies (Froumin, I. & Povalko, 2014). Since 2008, the process of differentiation of 
the higher education system by strengthening its leaders was intensified was pursued further in a number 
of programs, while simultaneously clamping down on the weaker segments of the HE system.  
Moscow and St. Petersburg State Universities, National Research Universities gain special status 
(2008) 
Moscow State University and Saint Petersburg State University had always been seen as “flagships” of 
the Russian HE system with a good record of research. In 2008, both universities received a special legal 
status exempting them from having to comply with the State Educational Standards and received signif-
icant resources for infrastructure development (Froumin, I. & Povalko, 2014). Their rectors were made 
to be appointed directly by the Russian President.  
In addition, between 2008–2010, a national competition was organized among Russia’s universities to 
be select the strongest research universities which would be awarded the title of National Research 
                                                          
31 The Southern Federal University in Rostov-on-Don and the Siberian Federal University in Krasnoyarsk, The 
Northern (Arctic) Federal Universityin Arkhangelsk, the Kazan Federal University, the Ural Federal University in 
Ekaterinburg, the Far Eastern Federal University in Vladivostok and the the North-Eastern Federal University in 
Yakutsk, the North-Caucasian Federal University in Stavropol and the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University 
in Kaliningrad.  
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University (Fedyukin & Froumin, 2010) and funding for the realization of their strategic development 
plans.  
While the Federal University program had been developed with relatively little outside input, the com-
petition was inspired by the concepts and experiences of the Chinese 211 and 985 Projects, the South 
Korean Brain Korea 21 Program, the Japanese Global 30 Project, the German Excellence Initiative and 
others. The selection criteria were a high number and quality of research and innovation projects; a 
noticeable diversity of scientific research; the ability to radically transform the curriculum, staff man-
agement and organizational structure (both administrative and academic departments); a high level of 
formal qualifications and competence of teaching and research staff; and “experience of innovative ac-
tivity” (Morgan & Kliucharev, 2012).The selection took place on a competitive basis in 2008 and in 
2009 by an expert group set up by the Ministry for Education and Science. The status “National Research 
University” was awarded to a university for the period of 10 years. In the end, 29 universities were 
selected and received funding for implementing their development program 2009–201332. Applying to 
become a national research university, HEIs needed to accept to change their status to autonomous uni-
versities (AUs) and to set up boards of overseers (nablyudatel’nye sovety), analogous to Federal univer-
sities.  
The particularity of the National Research Universities as opposed to the 2006 Federal Universities was 
that the latter were primarily intended to support the development of their geographic region, while the 
first were to promote internationally recognized research excellence, develop systems for its commer-
cialization, and cooperate with innovation-based companies. The total additional funding for the Na-
tional Research Development Program for the period 2009-2012 was 34.825 billion RUB, most of which 
was invested in improving the material base and information resources, but also into quality manage-
ment and internationalization (Froumin, I. & Povalko, 2014). The program had a considerable impact 
on the selected universities in terms of published research with the number of articles in Web of Science 
and Scopus-indexed journals rising by 23% respectively. At the same time, the quality of student intake 
(in terms of their EGE results) and of staff recruitment (in terms of their scholarly degrees) was signifi-
cant (Froumin, I. & Povalko, 2014).  
State Programs to attract leading researchers to Russian HEIs 
                                                          
32 Two pilot universities National Research Nuclear University - Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (State 
University) and National Research Technological University - State Technological University “Moscow Institute 
of Steel and Alloys” were identified by the Decree of President D. Medvedev in 2008. Later in 2008 12 more 
universities were identified through competition (thus bringing a total to 14 universities), which were to obtain an 
amount of RUB 1.8 billion (approximately EUR 40.5 million) each for the years 2009-2018. In 2009 another 15 
universities were identified through competition, which received RUB 49.8 billion from the federal budget for the 
years 2009-2014. Co-funding of their development programs from extra-budgetary funds should amount to RUB45 
billion.  
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There have been several further initiatives to support research in Russian HEIs through attracting leading 
researchers to work in Russian. An example is the “220” project (Resolution P220: On measures de-
signed to attract leading scientists to the Russian institutions of higher learning, 2010) which supplied 
400m USD during 2010-2012 for the development of world class laboratories at Russian HEIs. Accord-
ing to Froumin & Povalko (2014), this has increased the quality of research, stimulated openness to 
international knowledge circulation, and acted as a catalyst for many HEIs to improve their laboratories 
even without the help of additional government funding.  
6.2.3.4 The Unified State Exam, access barriers and forced consolidation of the HE system 
Since 2001, the Unified State Exam (EGE) had been rolled out to ever more regions. In 2009, university-
specific entrance examinations were abolished altogether and replaced by the government-administered 
EGE. The new nationwide state entry exam was intended to limit the possibility of corruption and the 
make access to HE easier and more transparent, particularly for cross-regional student migration. The 
EGE was also used as a government mechanism to regulate the size of the higher education system by 
introducing a minimum threshold of EGE test scores necessary for admission to HEIs, regardless of 
whether they were state-owned or private.  
6.2.3.5 More focused funding of HE and change in allocation of funding 
Since 2004, trying to better link financial support for higher education with public policy priorities, the 
State tried to influence the type of subjects studied by regulating the number of state-funded places in 
certain disciplines. Between 2004 and 2011, the number of state funded places in social sciences de-
creased by 30 %, while at the same time such places in engineering increased by 9 % (Abankina, I., 
Abankina, Filatova, & Nikolaenko, 2012). In addition, the state significantly increased its overall fund-
ing, investing mostly in large and successful institutions or forming new ones (with the 2006 Federal 
Union program), while revoking the licenses of about 600 public branch HEIs due to perceived low 
quality of their activity.  
Since the 1990ies, universities had had an itemized fixed budget from the State as well as a certain 
assigned quota for training students funded by the budget (“state order”). In 2007, this model was re-
placed with a scheme, drawing on some of the ideas of the GIFO experiment, which made state funding 
dependent on the number of students which were actually enrolled on these state-funded places. This 
meant that universities were set to suffer financially, if they would be unable to enroll enough students 
to meet the state-ordered quota. The “per-student” funding model also made funding a tool of power in 
the hand of the MoES, as they could – at least in theory – now change the state order any particular 
institution, without tediously having to negotiate individual items in a budget.  
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6.2.3.6 Changes to university autonomy and asserting control over rector’s appointments 
In 2006, an important change in university autonomy took place, when an amendment to the law on 
education required that candidates for the post of rector had to be coordinated with and be approved by 
a governmental committee. Before the changes, rectors were elected by Academic Councils and then 
approved by the MoES which could veto the result of elections once, but the academic council could 
overturn this veto by a two-thirds vote. The new regulations meant that politically unreliable candidates 
could be excluded from running in the first place (Smolin & Nasibov, 2006).  
With the same change of the law, the status of “autonomous institution” (avtonomnoe ucherezhdenie - 
AU) was introduced. This reform had been promoted by the same group of policymakers which had also 
developed the EGE and GIFO reforms (Forrat, 2012b). Such HEIs would be non-commercial institutions 
overseen by governing boards (nablyudatel’nye sovety). They would also receive lump-sum budgets and 
have financial autonomy about how to spend it. In addition, they would be allowed to keep any addi-
tional revenues and dispose over these funds as they pleased. Since 2006, only a few HEIs have chosen 
to change their status fearing financial cuts. HEIs participating in the targeted funding programs (Federal 
Universities, Research Universities, 5-100 and opornye VUZy) were required to convert to autonomous 
institutions. After 2012 this became a more widespread practice and according to one former vice-min-
ister of education, rectors of most universities now find themselves in a position of strong dependency 
to the MoES (Interview RU No. 16, 2017).  
 
6.2.4 Differentiated state steering (2012-2016) 
Between 2000 and 2010, the number of secondary school leavers had declined from 1,457,800 to 
789,300, while the number of state-funded places in universities had remained almost unchanged (Insti-
tut statisticheskikh issledovanii i ekonomiki znanii GU-VShE, 2012). The number of students had de-
clined from a total of 7.5 million in 2008-09 to only 5.2 million in 2014-15 with population forecasts 
predicting a fall to just 4.2 million students in 2020 (Semyonov, 2015). This made higher education 
almost universally accessible regardless of their academic preparedness, which, as test results and many 
observers of the education system noted, was falling overall (Smolentseva et al., 2015). While universi-
ties concurred in this assessment of the situation, they were opposed to reducing access via a more rigid 
selection process. Froumin and Dobryakova (2012) relate this to the fact that many HEIs had arranged 
themselves with a status quo of “academic non-aggression pacts” whereby HEIs did not demand much 
of students as long as they did not voice complaints about the lack of quality of the education they 
received. Notwithstanding the lowering of standards, by 2008, almost all remaining Russian HEIs had 
received state accreditation, which had ceased to act as a driving force for consolidation or differentia-
tion of the higher education system (Motova & Pykkö, 2012).  
  
page 120 
Both Ministers of Education and Science Andrey Fursenko (2004-2012) and Dmitry Livanov (2012-
2016), stressed that government policy would be to fight low-quality HEIs. The framework of the Fed-
eral Program of Education Development 2016-2020 (Pravitel’stvo RF, 2014) stated that the number of 
HEIs should be reduced by 40% overall and the number of branch campuses by 80%. The low position 
of most Russian universities in international rankings were increasingly cited as reasons to consolidate 
an oversized yet underperforming HE system and to improve the quality and the overall “effectiveness” 
of the Russian HE system. Priorities became strengthening the top-performing HEIs while eliminating 
low-quality private HEIs, many of which were opened in the 1990s and did not have adequate own 
resources and teaching staff (Semyonov, 2015). In a number of significant changes to the governance 
of the higher education system, the government changed the rules of the game.  
6.2.4.1 The “May Decrees” (Maiskie Ukazy) and the state program “Development of Educa-
tion for the period 2013–2020” 
After Vladimir Putin’s reelection as president of the Russian Federation, he issued 218 decrees on social 
and educational policy, to be implemented between 2012-2020. These became known as the 2012 “May 
Decrees” (Maiskie Ukazy). Regarding higher education33, the decrees describe a government program 
of raising salaries and stipends, improving state monitoring, steering, and control, clamping down on 
low-quality HEIs and of supporting the strongest. In particular, the decree states the following goals: 
- monitoring of the activities of state educational Institutions in order to assess the effectiveness 
of their work; 
- the reorganization of inefficient state Educational institutions, providing for the reorganiza-
tion of such institutions, ensuring the right Students completing studies in other state educa-
tional institutions; 
- Development and implementation by the end of December 2012 of measures aimed at improv-
ing the efficiency of Unified state examination; 
- Increase by the end of June 2012, the amount of scholarships to the subsistence level to first-
year and second-year students in need of full-time study at the expense of Budget allocations 
of the federal budget for bachelor's programs and training programs 
- Implementation by June 2013 of the transition to normative per capita financing 
- Approval of new Federal Educational Standards 
The May Decrees also ordered further support for leading universities: 
- Increase in financing for leading universities (in engineering, medical and natural sciences 
(specialties) 
                                                          
33 Ukaz № 599 “O merakh po realizatsii gosudarstvennoy politiki v oblasti obrazovaniya i nauki” (On measures 
to implement the state policy in the field of education and science”): http://gubernator96.ru/uploads/599.pdf  
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- Development and approval of a plan of actions for the development of leading Universities for 
increasing their competitiveness among the world's leading Scientific and educational cen-
ters; 
- Increase in the volume of financing of state scientific funds, as well as research and develop-
ment carried out on a competitive basis by leading universities; 
The May Decrees also ordered that the salaries of public employees should be raised across the board, 
with university professors and researchers to reach salaries exceeding the respective regional average 
by half. The considerable costs related to the Decrees was estimated by the Ministry of Finance at 2 
trillion rubles between 2014 and in 2016 (Falyakhov, 2015). Some commentators called the decrees an 
attempt to form a loyal electorate, ultimately leading to an increase in the deficit and the destabilization 
of Russian regional budgets, which are required to bear the brunt of the financial implications.  
The MoES had not been significantly involved with the development of the decrees concerning educa-
tion (Interview RU No. 16, 2017) but had to answer for their implementation. This put it in a challenging 
position. The decrees had prescribed very short deadlines for relatively ambitious goals. For example, 
the development of a new monitoring of HEIs was to be developed and implemented within four months 
– a herculean task in an HEsystem with over 1200 HEIs.  
As most universities had no additional funding available to raise salaries, some rectors were forced to 
cut the overall number of professors, in order to raise the salary of the remaining ones. While the imple-
mentation of the decrees in many areas was arguably only partial, those regarding higher education were 
mostly implemented. In particular the goal to consolidate the Russian system of higher education was 
clearly stated in the state program “Development of Education for the period 2013–2020” (Ministry of 
Education and Science of the RF, 2013). The program outlined that the future Russia higher education 
landscape should consist of: (a) leading research universities (40–60 institutions), which should act as 
the engines of innovation economy; (b) supporting universities of regional economic systems; and (c) 
universities providing extensive training for bachelor’s degrees. The State Program further tightened 
regulation on low-quality higher education by cutting the number of state-funded places in universities, 
by introducing a higher minimal EGE passing grade for students applying for state-funded places, and 
by further limiting HEIs in what kind and levels of study programs they could offer (BA, MA, PHD).  
6.2.4.2 Introduction of the government efficiency monitoring 
Since 2009, several changes had taken place in the licensing and accreditation procedures. Since 2011, 
HEIs did not have to renew their license on a fixed schedule of every 5 years any more, which became 
valid for an unlimited duration. However, Rosobrnadzor received the right to conduct unannounced 
inspections at any time. This had been used in individual cases as an instrument of political control 
(Forrat, 2012a) but became much more widespread with the introduction of a new government assess-
ment instrument, the so-called “effectiveness monitoring” (monitoring effektivnosti). Unsatisfied with 
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the failure of the accreditation system to reduce the number of low-quality HEIs and to improve the 
efficiency of public spending, in 2012–2013, a new yearly evaluation procedure had been mandated in 
the Maiskie ukazy to be introduced by the Ministry of Education and Science under Minister Livanov. 
This mechanism was implemented in the form of an “effectiveness monitoring” used to identify institu-
tions with low performance based on centrally collected data (Froumin, I. et al., 2014). The monitoring 
is based on a number of indicators measuring teaching effectiveness, research, faculty, infrastructure, 
finance, labor market outcomes of graduates, as well as the extent of internationalization. Indicators 
include the average EGE score of the students enrolled in state-funded places; the volume of R&D ex-
penditure per faculty member; the proportion of foreign students; the university’s income from all 
sources per faculty member; and the total area of classrooms and laboratories per student34. The indica-
tors used to measure HEI effectiveness were in part based on such projects as u-Map, the precursor to 
u-multirank and thus represent an internationally comparable inputs-outputs approach, but without sig-
nificant adjustment to local contexts (e.g. profile of HEI, differentiation of financial sources, regional 
diversity).  
HEIs which do not meet performance standards set by the Ministry of Education and Science are labelled 
as ‘ineffective’ and investigated by Rosobrnadzor. If sufficient shortcomings are found, HEIs are either 
merged with other institutions, partially restructured or lose their license or accreditation and are closed 
altogether in a so-called “optimization” process.  
“The monitoring is a continuation of the policy [of withdrawing accreditation]. The Monitoring 
[sends] signals to universities and supervisory bodies, including Rosobrnadzor, and for the 
ministry to take action. These decisions are either to close down a university or to merge it” 
(Interview RU No. 8, 2017) 
The Maiskie ukazy had foreseen only a period of four months for the development of the monitoring. 
When the first edition was launched, it was heavily criticized for not having been developed in consul-
tation with the professional community (Interview RU No. 14, 2017) and met with resistance especially 
from among the Russian Academy of Sciences, and representatives of small and specialized HEIs. Some 
criticism was directed at the supposedly western origin of indicator-based monitoring which is perceived 
and rejected for the same reasons as the other excellence initiatives and Russia’s accession to the Bolo-
gna Process (Telegina & Schwengel, 2012). But criticism was also voiced for other reasons: The uni-
versities which were closed usually had successfully passed state accreditation before. There had not 
been a public debate about the indicators. It was unclear how were they interpreted and according to 
which cut-off criteria HEIs were deemed “ineffective”? The measures were applied to all HEIs alike, 
disregarding the specificities of small and specialized HEIs, branches or remote geography. Some of the 
complaints were successively taken into account, but the monitoring remained a powerful instrument in 
                                                          
34 For the full list of indicators see http://indicators.miccedu.ru/monitoring/attach/%D0%90%D0%9A-
30_05%D0%B2%D0%BD_30.03.2015.pdf  
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the hand of Rosobrnadzor and the MoES. It is notable that even though the monitoring had been man-
dated by a binding presidential decree, the president did not render political support to this unpopular 
measure (Interview RU No. 16, 2017).  
Until the 2012 law on education, state accreditation had focused on the institutional level. Since the new 
law on education came into effect in 2013, state accreditation exclusively referred to study programs, 
which are assessed on their compliance with the FSES while still taking into account characteristics of 
the institution (ENQA, 2014a). Since September 2014, student surveys on learning conditions must also 
be conducted as part of state accreditation (ENQA, 2014a). The list of indicators for accreditation is 
developed by NAA and approved by the order of Rosobrnadzor (NAA, 2015b). The indicators are de-
rived from and intended to reflect the contents of the federal standards. Under the new law, it also be-
came impossible for HEIs to change their status (institute, academy, or university), which had to be 
applied for by their founding bodies, e.g. ministries, regions or private founders.  
Since 2012, decisions by Rosobrnadzor had resulted in mergers and liquidations of a large number of 
HEIs and an even higher number of branches. In 2014, Rosobrnadzor closed 357 HEIs and branches. In 
the first half of 2015 151 Russian HEIs and branches had their license withdrawn, 34 lost their accredi-
tation35. According to the Federal Statistics Service, the number of HEIs decreased from 1134 in the 
2008/09 academic year to 950 in the 2014/15 academic year, that is, 184 HEIs ceased to exist.  
6.2.4.3 The new excellence initiative: The “5/100” Program 
Redoubling on the goals of the National Research University program, the presidential decree 599 from 
May 7, 2012 and the State Program for the Development of Education (Ministry of Education and Sci-
ence of Russia, 2012) laid out the task of having at least five Russian universities in the top one hundred 
in global university rankings by 2020. To achieve this ambitious goal, a multi-year program called the 
“5/100 program” was launched. Among other goals, program universities were expected to increase 
their research output and its international visibility as well as significantly the number of international 
students (to 15%) and international academic staff (to 10%) by 2020.  
The outcome of the project should be the formation of a group of modernized flagship universities with 
an effective governance structure, high international visibility and academic reputation, which promote 
education, help to preserve national elites within Russia, develop professional competences of an inter-
national standard, promote science and innovation, and act as centers of development of the national 
higher education system. In comparison to the National Research University program, the funding for 
each participating HEI was increased three times as compared to the research universities program, and 
the number of participating HEIs reduced from 29 to 15 (later 21). Participating universities received 
                                                          
35 https://www.ucheba.ru/article/1041  
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greater autonomy in how to spend the program money, while their progress along their university de-
velopment programs is monitored each year by a special Council on Global Competitiveness Enhance-
ment of Russian Universities, which also reviewed the university strategic development programs, which 
are submitted by HEIs for the 5-100 competition. HEIs that do not meet the goals laid out in their de-
velopment plans can be expelled from the program. The Council itself consists of 12 members, six from 
Russia and six from among the international academic community and was chaired by Russian Minister 
of Education and Science.  
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Summary 
Without a doubt, the Federal University Program, the National Research University Program and the 
5/100 program has begun to transform the leading segment of the Russian higher education system. 
They designated a group of Russian universities first of 41 institutions (less than 4 % of the total number 
of universities), and later to an even smaller group of leaders with the 5/100 program (which included 
first 15, later 21 HEIs). This financial differentiation going on in the Russian higher education system 
become clearly visible in the overall allocation of state funding to HEIs: While overall state funding for 
higher education had increased since 2000, in 2014 expenses were reduced for the first time. This holds 
true for all HEIs except Moscow and Saint Petersburg State Universities, the Federal Universities and 
the National Research universities, among which were 15 (since 2016: 21) are also participants of the 
5/100 project), which saw an increase of up to 32% in funding and, by 2015, accounted for 42,5%  of all 
State funding for higher education (Abankina, I., Filatova, & Vynaryk, 2016).  
While the projects strongly invigorating the research capacity of the participating universities (Chirikov, 
2015), they also transformed the governance of this sector of universities. All participating HEIs were 
required to change their statutes to “autonomous institution” (AU). The National Research universities 
and the participants of the 5/100 program needed to undergo periodic evaluations by international expert 
consortia. The goal of improving their research performance and output led to significant changes to 
their internal organization and governance in the form of new academic units (e.g. schools and depart-
ments in the place of chairs, appointment of directors of institutes and department by the rector, instead 
of elections by faculty councils, and the use of effective contracts and key performance indicators to 
measure activity and outputs). Early indicators of research productivity show an impact of the program 
as well: The share of publications by Russian researchers from HEIs supported by the 5-100 program 
top quartile journals indexed in the Web of Science was at close to 40 percent in 2015, up from 10 
percent in 2010 (Yudkevich, 2015).  
Forrat (2015) argues that these programs served to create a class-society in competition between and 
within segments of the higher education system, preventing cooperation and coordinated political lob-
bying. Forrat further argued that the programs established an implicit agreement between the State and 
HEIs, to prevent anti-regime mobilization of students. While the leading universities are without doubt 
highly dependent on continued participation in these programs, Chirikov (2015) showed that there is 
little data to support the claim that their primary motivation was political control of the student body 
and discards this thesis as highly implausible.  
6.2.4.4 Introduction of Boards of Trustees  
In 2011, by presidential order, boards of trustees (popechitelskiye sovety) were established at all HEIs. 
These boards primarily established to involve employers in the development of study programs and in 
supporting HEIs. Boards of trustees would include representatives of the founder (in most cases – the 
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line ministry), of employers, of executive authorities of regional and local authorities, as well as repre-
sentatives of other organizations chosen by the HEI. Boards of trustees did not gain any formal decision-
making powers. Rather, they were meant to act as coordination bodies between HEIs, local business, 
regional and local authorities and served, to a degree, to gain or maintain ties with and patronage of 
powerful individuals in business and politics for the universities (Interview RU No. 16, 2017). For ex-
ample, different deputy heads of the presidential administration have presided over the board of Trustees 
of the Higher School of Education in Moscow while Alexei Kudrin, one of the informal leader of the 
“liberal camp” in the Russian political establishment is a board member of the liberal European Univer-
sity of St. Petersburg. 
6.2.4.5 The role of professional public accreditation expands in the law on education without 
legal consequences  
The 1992 law on education for the first time explicitly mentioned public accreditation. The 2012 revision 
added public-professional accreditation, public accreditation, and independent quality assessment as ad-
ditional quality assurance instruments besides the official state accreditation. As with state accreditation 
since 2012, public-professional accreditation is exclusively granted at the study program level. While 
public-professional accreditation is no substitute for state accreditation, its results are supposed to be 
taken into account by Rosobnadzor, without specifying in which way. The law thus recognized the ex-
istence and activity of the private agencies and associations which had appeared during the 2000ies and 
were conducting their own activities in the field of accreditation but stopped short of giving them any 
form of legal recognition.  
The former Rosakkredagentstvo staff which had left the agency in 2009, founded the National Center 
of Public Accreditation (Natsakkredtsentr) in Yoshkar-Ola. Platforms such as the Guild of experts in the 
field of vocational education (2006) and annual expert forums continue based on the new agency. State 
grants to develop technology for the internet-based assessment of learning outcomes and online exams 
in vocational education (FEPO), accreditations of HEIs, and international projects have support its con-
tinued activities (Motova, 2015). By 2017, NCPA had become a full member of INQAAHE, ENQA, 
APQN, CEENQA and was officially listed in EQAR. From the point of view of the overall governance 
of the Russian HE system, however, independent accreditation never developed any real significance.  
6.2.4.6 Reform of the HEI financing mechanism 
In 2010 the Russian parliament had adopted a law turning public sector organizations into “autonomous 
providers of public services” (Forrat, 2012a). The key idea was that the government would no longer be 
directly responsible for public sector organizations as such but would reimburse services delivered to 
citizens. In return, they would be allowed to keep any additional revenues and dispose over these funds 
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as they pleased. This had been implemented for “autonomous universities” since 2006 but only few 
HEIs had chosen to change their status fearing financial cuts.  
In 2011, due to the demographic decline and financial crisis, State policy in higher education became 
focused on consolidating financial, material and technical, and intellectual resources in the Russian 
Higher Education system (Abankina, I. et al., 2016). As one measure, the system of distribution state 
funding for HE was changed. Prior to 2012, the Ministry of Education and Science established the num-
ber of state funded “budget places” per discipline and university. Since 2012, the Ministry of Education 
and Science distributes budget-funded places in a special procedure (raspedelenie kontrolnih tsifr 
priema) involving a public competition, in which state-accredited HEIs may bid for study places funded 
by the federal budget in specific areas of study (Klyachko, T. & Sinelnikov-Murylev, 2012). Addition 
restrictions on the kind of universities which were allowed to bid for state-funded places affected many 
HEIs such as engineering universities, which were to be barred from offering study programs in social 
sciences.  
The yearly process of distribution of study places includes several steps. It is based on an estimation of 
the current and future needs for specialists according to 55 fields of training (napravleniya), which is 
calculated by the labor and government authorities of the Russian regions and entered into an electronic 
system. On the basis of these predictions, the MoES creates a proposal for the number of government-
funded study places, taking into consideration government policy and demographic developments36. 
Since 2013, this proposal is then discussed by so-called “centers of responsibility” (tsentry otvetstven-
nosti), which are working groups of 5-10 people, representing large companies, universities and other 
experts working with or in areas related to one of the 55 fields of training, e.g. medical sciences, physics, 
etc. All centers of responsibility come together and discuss and negotiate the Ministry’s proposal and 
need to come to an agreement on the distribution of state-funded places across fields of study. Based on 
this distribution and the cost of different fields of study, the ministry creates a plan. In a next steps HEIs 
apply for study places. Based on the results of a ranking based on the same indicators used in the effi-
ciency monitoring of HEIs, the ministry distributes state-funded study places among HEIs. Thus, the 
HEI with the highest-ranking position receives places with the highest priority. If HEIs applied for more 
places than are “available”, those with the lowest results on the efficiency monitoring are not granted 
places, and, in consequence, public funding. The actual funding is based by the number of students 
actually enrolled by HEIs, taking further into account “regional coefficients”37 and coefficients for the 
mode of study (full-time/part-time).  
Regions assessment of need by regions Until November 
                                                          
36 The government defines as a policy, what percentage of the population should study on a state-subsidized basis, 
typically in the range of 400-800/10.000 population 
37 Taking into consideration the cost of living and bonuses to individuals working in the North of the countries, 
etc.  
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Discussion of distribution of state funded study places among 
employers and experts 
November and De-
cember 
Calculation of “state order” by MoES December 
State order is published by MoES January 
Bidding for state order by HEIs.  February 
HEIs get informed about results April 
HEIs enroll students August 
HEIs report actual enrollment and get compensated September 
Table 15: 2013 procedure of distribution of State Order for study places in Russian Federation 
The 2013 model is noteworthy for that for the first time, the normative costs of a study place were 
differentiated in three categories according to specialty (area of training) and level of higher education 
(BA, MA, PhD). Also, private HEIs for the first time became eligible to participate, although their num-
ber and share of students was capped. When they first became eligible, private HEIs accounted for about 
1,5% of all state funded places. As private accepting state-funded students HEIs need to accept lower 
limits on tuition fees for paying students and pass an “effectiveness assessment”, many choose to not 
apply and the number of budget-funded places at private HEIs has been dropping since then. Aside from 
a few exceptions, private HEIs do generally not receive public money (Interview RU No. 12, 2017). The 
system established a quasi-market, in which HEIs compete for study places as well as for students to fill 
them. Students likewise compete for study-places at the most prestigious HEIs which promotes their 
position on their “quality of student intake” as measured by EGE results. This market is tilted towards 
the most elite HEIs which participate in state targeted funding programs, which increases the funding 
they can invest in becoming attractive to students as well their prestige. Since state funding via a per-
student system is by far the most important source of funding for most state HEIs, the demographic 
decline in combination with the support for a small number of elite HEIs represents a significant risk 
for the large majority of regional HEIs destined to suffer funding contractions. Without greater govern-
ment subsidies via increased basic funding or participating in special government programs, it seems 
inevitable that many regional HEIs will be forced to consolidate programs or even cease operations 
(Abankina, I. et al., 2016). There is relatively widespread suspicion of the factual objectivity of the 
assignment of study places (Interview RU No. 16, 2017), but it has not been possible to substantiate 
these suspicions.  
6.3 The governance model of the Russian HE system by 2015 
After 25 years of transformation since the break-up of the Soviet Union, a new distinct model of gov-
ernance of the Russian Higher Education system has emerged. While during the 1990ies, the state had 
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withdrawn in a lot of areas from steering the HE system, since the 2000, the Russian government suc-
cessively created an array of new steering instruments giving the MoES significant powers to regulate 
the higher education system.  
Development of differentiated state steering mechanisms of the higher education system 
Via the Unified State Exam (EGE) and the system of allocation of state-funded study places, the 
state can regulate the overall size of enrollment, as well as determine priority areas of enrollment. State 
licensing and accreditation were transformed from relatively impartial instruments of verifying com-
pliance with regulation into a powerful instrument of state steering and control in the hands of Rosob-
nadzor and – by extension – the MoES. As Rosobnadzor received the right to revoke a license at any 
time and has discretion over how rigorous to apply existing norms and accreditation criteria, this is a 
very high concentration of power. HEIs can only resort to courts to challenge Rosobrnadzor’s decisions 
with uncertain outcomes. The government efficiency monitoring (since 2012) provides a wealth of 
indicator data based on which Rosobrnadzor conducts controls and can (and does) revoke licenses and 
accreditation of HEIs. The power to conduct unscheduled controls and therefore the constant latent 
threat of legal sanctions gives the state the means to intervene at any HEI, either as an instrument of 
long-term strategy, or as a (rare) emergency response to political threats (Forrat, 2012a). A more focused 
use of resources has created a differentiated model of governance for the different tiers of an increas-
ingly vertically differentiated HE system: The top-tier (Federal Universities, National Research Uni-
versities, 5/100-Universities, Flagship Universities) receive additional funding for the implementation 
of ambitious development programs, which have often been developed with the help of external con-
sultants. In return for receiving additional funding, HEIs which are participating in the targeted Federal 
programs are required to change their status into autonomous institutions and need to submit to a new 
monitoring and evaluation regime.  
In order to be included in these programs, HEIs need to change their statutes to autonomous institutions 
(AU) and in some cases switch of a system of appointing rectors (e.g. Federal Universities, Moscow and 
St. Petersburg State Universities). The substantive funding, the close indicator-based monitoring, and 
the additional powers of the university leadership have a fundamental impact on the institutional behav-
ior. Licensing and Accreditation, as well as the effectiveness monitoring are not really relevant for these 
universities, as they perform well on these instruments anyway or can operate according to their own 
standards altogether (in the case of Moscow and St. Petersburg State Universities). As they rank very 
high on indicator systems and enjoy strong political support, they usually also get awarded very high 
numbers of state-funded study places in the bidding system for the state order, in addition to non-budget 
students who are prepared to pay often considerable tuition fees. The “price” these universities pay is 
that they experience more individual attention from government about how and for which results they 
use their funds.  
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The lower-tier HEIs, on the other hand, do not only have to prove their compliance with licensing and 
accreditation requirements which, since the 2010s, have been applied in an increasingly restrictive man-
ner. In addition, they need to prove their “efficiency” in the government efficiency monitoring or risk 
being merged with other HEIs in the vicinity or even closed altogether. Less-than-positive performance 
on the monitoring indicators also puts them at risk to lose out on state funding, as, since 2013, HEIs 
have to bid for an increasingly scarce “state-order” of study places and these are awarded to the better 
performing HEIs first. Minimal EGE scores that students need to meet to be admitted to HE at all (which 
are established by the MoES) in combination with declining student numbers due to demography mean 
that attracting fee-paying students is also increasingly difficult for less attractive HEIs. In addition, also 
HEIs not participating in targeted funding programs, report pressure from the side of the MoES to 
change their statutes so that rectors would be nominated by the founder (in this case: the corresponding 
ministries) rather than elected by the academic council. The increased organizational autonomy and thus 
power in the hands of rectors thus translates into a greater power potential for the MoES which has 
(through the above-mentioned instruments) considerable sway over rectors and through them over HEIs.  
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The following figure illustrates the dynamics of this system:  
 
Figure 13: The differentiated model of governance of higher education system in the Russian Federation by 2015 
These developments clearly reflect a changed focus away from a one-size-fits-all approach towards a 
higher education policy of supporting a limited number of universities while controlling the remaining 
part of the sector.  
While the MoES increasingly recentralized power over the HE system in its own hands, the format 
chosen for stakeholder involvement were advisory structures, which provided deliberation spaces for 
discussing policy and steering decisions with employers, regional representatives and representatives of 
the academic community, and other experts, but which had a strictly advisory role. The format of choice 
for these structures in the Russian HE system were the so-called "state-public" associations or organi-
zations, which the state financially and organizationally supported and which it used to get feedback 
from stakeholder groups such as unions, professional associations, scientific and other societies, re-
search associations, teaching and methodological associations or various councils and commissions. In 
2004, the Council on State Educational Standards of Professional Education was created to involve 
representatives of employer associations to a greater degree in the development of State Standards for 
Higher education. The MoES also increased stakeholder involvement in the process of distribution of 
study places by involving regional authorities and business and university representatives in so-called 
“centers of responsibility” (tsentry otvetstvennosti). In addition, the MoES as well as the Presidential 
Administration maintain a number of advisory councils in which policy issues are discussed, but which 
have no decision-making power. Their activity is closely coordinated and supervised by the MoES.  
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As the level of control over the leadership of the HEIs has greatly increased since 1992, institutional 
autonomy of HEIs (or at least of rectors vis-à-vis their HEIs) has significantly substantially expanded 
as state regulation of day-to-day operations was reduced: With each generation of the State standards, 
curricular autonomy broadened as the amount of detailed prescription of subjects and disciplines was 
reduced. In HR matters such as hiring teaching staff and the possibility to use shorter-term “effective 
contracts” based on key performance indicators to measure activity and outputs) shifted the power dis-
tribution within HEIs clearly towards the rector. Initiatives such as the election of rectors by governing 
boards in autonomous institutions further strengthen the position of rectors vis-à-vis their HEIs. Since 
2006/2013, HEIs (and their rectors) enjoy greater financial autonomy over lump sum budgets and thus 
greater freedom of action to develop and implement individual institutional strategies.  
By the 2000ies, rectors had mostly consolidated their power and it became rare that elections were seri-
ously contested or lost (Interview RU No. 16, 2017). After the government had reasserted its authority 
over rectoral elections, effectively appointing rectors after 2006, the “power vertical” increasingly made 
itself felt also within HEIs. Academic councils lost their governance function in most areas but curricular 
matters, while rectors gained in authority vis-à-vis professors. The introduction of “effective contracts” 
tied staff salaries to reaching certain performance indicators which the HEI’s leadership has the power 
to specify. New academic units that are formed (e.g. schools and departments in the place of chairs), 
their heads were appointed by the rector, rather than elected by faculty councils. Both developments 
(stronger central control by the State combined with greater powers to HEI leaderships) are particularly 
true for HEIs participating in targeted funding programs (Federal Universities, Research Universities, 
5/100), as all participating HEIs were required to change their statutes to “autonomous institution” (AU).  
Individual professors have arguably lost most in terms of authority within the governance of the HE 
system. During the 1990ies, they had been relatively autonomous. There had been large gains in curric-
ular autonomy within the framework of the FSES. Powers were divested to the department level and 
heads of departments would now be elected by professors. The election of rectors by academic councils 
gave faculty a say in questions concerning the whole institution. With each version of the FSES, aca-
demics gained greater curricular autonomy. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that HEIs had 
been underfunded and salaries were so small that universities could be thankful that professors continued 
to teach. During the 1990ies this was often only possible due to idealism and the fact, that other sources 
of funding were accessible in the form of private tutoring, the renting out of university spaces and, in 
some cases, income from corruption.  
The following table summarizes aspects of the Russian model of governance in 2015.  
Changes in the relationship between HEIs and the state 
State is highly active in policy-setting. State supervising, steering from a distance and ex-post control is visible 
for top tier of HE system 
  
page 133 
Strong state control and intervention for the lower tier 
Quality Assurance Institutional Governance and 
Autonomy 
Financing higher education 
Study programs contents regulated 
by Federal State Educational 
Standards (FSES) 
External evaluation and control of 
performance by licensing & ac-
creditation and effectiveness moni-
toring  
Independent accreditation wel-
comed but optional 
National ranking of HEIs 
 
Considerable power of HE leader-
ship further expended 
Appointment by state-dominated 
governing boards or the President 
in AUs, de-facto appointment of 
rectors by MoES in others 
Power to appoint, evaluate, reim-
burse and dismiss academic staff 
with HEI leadership 
Advisory boards and state-domi-
nated governance boards 
Power of HEI leadership to ap-
point, evaluate, reimburse and dis-
miss academic staff 
lump-sum budgets and financial 
autonomy for AU, line-item budg-
ets for other state HEIs 
Competitive mechanism of allocat-
ing state-funded study places 
Competitive participation in gov-
ernment-programs (RU, 5-100, 
flagship universities) 
Competition for students to fill 
places 
Income-diversification from tui-
tion-fees and other sources 
 
Regulation of access to HE 
Centralized testing with EGE 
Table 16: Elements of governance model of Russian System of Higher Education by 2015 
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7 The Republic of Kazakhstan 
7.1 Introduction 
Kazakhstan is the world's largest landlocked country, roughly the size of Western Europe and the ninth 
largest country in the world. In 2015, the total population was 17,165,000, divided into 131 ethnic 
groups, including Kazakhs (63% of the population38), Russians, Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Germans, Tatars, 
Uighurs, and others. Kazakhstan is a secular multi-confessional country, with the most widespread reli-
gions being Islam and Christianity. The State Language are Kazakh and Russian, which is most com-
monly used in public Organizations and local self-government bodies. Kazakhstan is an upper-middle 
income country with a GDP per capita of about $ 13,000 (2013).  
Due to its abundant natural resources in oil, gas and minerals, Kazakhstan is not only by far the largest, 
but also the economically dominant nation of Central Asia, generating 60% of the region's GDP. The 
territory of what today comprises Kazakhstan was historically inhabited by nomadic tribes and gained 
a first form of organized statehood in the 13th century it became part of the Mongolian Empire under 
Genghis Khan. It reverted to being inhabited mostly by nomadic tribes, the dominant of which were the 
Kazakh. Russia began colonizing the Kazakh steppe in the 18th century, and by the mid-19th century, 
nominally ruled all of Kazakhstan as part of the Russian Empire. After the 1917 Russian Revolution, 
the territories of Central Asia were reorganized several times. Kazakhstan found its current borders in 
1936 as the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, part of the Soviet Union. In the referendum of 17 March 
1991 on the future of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan, as the other Central Asian republics overwhelm-
ingly voted in favor of the unity of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union collapsed later that year, 
Kazakhstan was the last of the Soviet republics to declare independence. The current President, Nursul-
tan Nazarbayev, has been leader of the country ever since.  
Higher education in Kazakhstan appeared first during the 1920s (Froumin et al. 2014; Kyzykeyeva and 
Oskolkova 2011) in the form of 20 HEIs focused on teacher training, agriculture and medicine (Dzhold-
asbekov and Kuznetsov 1975), and was further expanded during the 1930ies (Ahn, Dixon, & Chekma-
reva, 2018). By 1989, there were fifty-five HEIs in the Kazakh SSR which enrolled 287,400 students 
(Ahn et al., 2018).  
                                                          
38 With a considerably higher percentage among younger age cohorts 
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7.2 The development of the governance of the higher education system in Ka-
zakhstan 
Elec-
toral pe-
riod 
President’s Party/Coali-
tion 
President Prime Minister(s) Minister(s) of Edu-
cation/Science 
1991-
1994 
Independent Nursultan Nazarba-
yev 
Sergey Tereshchenko 
(1991-1994) 
 
Shaysultan Sha-
yakhmetov (1987-
1993) 
1994-
1999 
People’s Union of Ka-
zakhstan Unity 
Nursultan Nazarba-
yev 
Akezhan Kazhegeldin 
(1994-1997) 
Nurlan Balgimbayev 
(1997-1999) 
Yerezhep Mambet-
kaziyev (1993-1995) 
Murat Zhurinov 
(1995-1997) 
Imangali Tasmagam-
betov (1997) 
Krymbek Kusherba-
yev (1997-1999) 
Vladimir Shkol'nik 
(1999) 
1999-
2016 
Otan / Nur Otan Nursultan Nazarba-
yev 
Kassym-Jomart To-
kayev (1999-2002) 
Imangali Tasmagam-
betov (2002-2003) 
Daniyal Akhmetov 
(2003-2007) 
Karim Massimov 
(2007-2012) 
Serik Akhmetov 
(2012-2014) 
Karim Massimov 
(2014-2016) 
Bakhytzhan Saginta-
yev (2016-) 
Krymbek Kush-
erbaev (1999-2000) 
Nuraly Bekturganov 
(2000-2002) 
Shamsha 
Berkimbaeva (2002-
2003) 
Zhaksybek Kulekeev 
(2003-2004) 
Byrganym Aitimova 
(2004-2007) 
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Zhanseit Tuymenba-
yev (2007-2010 
Bakhytzhan 
Zhumagulov (2010-
2013) 
Aslan Sarinzhipov 
(2013-2016) 
Erlan Sagadiyev 
(2016-) 
Table 17: Overview of ruling parties, prime ministers, and ministers of education in Kazakhstan 1991-2017 
7.2.1 Establishing statehood and institutions (1991-1999) 
In the all-Union referendum on the future of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan, like all Central 
Asian countries, had overwhelmingly voted in favour of remaining within the Soviet Union. When the 
Soviet Union did collapse nonetheless, the economic shock which hit all post-Soviet republics after 
independence did not spare Kazakhstan. The devastating economic fallout of the break-up of the Soviet 
Union left the young State in a precarious situation. Between 1991 and 1995, real GDP fell by 39% and 
exports collapsed (World Bank, 2005). As on all other spheres of public life, this had a detrimental effect 
on spending on education, which fell on absolute terms, as well as a percentage of GDP, from 6 % in 
1990 to 3.5 % in 2000 (World Bank & OECD, 2007).  
In educational policy and governance, the central authority in Moscow had disappeared. Central funding 
for higher education ceased to exist. Disciplines such as business management, market economics, and 
social sciences like sociology and political science did not exist yet. The bleak economic situation and 
economic outlook coupled with insecurity about the status of non-ethnic Kazakhs in newly independent 
Kazakhstan led to a massive emigration of populations to Russia, Germany (the sizable Volga-German 
community) and other countries. The resultant brain-drain and departure of well-trained specialists con-
tributed to the overall decline. The first order of business for newly independent Kazakhstan was there-
fore to create state institutions from the ground up and assure the short- and mid-term survival of the 
educational system.  
In 1993, the Bolashak39 program was launched, providing high-performing students from Kazakhstan 
with scholarships to study at leading universities around the world, provided that they return to Kazakh-
stan to work for at least five years after graduation which was since gradually expanded in scope. In 
1995, a new Constitution was passed, which made the titular Kazakh language as the official state lan-
guage but retained Russian as “language of interethnic communication” and effectively working lan-
guage in business, higher education, and politics. First attempts were made to integrate into the wider 
                                                          
39 The word "Bolashak" is translated into English as "Future” 
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education space, when 1994, some universities experimentally began to introduce Bachelor’s degrees. 
In 1998, an agreement was signed between the Commonwealth of Independent States, to mutually rec-
ognize higher education degrees. Kazakhstan’s MoES had done much to promote this project (Zhake-
nov, 2007).  
In October of 1997, the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev laid out a vision for the country 
titled “Kazakhstan 2030” on economic development, social and government reform, beginning the prac-
tice of increasingly sophisticated strategic planning and 5- and 10-year plans in all areas of government.  
7.2.1.1 Basic architecture of higher education governance is established (1991-1994) 
A new legal framework was formulated in the laws “On Education’’ in 1992 and ‘‘On Higher Educa-
tion’’ in 1993 which regulated the overall operations of HEIs (Brunner & Tillett, 2007). These laws, 
along with other regulations and standards created a regulatory structure for the higher education system, 
mostly maintaining, however, the centralized control that had existed under the Soviet regime (Ahn et 
al., 2018). After independence, the ministry of national education (ministerstvo narodnogo obra-
zovaniya) was founded, which managed primary, secondary, technical professional education. A state-
level committee on HE had existed within the Kazakh SSR since 1959, which became the foundation 
for the Kazakhstani Ministry of Education and Science (ministerstvo vysshego obrazovaniya I nauki - 
MoES) (Kyzykeyeva & Oskolkova, 2011). The first structure thus conserved the Soviet division be-
tween the Ministry of Higher Education (ministerstvo vyshego obrazovaniya) and the “Enlightenment 
Ministry” (ministerstvo prosvysheniya CCCR). This structure remained in place until 1999.  
7.2.1.2 Tuition fees are introduced and private higher education booms 
With the economy in decline, market reforms in the making and public coffers empty, the Law on Higher 
Education in 1993 allowed state HEIs to enroll students on a tuition-fee basis and allowed the creation 
of private HEIs. In addition, the state itself, finding itself unable to fund these institutions, privatized a 
number of HEIs, often to their staff or third-party investors. As a former academic and minister of edu-
cation comments: 
 “When we became independent, there was no money in the budget. We had to build borders, 
we had to form a diplomatic corps, there was a crisis, there was not money, for 5-6 years, it was 
very difficult. Businesses closed down, there was mass unemployment, and no tax income. We 
started to close many HEIs, many colleges, because we could not close schools, pupils have to 
study somewhere. We started to hand over institutes to private hands, started to close down 
colleges. Higher education we almost completely passed into private hands. We almost gave 
these universities away for free. We wanted there to be ownership of these universities.” (Inter-
view KZ No. 18, 2017) 
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The liberalization of private HEIs at a time when state structures for quality assurance and regulation 
did not yet work led to an explosion in the number of private HEIs (Ahn et al., 2018). During the 1990ies, 
the number of HEIs rose from 55 in 1989 to 170 in 2000, the majority of which in Almaty, the biggest 
city and former capital. By 1998, there were 111 HEIs which were categorized as non-public, out of 165 
total HEIs in Kazakhstan (Brunner & Tillett, 2007).  
Nevertheless, economic times were challenging for public as well as for private HEIs and had to scram-
ble to make ends meet, sometimes at the expense of quality:  
“These universities started to train specialists on a fee-basis. Their also did not have the money 
to maintain building, pay their staff well, which is why they opened branches.” (Interview KZ 
No. 18, 2017)  
7.2.1.3 Standard study programs and, licensing and attestion are established (1994-1998) 
State standards and typical study plans are developed 
In 1994, the MoES began to organize the development of joint standards in higher education. “Typical 
study plans “(typovye uchebnye plany - TUP) were developed, a task that was delegated to teaching-
methodological associations (uchebno-metodicheskie ob’edineniya - UMO), associations of all univer-
sities offering a certain study program. UMOs were hosted by a specific “profile” HEI which was re-
garded as the leading center for this area of studies40, and which would be responsible for the develop-
ment of the study plans. The first resulting TUP determined roughly 90% of subjects in standardized 
study programs. They prescribed in which semester which course should be thought, which didactical 
format should be used, the form of exams, and how many hours each course should be taught.  
At the same time, the development of State Standards for Higher Education began. State standards com-
prised TUP but contained further common standards regarding the structure and contents of the educa-
tion process. They were successively developed for each study program foreseen in the official list of 
State Classifiers. The standards defined the intended knowledge and skills of alumni, the required sub-
jects and their key contents, and the forms of assessment. Between 1995-1997, standards for 310 study 
programs of higher education were developed and in 1996, a classificator (list) of higher education pro-
grams was released (Zhakenov, 2007).  
The first TUP and State Standards were thus developed by leading universities, on the basis of a decision 
by the MoES. The first generation of standards was developed without formal involvement of employ-
ers’ or other stakeholders. As other universities were not permitted to deviate from the core elements of 
the Standard, this gave the universities developing the standards for its field, a large degree of power 
                                                          
40 E.g. study plans for economic specialties would be developed by Narkhoz University, Social Science specialties 
by the Kazakh National University, and teacher training programs by Ablai Khan University 
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over the curriculum in the entire country, while lacking strong incentives to modernize their own cur-
riculum. Possibly as a result, the World Bank/OECD review of 2007 found that standards and curriculum 
materials were “in need of serious modernization”, especially in the areas of social sciences (World 
Bank & OECD, 2007). Nevertheless, the TUP and state standards provided a first orientation for HEIs 
after the central authorities in Moscow had disappeared. The new institutions re-created the Soviet struc-
tures of centralized curricular design which HEIs were used to expect to operate.  
Government licensing and attestation 
The MoES also established a system of government licensing and attestation for quality assurance. After 
the model of the Soviet-era Higher Attestation Commission (VAK), a Committee for Supervision and 
Attestation in Education and Science41 (CCES) was founded which would be responsible for the super-
vision and attestation of all HEIs in the country. In order to operate, all HEIs were required to receive a 
license from the CCES. To do so, they needed to meet minimal standards regarding facilities, qualified 
staff and were required to document that they operated in accordance with the State Educational Stand-
ard. For those HEIs who have been granted a license to operate, state attestation procedures were now 
being carried out every five years in order to assess whether HEIs operated according to the state stand-
ards. In case attestation is not granted, the HEI’s license is withdrawn and the rector of the HEI is liable 
to administrative proceedings. While the initial chaotic growth of HEIs and study programs had es-
chewed regulation, by 1996, the vast majority of HEIs had been brought under the supervision of MoES 
(McLendon, 2004).  
By 1999, a highly centralized and system of regulation of the educational content had been established. 
Highly detailed TUP had been developed for all subjects which all HEIs had to followed. The only 
exception was the Kazakh National Al Farabi University, which had a special autonomy status and re-
tained the right to develop their own study programs and issue their own diplomas.  
7.2.2 Curbing corruption and saddling the market (1999-2004) 
This economic downwards trend was reversed only in 2000, when the economy recovered, driven in 
part by reforms and in large part by rising commodity prices from which the oil and mining sectors 
profited. However, even as the economy slowly began to recover, governmental spending on higher 
education continued to decline (Brunner & Tillett, 2007).  
In 1999, The Law on Education was revised. The new law laid out a new institutional framework on all 
aspects of the governance of the higher education system. On the one hand, it introduced market-based 
principles to state funding of HEIs via the introduction of a voucher-like system of study grants. On the 
                                                          
41 The Committee was later renamed into “Committee for Control in Education and Science”. For the sake of 
clarity, I will only use CCES as abbreviation throughout the chapter.  
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other hand, it increased state control over access to higher education through a centralized school-leav-
ing exam and increased controls of universities’ academic outcomes.  
7.2.2.1 Introduction of Centralized Testing for university admission  
Since Soviet times, HEIs had been allowed to admit students based on their institutional specialization 
and the student’s academic background and performance42. By the end of the 1999ies, however, the 
general impression of this system was one of corruption (Interview KZ No. 18, 2017).  
Already in 1992, a “National Testing Center” had been set up, which was tasked with developing dif-
ferent forms of national assessment of education on different levels. In 1999, however, in order to ad-
dress the general lack of transparency in the university admission process and eradicate the possibility 
of corruption in university admissions, the MoES developed the Complex Test (CT), the first version of 
what would later become known as the Unified National Test (Edinoe Nacional'noe Testirovanie - 
UNT)43. The test was developed in the form of a three hour exam administered to all school leavers 
wishing to enroll to higher education and replaced the individual admissions procedures at universities 
(Winter, 2014). The first version of the tests were launched in 1999 and were then successively rolled 
out to all Kazakh schools until 2004 with testing centers being established throughout the country. The 
National Testing Center was reorganized into the National Centre of State Standards for Education and 
Tests (NCSSES) as a subsidiary of the MoES, which became responsible for developing standards and 
tests, as well as for administering the centralized testing. In 2004, the “complex test” in which only 
students applying to HEIs had participated, was transformed into the “Unified National Test” (Edinnoe 
natsional’noe testirovanie) which every student had to take obligatorily upon graduation from school.  
The new test established state control over HEI admission in a number of ways. First and foremost, as 
HEIs lost the authority over enrollment testing, they lost a source of income and a source of potential 
corruption in preparing for or helping to pass entrance examinations. Secondly, the state could now set 
a minimum passing score on the central exams. No HEIs could enroll students who had scored lower 
than this threshold. Thirdly, state financing of HEIs was reformed, which incentivized HEIs to invest in 
their quality and reputation (see below). Finally, having comparable test data gave the MoES infor-
mation on the performance of schools and regions, as well as on the attractiveness of HEIs, which could 
be used for monitoring and targeted intervention (Interview KZ No. 18, 2017). 
As a former minister of education explains his rationale on the introduction of centralized testing for 
university admission:  
“Quality begins with the quality of selection [of students] and the quality of secondary school 
education. This is why we developed a number of instruments of quality assessment of schools. 
                                                          
42 During Soviet times, the number of available study places had been the limiting factor 
43 The first edition was called simply “complex testing” (kompleksnoe testirovanie) 
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Maybe the tests have their faults but at the same time, they are the most objective instruments. 
They eradicate corruption. [..] You know, we have a very specific economy where administrative 
influence is very strong because we have elements of an authoritarian regime and when some-
body [powerful] says something, subordinates will set out right away to implement it. If we did 
not have the [centralized] testing, I do not know what would have been. The akim [mayor] or 
some public servant, or public prosecutor or the police would just dictate “admit my son, or 
that other son”. Now nobody messes with this process. This is why we now more or less objec-
tively admit students.“ (Interview KZ No. 18, 2017) 
7.2.2.2 Introduction of a money-follows-students grant system in HE financing  
In parallel to the introduction of centralized testing for university admission, the government completely 
overhauled the system of public financing for higher education. Before 1999 all State HEIs used to 
receive a yearly “admittance plan” (plan priema) with a certain number of state-funded study places per 
discipline. In 1999, this was replaced by a system of voucher-like grants which students were awarded 
based on their complex test (CT) and later UNT results. This shifted financing approach from “object-
oriented financing” (“finansirovanie obektov”) in which HEIs were provided with line-item budgets to 
“subject-based financing” (“finansirovanie subektov obrazovaniya”) of students (Kalanova, S. & 
Omirbayev, 2009) based on merit-based grant system (Brunner & Tillett, 2007)44. This system was the 
result of a study of different countries, among them Turkey (Interview KZ No. 9, 2017). The result was 
described by its developers as “revolutionary […] because it confirmed that the intake of HEIs was not 
be based anymore on the numbers of the government order, but on the basis of centralized testing.” 
(Interview KZ No. 9, 2017). The new system of public financing which emerged in 1999, worked the 
following way:  
In order to establish the number of state funds, each year, the government determines the number of 
state-funded study places per discipline (the so-called “state order”). The MoES does this on the basis 
of the projected number of needed specialists by fields. “The Republican Commission on the distribution 
of grants”, consisting of rectors of HEIs, representatives of Ministries and trade unions, announces how 
many grants there will be for which study programs. Students become eligible for state grants on the 
basis of their scores on the Unified National Test if they chose study programs which are included in 
national or regional priorities. After learning about available grants, students then chose a study program 
and an HEI and apply to the Republican Commission for a grant. Based on the applicant’s grades the 
commission distributes the grants, students enroll in HEI and HEIs receive funding from Ministry. Since 
state grants are given only for the study of priority fields, which are selected by the MoES, the state thus 
                                                          
44 Special preference is given to students from rural backgrounds, disabled students, orphans and Kazakh diaspora 
(mainly from China). For these groups, who on average score lower on centralized testing, special quotas exist, 
within which they compete against each other for admission. The highest scoring students from among the disad-
vantaged groups therefore receive privileged admission into HEI. 
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gained an important instrument to steer funding towards certain disciplines, while delegating the choice 
of a specific HEI to students.  
To make higher education more accessible for students who had not been able to secure a grant, the 
government provided state-backed education loans (“gossudarstvennye obrazovatel’nye kredity”). 
These were granted for 5 years, were free of interest and had to be repaid only starting one year after 
graduation. This system was abandoned, however, by 2004, when it turned out that many credit-holders 
could (or would) not pay back their loans, which were ultimately transformed into grants.  
The new system had fundamental consequences for the relationship between HEIs and the State, as the 
traditional allocation of funds by the ministry on the basis of historical costs or negotiated sums ceased 
to exist and was replaced by a process of competition between HEIs to attract grant-holding students 
who became as much a source of funding as a sign of prestige for HEIs (World Bank & OECD, 2007). 
From the point of HEIs, state funding thus became a substitution for student tuition fees, which made 
being attractive to students all the more important. Makridi et al. (2007) point to the positive steering 
effects the new system brought: Students reported carefully searching for information on the quality of 
institutions and of career prospects as graduates, when choosing a university. Some study programs did 
not receive any applications from grant holding students and were forced to close down without any 
outside intervention, while some private universities which charge very high tuition fees accept grant 
students on the basis that since attracting these students increased the quality of the student body and 
the prestige of the university (Makridi et al., 2007).  
The new system was not only praised but also criticized for different reasons: The OECD/World Bank 
study criticized that the process did not sufficiently involve consultation with private sector employers 
and was characterized by the typical challenges of centralized manpower planning in the process of 
establishing the distribution of grants by fields of study (World Bank & OECD, 2007). Secondly, only 
a small percentage of students profits from educational grants because of limited public resources for 
higher education. Since financing is distributed needs-blind on the basis of UNT results, it favors socio-
economically privileged groups while discriminating against students from less well-to-do families (In-
terview KZ No. 8, 2017; OECD, 2017). The system also resulted in some adverse selection effects as it 
represented an incentive to students to choose their study program based on the likelihood of winning a 
state grant, rather than on their individual inclinations. In general, only very strong students applied to 
popular subjects such as law and economics, while weaker students chose less popular subjects such as 
teacher training and engineering as they could hope to study tuition-free in these subjects (Interview KZ 
No. 9, 2017).  
Thirdly, because tuition fees may not undercut the rates of state grants (but may exceed them), the state 
also indirectly regulates the accessibility of higher education overall, as prospective students without 
grants have to pay tuition fees which may not be lower than state grants and, at prestigious universities, 
are often considerably higher.  
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Lastly, it should be noted, that while the income side became flexible, HEIs did not receive more auton-
omy on how they could spend this income. Line-item budgets remained in place and rigid, as did the 
very detailed reporting requirements of the MoES. State funding became fully dependent on semi-mar-
ket mechanisms (e.g. the ability to attract a high number of grant-carrying students), while financial 
autonomy remained limited.  
7.2.2.3 Saddling the market  
While the introduction of the CT and UNT curbed corruption at university enrollment, and the new 
system of state funding incentivized stronger HEIs to invest in quality, there still remained a large seg-
ment of HEIs which fully depended on tuition fees and operated in a difficult economic environment. 
Most less prestigious HEIs did not enroll any grant-carrying students. The tuition fees of these less 
selective HEIs were therefore not bound to the level state grants which allowed them to pursue a strategy 
of offering low-tuition, low requirement study programs, often in branches in other cities, amounting in 
many cases to little more than diploma-mills (Interview KZ No. 18, 2017). In order to regulate low-
quality providers of education, in the first five years, several initiatives of expanded state control were 
launched. The system of qualification requirements and indicators verified during attestation, grew 
stricter from year to year. As one senior public servant characterized the developments: 
“This time [the beginning of the 2000’s] was characterized by even more centralization of the 
governance system. […] Everything happened from one unified center. The Ministry strictly 
controlled every step. During this time, they had created standards for every specialty / study 
program and these strictly controlled the activity of HEIs. Their autonomy consisted of the 20%-
25% of study program contents that they could design themselves. Moreover, the standards be-
gan to regulate even the very educational process. That means, the standards contained things 
like how many semesters there should be, maximum learning load for students, based on the 
sanitary norm that students should not 50 hours per week, per week not more than 36 hours in 
the auditoria. They started to regulate these things ever more detailedly” (Interview KZ No. 9, 
2017) 
The first attempt to implement state accreditation 
The first such attempt was made with the introduction of state accreditation in the law on education of 
2001, as a supplement to state attestation. It was modelled after Russian State accreditation (Interview 
KZ No. 4, 2017) and conceived mainly as an assessment of quantitative indicators (Kalanova, S., 2014). 
Data on quantitative indicators was to be collected by the Department of State Inspection and submitted 
to an Accreditation Council under the MoES. The rationale of introducing accreditation was the hope 
that it would be possible to reduce the number of private universities (Interview KZ No. 4, 2017). The 
new methodology was, however prematurely implemented, as neither standards nor procedures had been 
developed. Within the first three days of the new procedure operating, 59 universities were accredited 
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(Interview KZ No. 4, 2017), but the whole system was heavily criticized by the academic community 
as an intransparent and ultimately pointless (ENQA, 2017). Minister Nuraly Bekturganov resigned in 
2002 and state accreditation was suspended for almost a decade (ENQA, 2017).  
Inspections 
Possibly because accreditation did not prove an effective tool for reducing the number of private uni-
versities was not successful, it was not resumed by the next minister, Shamsha Bekimbaeva (Interview 
KZ No. 4, 2017). Under the new minister, from January 2002, the MoES began to conduct a series of 
inspections of HEIs. Until 2003, 166 HEIs had were controlled, of which 12 HEIs and 32 branches were 
closed down, and 170 licenses for study programs had been withdrawn from 42 HEIs and 75 HEIs and 
64 branches had their licenses suspended for different periods of time (Lyal'kina & Kanafina, 2016). 
Later, branches were made illegal altogether.  
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Introduction of Comprehensive National Mid-Term Tests  
Even though several HEIs had been forced to cease their operations, many little selective, low-tuition 
HEIs continued to operate. In order to expose and regulate such HEIs, the MoES in 2003 introduced 
another instrument of central state control. The “Comprehensive National Mid-Term Tests” (vneshnaya 
otsenka uchebnhkh dostizhenii - VOUD) were to be conducted at all HEIs after the second year of stud-
ies. Students would be assessed on the compulsory basic disciplines as by the state standards (World 
Bank & OECD, 2007). If students did not reach a minimal level of knowledge, they would not be al-
lowed to continue to study in the third year.  
A former minister of this era points out that strengthening state control over higher education was with-
out alternative to safeguard the quality of education:  
“We developed a whole system of such barriers in order to raise the quality of specialists. But 
this also caused very strong resistance. The MoES also closed their eyes to many problems 
which is why it was necessary to introduce these things into the law. I came and woke up a lot 
of people and introduced a system of such barriers.” (Interview KZ No. 18, 2017) 
Many HEIs (and international observers) saw the growing degree of state control as increasingly over-
bearing. As one rector of a private university commented: 
“Well, for us, for private universities, in the beginning, it was a period of freedom. We worked 
without a license for 5-6 years. Then a period of cold war began. Each year new requirements 
were added, on square meters, about degrees of teaching staff, the number of researchers… 
[…] Then somebody added fire safety requirements, then sanitary and epidemiological ones. 
Now, in the last draft proposal, there were 514 indicators! Even nuclear power stations are 
checked on only 200 indicators” (Interview KZ No. 12, 2017)  
Regardless of its justification, the mid-2005ies certainly represent a high-point of state control of the 
higher education system in Kazakhstan, at a time when the state withdraw from micromanaging HEIs 
itself.  
7.2.2.4 Continuing differentiation of the higher education system  
Privatization of state HEIs 
In 2000, following the introduction of the new money-follows-students scheme in higher education fi-
nancing, the government launched a second round of privatization of public HEIs (Ahn et al., 2018). 
With the law “On the List of the Republican State Enterprises and Institutions to be Privatized in 2000 
–01”, twelve public HEIs became joint-stock companies (JSCs) in which the Kazakhstani government 
shared ownership with private investors. The privatized HEIs were sometimes bought by outside inves-
tors, but often by the rector or – at least in part – by professors of that university.  
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From the government's point of view, at the time of the transfer, privatization promised saving on future 
capital expenditures, short-term income from the sale of shares and long-term income from taxes of the 
privatized HEI (Interview KZ No. 13, 2017; Interview KZ No. 18, 2017). For the concerned universities, 
their new legal status brought greater independence from government administrative micro-management 
and restrictions (Makridi et al., 2007). The new Joint-Stock universities were governed by a board of 
directors/trustees overseeing the institutions’ budgets. They became responsible for the buildings, were 
allowed to operate branch campuses and own subsidiary businesses. In terms of curricular autonomy, 
they were still subject to state curricular standards and ministerial guidelines in areas such as hiring 
(Hartley, Gopaul, Sagintayeva, & Apergenova, 2016). By 2006, 16 state institutions had become joint-
stock companies (Brunner & Tillett, 2007). 
Designation of national universities 
While the government saved expenditures through privatization of HEIs, in 2001, it gave nine prominent 
HEIs the special status of “national universities” 45. This group would benefit from greater institutional 
autonomy, such as the right to establish their own admission guidelines, a higher paygrade for teaching 
staff, higher scholarships for students, more freedom in designing their curricula vis-à-vis the state stand-
ards and the privilege of issuing their own (state-recognized) diplomas.  
7.2.3 Preparing to join the Bologna Space (2005-2010) 
In 1997, President Nazarbayev had announced an overall development strategy for the country upon 
which a number of sectoral development strategies and programs had been based. By order of the Pres-
ident of 11 October 2004, the first State Program of Education Development in the Republic of Kazakh-
stan for 2005-2010 (SPED 2005-2010) was passed (Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan[MoES], 2004). The SPED outlined for the area of education the actions to be taken to 
reach the objectives outlined in the national development strategy. The SPED has a significant role 
orientating development priorities, as it is signed by the president and thus binding to the MoES and its 
changing ministers.  
The SPED2005-2010 had been coordinated mostly under minister Zhaksybek Kulekeev in 2003-2004 
and included a wide range of reform proposals. The SPED was extensively based on the analysis of 
successful international models and international trends (Interview KZ No. 4, 2017). The overarching 
objective of the program was to bring Kazakhstan closer to international practices in education. This 
concerned the structure of education (such as introducing 12-year pre-tertiary education and a three-tier 
                                                          
45 By the Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan of July 5, 2001 No. 648 "On the granting of special 
status to individual state higher Educational institutions", as national universities were designated: 1. Kazakh Na-
tional University. Al-Farabi. 2. Eurasian National University. L.N. Gumilev. 3. Kazakh National Agrarian Uni-
versity. 4. Kazakh National Technical University. K.I. Satpayev. 5. Kazakh National Medical University. S.D. 
Asfendiyarov. 6. Kazakh National Pedagogical University Abay. 7. Kazakh National Academy of Arts. T.K. Zhur-
genova. 8. Kazakh National Conservatory. Kurmangazy. 9. Kazakh National Academy of Music. 
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structure of higher education), governance of higher education (introduction of cooperative governance 
and the expansion of autonomy for HEIs, the integration of external stakeholders into the governance of 
HEIs, and an overhaul of external and internal quality assurance), the participation in international stud-
ies such as PISA, TIMSS, CIVIC, SITES, LES and the participation in international networks of quality 
assurance agencies such as ENQA, and INQAAHE. In 2002/2003, the classificator of specializations 
was changed and for the first time included BA and MA programs. In 2005 the first two universities 
began preparing PhDs. In 2007, 5-6 more HEIs joined them, and in 2008 the former aspirantura and 
doktorantura were discontinued in favor of PhD degrees. The last defenses of the old degrees took place 
in 2010 (Interview KZ No. 9, 2017). According to one of the co-authors, the SPED “…promoted HEI 
to international standards, and in particular to European ones. […] It created a powerful impetus and 
created the preconditions for the realization of the action lines of the Bologna Process. […] But partic-
ipation in the Bologna Process was not our goal in and by itself. It was important to do this so that we 
would be noticed and understood in Europe and the world.” (Interview KZ No. 9, 2017) 
As part of these efforts, a review of Kazakhstan’s education system was commissioned from the World 
Bank and OECD (2007). The report made a strong case for reforming the system of higher education, 
underscored the importance of investing in quality, decentralizing the rigid system of bureaucratic gov-
ernance, encouraged expanding institutional autonomy, encouraging competitive funding procedures, 
more autonomy as well as accountability in their use of funding, more entrepreneurial leadership and 
discussed the implications of adopting the Bologna framework (Hartley, Gopaul et al., 2016). Once of 
the key authors of the SPED2005-2010 summarizes its guiding thinking as follows: 
“When Kazakhstan became a market economy, we also became a part of the wider world. When, 
before we lived in a closed country, after the borders opened it became clear that there are such 
specializations like marketologists, managers, which we did not train. During Soviet times we 
trained “specialists”. There was no sense to train specialists for narrow fields any more. We 
tried on one hand, to improve the quality of training, and on the other we tried to integrate the 
experience of countries with a market economy to Kazakhstan and to orientate ourselves on 
these standards, to integrate ourselves” (Interview KZ No. 18, 2017) 
The SPED plays a significant role in the policy formulation process in Kazakhstan, in that it informs the 
yearly strategic work plans of the MoES which, in turn, tries to align the strategic development plans of 
HEIs and their rectors to the national priorities. As an experienced and high-ranking official from the 
MoES pointed out: 
“Everything should be in one architecture. First one [strategy], then everything in accordance. 
We came from a [central] planning state, which is why we need to plan. However, much they 
talked about how the market regulates, this is still not at all like that. And in higher education 
it should [not] be like that. Because it is very important to plan correctly, because the result will 
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be visible only in decades. If we now do something not right somewhere, nothing terrible will 
happen now. [But] it will show in 10, 20 years” (Interview KZ No. 5, 2016) 
7.2.3.1 National system of quality assurance, accreditation, and rankings emerge 
The SPED 2005-2010 included for the first time a sub-section on the quality of education (Kalanova, S. 
& Omirbayev, 2009) in which for the quality assurance framework of the educational system was for 
the first time described in its entirety, creating a “National System of quality assessment in education” 
which structured the existing instruments of quality assurance (licensing, state attestation, the UNT and 
intermediate state control) and added the accreditation, internal quality management and self-assessment 
of HEIs (Kalanova, S. & Omirbayev, 2009).  
The SPED 2005-2010 made explicit reference to the goal to create the conditions for Kazakhstan's ac-
cession to the Bologna Process. The introduction of quality management systems in HEIs, institutional 
and specialized accreditation by leading foreign accreditation agencies were mentioned as helping to 
“implement the key principles of the Bologna declaration and the WTO”46. Especially the introduction 
of accreditation can be clearly related to the Bologna Process, as one of the authors of the SPED ex-
plained: 
“It was very important that we should be in the Bologna Process and studied all its principles, 
because as long as the system of internal quality management don’t fully work, our HEIs will 
not be fully competitive on the European higher education market.” (Interview KZ No. 9, 2017) 
Voluntary state accreditation begins 
HEIs were expected to conduct internal evaluation in the form of self-assessments (self-certifications), 
quality management, ongoing performance monitoring, and the evaluation of educational achievements 
of students.  
The National Accreditation Center (Natsional’niy akkreditsionniy tsentr - NAC) was to be responsible 
for institutional and specialized accreditation, developing a consistent accreditation criteria and proce-
dures for evaluating the quality of harmonization with the terms of the Bologna process, performs the 
procedure of recognition and nostrification of education documents issued by foreign educational or-
ganizations, participates in international programs on quality assurance. It was established by the MoES 
and was charged with developing a new methodology for accreditation. At the time of the foundation of 
the NAC, the law on education did not formulate a basis for accreditation, therefore NAC began to 
develop their own standards based on American standards and the ESG and began to offer seminars on 
accreditation to HEIs.  
                                                          
46 It is not fully clear, however, why the WTO is referenced here.  
  
page 149 
In 2007, when the Law of education and the law on Licensing were revised, it did provide a framework 
for accreditation which specified that institutional accreditation should be a) a voluntary procedure, and 
b) that accreditation should be conducted according to the standards of the accreditation agency carrying 
it out. This allowed NAC to instantly start working on the basis of the ESG without waiting for the 
government to develop their own set of standards and created an important precondition for the inde-
pendence of Quality Assurance agencies in Kazakhstan.  
National rankings emerge 
At the time, however, there were few to no incentives for HEIs to undergo accreditation. This led the 
then president of NAC to develop Kazakhstan’s first university rankings in 2006 and 2007, which 
quickly became to be used by the government as a justification for certain decisions. As the former head 
of the NAC recounts: 
“Well, since I did not have any tools to influence HEIs I launched the [university] ranking. […] 
At the time, no such ranking existed [in Kazakhstan]. You see, we needed to do something to 
influence HEIs. […] When the ranking launched HEIs instantly became interested […] Then a 
friend of mine from the [presidential] administration calls me and says “I showed your booklet 
[with the ranking results] to the president and on the basis, that it takes last place we need to 
close down some state HEI. They took the ranking and closed that HEI on this basis. And when 
they had to get rid of some rector, they also used the ranking” (Interview KZ No. 4, 2017). 
Over the years, the ranking became increasingly popular with school leavers who regularly consult it as 
one source of information when choosing a university47. Since the ranking was not an activity of the 
MoES, but the intellectual property of the former director of NAC, when she founded the Independent 
Quality Assurance Agency (IQAA) in 2008, the ranking was published by IQAA.  
Systematic collection of educational data begins 
Another goal of the SPED 2005-2010 was to improve the statistical data basis on education through the 
creation of a national system of quality assessment and monitoring system. The National Center for 
Educational Quality Assessment (Natsional’niy tsentr otsenki kachestva obrazovaniya - NCEQA) was 
founded to fulfil this task. This monitoring system created a statistical database from data from different 
sources, including the results of HEI rankings, and feed into a yearly national report on the state of 
education. The system was to provide information on the effectiveness of the education system, help 
strategy development and planning and increase the responsibility of local executive bodies. NCEQA 
prepared an annual national report about the state of education in the Republic of Kazakhstan. NCEQA 
later became part of the Information-Analytical Center (IAC). The major changes in the QA architecture 
                                                          
47 The high attention that students and the government paid to the ranking results led the a change in methodology 
where the ranking positions of HEIs with the weakest results are not made explicit. 
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with its array of new institutions and accountability measure did not work smoothly at first. As Raza 
(2009) pointed out:  
“the accountability mechanisms that have been put in place as part of the reform process are 
excessive. In an attempt to radically reform the sector, the government of Kazakhstan has un-
dertaken too many changes, especially in the area of quality improvement. In the area of quality 
assurance, numerous bodies exist and often their tasks overlap with each other.” (Raza, 2009, 
p. 30) 
Raza (2009) also points out that the new structure had greater additional supervision and control of 
HEIs, but had not expanded HEIs autonomy.  
7.2.3.2 Restrictions on branch campuses, distance education and access to HE (2005-2010) 
Restriction on branch campuses (2004/2007) 
By the early 2000ies, private as well as state HEIs were arguably offering low-quality higher education 
in various ways. The most common of these were study programs at branch campuses, via distance 
education, and programs catering to alumni of professional colleges. During the 2000ies, these activities 
were successively clamped down upon. As a former minister of education remembers:  
“The most pressing problem when I entered office was that we did not control the opening of 
branch campuses. Any university or institute could open their branches in any city in Kazakh-
stan. We applied hard demands to the main university but not to its branches. That is why they 
could open branches with [just] 100m², and in effect, they started selling diplomas through these 
branches, people were buying diplomas. There was no regulation going on whatsoever. So, we 
needed to do something about that, and in short time, in order to close these branches, I initiated 
a change to the law of education”. […] There was very strong resistance against this because 
it was a really good channel to make money, but I closed this channel” (Interview KZ No. 18, 
2017) 
In July 2004, the Law ‘On introducing amendments and changes to the Law on Education of the Repub-
lic of Kazakhstan’ was adopted, which tightened the material and technical prerequisites for operating 
(private) HEIs and affiliated branches and introduced further requirements concerning teaching staff. 
From the moment the new law entered into force, students could study only the first two years in these 
branches and the third and fourth year, they had to study at the main HEI. Branches did not have the 
right to issue diplomas any more.  
This was later restricted even more in the 2007 law “On Education”, when HEIs were forbidden to 
offering any study programs education programs in their branches (“filialy”) in other cities. This Law 
also again significantly tightened the licensing requirements for HEIs. It introduced requirements for 
full-time academic staff, raised the requirements for the material and technical base of HEIs, such as the 
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availability of owned classroom and laboratory space.  
Reducing distance education (2006) 
As the number of branch campuses had risen, so had the number of students enrolled in part-time and 
distance-education programs (“zaochnoe obrazovanie”), which were often seen as being of low quality. 
In 2006, the government introduced restrictions on the enrollment of distance education by establishing 
that the ratio of students enrolled in distance education to students enrolled in full-time courses could 
now not exceed 1:4.  
Restricting access to professional college graduates (2010) 
Even though access to higher education for school graduates was only possible through taking the UNT, 
for graduates of professional colleges, taking the centralized test was optional and only required for 
those prospective students wanting to apply for state educational grants. Graduates of professional col-
leges, who were willing to pay out-of-pocket, could still apply directly to HEIs and be accepted based 
on an HEI’s own admittance exams.  
As a senior ministry official described, this led to a deterioration of standards: 
“This was the ministry’s policy because there were too many college graduates which had left 
schools after 9th grade, studied at a college and then entered HE without a [centralized] exam, 
mostly to poor private HEIs. And this is why the enrollment of private HEIs at that time almost 
equaled the enrollment of state HEIs. […] HEIs looked at them as a source of income, […] 
which is why, especially private HEIs did not care what level the student had. They just took in 
all and that is why especially private HEIs during that time, just became diploma factories 
[mills]. Not only private HEIs, but also state HEIs in the regions did this.” (Interview KZ No. 
9, 2017) 
In 2010, compulsory centralized “complex testing” (CT) became compulsory also for graduates of pro-
fessional colleges. This change significantly reduced access to HEI by these graduates who often did 
not pass the complex test (CT).  
As a result of these restrictions, as well as of several attempts to conduct an “optimization process” of 
the number of HEIs by encouraging them to merge, the number of HEIs dropped from 182 in 2004/2005 
to 139 in 2012/2013.  
7.2.3.3 Introduction of corporate governance – boards and strategic management 
In 2007, the MoES issued an order calling for the establishment of advisory boards (popechitel’skie 
sovety) for all HEIs. These boards were to support the HEI leadership with advancing international co-
operation, improve study conditions, support vulnerable students, and make suggestions to “eliminate 
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shortcoming” of unspecified nature (OECD, 2017). These boards were thus advisory in nature and pri-
marily tasked with providing guidance to senior administration, especially the rector, and they played a 
role in external relations and fundraising (Hartley, Eckel et al., 2016). The boards were not, however, 
given any formal role in the governance of the HEI. They did not have the oversight powers, could not 
hire or fire the rector, had no say over the budget and could not hold institutions accountable for their 
performance. Even through private HEIs were not by law required to have advisory boards, many fol-
lowed suit and established their own boards (Interview KZ No. 20, 2017). Between 2007 and 2015, 62 
of 125 established such boards (OECD, 2017).  
Since 2007, HEIs were also required by law to have strategic plans and to develop corresponding devel-
opment plans (plany razvitiya), which link key indicators on educational activity with corresponding 
financial indicators. HEIs needed to present their results each year to the Ministry of Finance and justify 
the expended finances with the results reached. An attempt to introduce results-based budgeting for the 
was made in 2008 education system (and the health system), but ultimately aborted since it proved 
impossible to link financial inputs to educational outcomes or the quality of education (Interview KZ 
No. 9, 2017).  
7.2.3.4 Institutional Differentiation in Elite Universities – Nazarbayev University is founded 
(2009) 
In 2006, the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev had first announced the idea of creating a 
world class university during his annual address to the nation. This university was founded as a Joint-
Stock Company under the name of “New University of Astana”. Construction had begun in 2007 and in 
2009, a new team was appointed, which was supported with advice by the World Bank which organized 
field trips and presentations of different university models (Interview KZ No. 3, 2017). The vision of 
the university and its stated purpose was to act as a model of a world-class university for Kazakhstan’s 
universities, promote international level research and contribute to the development of Astana as a hub 
of international innovation (Hartley, Gopaul et al., 2016).  
From its founding, Nazarbayev University was exempted from all oversight by the MoES and instead 
was governed by a board of trustees, a rector and senior administrative staff, and an academic council. 
NU operated under its own law, independent of oversight and control by the MoES, which grants it 
autonomy far beyond what other public HEIs enjoy. Among other areas, the board and leadership of 
Nazarbayev University may approve its own internal budget, set tuition fees, determine hiring policies 
for faculty and administration, determine admissions requirements, and open new programs. Each aca-
demic unit has an international partner that is supposed to aid them in their development. The govern-
ment created very favorable financial conditions to attract international faculty, established an endow-
ment fund for future financial independence and – since its start until the writing of this chapter in 2017 
- covered the tuition of all students who were admitted.  
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In 2014, the MoES introduced the idea of “special status” elite universities under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Justice. “Special status” universities were to be defined as universities that have made a 
significant contribution to the development of Kazakhstan since independence and are competitive by 
international standards. Universities that are given this status were to receive more autonomy from the 
MoES and should be able to respond accordingly to market and stakeholder demands in areas like pro-
gram offerings, course curricula, and student workload. Until 2016, however, only Nazarbayev Univer-
sity has been given this special status.  
Al-Farabi University had always been designated National Research University which had enjoyed cur-
ricular autonomy. In late 2014, the second university acquired the status of a National Research Univer-
sity when Satbayev Kazakh National Technical University was converted into a non-profit, joint-stock 
company with a 100% government share (Alpysbayeva & Akhmetzhanova, 2016).  
7.2.4 Differentiation and expanding autonomy (2011-2017) 
Thanks to the changes in study structures and quality assurance reforms of the SPED2005-2010, on 
March 12, 2010, Kazakhstan became the first Central Asian Republic to sign the Lisbon Convention 
and become the forty-seventh member of the Bologna Process (BP).  
The State Program of Education Development 2011-2020  
In 2010, a new reform vision was articulated in the “State Program of Education Development in the 
Republic of Kazakhstan for 2011–2020” (SPED 2011-2020) (Ministry of Education and Science of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan[MoES], 2010). In 2006, the government of Kazakhstan had invited experts 
from the OECD and the World Bank to conduct a review of its higher education system (World Bank 
& OECD, 2007). The results of this study markedly informed subsequent reforms (Hartley, Gopaul et 
al., 2016) as is evident in the SPED 2011-2020’s identification of the most pressing challenges: “infra-
structure development, academic corruption, a mismatch between academic programs and the labor 
market’s needs, a gap between teaching, research and industry, a need for more effective university 
leadership, harmonizing the academic system with the Bologna, democratization of education and the 
lack of legislative framework for universities seeking greater autonomy” (Ministry of Education and 
Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan[MoES], 2010).  
Concerning the governance of the higher education system, the SPED 2011-2020 formulated the fol-
lowing objectives and activities: 
- align the higher education system with the Bologna Process regulations by 2015 
- establishing an independent QA system, and have universities undergo independent national 
institutional and program accreditation  
- improvement of education management including implementation of corporate governance 
principles (through implementing boards of trustee, expanding public-private partnerships; and 
qualification training for heads of HEI);  
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- improvement of the system of monitoring education development, that includes establishment 
of national education statistics with consideration of international requirements;  
- Implementation of an internationally recognized National Qualification System with participa-
tion of employers’ associations who were to develop professional standards corresponding to 
the National Qualification System.  
- expanding university autonomy and strengthening university governance 
- The SPED laid out a new system of classification of HEIs depending on the study programs 
they offered and the scope of scientific-research activity they carried out. HEIs would be differ-
entiated into national research universities, national higher educational institutions, research 
universities, universities, academies and institutes. This process was begun in 2015, when the 
status of national research universities was legally established in the law on education.  
The SPED2011-2020 laid out most of the policy changes which were implemented between 2011 and 
2017.  
 “100 concrete Steps” – Plan of the Nation 
In 2014, continuously low oil prices, the parallel economic downturn within the Russian Federation 
starting in 2014 (driven itself by low commodity prices, and Western sanctions due to the annexation of 
Crimea) led to the decision to uncouple the Tenge from the US-Dollar and let the exchange rate float. 
This led to further currency devaluations in 2014 and 2015. On 20 May 2015, soon after President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev’s re-election, the president announced the “100 Concrete Steps” program, titled 
“Plan of the Nation”, which was seen as a direct reaction to worsening regional and global conditions. 
The plan was a highly ambitious, comprehensive reform package with measures to contribute to five 
institutional reforms: 1. Creation of a modem and professional civil service (measures open recruitment 
including from the private sector and from abroad, better training, and pay and promotion linked to 
performance will be introduced); 2. ensuring the rule of law (English system of law, improving qualifi-
cations and standards for judges and police); 3. industrialization and economic growth (improving pro-
tection for investors, cutting red tape, making tax more transparent and supporting entrepreneurship); 4. 
“a unified nation for the future”; and 5. transparency and accountability of the state. A Commission 
on National Modernization was set up under the President of Kazakhstan to coordinate and monitor the 
implementation of the program. The CEO of Sberbank and author of Russia’s economic reforms of the 
early 2000ies, German Gref was quoted to have experienced a “culture shock” at the depth and scope of 
Kazakhstan’s reform agenda (Idrissov, 2015).  
The program included several provisions with impact on higher education to HE governance. Regarding 
the general reforms of public administration relevant to higher education, it reinforced the call for re-
duced and more standardized procedures of monitoring, assessment and control focused on results, and 
abolishing procedural and interim oversight. State agencies’ efficiency were to be audited annually, with 
audits replacing operational control. Heads of state agencies were to publish annual reports on achieving 
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key objectives on official websites. Likewise, all central state agencies were to facilitate online access 
to statistical data, including reports on budgets, spending, and reports on external evaluations. Lastly, 
the participation of citizens, the private sector and self-regulated organizations in governance was to be 
promoted. The program reaffirmed the goal of university autonomy, phrased as “moving gradually to-
wards the self-management of universities”, considering the experience of the Nazarbayev University. 
Private universities were to be transformed into non-profit organizations.  
Since 2016, the expansion of university autonomy, of the rights of university boards, and the easing of 
qualification and licensing requirements correspond to these priorities. In the 2000s there used to be 216 
individual qualification requirements, such as square meters of lecture halls per student or the required 
number of books in libraries can be seen. Since 2015, their number started to shrink and more areas to 
be less strictly regulated (Interview KZ No. 20, 2017).  
7.2.4.1 System of independent Accreditation emerges  
In 2005, the government had established the National Accreditation Centre (NAC) within the MoES as 
an accreditation agency as well as the competent authority to recognize accreditation agencies (OECD, 
2017). In 2007, the law of education had first made mention of voluntary accreditation but had not yet 
attached any legal consequences to HEIs or study programs who had successfully passed it. Neither had 
accreditation replaced mandatory state attestation.  
There had been a lot of criticism of the attestion process among HEI representatives for being both too 
inflexible and oriented at quantitative indicators as well as for being conducted in the spirit of distrust 
and control, as well as of insufficient training of reviewers.  
Even though attestation was formally paid for by the state, it still incurred costs for HEIs.  
“You see, in reality, attestation turned out more expensive for HEIs [than accreditation]. They 
spent it to take the commissions somewhere. Somewhere money was given, others were ap-
peased [in other ways]. In fact, they spent more money than on accreditation, but that is not 
even the most importantly thing. They were not even sure whether they would pass [because the 
criteria were intransparent]” (Interview KZ No. 4, 2017) 
The process was criticized for being too much dependent on the review committee and their individual 
members’ preferences and ideas, for the poor quality of and for the site-visits being excessively long48 
(Interview KZ No. 4, 2017). As one rector describes her experiences with attestation: 
“The people who came to control are also teachers [professors] from other HEIs. And they 
somehow believe that how they are doing things at their own HEI is the right way and how we 
are doing them is not right. I always said “explain to me why this is not correct? Show me why 
                                                          
48 The site-visit of an attestation committee could take up to 10 days 
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this should not be correct?”. This was a very, very difficult process.” (Interview KZ No. 11, 
2017) 
Especially within the MoES and the CCES, which was responsible for attestation, however, there was a 
high degree of skepticism and reluctance to let go of state control in attestation or in accreditation. As a 
former high-ranking official from the MoES recounts:  
“Formally, accreditation was non-governmental, but in fact it remained in the hands of the 
government as NAC was a subordinated body to the MoES. We just did half a step forward and 
said the MoES would not conduct accreditation, that would be done by NAC according to inde-
pendent principles. That the MoES would not intervene. But in actual fact, of course, the minis-
try got involved” (Interview KZ No. 9, 2017) 
Between 2008-2017, however, the system of quality assurance was gradually shifted from state attesta-
tion towards accreditation by independent quality assurance agencies. The SPED2011-2020 was instru-
mental in this shift which fundamentally changed the quality assurance system of Kazakhstan. Several 
factors can be identified which promoted the shift from state attestation and accreditation to independent 
accreditation:  
In March 2010, Kazakhstan had signed the Bologna Declaration. One of the action lines of the BP was 
quality assurance through accreditation with the European standards and guidelines (ESG) with their 
basic understanding that external quality assurance should be independent. The absence of independence 
had been criticized in several external reviews (Raza, 2009; World Bank & OECD, 2007). As a former 
senior official from the MoES describes the influence of the Bologna Process on accreditation:  
“As a country which joined the Bologna Process and took upon itself the responsibility to cor-
respond to these criteria, we started to reform our system of quality assurance in accordance 
with these requirements. As you have seen, as the system changed from government accredita-
tion to independent accreditation which corresponds to European standards. If we had not been 
in the Bologna Process, of course we would have said, “oh no, we will do it our way”.” (Inter-
view KZ No. 9, 2017) 
Furthermore, the system was often been criticized for “introducing new private sector players without 
offering the necessarily levels of autonomy, while overloading institutions with accountability 
measures” (Raza, 2009). During the preparation of the SPED, the President himself held several meet-
ings where he urged all ministries to reduce the amount of oversight-related controls and the number of 
inspections in their areas (Interview KZ No. 4, 2017), thus stressing the importance of less state super-
vision and greater autonomy. This gave a strong impetus especially to the development of independent 
accreditation in Kazakhstan:  
“He [the president] [said] that we have too many inspectors, too many inspections, and it's 
necessary to stop this, and to reduce, because these checks do not permit businesses to work. 
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They do not allow, as they said, Kazakhstan to move forward. And therefore, every ministry 
needed to cut the number of controls. And since at that time the process related to introducing 
accreditation was ongoing […] the ministry [MoES] was really to let go of state attestation, and 
to conduct accreditation, in order that there would be some sort of verification from the side of 
the ministry. The fact that the president made this point so strongly […] made this possible.” 
(Interview KZ No. 4, 2017) 
The business community which participated in the development of the SPED2011-2020 supported the 
shift from state control to accreditation. As the former general secretary of Atameken remembers, the 
independence of HEIs and its perceived international prestige were significant motivations for the in-
troduction of accreditation:  
“We were attracted to independence then. [… Out policy was to the reduction of the control 
and supervisory functions of state organs. When we looked at all of their control and oversight 
functions, we realized that you can reduce these things and transfer them to the market – to 
independent accreditation. […] Moreover, we, too, [analyzed] the international level, we saw 
how it was developing in other countries. It is time that we also introduced this institution, 
[since] the most advanced [Kazakh] universities already went to Europe looking for agencies 
to accredit them. This was, in the first place, about prestige, although they did not gain anything 
[any tangible benefits] from it. It was neither connected to financing, nor to the kind of diploma, 
as it now is. It was a matter of prestige. They wanted to keep pace with these European univer-
sities.” (Interview KZ No. 19, 2017) 
General doubts about the MoES’s ability to objectively conduct accreditation and the hope that partici-
pation in a regional QA structure would lead to greater recognition of Kazakh degrees in Europe were 
additional motivations:  
“On one hand, this way world practice. In the old version of the law, there was only state ac-
creditation. It was very important for us that the private sector recognized our diplomas. On the 
other hand, in our country there was no accreditation organ, this function was implemented by 
the ministry. The ministry cannot do this work qualitatively. There are public servants there. 
This is why there cannot be quality. For different reasons: Public servants come, and they can 
really easily be bought. Today, he is on this job, tomorrow on another. There is no history, etc. 
On the other hand, we wanted to accomplish that our diplomas would not only be recognized in 
Kazakhstan, but also in other countries. If there would be only state accreditation, with this 
accreditation getting recognized in European countries would be very difficult. In Europe, there 
are institutes of independent accreditation. If we become part of this regional organ of accred-
itation, if they recognize the work of our independent organ of quality assurance, as a conse-
quence, they can recognize the diplomas of HEIs accredited in Kazakhstan, that what we wanted 
to reach.” (Interview KZ No. 18, 2017) 
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The goal of independent accreditation replacing state attestation was formulated in the SPED2011-2020 
and foresaw that by 2012, accreditation should be carried out by noncommercial, nongovernment ac-
crediting agencies, which would be listed members in a register of recognized accreditation bodies. By 
2015, state attestation should cease completely and be replaced by independent accreditation. By 2020 
65% of Kazakhstani HEIs were to have passed independent National Institutional as well as program 
accreditation in accordance with international standards (Ministry of Education and Science of the Re-
public of Kazakhstan[MoES], 2010). Furthermore, by 2020 all Kazakh QAAs should be included in 
EQAR. In the earlier drafts of the SPED2011-2020, it was foreseen that accreditation should be exclu-
sively conducted by international agencies. This was later changed to include (future) national QAAs, 
which would operate according to international standards (Interview KZ No. 4, 2017).  
Implementation 
First experiments with international accreditation had been supported between 2008-2011 through a 
publicly funded program called “Quality assurance in education”, which had provided funding for the 
accreditation of ten study programs at five national universities (Dondi, 2014). Likewise, in 2008, the 
first Independent Kazakhstan Quality Assurance Agency for Education (IQAA) had been founded to 
conduct accreditation on the ESG principles that the quality assurance of HEIs should be conducted by 
independent organizations outside of the direct control and without operational interference by the gov-
ernment. The founder and president of IQAA, Sholpan Kalanova, had been a Vice-rector of two public 
universities, Deputy Director of the Department of State Inspection and Monitoring, Deputy Director of 
the Administrative Department of the Ministry of Education and Science, Director of the National Ac-
creditation Centre of the MoES. She left the National Accreditation Centre (NAC) in 2008 and founded 
IQAA. For the period between 2008 and 2012, both IQAA and NAC conducted accreditations in Ka-
zakhstan. Interest in independent accreditation during the first years was rather low, however: 
“[NAC], of course, spread fast because the minister gave the order that everybody should be 
accredited through the ministerial agency. This was in 2009, 2010. Only, afterwards this 
changed, when I joined the presidential administration. Because [our] status was different. You 
see […], they began to have a different attitude, including the minister himself. You see, how 
life changes” (Interview KZ No. 4, 2017) 
Accreditation became fully independent in 2011, when the National Accreditation Centre (NAC) was 
reorganized into the “Bologna Process and Academic Mobility Center”, the National Register of Ac-
creditation Bodies and the National Registers of Accredited Institutions and Accredited Study Programs, 
which were established within the MoES, as well as rules and procedures for inclusion into the register. 
Modelled after the US-model and the European register of quality assurance agencies (EQAR), HEIs 
may any other registered national or international QAA to undergo a state-recognized accreditation re-
view (Interview KZ No. 4, 2017). The MoES Order on the National Register of Accreditation Bodies 
included a number of stipulations to safeguard the operational independence of QAAs. No registered 
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agency may be affiliated with any HEI, their seat cannot be located on the premises of any HEI and 
reviews must be conducted on their own terms and conditions (ENQA, 2017). 
The Bologna Process and Mobility Center became the central coordinating and training authority on all 
issues related to the Bologna- and mobility-related reforms and processes, such as recognition of diplo-
mas and degrees. Part of the staff of the NAC founded the Independent Agency for Accreditation Rating 
(IAAR) as the second non-governmental quality assurance agency after IQAA. It continued to use the 
accreditation methodology and standards of NAC.  
The 2011 law on education also included clear incentives for HEIs to undergo independent accreditation: 
HEIs that passed institutional and program accreditation in recognized accreditation agencies would be 
exempt from state attestation for the period of accreditation, but not more than 5 years (Article 59, item 
4). They would be allowed to issue their own diplomas. Lastly, and most significantly, only accredited 
HEIs would be allowed to enroll state-funded students. This represents a powerful incentive for most 
universities to seek accreditation (Sagintayeva, A. et al., 2014).  
The announcement that accreditation would become a prerequisite to enroll state-funded students caused 
uncertainty among universities. Several HEIs sought out international accreditation. As one former vice-
rector remembers:  
“Because of this, we applied for accreditation for those study programs, which are the most 
important ones for us. And we paid a lot of money. […] For us as a university, this was a very 
serious amount. But due to the fact that we were afraid that the next year we would not receive 
any grants for our main study programs, it was the decision of the leadership that we will go 
for it, even if they would give us only some kind of temporary accreditation. In any case, we 
needed international accreditation. […] Although we actually underwent accreditation as well 
as attestation, just in case, as we always do in Kazakhstan, so that we would have everything. 
(Interview KZ No. 13, 2017) 
With the 2011 revision of the law of education, for the first time since independence, the MoES did in 
fact transfer powers to other bodies not under its direct control. It went even further than most EU-
countries, as it allows all kinds of accreditations being conducted by recognized international agencies. 
As one representative of a quality assurance agency comments: 
“Kazakhstan in this respect is at the forefront of the entire planet, even among European coun-
tries you hardly find a country which has completely opened its market for international agen-
cies. You see, in 2011 when we conducted the reforms, we implemented the Bologna Process 
[…] There were recommendations that there should be an independent agency and the system 
should open and our government opened the system so that it would be competitive, that there 
should be competition on this market. Maybe we approached the [Bologna] ministerial recom-
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mendation a bit overeagerly, but on the other hand, it is good, even for national agencies, be-
cause for us this is an incentive to develop because we have strong international competition” 
(Interview KZ No. 14, 2017) 
The difference between attestation and accreditation was stressed by all interviewed stakeholders. The 
general perception was summarized by one experienced academic reviewer as follows: 
“Attestation and accreditation really check different things. That is, I gained the impression that 
accreditation looks at the general atmosphere of higher education institutions That is because, 
we interview students, teaching staff and so on. […] Despite all the tricky questions [we ask], 
we most of all perceive the spirit, the mood, that's how this is. If we had been an attestation 
commission, we would have enclosed ourselves in an office, have asked for all the curricula, 
and all the minutes of all committee meetings, all of the teaching load, the calculation of load, 
the calculation of hours, well, that is, on what subject, how much, what kind of teacher, did how 
much work. And we would have checked it all and then we would have found mistakes and 
punished everyone. Accreditation is different .... they gave recommendations!” (Interview KZ 
No. 13, 2017) 
7.2.4.2 Conflict about abolition of state attestation and move to independent accreditation 
According to the SPED2011-2020, in 2015, independent accreditation should completely replace state 
attestion. When 2015 came, all the preconditions were in place. The then-minister of Education and 
Science, Aslan Sarinzhipov, and the head of the Committee on Control were against the move from 
attestation to accreditation., however. As a representative of a quality assurance agency remembers: 
“I explained to him [Sarinzhipov] what accreditation is, […] how much it costs, and how many 
universities were accredited. And he immediately sat down at the calculator and began to count. 
And I told him "you know, firstly, we did not accredit it for one year, that is, divide it into 4 
years, and secondly, you consider only incomes, and you do not consider expenses. […] Then, 
after the meeting, the Chairman of the Committee on Control invited us to his office [..] and 
said, "I'll destroy your business." I said “you know, this is not my business. This is my work”. 
(Interview KZ No. 4, 2017) 
When in 2015, the law on education was due to be revised, the MoES submitted a draft according to 
which state attestation was to remain in place while accreditation would not be tied to financing in any 
way. The MoES argued that HEIs and the higher education system as a whole were not ready for this 
degree of trust and autonomy and that accreditation would be too expensive for HEIs. HEIs, however, 
strongly opposed this view and argued that in the fact of the matter, attestation, even though nominally 
financed by the state, was even more expensive than accreditation.  
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The Ak-Zhol opposition party and its chairman, Azat Peruashev, president of the national chamber of 
entrepreneurs, took up the issue in favor of accreditation. As a Ak-Zhol official recounts:  
“In fact, they had a very weak argument. They just said that it is public money, it's expensive 
for universities. Even though the universities themselves came [to seek out accreditation!]. It 
also affects student mobility. They [foreign universities] asked the students whether their uni-
versity was independently accredited!” (Interview KZ No. 19, 2017) 
The MoES, however, was set on their priorities and proceeded to go forward with the bill, using the Nur 
Otan party’s comfortable majority in parliament. As an opposition party-official remembers:  
“In the parliamentary working groups, there was of course nothing we could do. And when the 
bill was brought under discussion, our chairman gave a very tough speech. He emphasized the 
fact that they were changing the state program, the main document. If they changed that, then 
they should recognize that they failed to implement it properly.  
They had decided on the changes already in 2008 and it was already 2015, so much time [had 
passed] and they still claimed that the system was not ready. So, what had they been doing 
[during all this time]? […] He told them in this way: “Admit that you did not fulfill it [the 
SPED2011-2020], and that is why you want to change it. Of course, they did not agree to this. 
[…] We began to accuse the Ministry of Education and the Ministry, in turn, of course, not 
completely honestly began to accuse us that we were lobbying for the interests of the [quality 
assurance] agencies. […] After this dispute, a huge fight began. Our chairman and the minister 
were on the front pages of the newspapers.” (Interview KZ No. 19, 2017) 
During this conflict, Minister of Education and Science Sarinzhipov accused the leader of the Ak Zhol 
opposition party, Azat Peruashev, of lobbying for private universities for which the latter, in turn, ap-
plied to the general prosecutors’ office with a public request to assess Sarinzhipov’s words for slander. 
Eventually, the MoES was forced to concede to the implementation of the SPED and to discontinue 
state attestation.  
When the final bill was put up to the vote, however, only accreditation by international QAAs was 
mentioned. After further lengthy discussions about the importance of having domestic agencies, of keep-
ing public money within the county and that accreditation by domestic agencies was much cheaper. 
Finally, a compromise was reached and agencies registered in EQAR would be eligible and that the end 
of attestation would be postponed to 2017. Since January 2017, state attestation was discontinued and 
most of Kazakhstan’s HEIs began seeking accreditation. By mid-2016, a total of 95 (i.e. 74%) of all 128 
HEIs and 2 632 (i.e. 55%) of all 4 800 programs licensed by the MoES had been accredited in Kazakh-
stan (ENQA, 2017).  
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7.2.4.3 Expansion of institutional autonomy 
Next to independent accreditation, institutional autonomy occupied a prominent place in the SPED 
2011-2020. Like accreditation, this most likely had several reasons. The OECD and World Bank review 
of Kazakhstan’s higher education system (World Bank & OECD, 2007) had strongly stressed the issue 
of institutional autonomy. The Bologna Process also included several references to university autonomy 
which Kazakhstan had eagerly adopted on a policy level. Before Kazakhstan joined the Bologna Pro-
cess, Members of the MoES reached out to the Magna Charta Observatory in Bologna and several uni-
versities signed the university rectors signed the Magna Charta Universitatum, which underlines HEIs’ 
independence and autonomy, the freedom of faculty in teaching and research, and of students to an 
effective education’ (Bricall & Roversi-Monaco, 2002). The process of joining the Bologna Process had 
then brought to light the tensions between the idea of university autonomy and independent quality 
assurance in the one hand, which were an inherent part of the European Standards and Guidelines on 
Quality Assurance (ESG), and the reality of Kazakhstan’s centralist model of HEI governance on the 
other.  
Clearly, the discourses around the Bologna Process, the European University Association (EUA), the 
World Bank and the OECD framed university autonomy “as a precondition of competitiveness” (Nok-
kala, 2012). Policy documents and Kazakh media coverage have portrayed greater university autonomy 
as a case of global best practice (Sagintayeva, A. & Kurakbayev, 2015). This view was underlined by 
one senior advisor to the MoES:  
“Simple analysis shows that the best education systems are those that are autonomous, where 
universities are autonomous. This is a simple conclusion. Just look at rankings. […] Our uni-
versities do not understand this. They are afraid that when the autonomy comes, they will not 
be given money anymore. But in the world, where there is autonomy, there is also good money.” 
(Interview KZ No. 8, 2017). 
During the late 2000ies, the MoES was ready to follow the policy advice on decentralization of power 
in the formulation of the SPED2011-2020. As one former employee of the World Bank noted: 
“The World Bank at that time, we were kind of the top organization that the government would 
go to. We participated in the development of program for education development. We provided 
recommendations for the program and technical and vocational education (during the 2000ies). 
The World Bank was well-taken by the government. They would seem to listen to the World Bank 
as one of the authorities” (Interview KZ No. 3, 2017) 
The SPED 2011-2020 included an expansion of university autonomy “carrying out their educational, 
scientific, financial, international and other activity, on the model of the Nazarbayev University” (Min-
istry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan[MoES], 2010). This was to be imple-
mented through several changes:  
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- HEIs would receive greater curricular autonomy in developing their study programs.  
-  “National Research Universities” were to obtain more autonomy by 2015, “National Universi-
ties” by 2016, and all other HEIs in 201849  
- Public HEIs were to change their status from state enterprises to autonomous noncommercial 
organizations, subordinated to boards of trustees, and with mechanisms to ensure transparency 
of HEI activity.  
- The SPED also stated that the mechanism of appointment of rectors at the state universities 
would be “improved”.  
The ideal laid out in the SPED was clearly one of more autonomous HEIs, which are responsible for 
competing in the academic marketplace for students, faculty, and research grants on the basis of quality 
and innovation (Hartley, Gopaul et al., 2016).  
Following the SPED 2011-2020 program, the Law on Science (February 2011) and Education (October 
2011) were revised. Nazarbayev university received its own Law “On the status of “Nazarbayev Uni-
versity, Nazarbayev Intellectual schools and the Nazarbayev Fund” which allowed it to operate com-
pletely independently from the regulations which governed the rest of the HE system. Several changes 
were implemented to increase university autonomy, as foreseen in the SPED2011-2020.  
Public HEIs become “State enterprises” 
In 2013, the legal status of public HEIs was changed from State-owned educational institutions (kazen-
nyye predpriyatiya) to “state enterprises on the basis of economic management” (respublikanskoe gosu-
darstvennoe predpriyatie na prave khozyaistvennogo vedeniya). This put them on the same basis as 
other state enterprises and gave them more operational freedom regarding their internal structure and 
management. HEIs also received more freedom to remunerate their teaching staff. HEIs could now 
freely set salaries for senior academic staff within the personnel budget approved by the MoES. Like-
wise, they could set salaries for senior administrative staff, up to a cap set by the MoES (Alpysbayeva 
& Akhmetzhanova, 2016). They may could and dismiss staff freely, regulated only by the Labor Code. 
In addition, national universities were given more autonomy in the area of enrollment procedures, of 
developing their own study programs, apply their own standards in academic affairs and research, and 
issue their own diplomas (Alpysbayeva & Akhmetzhanova, 2016). Many were, however, slow to use 
their new freedoms to develop their own KPI or other system (Interview KZ No. 8, 2017).  
HEIs were now regulated by both the law on education as well as the Law on State Enterprises. This 
did, however, create new restrictions and changed the incentives for their governance: 
                                                          
49 Although it was not clearly formulated what form this autonomy would take 
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“One characteristic is that the head of the organization has personal responsibility of the rector. 
Under these circumstances, the rector will try to ensure compliance with the law, in order not 
to get into trouble.” (Interview KZ No. 3, 2017) 
 
7.2.4.4 Strengthening lay governance of HEIs: Introduction of Boards of Overseers (na-
blyudatel’nye sovety) 
The SPED 2011-2020 states that by 2020, ninety percent of all public universities would use “corporate 
governance mechanisms”, which primarily referred to the establishment of boards of overseers made up 
of representatives of the wider society: civic leaders, employers, authorities, business, NGOs, and mass 
media representatives (Bilyalov, 2016).  
Contrary to original expectations, the advisory boards established since 2007 had not evolved to play a 
substantive role in the governance of HEIs, as power remained concentrated in the hands of the rectors. 
As one interviewee involved in research on the effects of advisory boards and boards of overseers 
pointed out: 
“The good thing about the boards of trustees was that they could help the institutions to under-
stand what type of curricula the employers wanted. The problem was that they were not involved 
in governance. They were not involved in any strategic decisions. And still, if you look at the 
bylaws of some boards of trustees you would see all kind of these suggestive verbs, such as 
“advise the rector”, or “suggest”, or “recommend” or “support”. There wouldn’t be any real 
power in the boards. Plus it was not a very effective enterprise, because those boards meet once 
or twice a year, the members did not invest a lot of time into board work and was acting in a 
supporting role rather than anything else. ” (Interview KZ No. 3, 2017) 
In 2012, the MoES issued an order calling for the establishment of “boards of overseers” (na-
blyudatel’nye sovety). In nine universities, such reformed “Boards of Overseers” were established.  
The new Boards of Overseers were to be composed of representatives of the MoES, regional executive 
bodies, the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs, the public50, and leaders of state-owned enterprises 
(OECD, 2017). The Boards were to decide on the allocation of scholarships and other funds from non-
government sources and accumulated capital. There was also to be more accountability as board mem-
bers were assured the right to access any documents and data pertaining to the state of the HEI. In 
statements of intent, the MoES communicated boards of overseers were eventually to have powers com-
parable to governing boards of western HEIs, including the rights to select the rector of the university; 
approve budgets; define strategy, admissions criteria, and faculty hiring policies; and even set the senior 
                                                          
50 It is unclear what constituency is meant, however 
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leadership team’s salaries (Bilyalov, 2016). It was planned that the original Boards of Trustees will be 
transformed into these new structures (Bilyalov, 2016). The MoES expanded the rights of the boards in 
small steps.  
Election of Rectors through boards of overseers 
In early 2015, the MoES established a new procedure for appointing rectors of a public universities, in 
which the role of boards of overseers was strengthened. The MoES also further specified the procedures 
and qualification requirements for electing Board Members and, for the first time, guaranteed their role 
in the Law on State Assets which regulates public universities.  
A significant change in the role of overseers was their new role in the election of rectors since 2016. 
Whereas they used to be appointed directly by the minister (or, in the case of national universities, by 
the president), a new multi-step selection process involving a public competition procedure was intro-
duced. This process includes the following steps:  
When a position of rector becomes vacant or a three-year term nears its end, the MoES announces a 
public competition to which interested individuals can apply with a strategic development plan for the 
HEI in question. The candidatures are forwarded to the HEI’s board of overseers, which assesses them 
and conducts interviews with candidates. The board then issues a recommendation of at least two indi-
viduals to the “Republican Commission on the selection of rectors” operated by the MoES (composed 
of the Minister, Members of Parliaments, representatives of the President’s administration, of the asso-
ciation of HEIs, of unions, of MoES staff, and of the association of entrepreneurs. The Commission 
assesses the candidates, their qualifications and strategy and makes a judgement on how well the pro-
posed strategy serves the wider strategy for the country’s development. On the basis of the recommen-
dation of the Republican Commission the Minister then issues the decree nominating the rector. The 
Commission can (and sometimes does) also reject all candidates and demand that the competition be 
repeated. After a three-year term ends, the rector has to account for the results reached during this time 
and a new competition is announced, in which the rector may (and has to) re-apply.  
As a high-ranking MoES employee recounts, the new procedure is well-received by its target audience:  
“I am a member of the board of trustees of [a regional university]. When the competition was 
announced, we had 18 candidates for rector. The competition is open. I was very surprised and 
glad that people already believe [that they can become rector] and apply, from all regions of 
Kazakhstan.” (Interview KZ No. 10, 2017) 
On the one hand, the new procedure does allocate more responsibility and involvement to the boards of 
overseers and thus of more stakeholders than the old system of direct appointment of rectors by the 
minister. As a high-ranking MoES employee summarized the changes, “the good old times, when a 
rector was appointed by the minister and stayed there forever, are over” (Interview KZ No. 10, 2017). 
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On the other hand, the new structure is also a powerful instrument of the State to ensure that HEI’s 
strategies coincide with the central government’s priorities.  
Reluctance among rectors and staff against boards of overseers  
As of 2015, in general, the Boards of Overseers seem to not yet have developed a strong role in decision-
making and accountability of the rector (Sagintayeva, A. & Kurakbayev, 2015). A roundtable of rectors 
organized by the Graduate School of Education at Nazarbayev University on the topic of boards of 
oversees shows that many HEIs were still struggling re-define the working relationship between rectors 
and boards (Hartley, Eckel et al., 2016). The resulting white paper identifies legal, capacity-related, and 
cultural barriers for the expansion of university autonomy and governance and oversight by boards of 
overseers. A key concern which was voiced by several rectors relates to the balance of autonomy and 
accountability. Rectors fear that a loosening of ministerial control without sufficiently principled HEI 
leadership and strong oversight by board and/or other bodies might open the doors to corruption. A 
second reason is that not all Kazakh HEIs may have sufficient capacity for autonomy, as they are highly 
diverse in terms of their profiles, geographical location, revenue opportunities, the quality and experi-
ence of their boards, and the expertise of their administrative staff to take over functions previously 
fulfilled by the MoES. A third reason are the incentives set by the legal framework. Even though the 
role of the boards of overseers is to be strengthened vis-à-vis the MoES, the latter still controls the 
appointment of rectors and needs to confirm the appointment of vice-rectors. The Law “On State Prop-
erty”, which public HEIs underlie, specifies the rector as having “undivided authority” as well as her 
individual responsibility for the management and development of the university, as well as for compli-
ance with legislation. HEIs have little flexibility in actively manage their budgets and the rector is per-
sonally responsible for the university as public property.  
The establishment of boards of overseers with whom strategy and budget need to be coordinated added 
an additional factor of uncertainty to this relationship, which was at odds with the legal framework. If 
boards were to gain legal power over budgetary decisions, this would divide authority from responsibil-
ity, exposing the rectors to consequences and disincentivizing risk taking and innovation (Hartley, Eckel 
et al., 2016). Likewise, as the institution of boards of overseers was new, many board members (still) 
lacked a sufficient understanding of their roles and/or the HEIs they are supposed to oversee. This left 
rectors with both much greater power, as well as additional responsibility to educate the board members 
to whom they are accountable. Lastly, the white book notes that not all board members understand the 
distinction between management and governance and that some board members begin to micro-manage 
act rather than provide oversight and direction (Hartley, Eckel et al., 2016). While boards in general did 
not yet play a strong role, one rector was quoted that “the Akim [mayor, on the board of overseers] 
decides everything. Supervision has been replaced with the actual management of the university” (Hart-
ley, Eckel et al., 2016, p. 11). A higher education researcher I interviewed explained the weak role of 
boards by 2017 as follows: 
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“The boards of trustees, they have no income and they do not even get any encouragement. It's 
only the status, and here the question is how much influence they have, when in the law on 
education it is written that the rector is responsible for everything. He is responsible for every-
thing: for health, for the premises, for fire safety, for the material base, for everything .... And 
if he is responsible for everything, then this is the responsibility of one person. Of course, he 
also decides everything because it is his responsibility. Perhaps, another law on education is 
needed, where this responsibility will be collective and lie with the board of directors” (Inter-
view KZ No. 13, 2017) 
The MoES, however, retains a degree of influence also in boards of overseers as no decisions can be 
taken with the MoES representatives being present. As a senior MoES official and former rector ex-
plained:  
“You know we cannot make the boards of overseers completely independent. The policy of the 
ministry should be aimed at implementing the general education policy. That's why each super-
visory board has representatives from the ministry. Without the representative of the ministry 
no decisions may be made. It is not a veto, everybody can be against him and the decision will 
be taken. But if he was against it in the Ministry they will know about it and will react somehow.” 
(Interview KZ No. 5, 2016) 
However, although boards are still finding their role and the relationship between HEIs and MoES is 
still in the process of readjustment, the changes have led to rectors finding themselves more accounta-
ble to a wider stakeholder environment as before. As a senior HEI administrator summarizes:  
 “Before, the rector’s powers were absolute. He was "god and king" [bog I tsar] in the univer-
sity. Now they [the rectors] begin to understand they have to account to someone. Some are 
nervous about the situation, but this is already a fact ... In my view this was a very good move. 
[…] The fact that they have to fight to become rector, write a development plan, then defend it 
before the supervisory board - this is good. Previously, they were simply appointed by the min-
istry. Now they pass through the supervisory board. It seems to me that this is a revolutionary 
thing.” (Interview KZ No. 8, 2017) 
7.2.4.5 Creation of analytical capacity and joining of OECD 
Since 2010, the MoES has been pursuing actions to redefine its role in support of a more decentralized, 
autonomous network of HEIs while at the same time maintaining essential national-level regulatory 
controls and increasing its system steering capacity. There were indeed several steps taken towards de-
centralizing governance functions from the MoES to subsidiary bodies, buffer institutions and HEIs, 
with the stated goal of increasing the autonomy of institutions in their academic, financial, and organi-
zational decision-making (Bilyalov, 2016). These new buffer bodies include the new independent qual-
ity assurance agencies and the creation of an independent accreditation system, the Bologna Process 
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and Academic Mobility Center for promoting the implementation of the BP, or the Information-Analyt-
ical Center (IAC).  
Efforts to strengthen the analytical capacity of education in the country and to improve the data basis 
for effective governance had been called for already in the SPED2005-2010. In 2011, Kazakhstan began 
the process of joining the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Inter-
view KZ No. 8, 2017). This process entails joining the different committees of OECD, including joining 
the committee on educational policy. The precondition for this was that Kazakhstan conduct a complete 
review of all levels of education as well as participate in TALIS and PIACC.  
In 2012, in order to improve the data basis for education management and to create a central authority 
for education statistics and a single data base, as well as to administer all OECD-related research, the 
MoES reformed the National Centre for Education Quality Assessment into the National Centre of Ed-
ucation Statistics and Evaluation (NCESE) and in 2014 into the Information-Analytical Center (IAC) 51 
under the MoES. As a senior member of IAC describes, its foundation represents the creation of an 
instrument for more effective governance of the education system:  
„There is the project cycle, there is planning, there is implementation, then there is monitoring 
and evaluation. In this cycle our place is the monitoring and evaluation of reforms which are 
being implemented in Kazakhstan. […] Five to six years ago, state bodies began to widely im-
plement strategic management, strategic planning, and project management. […] The fact is 
that without monitoring, without evaluation, our reforms may stall and then fail. Now this is 
very clearly understood by politics. Therefore, we perform this function (Interview KZ No. 8, 
2017). 
The IAC has since published an annual report on education statistics, studies on various issues, such as 
university autonomy in Kazakhstan (Alpysbayeva & Akhmetzhanova, 2016), and coordinates the work 
of international organizations such as the OECD in the country. In 2015, Kazakhstan and the OECD 
began a two-year Country Program, to support a set of reforms of Kazakhstan’s policies and institutions, 
covering areas such as public-sector integrity and governance, environment, health, taxation, competi-
tion and business climate, and statistics. The program was envisioned to lead to over 20 policy reviews, 
co-operation in capacity building projects, an increased level of participation in six OECD Committees, 
and possible adherence to 28 OECD legal instruments, including the Declaration on International In-
vestment and Multinational Enterprises. As to the motivations for joining OECD and founding IAC, a 
senior employee stress the value of the international comparison in informing policy: 
“Of course [it is a matter of] prestige for the country. But more importantly, we have recently 
been actively engaging in benchmarking in Kazakhstan. You must have noticed. We look at 
                                                          
51 IAC was founded as a joint-stock company (aktsionernoye obshchestvo) with 100% of stock owned by the 
government. 
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foreign experience. So now for us it is very important for us to see how things are done in the 
best countries, and to do it like this. In order to understand your [our] place. Because for a long 
time we did not have this opportunity.” (Interview KZ No. 8, 2017). 
Effects of returning students 
IAC is a good example of the effect of the Bolashak program and other initiatives of international ex-
change which Kazakhstan has promoted since the 1990ies. It is notable that the returning graduates are 
now slowly moving into analytical and leadership positions in the MoES and (to a lesser degree) HEIs. 
This certainly creates additional capacity in organizations to understand the internal context and apply 
international practices in Kazakhstan’s institutions. As a senior employee of IAC describes: 
“At IAC, almost 70% of our staff are young people who studied abroad, at good universities. 
So, they studied, for example, education. Somewhere around 30% are people who, like me for 
example, have worked in the system all their life, so they know what Kazakh education is. We 
hope that this mix will lead to some effect, because on the one hand we have people who know 
foreign practices and can communicate them there and, on the other hand, there are people who 
are professionals. This it makes it now possible to study and compare ourselves.” (Interview KZ 
No. 8, 2017). 
7.2.4.6 Changes to university admission  
Based on recommendations from the 2007 OECD/World Bank review of Kazakhstan’s higher education 
system (World Bank & OECD, 2007), the State Program for Education development (SPED) 2011-2020 
proposed, that the UNT would be separated into school-leaving and university entry tests from 2015 and 
to abolish the UNT and Complex Tests. There had always been, however, strong resistance to this rec-
ommendation because of fear that such a reform would revert the system to the status ex-ante and expose 
the process of university admission to corruption (Sagintayeva, A. et al., 2014). Since school graduation 
exams were conducted separately from the UNT again, uncoupling the functions of university entrance 
and school leaving exam. As the UNT was not regarded any more as a form of control, but part of the 
application process to HE, responsibility was passed from the committee of control into the responsibil-
ity of the department of higher education within the MoES.  
7.2.4.7 Public councils and compulsory inclusion of stakeholders in governance 
Starting from January 1, 2016, as a result of “100 steps of the Plan of the Nation”, new public councils 
(obshestvennye sovety) were created in Kazakhstan, attached to all government organs. The members of 
these councils should be representatives of their respective sphere of activity. Under the MoES, the 
public council on education and science was founded, which is to act as an independent civil organ, 
chaired not by a ministry representative but by an individual outside of the state structures. The members 
of this council are representatives of the academic community, professionals, managers from the area of 
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education, NGOs from the educational sphere. The Council needs to review and discuss all legislation 
issued by the MoES. The public councils need to be consulted and needs to approve before any norma-
tive documents and legislation may be passed, which gives their role a lot of weight.  
Without the presence of their commentary (ekspertnoe soklycheniya), the ministry of justice does not 
register any normative documents and legislation issued by the MoES and new laws may thus not enter 
into force. Likewise, associations such as the association of HEIs and the business association Atameken 
need to be obligatorily involved in assessing and commenting on all changes to normative documents 
and legislation on higher education, such as changes of qualification and licensing requirements before 
they can enter into force. 
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7.3 The governance model of the Kazakh HE system by 2015 
After having re-created tight state control over higher education during the 1990ies through strict state 
curricular standards, State licensing, attestation and accreditation, centralized testing and centralized 
state control over admittance into HE, a governance model has emerged in Kazakhstan which is char-
acterized by marketization and state-driven westernization. More than the other two case countries, Ka-
zakhstan has privatized higher education both through direct state universities in 2001, as well as in 
funding via its Money-Follows-Students financing model. Since the 2000ies, Kazakhstan has pursued a 
strategy of involving international, mostly Anglo-Saxon consultants and international organizations 
such as the OECD but also EU-funded activities in evaluating and advising higher education policy. 
Under their influence but crucially promoted by the president of the country, the governance system 
adopted international practices.  
These changes include the shift from state attestation to independent and international accreditation in 
quality assurance (2008/2011/2017). Kazakhstan went further than most EU-countries, as it recognized 
national reviews as well accreditations conducted by international agencies, as one of the first countries 
in the EHEA to do so. Stakeholder involvement in governance is being promoted through the introduc-
tion of governance boards for stakeholder involvement in HEI-governance (2009/2012), and their in-
volvement in the appointment of rectors. Paradoxically, since involving autonomous stakeholder asso-
ciations did often not exist, they needed to be created top-down first, before they could be involved in 
stakeholder governance, as in the case of the business association Atameken, which was founded by 
presidential order. In terms of institutional governance, state strategy is promoting less direct govern-
ment control and expanding institutional autonomy. The creation of Nazarbayev University as “Global” 
Research University with “western” staff and an Anglo-Saxon governance model is an explicit attempt 
to act as a “role model” and consultants for Kazakhstan’s HEIs. In terms of funding the government 
directly and indirectly prioritizes funding its leading HEIs by higher grant allocations to students at 
national universities and by incentivizing HEIs to compete for the best students.  
While it is clear that the government has been delegating control in a cautious fashion, often keeping 
final decision-making within its area of competence, the direction of changes point clearly towards the 
adoption of Anglo-Saxon and EU-models, while the key driving force behind these changes is the Pres-
idential administration as well as internationally-educated cadres, often comprised of alumni of Kazakh-
stan’s Bolashak program.  
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The following table summarizes aspects of Kazakhstan’s model of higher education system governance 
in 2015: 
Changes in the relationship between HEIs and the state 
State remains highly active in policy-setting but is withdrawing from operational control 
 
Quality Assurance Institutional Governance and 
Autonomy 
Financing higher education 
Study programs and their contents 
are regulated by the educational 
standard, the state classifier, typi-
cal study plans, and qualification 
and licensing requirements 
Compliance with standards is con-
trolled through state licensing, 
post-licensing controls, and un-
scheduled controls 
Study programs are accredited by 
independent accreditation agencies 
rankings of HEIs operated by 
QAAs 
Considerable power of HE leader-
ship since Soviet times 
Proposal of Rectors by boards of 
overseers and appointment by gov-
ernment commission 
Boards of overseers with power to 
approve budgets and collaborate in 
questions of strategy, admissions, 
hiring, and reimbursement  
Power of HEI leadership to ap-
point, evaluate, reimburse and dis-
miss academic staff below vice-
rectors considering state qualifica-
tion requirements 
Line-items prescribed for spending 
student grants, State funding via 
money-follows-students scheme.  
Competition for students to fill 
places 
Income-diversification and finan-
cial autonomy for tuition-fees and 
other types of income 
Regulation of access to HE 
Centralized testing with UNT and CT 
Number of fee-paying students not regulated  
Table 18: Elements of governance model of Kazakhstan’s System of Higher Education by 2015 
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8 The Republic of Moldova  
8.1 Introduction 
The Republic of Moldova is the South-Westernmost post-Soviet state, situated between Romania and 
Ukraine, between the area's two main rivers, the Dniester and the Prut. The territory of modern-day 
Moldova has a long of shifting borders and allegiances, always at the periphery of whatever powerful 
neighbor happened to control it at the time. The name “Moldova” relates to the Romanian principality 
of Moldova which existed as an independent entity from 1359 until 1538, when it became a vassal state 
of the Ottoman Empire. In 1812, the Russian Empire annexed the eastern part of medieval Moldova 
from the Ottoman Empire and renamed the annexed territory “Bessarabia”. Bessarabia remained one of 
the most underdeveloped areas of the Russian empire until World War I, when Romania, having been 
allied to the victorious Entente Powers, took control of the territory and its majority Romanian-speaking 
population. It remained part of the Romanian State until the German-Russian non-aggression Pact des-
ignated the territory as part of the Soviet sphere of influence, which allowed the Soviet Union to re-
annex Bessarabia in June 1940. In August 1940, the Soviet authorities created the Moldovan Soviet 
Socialist republic (MSSR), based for the most part on the annexed territory of the interwar Bessarabia 
and an earlier-established Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) which had ex-
isted on the eastern bank of the Dniester since 1924 as an autonomous republic of the Ukrainian SSR.  
After the Annexation of Bessarabia to the USSR, the Moldavian SSR was formed on August 2, 1940 
from the mains parts of Bessarabia and from about 40% of the territory of Moldavian ASSAR which 
was dismantled. The southern and northern areas of Bessarabia and almost 60 % of the territory of the 
former MSSAR were incorporated into Ukraine and the new MSSR lost its direct access to the Black 
Sea. In addition to reconfiguring the demographic landscape of the MSSR in this way, the Soviet gov-
ernment sought to reshape the identity of the republic's remaining population through the creation of a 
distinct national Moldovan identity. The new Moldovan national identity presupposed a distinctive 
„Moldovan“ language, different from and separate of the Romanian language, spelled in Cyrillic letters 
and Russian was imposed as the dominant language at all areas of the public space. This process was 
not specific to the territory of the Republic of Moldova, but part of the much larger Sovietization that 
was taking place across the Soviet Union (Worden, 2014, p. 49). 
The first democratic elections of the local parliament (February-March 1990) resulted into a strongly 
western-oriented majority. On 23 June 1990 the new parliament adopted the Declaration of Sovereignty 
of the MSSR, on 23 May 1991 it officially renamed the MSSR into the Republic of Moldova and on 27 
August 1991 it declared the political independence of Moldova and its territorial sovereignty over the 
former MSSR. On 2 March 1992 the new successor state of the USSR became a member of the United 
Nations Organizations and gained international recognition as an independent nation.  
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The Proclamation of Independence of the Republic of Moldova in 1991 marked the beginning of radical 
political, economic, and social changes aiming at developing a market economy based on private and 
public property, entrepreneurship, and competition. Much like other CEE nations, it proclaimed political 
democratization, human rights, civil liberties, and equality of all people regardless of their ethnicity, 
religious affiliation or race, as guiding principles for its nationhood (Padure, 2009b). Its geographical 
position at the periphery of Europe and the former Soviet Union, the disappearance of its economic ties 
and its integration into the Soviet economy and its lack of traditions of as an independent state, and its 
ethnographic fragmentation represented formidable obstacles. Among the ethnic Moldovans who rep-
resented 64 per cent of the population, the creation of an independent Moldovan state coincided with a 
revival of the ethnic identity as Romanian. The Cyrillic alphabet was replaced by the Latin alphabet, the 
name ‘Romanian’ was increasingly used to define the Moldovan language, the Romanian tricolor flag 
was adopted, and there were a growing number of calls to reunite with Romania.  
In opposition to these tendencies, in August 1990 the region on the eastern bank of the Dniester – much 
of which had been part of the MASSR before the annexation of Bessarabia with its predominantly Rus-
sian-speaking population – self-proclaimed an independent “Pridnestrovian Moldavian Soviet Socialist 
Republic” (Transnistria), with its capital in Tiraspol. In 1992, the political conflict degenerated into a 
military engagement and evolved into a frozen conflict. This also meant that the majority of Moldovan 
heavy industry and energy production, which had been built on the left bank of the Dniester, was not 
any more controlled by the government in Chisinau and was not contributing taxes to the budget. The 
breakup of the USSR meant that the substantial agricultural exports of Moldova lost their markets while 
imported energy and raw materials became painfully more expensive. The inexperienced bureaucracy 
was in no way prepared to deal with these gargantuan challenges. The economic collapse happened at a 
time when public institutions such as a National Bank (established in 1991) and a system of public 
service were only just being created. The leadership consisted mostly of former Communist party offi-
cials while local administrators were either young and inexperienced or trained and socialized in the 
hierarchical structures of the Soviet Union. In any case, they were not prepared to respond adequately 
to the cataclysmic changes that were happening in the country (Padure, 2009b).  
Political disagreement about the basic direction of the country exacerbated the problems. The political 
balance frequently shifted between right, center and left political forces, who, when in power, initiated 
far-reaching changes in many areas. Particularly contagious issues turned out to be language and identity 
(Romanian versus Moldovan), the role of the state in public and economic life, and the relationship 
between Moldova and Russia vs. Romania and the EU (Padure, 2009b). The 1994 Constitution estab-
lished Moldova as a semi-presidential republic in which the president was elected by popular vote. In 
2000, the Moldovan Parliament changed the Constitution, and Moldova became a parliamentary repub-
lic, with the president being elected by Parliament. As we will see below, these political oscillations led 
to major fallout in the education sphere as well.  
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As of the 2004 census, the majority ethnic groups in the areas controlled by the central government in 
Chisinau identify as Moldovan/Romanian (78 per cent) and Ukrainian (8 per cent), followed by Russian 
(6 per cent), Gagauz (4 per cent), and Bulgarian (2 per cent) (National Bureau of Statistics of the Re-
public of Moldova, 2014). According to the 2004 census, Moldova's population was counted to be ap-
prox. 3,380,000 in the areas controlled by the central government and 560,000 in the breakaway region 
of Transnistria. The total population of Moldova in its internationally recognized borders in 2014 was 
3,940,000 persons (National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, 2014).  
Development of the higher education system during the Soviet Period 
Most of the history of higher education on the territory of the current Republic of Moldova is relatively 
recent and its development only started in scale after the Soviet annexation. While during the interwar 
period there had been conservatory and two faculties of Romania's University of Iasi in Bessarabia and 
a pedagogical institute in Tiraspol, after 1940, new HEIs opened in Chisinau, mostly staffed with aca-
demics who had been transferred from other Soviet Union republics and Tiraspol (Lisnic, 2011, p. 340). 
In addition, the training of new teaching staff was conducted mostly in Russian-speaking institutions in 
Odessa, Kiev, and Moscow (Cojocaru, 1995; Tiron, Arion, Paiu, Scalnîi, & Stan, 2003, p. 23). By 1988 
the higher education system of the MSSR included 9 State HEIs (Yagodin, G. A., 1990, p. 76) – one 
university, seven specialized institutes (tree pedagogical institutes, one medical institute, one technical 
institute, one agricultural institute, and one institute of art) as well as one conservatory. Participation in 
HE was, however, lower than in other Soviet republics: In 1988 in the MSSR only 123 persons out of 
10,000 were enrolled in higher education, while in the whole USSR this indicator stood at 177 persons 
per 10,000. Only the Tajik and Turkmen SSR had lower levels of enrollment in higher education.  
Excursus: Development of the higher education system after independence in Transnistria 
The Transnistrian conflict and the loss of control of the central government over the territory of Trans-
nistria led to a split of the HES of the country in two. In 1990 the Transnistrian regional administration 
renamed the “T.G.Shevchenko” State Pedagogical Institute into Tiraspol State University and in 1991, 
the name was changed again into „Tiraspol State Corporative University of the Pridnestrovian region”. 
1992 the conflict between Transnistrian and Moldovan authorities had escalated into an armed conflict 
and the government of the Republic of Moldova evacuated the Tiraspol State University in an organized 
manner to Chisinau, in a procedure in which almost 2500 students and teaching staff were relocated 
from Tiraspol. At the same time the staff of “T.G.Shevchenko” Pridnestrovian State Corporative Uni-
versity which had remained in Transnistria established merged what remained of “T.G.Shevchenko” 
Tiraspol State Pedagogical Institute with the Tiraspol State Corporative University of the Pridnestrovian 
region. The result was a “breakaway university”, since 1997 renamed into Transnistria State University. 
This university formed the core of a Transnistria regional HES, which oriented itself at the HES of the 
Russian Federation. Nowadays this university with around 12.000 students and 110 PhD students fol-
lows Russian educational standards and plans and its degrees are recognized within the territory of the 
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Russian Federation. In addition, five branches of Russian HEIs and one branch of a Ukrainian HEI 
operate on the territory of Transnistria. There is, however, only very little statistical information and 
very limited ways to verify any data’s validity.  
8.2 The development of the governance of the higher education system in 
Moldova52 
The development of the HE system in Moldova in general and its governance in particular has been 
strongly shaped by the changing political forces in the country. To understand the developments in 
higher education, it is therefore necessary to consider the parties and coalitions that were shaping higher 
education policy in the country since its independence.  
The following table provides an overview of the ruling parties and coalitions and the ministers of edu-
cation in the respective cabinets:  
Elec-
toral pe-
riod 
Ruling Party/Coalition President Prime Minister(s) Minister(s) of Edu-
cation 
1990-
1994 
Center-right Moldovan 
Popular Front (NSF) 
Mircea Snegur Mircea Druc; Valeriu 
Muravschi; Andrei 
Sangeli 
Nicolae Mătcaș 
1994-
1998 
Center-left Agrarian 
Democratic Party (ADP) 
Mircea Snegur 
(1994-1996) 
Andrei Sangeli; Ion 
Ciubuc 
Petru Gaugas 
1998-
2001 
Centre-right, liberal coa-
lition  
Petru Lucinschi 
(1997-2001) 
Ion Ciubuc, Ion 
Sturza, Dumitru 
Braghis 
Iacob Popovici, Ana-
tol Gremalschi, Ion 
Guțu 
2001-
2005 
Party of Communists of 
Moldova 
Vladimir Voronin 
 
Vasile Tarlev  
 
Ilie Vancea, Gheor-
ghe Sima, Valentin 
Beniuc 
2005-
2009 
Left-right coalition, led 
by Party of Communists 
of Moldova 
Vladimir Voronin 
 
Vasile Tarlev, Zinaida 
Greceanii 
 
Victor Țvircun, La-
risa Șavga 
  
                                                          
52 Parts of this chapter have been published in Middell, Reinhardt, and Bischof (2016). The book “The politics of 
higher education reforms in central and eastern Europe. Development challenges of the Republic of Moldova“ by 
Lucia Padure (2009a) has contributed significantly to this section. I would also like to thank Nicolae Toderas of 
the Școala Națională de Studii Politice și Administrative in Romania for making his unpublished thesis available 
to me for the writing of this chapter. 
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2009-
2012 
Alliance for European In-
tegration led by Liberal 
Party 
Mihai Ghimpu, Vlad 
Filat, Marian Lupu 
(all acting) 
Vlad Filat Leonid Bujor, Mihail 
Şleahtiţchi 
2012-
2015 
Alliance for European In-
tegration led by Liberal 
Party 
Nicolae Timofti Vlad Filat, Iurie 
Leancă, Chiril 
Gaburici, Valeriu 
Streleț  
Maia Sandu, Corina 
Fusu 
Table 19: Overview of the ruling parties and governments in the Republic of Moldova 1990-2015 
8.2.1 Experimentation and laisser-faire after independence (1991-1994) 
The post-Soviet era (1989 – 1994) started off a period of national revival and de-ideologization of higher 
education. This period was characterized by new State institutions such as the Ministry of Education 
and by the emergence of private higher education in the young Republic. During the early 1990s, there 
was little regulation and no formal accreditation procedure, which gave entrepreneurial and politically 
connected individuals a large latitude of discretion. Philosophically, the ideological goals of political 
democratization and economic liberalization meant a decentralization of governance of the higher edu-
cation system (Padure, 2009b). To achieve this in higher education (HE), the intention was for the Min-
istry of Education (MoE) to devolve some of its powers to specialized and autonomous agencies 
(Toderaş, 2012b).  
Some changes were quickly implemented. Elections for university rectors were held and the mandatory 
job placement of graduates was abolished. First experiments were conducted with developing the baca-
laureat as a national centralized test for university admission, as it was conducted in Romania. The firsts 
bacalaureat exams were held in 1996. The economic disruption, the decline in funding, the political 
instability and the disappearance of many of the institutions of the former USSR, however, led to an 
policy vacuum which hampered qualitative development (Padure, 2009a). The reforms which did take 
place, thus did not follow a coherent pattern or strategy. As Padure (2009b) quotes a policymaker of the 
time “…the first years of independence represented a period of legal nihilism in education, when Soviet 
regulations were declared invalid in the Republic of Moldova, while local regulations were missing”. 
Within HEIs, new study programs were developed and the freedom of HEIs, in the absence of any 
regulatory framework, was basically boundless. This legal vacuum likewise allowed the number of both 
public and private to mushroom, often to the detriment of their quality (Tofan & Bischof, in preparation). 
Only in 1995 did the new law on Education bring about a new structure and order to the higher education 
sphere.  
The development of the HE system during the 1990ies was strongly influenced by the exchange with 
Romania, which became a model in many areas (Toderas, 2012). Experts from the Romanian Ministry 
of Education and from the Romanian Institute of Sciences of Education were heavily engaged in the 
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development of the first Law on Education. New universities were founded using the model of Roma-
nian HEIs, such as the Academy of Economic Studies (ASEM) in Moldova, the University of Cahul. 
Romanian professors were among the first to teach in new study programs in the social sciences. What 
is more, the Romanian government provided scholarships to Moldovan students, amounting, according 
to one estimate, to over 50.000 beneficiaries during the 1990ies and 2000s (Toderas, 2012). 
8.2.2 Attempts to establish impartial instruments to regulate quality (1994-2001) 
In 1994, the agrarian party, mainly composed of the directors of collective farms and former mid-level 
Communist nomenklatura, won the parliamentary elections. The first law on education went into effect 
in 1995 and defined what constitutes a higher education institution (which, other things, legitimized 
private higher education) and also gave university senates the power to elect rectors, while giving the 
MoE the power to confirm (and thus veto) them. During the second part of the 1990s, the state tried to 
reassert its role in the governance of higher education. 
In the absence of a quality assurance system following independence, a large number of private HEIs 
had been founded, often without sufficient resources, teaching staff or material base, which were issuing 
degrees (Interview MD No. 12, 2016). The Law on the Evaluation and Accreditation of Educational 
Institutions (1997) foresaw an academic evaluation and accreditation of education of all levels of edu-
cation, under any form of ownership (public and private) or ministerial subordination, would be per-
formed under the remit of the Ministry of Education. Two years later, the Law on the Endorsement of 
the Regulations on the Evaluation and Accreditation of Educational Institutions (1999) codified the 
procedure of quality assurance. This law foresaw quality assurance through state control and accredita-
tion. Modelled after similar structures in Romania, two agencies were established to regulate the quality 
of research and teaching: The National Council for Accreditation and Attestation (Consiliul Naţional 
pentru Acreditare şi Atestare – CNAA) for research and academic staff and the National Council for 
Academic Evaluation and Accreditation (Consiliul Naţional de Evaluare şi Acreditare Academică - 
CNEAA) for teaching and study programs. One of them was to be successful, while the other was not.  
The National Council for Accreditation and Attestation (CNAA) was founded in 1999 as a legally 
autonomous agency concerned with research and scientific-pedagogical qualifications, as well as the 
recognition of degrees and titles (Art. 90 of the Code on Science and Innovation of the Republic of 
Moldova). CNAA is therefore responsible for quality-assuring and recognizing PhD degrees, as well as 
academic positions such as professors or associate professors. PhD diplomas are granted by CNAA. 
Only since the 2014 code of education are universities allowed to operate doctoral schools and, given 
that they are accredited, may issue their own PhD degrees.  
The CNAA accredits HEIs based on their research capacity as either “profile members” or “affiliate 
members” of the Moldovan Academy of Sciences (ASM), which gives them access to public research 
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funding for projects in a specific area, either alone (profile members) or in cooperation with the Acad-
emy of Sciences (associated members). The strong presence of the ASM gives it a powerful role in the 
distribution of research budgets, which has led to criticism from the university sector (Toderaş, 2012b). 
The CNAA has lobbied against including doctoral education as third tier of university education, which 
was only included in the 2015 law on education, presumably fearing a loss of power and influence 
(Toderaş, 2012b). The Soviet-era Higher Attestation Commission (VAK) is clearly visible as a model 
for the CNEAA. As one interviewee pointed out in this context “It is exactly the Soviet System which 
was just renamed and the system remained the same.” (Interview MD No. 2, 2016). The CNAA did 
succeeded, however, in institutionalizing a unified and transparent system of evaluation and accredita-
tion of HEIs as well as assuring consistency in the granting of titles and scientific degrees, which is 
something that cannot be said for quality assurance of education.  
Also in 1999, through an amendment to the Law on education53 and government decision in 2000, the 
National Council for Academic Evaluation and Accreditation of educational institutions of the 
Republic of Moldova (Consiliul Naţional de Evaluare şi Acreditare Academică - CNEAA) was estab-
lished54 to address the legal vacuum in which HEIs were offering study programs. Prior to 1999, the 
assessment and accreditation of educational institutions was seen as a prerogative of the Ministry of 
Education. However, the Ministry had not managed to establish transparent criteria and procedures for 
the evaluation, authorization and accreditation of HEIs. The steep increase of the number of private HEI 
– which were not rarely even using the same physical spaces, learning resources, and teaching and ad-
ministrative staff of public HEIs – was seen as a sign that the system was ineffective or even corrupt 
(Toderaş, 2012b). After the Law on the Evaluation and Accreditation of Educational Institutions (1997) 
had been passed, for some time no immediate steps were taken to establish such a structure, until Victor 
Scalnîi, a professor from the Technical University of Moldova was charged with the task of setting up 
an agency, developing structures, criteria, processes, by himself (Interview MD No. 12, 2016). The Law 
on the Endorsement of the Regulations on the Evaluation and Accreditation of Educational Institutions 
(1999) then codified the procedure of quality assurance.  
CNEAA was composed of a president, a secretary, and nine members representing the Ministry of Ed-
ucation, the Ministry of the Economy, the Ministry of Finance, the Academy of Sciences, and CNEA 
(Tiron et al., 2003, p. 40). The Council developed and implemented accreditation procedures, conducted 
evaluations of private and public HEIs and granted accreditation to institutions and study programs. The 
procedure for accreditation of HEIs and study programs followed the internationally established model 
of self-evaluation according to established criteria such as teaching and research, staff, students, educa-
tional contents of study programs, technical and material infrastructure, and economic and financial 
indicators (Tiron et al., 2003, p. 41). The HEI was then visited by an expert commission (“specialty 
                                                          
53 http://lex.justice.md/md/311272/  
54 Law 328-XIV of March 24 1999 
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commission”) composed of peers which verified the self-assessment and drafted a report. The report was 
then discussed in the MoE and a decision is taken on accreditation or non-accreditation, which, pending 
confirmation by the government, entered into force by official publication. While CNEAA had a degree 
of autonomy, at no point in time could it be considered a truly independent organ of quality assurance. 
The law specified that the members of the Council and its committees were to be nominated by the 
government and that the Council did not have neither autonomy regarding its internal organization nor 
regarding the evaluation and accreditation procedures, criteria, and decisions, which had to be approved 
by the government. Nevertheless, although not completely independent, CNEAA did manage to resist 
influence from the government. In one noteworthy case, one large private university in Moldova opened 
a program of medicine. It successfully attracted a significant number of free-paying international stu-
dents (mostly from Arab countries). It did not, however, have own facilities to teach medicine and relied 
primarily on facilities and teaching staff from the State Medical University. The rector of the university 
had the political support from the government and in parliament, as well as the president, which all tried 
to pressure CNEAA into granting accreditation to the program. CNEAA refused and subsequently had 
to defend its position in front of the president of Moldova and a commission of all of the former ministers 
of health of Moldova (Interview MD No. 12, 2016).  
By 1999, however, Moldova’s economic and social situation had reached a low point: Its economic 
output had declined to only 35 per cent of its 1989 level (the second largest decline in GDP of all CEE 
countries), a quarter of its population was working illegally abroad and the government never regained 
control of the breakaway region of Transnistria (Padure, 2009b). Budget austerity, privatization pro-
grams, and fiscal reform stabilized Moldova’s exchange rates but contributed to a further decline in 
GDP and widening of the budget deficit and foreign debt. In the 1998 Parliamentary elections, the Party 
of Communists of Moldova had already won 40%. A number of smaller parties managed to form a 
government, which continued along the path of neoliberal reform. Their government was marked by 
further privatization reforms, cuts to pensions, soaring public and private debt, an impoverishing popu-
lation, and often changing prime-ministers and ministers of education (three ministers between 1998 
and 2001). The economic decline led to shrinking public budgets for HEIs. During this time, the number 
of private HEIs rose sharply from four in 1994 to 32 in 2000, as did the number of fee paying students. 
At the same time, it became typical for university teachers to hold several concurrent positions at dif-
ferent institutions. All of these developments led to deteriorating standards of higher education (Padure, 
2009b).  
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Figure 14: GDP Moldova at market prices (current US$). Source: World Bank Data 
Between 2000 and 2013, Moldova’s economic situation recovered and the economy grew. However, 
over a third of the adult population is working abroad and remittances from Moldovans abroad account 
for almost 24,9% of Moldova's GDP, the fifth-highest percentage in the world. As of 2013, higher edu-
cation was financed approximately with € 75m (1.26% of GDP), and R&D € 24m (0.4% of GDP).  
Regarding access to higher education, the centralized bacalaureat exam was rolled out to ever more 
lyceums in Moldova since 1996.  
8.2.3 Re-Centralization of powers in the Ministry of Education (2001-2006) 
During the 1990ies, international donor organisations such as the Soros Foundations had significantly 
supported the transfer of practices and experience from Romanian universities to the universities in the 
Republic of Moldova, on issue from university management to teaching approaches and techniques, 
evaluation, to curriculum development (Toderas, 2012). In 2000, the European Commission launched 
its TEMPUS Program for Moldova in 2000, which supported the alignment of the Moldovan HE system 
with the Bologna Process. In preparation for Moldova joining the Bologna Process, between 2002-2005, 
a large number of conferences, study visits and internships were organized at HEIs in Romania, to pro-
mote institutional quality assurance systems and institutional governance (Toderas, 2012). Simultane-
ously, however, the communist government discontinued efforts promoting per-capita financing in favor 
of state-determined orders for study places and set out to re-centralize the HE system. A prominent 
example was the area of quality assurance.  
The CNEAA had started to conduct its first accreditations when in 2001 the communist party came into 
power and the new minister Gheorghe Sima abolished it as of August 2002. The former head of CNEAA 
relates this to their independent stance:  
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“We began to critically evaluate their work [..], we criticized the ministry in that it did not fulfill 
certain [of its] tasks. Well, they did not like this, they wanted the council [CNEAA] to be subor-
dinated to them, as a unit of the ministry. And that the minister could give it orders “do this or 
do that”. This did not happen, and in principle, because of it, they completely transformed us. 
Not one [of the staff of CNEAA] was kept on the new team [at the ministry]” (Interview MD No. 
12, 2016) 
All of its functions were transferred to the Directorate of Higher Education Accreditation (Direcţia 
Acreditarea Învăţămînt Superior) within the Ministry of Education. Accreditation decisions were taken 
by the Colegiul ministerului educaţiei, the governing body of the MoE. The right to establish, reorganize 
or close HEIs was even transferred from the Ministry of Education to the presidential administration 
itself. This decision was taken in spite of explicit disagreement by most Moldovan HEIs, the Rectors' 
Council, and international experts. The reasons for this decision are difficult to clearly delineate. Most 
respondents identify the minister as the sole actor behind this decision and perceived it as arbitrary and 
rash (Interview MD No. 10, 2016; Interview MD No. 6, 2016).  
 “Strictly speaking, the decision to close this body was arbitrary and politically motivated. Nobody 
clearly said why but literally overnight, they decided to close it.” (Interview MD No. 10, 2016)  
Most observers as well as the then-director of CNEAA, Valentin Scalnîi, attribute it to the view of the 
new Minister of Education, Ilie Vancea, that the Ministry of Education should have all areas of the 
higher education system under its direct control (Interview MD No. 12, 2016). When CNEAA was 
abolished, the normative basis and criteria it had established for accreditation of study programs and 
HEIs, which it had established was not annulled but remained in place after 2002 (Interview MD No. 
10, 2016). The relative independence that CNEAA had been able to maintain, however, ended with its 
integration into the Ministry. As one former high-ranking ministry official remembers:  
 “There were cases […] when the accreditation commission took the decision to not grant ac-
creditation to an HEI and it was all clear within the ministry, there were reports and docu-
ments with the decision, the college of the minister of education took the decision to grant the 
accreditation. There were a number of such cases” (Interview MD No. 10, 2016)  
The Directorate of Higher Education Accreditation conducted evaluations and accreditations from 2002 
until 2008, bringing a degree of order back into the higher education system. During this time, a number 
of private HEIs were closed down or voluntarily ceased operations due to stricter accreditation require-
ments55. All public HEIs retained their accreditation. As one former member of the department for ac-
creditation recalls:  
                                                          
55 For example, the amendment of 2003 to the law of education (art. 36) stated that private HEIs need to have a 
base capital of 1 million MDL. In 2003 this was quite exorbitant (Toderas, 2012)  
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“[Moldova] had just undergone the Bologna Reforms. This is why the agency did a great job in 
ensuring the quality of HE. […] As you know, before in our country like in all countries [of the 
former Soviet Union] there had been a surge of private universities and order left much to be 
desired. Some universities even were afraid of accreditation and closed by themselves. This is 
why I believe there was a large effect on higher education “ (Interview MD No. 11, 2016) 
8.2.4 Creation of dysfunctional public structures (2006-2009) 
In 2003 Moldova began to prepare to join the Bologna Process, which officially took place in 2005. This 
required changes to a number of laws, structural reforms in higher education, a new nomenclature of 
study programs and a number of other changes, among them an orientation of the quality assurance 
system at the European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance (ESG). As one former ministry 
official remembers: 
“I the context of the Bologna Process we studied the experience of other countries and it was clear 
that within the framework of the MoE it is not good to have such a structure. […] This is why they 
closed it within the Ministry because it did not correspond with the tendencies in Europe. It was 
clear that we needed to create another structure. […] this was an idea from within the Ministry. 
But, unfortunately, they closed one but did not establish the other” (Interview MD No. 10, 2016) 
In 2006, trying to adapt to the ESG and responding to a certain pressure from the Council of Europe and 
the European Commission, to separate the MoE from evaluation, authorization and accreditation of 
HEIs, the Moldovan government closed the department for quality assurance within the MoE and trans-
ferred its responsibilities to a newly created Agency for Assessment and Evaluation (Agenţia de Eval-
uare şi Examinare - AEE)56, a public institution under the remit of the MoE57. A national commission 
for Evaluation and Accreditation (Comisia Naţională de Evaluare şi Acreditare) (made up in their ma-
jority of members of the MoE) was to take decisions based on the recommendations of AEE. The agency 
was initially designed to take care of quality assurance, evaluation and accreditation of all levels of 
education. While already charged with a very wide range of responsibilities, the agency was burdened 
with additional tasks for which it was ill-prepared, such as the organization and administration of exam-
inations in secondary education, or the organization of science Olympiads and national and international 
competitions. As a consequence, the communist government had difficulties finding a director for this 
new agency who was knowledgeable in both secondary and tertiary education, willing and capable to 
run the agency, as well as politically opportune. In the end, the agency only occupied itself with non-
tertiary education (Interview MD No. 6, 2016)58. It did, however, finalize the roll-out of the centralized 
                                                          
56 Hotărîrea Nr.1469 
57 The Agenţia de Asigurare a Calităţii was reorganized by Government Decision GD 72 from 10.03.2015 into a 
“National Agency for Curriculum and Assessment”, an administrative authority subordinated to Ministry of Edu-
cation.  
58 The agency continued to work on examinations and curriculum in secondary education until 2014 when it was 
renamed into Agenţia Naţională pentru Curriculum şi Evaluare 
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bacalaureat exam at all lyceums in Moldova, which, in 2006, became a mandatory exam for all lyceum 
graduates. By 2008 it had become obvious to the Communist party that they would lose the next elec-
tions and they would lose their influence in the Ministry of Education. Among other decrees, in Novem-
ber 2008, the Government issued a decree creating the Quality Assurance Agency (Agenţie de Asig-
urare a Calităţii - AAC) and approved a set of new regulations. The objective was to create a transparent, 
integrated quality assurance system for both secondary and tertiary education. Possibly due to the lack 
of time for its elaboration, instead of clarity, the concept for the new agency created even more confusion 
and uncertainty among its stakeholders. The QA processes foreseen for higher education and those for 
primary, secondary and upper secondary education were not clearly differentiated. Toderaş (2012b) 
claims that in addition to these design flaws some structures and departments were created not to best 
serve the foreseen processes, but to guarantee the influence of certain individuals and their special in-
terests within the future structures.  
At the same time, in 2008, shortly before the new elections, a new code of education was proposed by 
the communist government. This code, however, had been so full of contradictions that it was never 
passed by parliament (Interview MD No. 6, 2016). When the parliament majorities changed and the 
Alliance for European Integration led by Liberal Party took control of the ministry, the Department of 
Accreditation within the Ministry had been closed, but the new agency had not been founded. This left 
the higher education system without a functioning quality assurance body at all59 (Toderaş, 2012b).  
8.2.5 The long struggle for a new system of governance (2009-2015) 
By 2009, the establishment of an independent quality assurance agency based on a normative-driven, 
pluralist and representative peer system had been attempted twice and had failed to materialize. The 
situation was complicated. Political instability had so far obstructed the implementation of several re-
forms and resulted in a specific mixing of “traditional” Soviet hierarchical thinking in governing HE 
with new educational principles and institutions. The inherent contradictions of this confluence were 
clearly visible in the establishment of a quality assurance framework for HE: On the one hand, the 
ascension of Moldova to the European Higher Education Area had created a situation of “coercive iso-
morphism” insofar as the European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance (ESG)60 provided 
a strong model as to what kind of quality assurance system would have be developed in order to become 
part of the European Higher Education Area (Toderaş, 2012b). On the other hand, political considera-
tions, vested interests of the academic oligarchy, corruption in the HE system and the economic and 
financial difficulties of HEIs as well as of those working within them created powerful forces of inertia 
and resistance to change (Ciurea, Berbeca, Lipcean, & Gurin, 2012). As a result of this, Toderaş (2012a, 
                                                          
59 Among other things, the agency was not truly independent as its decisions needed to be confirmed by the MoE, 
the nomination of key staff was done by the Ministry and the consequences of the outcomes of its evaluations were 
very limited (Ciurea et al., 2012).  
60 http://www.enqa.eu/index.php/home/esg/  
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p. 4) noted that the higher education system in Moldova was “drifting in the attempt to identify and 
adopt a style of governance, according to current models of Western systems. [but], still remain[ed] 
dominated by institutional arrangements established in the post-war period and marginally modified 
during subsequent decades. The general lack of confidence in decentral structures among policymakers, 
a strong reliance of the political elite on authoritarian relational systems, and the interference of other 
authorities and special interests further created conditions in which strong and independent institutions 
of quality assurance had had difficulties to emerge (Toderaş, 2012b, p. 254).  
Without any legal procedure in place, study programs which were established after 2008 could not un-
dergo the mandatory periodic evaluations and accreditations and were therefore operating in a state of 
semi-illegality (Ciurea et al., 2012)61. Aside from the legal limbo HEIs found themselves in, university 
graduates sometimes experienced that their study programs were not recognized internationally due to 
their missing accreditation, a particular problem for many Moldovan students who wanted to transfer to 
Romania or Russia, where their degrees were only recognized if their university was accredited (Inter-
view MD No. 8, 2016). The growing internationalization of some Moldovan universities62, the wish for 
more academic partnerships (such as though Erasmus+) and academic mobility were further important 
reasons for universities to want to be officially accredited (Reinhardt, 2011).  
Both universities and government were frustrated by the state of affairs. As shown by results published 
by Toderas (2012b), by 2011, the vast majority of decision makers in the higher education system63 felt 
the urgency to set up a coherent and independent system of quality assurance. It was widely felt that 
quality assurance in Moldova was not functional (Reinhardt, 2011): On the one hand, quality manage-
ment departments existed within Moldovan HEIs. There were quality management units at the university 
and at the faculty levels, and vice rectors in charge of quality management. These positions had been 
mandated by a ministerial order inspired by recommendations of the European Standards and Guidelines 
for quality assurance (ESG). These positions were funded directly by the ministry of education yet they 
remained relatively formalistic as those who held them were often not trained in quality assurance, were 
lacking in technical equipment, and their activities were often conducted with little interaction between 
the quality units and academic staff64 (Reinhardt, 2011). HEIs who had experienced the process of eval-
uation and accreditation by the MoE between 2001 and 2008 regarded it as intransparent and had a rather 
low level of trust in the fairness and objectivity of procedure (Ciurea et al., 2012). The Ministry had the 
authority to set the level of financing to HEIs, the decision to grant or refuse accreditation to a particular 
                                                          
61 While some ministers (Şavga and Bujor) pledged to create the agency, their short terms in office (less than 1 
year each) prevented any success (Ciurea et al. (2012)). 
62 such as the high number of international students for instance at the Medical University 
63 Toderas (2012) surveyed Rectors (9), Vice-Rectors (18), Deans (38), Vice-Deans (10), Heads of Department 
(145), Representatives of the MoE (11) as well as other experts on educational policy and (19) 
64 A notable exception was the Technical University which had elaborated guidelines on self-evaluation which 
were applied in the review of all its study programs at BA and MA level.  
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HEI, or to authorize or refuse new programs of study. The lack of a coherent QA system and a lack of 
clear criteria for the Ministry’s decisions, which were felt by some to depend on political considerations 
rather than performance, were conducive to the production of voluminous reports, which, however, in 
reality did not have real impact on HEI strategies (Ciurea et al., 2012). In short, the system had been 
fostering a culture of compliance, rather than one of quality (Toderaş, 2012b).  
At the same time, however, integration into the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) remained a 
priority of the government and having a functional QA system at institutional and country-level was 
seen as crucial not only for achieving this goal65. After the communist party lost their parliament major-
ity to the Alliance for European Integration led by the Liberal Party in 2009, and the code of education, 
which had been proposed by the Communist government was scrapped, work began to draft a new 
version of the code. Especially the universities had long called for a revision of the 1995 code on edu-
cation, which had been amended multiple times and did not reflect the Post-Bologna realities while 
having accumulated several contradictions. The Moldovan Rectors’ Council had already in 2008 pre-
sented to the Ministry of Education and Youth a systematic analysis of the need for revision and con-
solidation of the multiple legal provisions in force and their alignment with the demands of the Bologna 
Process.  
The Ministry of Education was determined to reintroduce an agency for quality assurance and accredi-
tation and the new Minister of Education, Leonid Bujor, and his team set out to address a number of 
other issues as well. The Rectors’ Council, the Academy of Science and other interest groups in parlia-
ment would participate in a debate which took almost four years to conclude. What further complicated 
reaching a consensus were the frequent changes in ministers. With Leonid Bujor, Mihail Şleahtiţchi, 
and Maia Sandu, there were three different ministers of education between 2009 and 2012. The first 
draft was published for debate in early 2010. Several times, a new version of the Code of Education was 
worked out by the Council of Rectors and the MoE, only to be sent to parliament to be refused or 
changed. An agreement in parliament could only be reached on the third variant of the Code of education 
which finally passed in 2014.  
8.2.5.1 Autonomy, governance, and a viable HE system: the EUniAM and ATHENA projects 
The recommendations made by the Council of Rectors on the 2010 versions represented a radical re-
structuring of the current governance arrangements in higher education calling for a decentralization of 
control of the educational system, university autonomy in academic, organizational, financial areas, a 
new funding formula for differentiated funding according to educational institutions performance, and 
                                                          
65 The consolidated education development strategy 2011-2015 and the "Education Strategy 2020" highlighted the 
objective to establish a functioning National Agency for Quality Assurance in Vocational Education. The Strategy 
of European Integration of the Republic of Moldova and of the EU-Moldova Action Plan, which stipulated the 
preparation of Moldova’s integration into the European Research Area and the Community R&D Framework Pro-
grams such as FP-7 also called for re-establishing a quality assurance system.  
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a monitoring of the overall efficiency of the educational system. Two TEMPUS projects supported a 
comparative analysis of the status quo and the development of recommendations.  
The TEMPUS ATHENA project “Fostering Sustainable and Autonomous Higher Education Systems in 
the Eastern Neighboring Area”66 was a multi-country structural measure project with Moldova, Ukraine 
and Armenia as beneficiary countries which ran between mid Oct. 2012 – mid Oct. 2015. Project coor-
dinator was the European University Association. Within the project, the focus lay on university auton-
omy and funding, study visits to European countries and policy development and regional benchmark-
ing. The project resulted in a rating of university autonomy, analogous to the EUA University Autonomy 
benchmarking project67 in EU countries.  
The TEMPUS project „Enhancing University Autonomy in Moldova” (EuniAM)68 ran from 2012-2016 
and was a structural measure aimed at enhancing the university autonomy in the Republic of Moldova 
by proposing legislative changes to the higher education legal framework. On 17.02.2011, the Rectors’ 
Council and the TEMPUS Office in Moldova organized a workshop on "University Governance: mod-
ern approaches in the context of EU experience” involving John Reilly, a UK Bologna Expert and former 
Director of Academic Administration at the University of Kent (Amariei, 2013). Out of this meeting, a 
project took shape which was in part the initiative of new minister of education, Maia Sandu, to reor-
ganize the governance structures of the Moldovan HE system, and in part on the initiative of Larisa 
Bugaian, vice-rector of the Technical University of Moldova, and was promoted by the Rectors’ Council 
of Moldova.  
The goal was to study and compare different good practices in Europe in order to inform policy-making 
in Moldova. The cases were selected from small countries which ranked high on different aspects of 
university autonomy on the corresponding EUA ranking69. The existing Moldovan system of higher 
education was analyzed with a view to university autonomy, the selected good practices were studied 
and a benchmarking on organizational, financial, personnel, and academic autonomy was conducted. 
The stated goal of the project was to create a more effective, more efficient, more productive, and more 
quality driven higher education system, ending sub-critical subject duplications and creating institutions 
of the necessary size and resource base for good governance and management.  
Through the participation of eight Moldovan universities, the Moldovan rectors’ council, the MoE and 
the Ministry of Finance, the project involved a large number of decision-makers and led to an increased 
awareness of the need for reform and a growing consensus on the type of necessary reforms.  
The recommendations of the project were quite far-reaching and encompassed virtually the entire archi-
tecture of the Moldovan HE landscape (EUniAM, 2015). When the 2014 draft for the new code of 
                                                          
66 http://www.athena-tempus.eu/  
67 http://www.university-autonomy.eu/  
68 530740-TEMPUS-1-2012-1-DKTEMPUS-SMGR http://www.euniam.aau.dk/  
69 http://www.university-autonomy.eu/  
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education was available, an assessment was prepared and recommendations were made (Reilly, 2015). 
Among other things, the project proposed to reorganize the Moldovan HE sector and merge HEIs from 
31 into 7, merging the research institutes of the Academy of Science with the universities, creating new 
funding mechanisms and bodies for research and teaching & learning, and creating new governance 
arrangements between the government and universities as well as within universities. Regarding the 
latter, they recommended the establishment of university boards as governing bodies overseeing the 
university management’ activities and finances. It also recommended a term limit for university rectors, 
and suggested clear role descriptions, performance criteria, and reporting obligations.  
A reduction in the number of HEIs, while being regarded as necessary by many stakeholders, was never 
taken into closer consideration. Other proposals such as the ones concerning financial autonomy and 
university charters did not meet strong resistance and were taken into account in the final 2014 new law 
on education. Yet others proved strongly contagious and caused a long and protracted fight between the 
MoE, the Academy of Science and university rectors. These issues were the establishment of Strategic 
Development Councils, the role of university research and the establishment of a new quality assurance 
agency.  
8.2.5.2 The struggle on the establishment of Strategic Development Councils  
One of the key recommendations put forward by the EUniAM project Minister of Education Maia Sandu 
had been the establishment of so-called Strategic Development Councils as governing boards and setting 
a fixed term limit for university rectors. In the first draft proposals, the Councils were designed as gov-
erning boards having, among other responsibilities, the function of electing rectors, developing policy 
and demanding accountability.  
While most Rectors agreed in principle to the differentiation of governance and management and to the 
idea of governing boards, there were at the same time strong objections to the concrete proposals. Sev-
eral interviewees who had participated in the discussions of the Rectors’ Council explained this re-
sistance with fear of political influence to the detriment of the universities in question. They related this 
fear to the Soviet and post-Soviet experiences. In the USSR, rectors always needed to be high-ranking 
members of the Communist party and could be removed at a stroke of a pen based on ideological or 
opportunistic considerations. After independence, political influence had often been used for rent-seek-
ing behaviors, such as “privatizing” certain university properties. Some of the participating rectors ar-
gued that in powerful governing boards, MoE and MoF delegates could be used as agents of political 
parties. They argued that party interests (such as the potential of universities to pressure students to vote 
for a certain party) rather than academic merit or strategy might becoming the determining factor for 
university policy and the election of rectors (Interview MD No. 9, 2016). Other argued that the small 
size of the country would make it impossible for such advisory boards to be independent, because their 
members would in many cases be from other Moldovan HEIs (Interview MD No. 3, 2016).  
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On the other hand, the impression of some actors was that these reservations were but a pretense for 
rectors to justify keeping their authority over finances and strategy and not becoming accountable to a 
powerful new body within the university. As one respondent states:  
 “The rectors insisted that [everything] should remain as before: The rector as the executive 
body but also president of the senate. For me, how the prime minister could be prime minister 
and also at the same time the president of the parliament sounds stupid. They insisted to be like 
this” (Interview MD No. 2, 2016) 
In the end, the rectors largely prevailed and a compromise was reached: Strategic development councils 
were included into the 2014 code of education (art. 104) and did include external stakeholder represent-
atives. Boards were to coordinate the development of the Strategic and Institutional Development Plans, 
monitor and evaluate the efficiency of using the financial resources, approve enrollment numbers and 
the level of tuition fees, take decisions regarding the development and consolidation of the institution’s 
facilities, the launch and closure of the study programs, the methodology for remuneration and motiva-
tion of personnel, entrepreneurship activities, public-private partnerships, cooperation with the busi-
nesses, as well as organize and carry out the election for rector’s vacancy (Code of Education, 2014). 
Their rights address a lot of crucial areas of institutional management and governance. They are, how-
ever, formulated sufficiently vaguely to allow for very different interpretations. The degree to which 
Strategic Development Councils will occupy a strong or weak role in institutional governance thus likely 
will depend on the institution, the rector and the individual board members (Interview MD No. 13, 
2017). While in some HEIs, boards are becoming powerful oversight bodies, in others they became 
purely advisory bodies, while the senate – presided by the rector – remained the main decision-taking 
organ. As one respondent states: 
In the new code it is the same as it was before. […] At the moment I think that at my university 
this advisory council is just a formality. And the president of the council is just a formality” 
(Interview MD No. 2, 2016) 
Likewise, a term-limit for rectors was indeed introduced in the new code, but a transition period of 10 
years was granted to acting rectors, rendering this change inconsequential at least in the short term.  
8.2.5.3 The role of university research and doctoral training  
The second large battle-ground was university research and whether universities should be engaged in 
doctoral training. The introduction of doctoral education as the third cycle of university studies is was 
introduced to the Bologna Process in Berlin in 2003 (European Ministers Responsible for Higher Edu-
cation, 2003). Because of the division of education and research which had been maintained in Moldova, 
this topic was hotly debated. For the new code of education, CNAA had studied different international 
experiences with doctoral schools. The Moldovan Academy of Science was strongly opposed to granting 
the universities the right to issue doctoral degrees and providing funding for PhD students, which was 
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perceived as an attack on its position in the national research and innovation system. At the end, doctoral 
schools were indeed introduced. A proposal to found an impartial council for research funding met 
strong resistance from ASM (Interview MD No. 6, 2016) and was postponed to the discussion on the 
national code of research.  
8.2.5.4 Regulating access to higher education 
By 2006, the centralized bacalaureat exam had become compulsory for all lyceum graduates. Until 
2011, admission to higher education had still been possible for graduates from general secondary schools 
and for holders of Certificate of studies (Atestat). In 2011, by ministerial order70 the bacalaureat Di-
ploma became the exclusive entry requirement for higher education. This was widely seen as signifi-
cantly raising the quality of students but restricted contributed to the already problematic shortage of 
students and thus funding for HEIs.  
8.2.5.5 The establishment of a new quality assurance agency 
The TEMPUS project “Development of Quality Assurance in Higher Education in Moldova” 
(QUAEM)71 (2012-2016) was developed in the fall of 2011 jointly by the University of Leipzig, the 
German higher education consultancy firm CHE Consult72 and a large number of Moldovan and Euro-
pean partners. The goal was to bring together all Moldovan stakeholders from Ministries, a range of 
strong universities with different disciplinary and geographic profiles, as well as stakeholder organiza-
tions representing students and universities. The project’s objective was to support the Moldovan higher 
education system to make quality assurance functional. As quality assurance systems are highly depend-
ent on the institutional context, traditions and existing relationships between the actors in the system, 
any attempt to transplant a “best practice” from one country without adapting it to the local context 
would be doomed to fail. The project design tried to take great care to support the Moldovan partners in 
developing their own system that might be useful and functional in the Moldovan institutional context. 
Therefore, from its inception, the project addressed all stakeholders involved in quality assurance in the 
Republic of Moldova: HEI rectors and vice rectors in charge with QA, members of QM structures at the 
Moldovan HEIs, academic staff and students, as well as Ministry of Education staff (to be) involved in 
the evaluation and accreditation processes of the new QA agency ANACIP. To support the development 
of quality assurance in the country, the project conducted activities on several levels, including internal 
quality management, evaluation, accreditation, student engagement and the link between QA and stra-
tegic management.  
                                                          
70 Ministerial Order nr. 891 of 24.12.2009 
71 530537-TEMPUS-1-2012-1-DETEMPUS-SMGR 
72 www.che-consult.de/. Within the QUAEM project, the author was responsible for quality assurance and moni-
toring of the project results 
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Some technical equipment was supplied to QA offices of project universities, QA staff were invited to 
study different approaches to internal quality management from Germany, Catalonia, Romania, Bosnia, 
and Denmark as well as different approaches to external evaluation and accreditation. The project acted 
as a laboratory for developing and testing exercises in self-evaluation, peer review, and accreditation. 
The partner universities conducted self-evaluations reflecting on their strengths, weaknesses and devel-
opment strategies and visited each other in peer review exercises. Conducting a peer review exercise in 
a supportive frame of mind in the context of accreditation was new to the Moldovan HE system and the 
participating universities stated that the exercise had been most insightful for them. Building on this 
experience, the six project universities each prepared self-evaluation reports for three study programs (a 
total of 18) from which the four strongest were selected to undergo international accreditation by the 
German accreditation agency AQAS. The criteria for this accreditation had been jointly developed by 
the project partners based on the European Standards and Guidelines for quality assurance – ESG 
(ENQA, 2005b). In addition, the Ministry of Education made funds available for the international ac-
creditation of 12 more study programs. For the first time for many universities, they were asked to 
conduct self-evaluations of their study programs in preparation for accreditation. In this way, the six 
project universities gained first-hand experience in a new type of accreditation and a possible model 
emerged for the procedures of the future Moldovan quality assurance agency ANACIP. The universities 
that did undergo the accreditation procedures reported it to be a highly valuable learning experience 
which not only gave them the opportunity to self-reflect but also get a constructive outside perspective 
on their activities. Last but not least, a special focus was put on the role of students in quality assurance. 
For one, the local and national students’ unions were involved in all project activities and trainings. In 
addition, 30 students participated in a 1-week-long workshop by students of the European Students Un-
ion (ESU). A group of selected students had a chance to visit the European Students’ Union in Brussels 
and engage with representatives from the Belgian national students’ unions. Finally, a sustainability 
action plan for student involvement in Moldova was developed with the project partners, ANACIP, and 
the MoE.  
In summary, the work done within the QUAEM project tried to address many of the challenges that 
have until now held back the development of an improvement-oriented quality culture in the Moldovan 
higher education system. By the end of the project, a sizable number of academics and students had 
participated in trainings and discussions on quality assurance. Project participants underscored how val-
uable the project was for them and their understanding of quality assurance for their own study pro-
grams, and the future system of accreditation in Moldova. A significant number of students had been 
trained who were willing to be engaged in quality assurance activities. Through common workshops, 
conferences, training, seminars, and participant observation, the project has helped to form a community 
of trained university teachers, administrators and students as well as key individuals at the Ministry of 
Education and the newly created Quality Assurance Agency ANACIP. The project has helped to foster 
links between Moldovan experts and academics and those of universities and quality assurance agencies 
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in other European countries. At the end of the project it has gained a large visibility among the higher 
education community in Moldova. Maybe even more importantly, when ANACIP was finally founded 
in 2015, all of its staff and the majority of its governing council consisted of persons who had been 
trained within the project. The accreditation methodology and criteria that had been developed within 
the project provided ANACIP with a model for its own methodology, as did a project with the Romanian 
Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ARACIS), which was invited to conduct the ac-
creditations of law programs in the framework of a justice reform project in 2013/2014, and a project 
with the Estonian Quality Assurance agency EKKA, which won a tender from the Fund for Develop-
ment Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia to support the development of ANACIP. 
Both of these activities contributed to the work of the new Moldovan quality assurance agency.  
While the project was widely lauded as a great success, the establishment of a new quality assurance 
agency was a fraught journey. In 2013, the education law was amended to specify that the function of 
evaluation, authorization and accreditation should be independent of the Ministry of Education73. The 
new Moldovan quality assurance agency ANACIP was officially founded in October 201374 and took 
up its operation in 2014/2015 in the form of an interim council which was to establish the structures, 
procedures and evaluation criteria. There, however, the first rifts appeared between the agency-to-be 
and the Ministry of education. As one former member of the interim council recounts an episode after 
she was elected to the interim council: 
“After her [Minister Maia Sandu] speech, I expected that she would congratulate us that we were 
selected and that she would wish us all the best but the conversation was a bit difficult, she was all 
on the high horse and she said that she founded this agency and if it does not work [as she wants it 
to] she would also close it again. “ (Interview MD No. 10, 2016) 
When the interim council refused the structure that the Minister wanted the agency to assume and she 
initially refused to pay them. Only in 2015, after she had left, did the next minister agree that the former 
members of the interim board would be reimbursed as they had been promised. In early 2015, the new 
agency had to accreditate the doctoral schools for which it needed to quickly work out and apply a 
methodology.  
As of May 2016, the political situation is far from stable. In 2014, a scandal of unprecedented propor-
tions even for the notoriously corrupt elites in Moldova had shaken the macro-political context as it was 
discovered that $1 billion had disappeared from three Moldovan banks. On November 27, the Moldovan 
Government, headed by Prime Minister Iurie Leanca, secretly decided to bail out the three banks with 
$870 million in emergency loans, which caused a deficit in Moldovan public finances equivalent to an 
eighth of the country's GDP (BBC News, 2015). In response, the EU, International Monetary Fund and 
                                                          
73 see Law 239 of 10/18/13, MO297-303 / 12.20.13 art.807 
74 Law nr.239 from 18.10.2013 on the modification of the law of education nr. 547-XIII of July 21, 1995.  
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World Bank froze their financial assistance to Moldova. Harsh cuts in public budgets and a steep deval-
uation of the Moldovan Lei followed. Despite the political instability and street protests that went on for 
over a year, nobody was indicted for the theft and the pro-European coalition managed to barely stay in 
power.  
The new agency was still attempting to establish itself. It had taken roughly one year to find office space 
und infrastructure, hire staff and develop criteria and procedures for accreditation. Staff had been hired, 
but the low salaries typical of public service in Moldova and the uncertain situation had led several staff 
members to resign again. The new quality assurance agency has not yet begun to carry out accreditations 
of study programs and HEIs. Many observers see ANACIPs future in a doubtful light. A former member 
of the Ministry of Education makes note of this situation: 
“Our [QA] agency is modeled according to the Romanian agency. […]I believe that that this is 
not very good because the conditions of its establishment were different, […] they founded it in 
such a format with a government support that was completely different. Here they founded it but 
the support…ask them yourself what their salary is. […] How can you demand from these people 
objectivity? […] They selected good people and they are all responsible and they are all trying. 
But under our conditions, you need to somehow motivate people. Lower salaries as theirs [at 
the agency] don’t exist! These salaries are just not serious.” (Interview MD No. 10, 2016) 
Others senior officials in the Ministry of Education recognize this situation but worry about the future 
of the agency: 
“I got him [the president of ANACIP] the money. We need[ed] to take care of that. First, I found 
him two rooms to work. I understand that he was not happy. But he himself, [he should] go find 
[himself] space! Until he got to where he is now, another year has passed! […] we will soon 
have presidential elections and we don’t know who will come, what they will support, who will 
support. If in a few months nothings happens, they will just smother him. […] Just as we founded 
the agency, we could close it by this evening” (Interview MD No. 6, 2016) 
At the same time, interests opposed to the functioning of the new QAA are working to change the insti-
tutional framework yet again: 
“The Academy of Science is putting pressure on the Ministry to unify ANACIP with CNAA and 
to create some form of super-body where the functionaries and structures of CNAA will be the 
major force, because, you know, they are against ANACIP. [… ]I think they will not win this 
fight, it is very, very complicated because of ASM. They are a big body, they want to keep their 
competence as a ministry of science. They want to pay, distribute and evaluate research, and of 
course, when the same body is paying, distributing and evaluating, everything just remains in-
side of ASM, for universities there is practically nothing” (Interview MD No. 3, 2016) 
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Others are doubtful of the Agency’s independence. Indeed, according to the 2014 code of agency, the 
MoE and the government are the final decision-making organs for all decisions of ANACIP. Yet, in the 
context of Moldova’s weak institutions, both personal ability and institutional independence are im-
portant to resist pressure on decision-making.  
 “I think to be independent and to take very hard decisions is important at the moment in Mol-
dova. [But] the agency is not really independent. Still today the agency is dependent on the 
MoE. Because of the budget, because of the office and many, many other things. They are not 
independent to pay their own bills. […] They depend on the Ministry of Education. The influ-
ence, the internal influence and the political pressure will be used during the accreditation pro-
cess which will start soon. At the moment we are in the mist between needs and realities.” (In-
terview MD No. 2, 2016) 
While the 2014 new law of education did bring about significant changes, the analysis of the code done 
within the framework of the EUniAM project (Reilly, 2015) highlights that there remain many areas in 
which the State keeps the final control over universities. These include a regulation of personnel cate-
gories, categories, status, titles, work load, and even types of tasks that different university staff carry 
out. The Ministry and government in charge of developing educational standards and – while leaving 
the development of accreditation criteria to ANACIP – retains the power veto them if need be. Article 
102 defines management bodies which must be established by HEIs and article 100 even foresees for 
the ministry to develop framework regulation on student internships. While financial autonomy was 
granted, EUniAM recommendations for changing the funding formula and optimizing the number of 
HEI were not (as of 2015) taken into account.  
8.3 The governance model of the Moldovan HE system by 2015 
Especially the Bologna Process has had a considerable impact on the higher education system in Mol-
dova and European-funded projects have influenced the development of its governance model. During 
the 2010s, the pace of change has accelerated. The final introduction of compulsory centralized testing 
and the closing of loopholes for non-eligible students effectively drained a corruption-prone and low-
quality sector of the HE system of its income. Curricular autonomy within the state educational stand-
ards did grow. In 2015, an independent QAA was created and university autonomy was expanded.  
Out of all three country cases, the governance of the Moldovan higher education system has arguably 
changed the least. The primary “mental model” regarding governance has remained the hierarchical 
chain of command. Governance and management is typically not separated: The Ministry of Education 
establishes legislation, and at the same time monitors and enforces it. In legislation as recent as the 2014 
code of education, the MoE and even the Government preserve is the final decision-making organ for 
all major decisions, including those of the new quality assurance agency ANACIP. Within the ministry, 
the minister of education is the unquestionable final authority on all matters and has the power and 
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legitimacy to influence any decision within the ministry. The principle of hierarchy is enshrined in leg-
islation in the fact that the MoE and the government remain the final instances to approve (or, therefore, 
to reject) any decisions of subordinate bodies. The government has also, until now kept the financing of 
public HEIs (via budget places) under its discretion. The effect of this is that the particular preferences 
of individual ministers of education are perceived as relevant and individuals as the decisive actors and 
true centers of power, much more than formal bodies and structures. On the side of the Ministry of 
Education, there is the expectation that they should steer the HE system and among HEIs many expect 
the ministry to provide the direction of development. In internal governance of HEIs, the principle of 
hierarchy is perpetuated in that rectors are simultaneously the head of the university administration, 
control university finances and strategy and are, at the same time, the head of the university senate. The 
powers of the newly stakeholder governance “strategic advisory boards” is unclearly defined and varies 
greatly between HEIs.  
In terms of funding higher education, the governance approach has continued virtually unchanged since 
Soviet times by direct ministry allocation of state-funded study places based on a government forecast 
of the number of required specialists. The political gridlock as made a reform so far impossible and the 
underfunded Moldovan HE system continued to suffer from its fragmented structure. During a time of 
a declining population, in the academic year 2015/2016 Moldova maintained 32 HEIs for a declining 
population of about 3,380,00075. The large number of HEIs incurs expenses for buildings, administrative 
and teaching staff and the administration of the system that strain the capacities of a poor country such 
as Moldova. Public funding gets distributed into too many small institutions without the critical mass to 
excel in either teaching or research. Citing the above-mentioned reasons, in 2013, the EUniAM recom-
mended that Moldovan universities be merged into just 6 or 7 universities. This proposal was quickly 
off the table as it was deemed politically impossible to implement, even though in principle most actors 
agree with the analysis. The strong voice of particular interests in the political sphere may also be re-
sponsible for the lack of focused use of limited resources in other areas. A similar situation presents 
itself in regard to distributing funding for doctoral schools at universities, which had been made possible 
by the 2014 code of education. Universities could apply to be granted government funding in 2015/2016. 
At the end, 43 out of 45 applications were granted, which presented the problem that the limited funding 
available had to be distributed among a large number of doctoral schools, resulting in a very low number 
of funded places per doctoral school (typically 1-2 PhD students per doctoral school).  
  
                                                          
75 in the areas controlled by the central government, without Transnistria.  
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The following table summarizes aspects of the Moldovan model of governance in 2015: 
Changes in the relationship between HEIs and the state 
State is not very effective at policy-setting and enforcing 
State remains directly engaged in large number of HEI decisions 
State supervising, steering from a distance and ex-post control is not wide-spread; relegation of control visible 
in some areas (QA) 
Quality Assurance Institutional Governance and 
Autonomy 
Financing higher education 
Study programs contents regulated 
by National Qualification Frame-
work and framework plan for study 
programs 
External control of licensing re-
quirements by MoE 
Accreditation of study programs by 
semi-independent QAA 
No national ranking (yet) 
Considerable power of HE leader-
ship since Soviet times 
Election of Rectors by Senate and 
Strategic Development Councils 
(unclear), confirmation by MoE 
Strategic Development Councils 
with unclearly defined powers 
Power of HEI leadership to ap-
point, evaluate, reimburse and dis-
miss academic staff 
Line-item budgets from state fund-
ing; financial autonomy for other 
sources of income 
Allocation of state funding via 
study places as well as number of 
tuition-funded places by govern-
ment decision 
Competition for students to fill 
places 
Income-diversification from tui-
tion-fees and other sources 
Regulation of access to HE 
Centralized testing with Bacalaureat 
Number of fee-paying students regulated  
Table 20: Elements of governance model of Moldovan System of Higher Education by 2015 
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9 Cross-National Comparison of Developments and Discus-
sion of Results 
The study set out to investigate how the governance of higher education systems of post-Soviet States 
has changed since the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 until 2015 in the three States of Russia, 
Moldova, and Kazakhstan. In particular, the research questions were: 
RQ 1. How has the governance of higher education systems changed between 1991 and 2015?  
RQ 2. Is there a convergence towards a “global model” of higher education governance?  
RQ 3. Is there a common model of governance of higher education post-Soviet countries?  
RQ 4. What was the relative influence of national, regional and global factors on the development 
of the governance of higher education? 
Table 21: Research Questions (repeated) 
The construct of “governance of higher education” was studied by analyzing the changes in Educational 
Standards and Quality Assurance, the Regulation of Admission to Higher Education, Institutional Gov-
ernance, Decision-Making and Institutional Autonomy, and the Financing of Higher Education. Beyond 
providing an in-depth account of the developments (RQ1), the study intends to shed light on the question 
whether there is still a common model of governance of higher education post-Soviet countries (RQ3) , 
whether there is a process of convergence towards a “global model” of higher education governance 
(RQ2) and in which way global, regional, and national forces have shaped the paths of development in 
the three post-Soviet countries (RQ4).  
The first section of this chapter will summarize the common and divergent developments and charac-
terize each country case. The second section will analytically compare the resulting arrangement of 
governance instruments and assess the degree of their convergence towards the “global model”. The last 
section will try to explain the developments employing the “glonacal agency heuristic” proposed by 
Marginson and Rhoades (2002) as a structuring device.  
9.1 How has the governance of higher education systems changed between 
1991-2015?76 
9.1.1 Common challenges and similar answers 
HEIs gain in autonomy, rectors gain in Power 
                                                          
76 Parts of the results were published in: Bischof (2018): Effects of the Bologna Process on quality assurance 
regimes in the post-Soviet space: Isomorphism and path dependencies in Moldova, Russia, and Kazakhstan. 
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The Soviet Model of internal governance of HEIs had been characterized by a mixture of strong hierar-
chical control and power in the hands of university leadership, which had bene curbed only by the strong 
centralization and standardization of structures, processes, salaries, and quality assurance by the state. 
Rectors and first vice-rectors (a position always occupied by a representative of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union) had far reaching powers over their institution. When the Soviet Union ceased to 
exist, universities were suddenly operating in a regulatory vacuum which affected internal governance 
in a fundamental way.  
Since the internal power relation otherwise stayed the same, yet HEIs suddenly had much greater free-
dom of action and less state planning to implement, rectors significantly gained in power and influence 
within their HEIs. In both public and private HEIs, the rector was the final authority regarding strategy, 
personnel and financial questions, exerted considerable control over academic (scientific) councils 
which were often (but not always) relegated to formal “rubber stamp” bodies or as advisory bodies to 
the rector. The need to find new sources of funding to make up for the declining state support gave 
outsize influence to those individuals who could successfully do so. While in some case there were 
successful faculties, often, crucial resources were controlled by the rector. The fact that rectors were 
elected by academic councils in Russia, did not fundamentally change this power imbalance, as the 
voting individuals depended on rectors’ goodwill in other areas. Newly founded private HEIs began 
operating in a legal vacuum and established their own internal governance structures, often mirroring 
state HEIs.  
Re-introduction of external quality assurance mechanisms 
In the entire post-Soviet space, the 1990ies were a period of re-establishing state institutions and a basic 
framework of standards and quality assurance for the higher education system. During the early post-
Soviet regulatory vacuum, there were no formal quality assurance procedures. With the introduction of 
private HEIs and the right for all HEIs to charge tuition fees, the number of public and private HEIs 
quickly mushroomed, often to the detriment of their quality.  
In order to assure the basic quality of more autonomous HEIs, all three case countries initially followed 
a similar approach of quality assurance. New versions of the Soviet-era curricular standards were devel-
oped, which defined common contents and structures for study programs of a specific discipline. The 
second common element in the 1990ies was a system of State licensing, attestation, and accreditation 
to control and certify compliance with these standards by HEIs. Under the new system, licensing verified 
whether an HEI had sufficient resources (premises, equipment, information and library resources, or 
teaching staff) to carry out educational activities. Attaining a license meant that HEIs were authorized 
to deliver instruction and could enjoy certain tax benefits. Attestation consisted of verifying that gradu-
ates’ performance corresponded to the State Educational Standards (SES). Lastly, accreditation granted 
the accredited institution the right to award nationally recognized state diplomas and to participate in 
state budget funding and exempted its male students from obligatory military service.  
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The legislative vacuum or practice of ad-hoc ministerial decisions on licensing and accreditation lasted 
for different periods of time in different countries. Russia was the first country to develop a new version 
of state standards and a new system of external quality assurance, since it was able to draw upon a large 
reservoir of specialists from the previous institutions, whereas Kazakhstan and certainly Moldova had 
belonged to the periphery of the Soviet higher education system and thus had to first solve the task of 
creating state institutions.  
While all countries established a peer-based system of external quality assurance, during the 1990ies, 
Russia granted its HEIs the largest degree of independence while Kazakhstan and Moldova pursued a 
much closer control. In Russia, decisions were taken by an Accreditation Board composed of heads of 
HEIs, and representatives of associations of HEIs and sectoral ministries (Chistokhvalov, 2007). The 
quality assurance agency was located in Yoshkar-Ola, 1000km away from Moscow, giving it a far 
greater degree of factual autonomy. In Moldova, in contrast, the first QAA (CNEAA) was composed 
almost exclusively of representatives from ministries and the Academy of Sciences, while decisions on 
accreditation or non-accreditation still required confirmation by the government. In Kazakhstan, the 
Committee for Supervision and Attestation in Education and Science was a direct subordinate part of 
the MoES.  
Introduction of centralized testing and consolidation of higher education system 
After a process of consolidation of their statehood and economic survival, in all three countries, govern-
ments began reasserting themselves as actors in their higher education systems around the turn of the 
millennium. By the end of the 1990ies, all three countries had developed a system of standards and 
external quality assurance. In all three countries, one problem was clearly showing: Since Soviet times, 
HEIs had had the right to select their own students. What had changed, however, was that the govern-
ment no longer regulated the number of students an HEI could accept on a tuition basis, which had led 
to a massive expansion of for-tuition HE and an erosion of entrance requirements and quality standards 
within cash-strapped HEIs.  
During the first half of the 2000ies, Russia, Moldova, and Kazakhstan all conducted state interventions 
to eradicate low-quality HEIs and branches of HEIs. This included state inspections and the withdrawal 
of licenses, restrictions on the operation of branch campuses and the introduction of centralized testing. 
First experiments with a centralized exam had begun as early as 1993 in Moldova but began in earnest 
in Kazakhstan77 with the introduction of the “complex test” and the simultaneous introduction of the 
Kazakh ‘money-follows-students’ system of study grants in 1999. In Russia, the ‘Unified Entry Exam’ 
was rolled out to the whole country between 2001 and 2009. In Moldova, the centralized bacalareat 
exam became compulsory for Lyceums in 2006 although the closing of various loopholes in the system 
                                                          
77 Allegedly following a visit by a Kazakh delegation to the Russian Ministry of Education where the Russian 
plans were discussed.  
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was finalized only in 2014. Kazakhstan took centralized one step further by applying it to university 
students themselves, when, in 2003, it introduced the ‘Comprehensive National Mid-Term Test’ to be 
conducted at all HEIs after the second year of studies on the contents of the compulsory subjects foreseen 
by the state standards. Students who failed the test were not be allowed to continue their studies to the 
third year (World Bank & OECD, 2007).  
Slowly growing operational autonomy  
During the early 1990ies, governments everywhere restricted academic autonomy through state stand-
ards for study programs and personnel autonomy through the introduction of qualification requirements 
and the control of academic titles and degrees, while leaving financial, and organizational autonomy 
relatively high. Since the early 2000s, governments increasingly gave HEIs more academic autonomy 
and reduced the degree of prescriptiveness of state standards. Step by step, governments in all countries 
also widened the operational autonomy of HEIs in terms of setting salaries, employment contracts, 
building administration and internal incentive systems.  
In Kazakhstan, the vehicle for greater autonomy was privatization. In the early 2000ies, a number of 
state HEIs were semi-privatized and transformed into joint-stake companies, thus enjoying the same 
regulatory freedoms and the internal governance of private HEIs, such as board of directors appointing 
and overseeing the rector. Indeed, the State Strategy for Educational Development 2016-2020 foresees 
transforming all state HEIs into not-for profit companies.  
Experiments with stakeholder governance 
Since the mid-2000s, countries began to experiment with the creation of boards of trustees and boards 
of overseers. These were introduced in autonomous HEIs in Russia in 2006, in state HEIs in Kazakhstan 
in 2007 and 2010 and in Moldova in the form of ‘strategic development councils’ in 2013. However, in 
all countries, the boards did not grow into real governing bodies, in part due to legal and cultural con-
tradictions between the complete responsibility of rectors to the ministries of education and a lack of 
formal powers and responsibilities of the boards. In 2016, Kazakhstan began experimenting with in-
volving boards in the nomination of rectors for state HEIs. At the time of writing, however, in all coun-
tries the final decision on the nomination of rectors remained with the government.  
9.1.2 Diverging paths 
Diverging responses to the European model of Quality Assurance 
The 2000ies mark the beginning of the different paths the three countries took in their approach to gov-
erning their HE systems. Among other areas, this becomes visible in the area of quality assurance and 
the alignment to the European Higher Education Area.  The ‘European Model’ of quality assurance, as 
formulated in the European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance (ESG) stresses HEIs’ pri-
mary responsibility for quality and calls on them to develop their own internal quality assurance systems 
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(IQA). External quality assurance (EQA) is to be conducted by independent quality assurance agencies 
on the basis of peer-based external reviews involving internal as well as external stakeholders. 
In 2003, Russia joined the Bologna Process. Moldova and Kazakhstan started their efforts to join around 
the same time. Under the influence of this “European model”, Russia merged attestation and accredita-
tion into a single procedure. The Ministry of Education and Science (MoES) began organizing compe-
titions for the best quality management systems within universities (Forrat, 2012a). A ‘Coordination 
Council on Quality Provision’ was established which issued recommendations on internal quality man-
agement systems (Motova, 2015) and the effectiveness of internal quality management systems became 
one of the indicators for accreditation (Forrat, 2012a). A new generation of educational standards 
granted HEIs greater freedom to define the contents of their own study programs. During the period 
between 2002/2003 and 2009, related to Russia’s ascension to the Bologna Process, proposals within 
the MoES were continuously being discussed that independent accreditation agencies should be certified 
by the state and their accreditation be recognized as equivalent to state accreditation. An incorporated 
‘guild of experts’ received support from the state oversight body for education Rosobrnadzor to conduct 
trainings for reviewers and independent QAAs were given signals that they might be recognized by the 
state replacing state accreditation.  
Just as Russia was beginning to reform its system of quality assurance based on European and interna-
tional models, in Moldova the communist party came into power, and the new minister Gheorghe Sima 
abolished Moldova’s Quality Assurance Agency CNEAA, which had just started to conduct its first 
accreditations. All of its functions were transferred back to the Ministry of Education and the entire staff 
was replaced. Nevertheless, Moldova’s ascension to the Bologna Process did create a situation of “co-
ercive isomorphism” insofar as the ESG provided a strong model of what kind of quality assurance 
system would have to be developed in order to become part of the European Higher Education Area 
(Toderaş, 2012b). This required changes to a number of laws, structural reforms in higher education, a 
new nomenclature of study programs and a number of other changes. Significant resources and support 
were made available by donors (primarily by the European Union) to support policy convergence in 
Moldova. In 2006, trying to adapt to the ESG and responding to a certain pressure from the Council of 
Europe and the European Commission, to separate the MoE from evaluation, authorization and accred-
itation of HEIs, the Moldovan government decided to close the department for quality assurance within 
the MoE and to transfer its responsibilities first to a newly created Agency for Assessment and Evalua-
tion in 2006 and to a new Quality Assurance Agency in 2008. While the first never came to occupy itself 
with higher education, the second never was founded and the country stayed without a procedure for 
accreditation until 2015.  
Kazakhstan had, by 2003, put in place a heavily regulated quality assurance system resting on detailed 
standards and top-down control. At the same time, a reorientation to global and European practices was 
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taking place among the country’s leadership. The State Program of Education Development in the Re-
public of Kazakhstan for 2005-2010 (SPED 2005-2010) outlined an ambitious reform program to adapt 
Kazakhstan’s education system to what were perceived as international best practices78 regarding the 
structure and governance of higher education. The SPED structured the existing instruments of quality 
assurance (licensing, state attestation, the UNT and intermediate state control) and called for the intro-
duction of independent accreditation and internal quality management systems to implement the princi-
ples of the Bologna declaration (Kalanova, S. & Omirbayev, 2009). A National Accreditation Center 
was founded under the MoES which developed a new methodology for accreditation and in 2007, ac-
creditation was introduced to the law on education as a voluntary procedure. The following State Pro-
gram of Education Development (SPED 2011-2020) called for independent accreditation to replace state 
accreditation and attestation by non-commercial, non-government, internationally recognized quality 
assurance agencies. The 2011 law dissolved the National Accreditation Center and created powerful 
incentives for HEIs to undergo independent accreditation (Sagintayeva, A. et al., 2014): HEIs that passed 
institutional and program accreditation in recognized accreditation agencies would be exempt from state 
attestation for the period of accreditation. More significantly, only accredited HEIs would be allowed to 
enroll state-funded students.  
 
New funding models  
A key change in the incentive structure for HEIs in almost all post-Soviet countries, was the introduction 
of dual-track financing in the early 1990ies. This meant that HEIs would receive a share of their income 
from the State as compensation for the costs of educating state-funded students. In addition, they could 
enroll students on a self-funding basis. This allowed countries to maintain a relatively broad access to 
higher education even in the face of shrinking tax revenues and budgets.  
Both Kazakhstan and Russia began using state-funding as a steering instrument in the late 1990ies. In 
order to create an incentive for HEIs to invest in the quality of their higher education offer, Kazakhstan 
switched from pre-established budgets per HEI to a money-follows-students system of study grants in 
1999. This represented possibly one of the strongest market mechanisms in HE funding in the post-
Soviet space, as state-funding was now effectively distributed according to the same criterion as funding 
from tuition fees: Student-choice of where to study. The attractiveness of an HEI to students thus became 
one of the most determining factor for the competitiveness and even survival of Kazakh HEIs79.  
                                                          
78 Following, in essence, the anglocentric OECD line  
79 An exception to this pattern is only Nazarbayev University which receives a substantial share of the overall 
higher education budget and provides scholarships for all of the students it admits. National universities, which 
receive more state-funding per student also have an advantage in this competition, as they enjoy a better reputation 
among students. 
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Russia implemented as similar system in 2002 with the introduction of the money-follows-the-best-
students GIFO system. While a similar, Russian-inspired system was swiftly implemented in Kazakh-
stan, in Russia itself, the model encountered heavy resistance from the strong rectors’ union and regional 
politicians who feared (in most cases correctly) that their universities would lose income as state-funded 
students would increasingly coalesce in the most reputable HEIs. The experiment, which ultimately 
never extended beyond a few regions, was finally abandoned in 2005. Nevertheless, the experience cre-
ated a blueprint for the design of a similar funding model with greater government control in 2013 (see 
below). Plans to introduce a similar system in Moldova find themselves in different government strate-
gies but have not yet materialized.  
The end of the 2000ies clearly marks diverging developments in the governance of higher education in 
the three case countries:  
9.1.3 Two-track state steering system in Russia 
In Russia, the movement towards a governance system more independent of direct government inter-
vention never gained sufficient government support to overcome the resistance within the state bureau-
cracy and parts of the higher education establishment. In 2009, adapting to the ESG ceased to be a 
relevant consideration altogether, as the Russian government re-centralized decision-making and 
strengthened its interventive and steering capabilities through an array of steering instruments. The 
framework which successively emerged since 2004 – and picked up pace significantly after 2012 – was 
guided by the idea that public resources in HE should be concentrated on so-called “pivot points” (tochki 
rosta), a smaller number of high-quality HEIs while the overall number of HEIs should be radically 
reduced. This new system rested on support and incentives through a redistribution of funding on the 
one hand, stricter state monitoring of performance indicators, state inspections, closures and mergers of 
HEIs on the other, flanked bz a redistribution of public funding from the weaker HEIs to the stronger 
ones.  
The first pillar consisted of increased support for leading universities. Since 2005, a series of support 
programs were launched to establish Federal Universities (in 2005/2006), National Research Universi-
ties (in 2008), world-class research universities (“5-100” project80 in 2012) and “flagship universities” 
(in 2016). Participants were chosen in an open competition81 and were allocated considerable additional 
funding. This came at the price of losing the right to elect their own rectors, who were henceforth ap-
pointed by the government (Froumin, I. & Povalko, 2014). Participating HEIs also had to submit to a 
                                                          
80 The designation “5-100” refers to the program’s goal of at least five Russian universities being represented 
among the top one hundred in global university rankings by 2020.  
81 Except for the Federal universities 
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regime of regular evaluation of their implementation progress towards their HEI’s development pro-
gram. HEIs which do not meet their own goals can be expelled from the program, although so far none 
ever was.  
The second pillar of the strategy rested on tighter control and intervention by the state. In 2009, by 
decision of the new head of Rosobrnadzor, a staff reshuffle took place at the National Accreditation 
Agency (Rosakkredagenstvo) and almost all of the staff left due to disagreements over the role and 
functioning of the agency. The centralization was completed when the seat of Rosakkredagenstvo was 
moved from Yoshkar-Ola to Moscow in 2011 where the agency shared offices in the same building with 
Rosobrnadzor. At the same time, Rosobrnadzor received the right to conduct unannounced inspections 
of HEIs at any time as well as the power to revoke a license of a university, which earlier could have 
been done only by court decision. This change converted the system of licensing and accreditation from 
a fairly bureaucratic, yet predictable process into a powerful instrument of state steering and control in 
the hands of Rosobnadzor. Since Rosobnadzor can revoke any license or accreditation decision until the 
HEIs in question successfully challenges this decision in court, it may not enroll new students. Due to 
the possible length of the legal procedure, this may doom an HEI regardless of the appeal’s outcome. 
With the ground thus laid, the so-called ‘effectiveness monitoring’ (monitoring effektivnosti) was 
launched in 2012 with the purpose was to identify HEIs with low performance based on centrally col-
lected indicator data82 (Froumin, I. et al., 2014). HEIs which do not meet performance standards set by 
the MoES are labelled as ‘ineffective’ and subsequently investigated by Rosobrnadzor. If sufficient 
shortcomings are found, HEIs can be merged with other institutions, partially restructured or lose their 
license or accreditation altogether and have to close.  
Finally, a third pillar can be seen in the new mechanism of allocation of state funding for HEIs that was 
introduced in 2013. HEIs which perform well on a set of state-defined performance indicators (similar 
to the ones used in the efficiency monitoring) are now getting preferential allocation of state-funded 
study places. This puts further pressure on weak HEIs and increases their risk of being investigated by 
Rosobrnadzor (pillar two). Since 2012, decisions by Rosobrnadzor have resulted in mergers and liqui-
dations of a large number of HEIs and an even higher number of branches. In 2014 alone, Rosobrnadzor 
closed 357 HEIs and branches. In the first half of 2015, 151 Russian HEIs and branches had their license 
withdrawn, 34 lost their accreditation83. Independent accreditation continued to exist at the fringes of 
the system, but demand remained low and the agencies offering it have never come to play a significant 
role in the overall governance of the higher education system.  
By granting greater operational autonomy and power to university leadership, the state has increasingly 
withdrawn from micro-managing internal affairs of universities in Russia, although it reserves the right 
                                                          
82 indicators relate to quality of student intake, teaching effectiveness, research, faculty, infrastructure, finance, 
labor market outcomes of graduates, and internationalization 
83 https://www.ucheba.ru/article/1041  
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to intervene at any moment. Academics have considerably lost in influence in university management 
and the introduction of effective contracts has given the university management the power to financially 
reward or sanction certain activities, while collegial professorial authority was reduced to purely aca-
demic matters.  
The primary mission of the university in the new model is satisfying state socioeconomic objectives, but 
the instruments by which the state is hoping to achieve these goals is through creating and employing 
market-mechanisms under the control of the state. The state uses a manpower planning system design 
coupled with incentives for competition for implementation of these goals. The involvement of eco-
nomic and employer stakeholders has grown both on the central governmental level with the creation of 
the Council on State Standards, and stakeholder inclusion in various ministerial and presidential advi-
sory committees and into advisory and governing boards within HEIs. In general, boards in their major-
ity still play a rather limited role of mostly advising and marketing for HEIs. Both for committees and 
universities, the state plays a large role in appointing members to these boards.  
The dominating source of university funding is the state budget followed by tuition fees. State funding 
is allocated by a competitive distribution state-funded study places based on state-controlled criteria. 
HEIs compete for students for state-funded places and for self-funded studies. The total size of this 
contingent is determined (aside from demography) by the threshold the state determines for the central-
ized university entrance examination. For the small top-tier segment of universities, significant addi-
tional funding from government-programs (Research University program, 5-100 program, flagship uni-
versity program) is allocated on a competitive basis, if only (so far) exclusively to state HEIs. Strategic 
investments typically follow state-defined development priorities but are allocated in a competitive man-
ner based on HEI’s development plans and strategies. To a smaller degree, investments are also under-
taken by university management and faculties, into spin-off companies, and technology centers, alt-
hough as a rule without state support.  
In many ways features of the Russian approach to HE governance correspond to what by Dobbins et al. 
(2011) described as the market-oriented model. The key difference, however, is that most of these mar-
ket mechanisms are created and controlled by the state.  
9.1.4 Marketization and expanding state-overseen stakeholder governance in Ka-
zakhstan 
Kazakhstan has come to pursue a model of development, importing, imitating and re-creating Western 
institutions in the Kazakh context by an authoritarian State.  
Regarding quality assurance, the move from state attestation to independent accreditation represented, 
for the first time since independence, a clear transfer powers of powers from the MoES to bodies not 
under its direct control. It went even further than most EU-countries, as it recognized national reviews 
as well accreditations conducted by international agencies, as one of the first countries in the EHEA to 
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do so, while licensing, intermediate testing and licensing controls remained in place as instruments of 
control within the purview of the MoES. As part of granting increased autonomy to HEIs, in 2011, the 
State Educational Standards for each study program were abolished and replaced by more general frame-
work state standards for the Bachelor, Master’s and PhD level which defined the generic basic structure 
of study programs of each level. As by 2017, HEIs may define up to 55% of study program contents 
themselves (70% in the case of national research universities).  
The role of Western policy concepts is visible in the strong involvement of the OECD in evaluating and 
advising higher education policy, in particular in the development of the influential state programs for 
education development (SPED). The “Washington consensus”84 of the 1990s is arguably also visible in 
the policy of privatizations of state universities taking place in 2001, which is unique for the post-Soviet 
space.  
The strong presence of Anglo-Saxon models is also visible in the foundation of Western-type institu-
tions: The establishment of KIMEP, a private university with a large proportion of Western-educated 
academic staff in the early 1990s, the foundation of British-Kazakh Technical University in 1997, and 
the creation of Nazarbayev University in Astana in 2006 are all examples of this approach of creating 
elite HEIs with western curricula and English as their working language. Especially Nazarbayev Uni-
versity (NU) was explicitly created as a model and testing ground for the internal governance for other 
Kazakh universities.  
A good example of the process of policy transfer happening in Kazakhstan was the introduction of gov-
ernance boards in state HEIs. Greater stakeholder involvement in university governance had been rec-
ommended in virtually all recommendations by the OECD and the World Bank. A particular challenge 
for involving autonomous stakeholder associations was that, as a rule, they did not exist in country and 
needed to be created top-down first, before they could be involved in stakeholder governance85. Never-
theless, the creation of governing boards had become state policy in the State Program of education 
development 2005-2010 and renewed for the SPED 2011-2020. The first introduction of boards of trus-
tees in 2007 had been seen as largely ineffectual, as the board bylaws were created by HEIs themselves 
which allowed them merely to suggest, discuss, and advise the rector, thus withholding any real formal 
authority, making them sounding boards and forums for consultation with employers and the regional 
community rather than true governing boards. In 2012, the government reacted to this state of affairs 
and introduced “boards of overseers” with clearly stated responsibilities guaranteed under the Law on 
State Assets that regulates public universities. The entire process was advised by a team of consultants 
                                                          
84 The Washington Consensus is a commonly-used term in development studies for the set of 10 economic policy 
prescriptions considered to constitute the "standard" reform package promoted for crisis-wracked developing 
countries by Washington, D.C.–based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, 
and the US Treasury Department. Among its recommendations, privatization of state enterprises and deregulation 
were deemed particularly important in post-Soviet “transition” countries.  
85 As was the case of the business association ‘Atameken’, which was founded by presidential order. 
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of Nazarbayev University and Pennsylvania University. Since 2016, their powers were expanded to 
vetting and proposing candidates for rector, approving budgets; defining strategy and admissions crite-
ria, creating faculty hiring policies, and even set the senior leadership team’s salaries (Bilyalov, 2016). 
While the final decision on rector appointments is still taken by a government committee, a pattern of 
tentative experimentation towards adopting Western-inspired reforms of internal governance is clearly 
visible.  
The import of international (western) models of higher education institutions has clearly shaped Ka-
zakhstan’s higher education policy. It is also clear, however, that the government has been delegating 
control in a cautious fashion, often keeping final decision-making within its area of competence.  
 
9.1.5 Imitation of “European” institutions in Moldova 
The development of the governance of the Moldovan higher education system can be read as a story in 
which reforms to establish a more decentralized approach to system governance were tried – and failed 
– again and again, due to a lack of capacity in the ministerial bureaucracy, erratic policy shifts, and deep-
seated mutual distrust between actors. It can also, however, be read as a story of how a small number of 
individuals within HEIs and the Ministry of Education have labored tirelessly to keep the higher educa-
tion system running, protect it from abrupt policy turns brought about by shifting governments and im-
prove it using any means (mostly from European funds) available to them to become part of the Euro-
pean Higher Education space.  
Out of all three country cases, the governance of the Moldovan higher education system has arguably 
changed the least. Moldova took the longest to establish an operational system of external quality assur-
ance, which only in 1999 began to curtail the greatest excesses of the lack of systematic oversight had 
created. After the re-centralization of control within the MoE and the Presidential administration in 
2002, and the twice-failed foundation of new, autonomous quality assurance agencies, a new functional 
QAA appeared only in 2015. During this time, the Ministry of Education tried to maintain order and 
structure in the higher education system, using its leverage in the allocation of state-funded study places, 
the licensing of HEIs, authorization of study programs, and its control over state educational standards.  
From 2009 onwards, policy in higher education clearly began to orient itself at the European Higher 
Education Area as a model. The revision of the educational code, which finally entered force in 2014 
contains a number of governance reforms based on European models, such as the quality assurance 
framework, the expansion of university financial autonomy, and the introduction of strategic advisory 
boards. It is notable that where reform initiatives were launched, they were often accompanied by finan-
cial support from international donors, first among them the European Union which funded notable 
TEMPUS projects which contributed to reform in quality assurance (QUAEM), and university financial 
autonomy and governance (ATHENA, EUniAM).  
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In most aspects of higher education governance, however, the reforms have stopped short of fundamen-
tally changing the distribution of power within the higher education system: Instead of becoming gov-
erning boards, university development councils became advisory bodies with unclear powers over rec-
tors. University autonomy was extended in the area of financial autonomy of HEIs but the decisions 
about state-funded study places (the most important income of HEIs) remained under the full discretion 
of the Ministry of Education. Maybe the most significant changes were made in the area of quality 
assurance. The introduction of compulsory centralized testing and the closing of loopholes for non-
eligible students effectively drained a corruption-prone and low-quality sector of the HE system of its 
income. Curricular autonomy within the state educational standards did grow and a new independent 
quality assurance agency was founded. At the time of writing, however, it was still too early to see which 
degree of independence the agency would be able to exert and whether its resource base would allow it 
to be operationally independent, and whether it would be able to withstand pressure from the political 
elites. At the time of writing, due to the very low salaries paid, most staff still had second jobs at uni-
versities, potentially compromising their independence.  
9.2 Is there a convergence towards a “post-Soviet” or global model of govern-
ance of higher education systems?  
Convergence of models of governance can be studied under different aspects. I will begin to explore 
this topic by studying to what degree the instruments of governance used by case countries correspond 
to the propagated “global model” of university governance (Baker & Lenhardt, 2008) and whether there 
have been trends towards or away from this model.  
9.2.1 Quality Assurance 
The basic approach to quality assurance in all case countries is similar in that study programs contents 
are regulated by State Educational Standards which define which study programs can be offered, their 
basic structure, compulsory contents and electives. Countries differ by the degree of detail that is pre-
scribed but there is a trend towards greater academic autonomy for individual HEIs in this area.  
Basic requirements for HEIs to operate or to offer specific study programs are defined in licensing and 
accreditation standards. Compliance with these standards is controlled through some form of state li-
censing or authorization procedure, post-licensing controls and accreditation. The latter is conducted 
either by a single state-dependent agency (in Russia), a single semi-independent agencies (Moldova) or 
multiple independent agencies which have been accredited to operate by the state (in Kazakhstan).  
It has become clear that the Bologna process and the ESG principle of independent external accreditation 
have exerted a considerable isomorphic influence on quality assurance in all three post-Soviet countries 
under analysis. On the one hand, in all countries, Quality Assurance Agencies were established by the 
government or on the initiative of individuals, which operate according to the ESG and have joined the 
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European Network for Quality Assurance (ENQA) and are registered (or plan to be) in the European 
Quality Assurance Register (EQAR) 86.  
On the other hand, the specific practices in quality assurance in the three countries illustrate clearly 
diverging trajectories: 
In Russia, during the 2000ies, there was a clear openness to adopting a “European” model of quality 
assurance. While this idea enjoyed some support by actors within the MoES and Rosobrnadzor, it was 
never sufficient to overcome the resistance within the top echelons of the MoES, the state bureaucracy 
and parts of the higher education establishment. In 2009, adapting to the ESG ceased to be a relevant 
consideration altogether, as Russia developed its own governance model based on the three pillars of 
financial support, financial redistribution and administrative intervention. Independent QAAs continues 
to exist at the fringes of the system, but demand remains low and the agencies offering it have never 
come to play a significant role in the overall governance of the higher education system.  
In contrast, Kazakhstan, even though joining the Bologna Process much later than the other two coun-
tries, has become a type of “model student” of the Bologna Communiqués on QA. Not only did the 
country introduce independent accreditation, but it has also allowed international QAAs to operate on 
par with national agencies. Looking at the national factors underlying this apparent policy convergence 
however, three stand out: Firstly, Kazakhstan did not have a strong entrenched higher education lobby 
rejecting reform that conflicted with past ideals. Secondly, a number of key experts in the MoES and 
the presidential administration, have lobbied for reform on accreditation and have succeeded to include 
it in the presidential development programs. Lastly, and most importantly, the president of the country 
has acted as a decisive proponent of reform (not only) in the sphere of higher education, pushing for the 
adoption of international practices, inviting international organizations and pursuing membership in in-
ternational bodies from the Bologna Process to the OECD. Presidential support for the state strategies 
for education development were undoubtedly a key factor in overcoming (or overruling) resistance and 
skepticism in the ministerial bureaucracy. This factor sets Kazakhstan apart also from other Central 
Asian countries, where “traveling policies” promoted by international organizations have increasingly 
clashed with the desire of policy-makers to maintain Soviet education legacies (Silova, 2011c).  
In Moldova, the ascension to the Bologna Process did create a situation of “coercive isomorphism” 
insofar as the ESG provided a strong model of what kind of quality assurance system would have be 
developed in order to become part of the European Higher Education Area (Toderaş, 2012b). Significant 
resources and support were made available, primarily by the European Union to support policy conver-
gence in Moldova. On the other hand, the often-changing political landscape in the country, political 
inter-dependencies of key actors, vested interests of the academic oligarchy, corruption in the HE system 
                                                          
86 The Moldovan QAA ANACIP is an associated member of ENQA. The 2014 code of education foresees full 
membership and registration in EQAR.  
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and the overall economic and financial difficulties of HEIs acted as powerful forces of inertia and re-
sistance to any systemic change in quality assurance as in the overall governance of higher education 
(Ciurea et al., 2012). In 2014, the new code of education established ANACIP as a new independent 
quality assurance agency. To what degree the new QAA will be indeed be independent and be successful 
in the long run, remains to be seen.  
9.2.2 Institutional Governance and University Autonomy 
The “global model” of university governance propagates a strong rectoral/presidential decision-making 
power to HE leadership, endowed with decision-making powers, in particular the power to appoint, 
evaluate, reimburse and dismiss academic staff, which is appointed and controlled by an influential 
governing board representing the most important stakeholders of the institution.  
During the 1990ies, Russia gave the most far-reaching autonomy to its HEIs, including the election of 
rectors by academic councils. In Moldova, HEIs formally received the same right, but any appointment 
of rectors or of vice-rectors, deans, vice-deans, directors of study services, and chairpersons required 
ministry approval, giving it a strong degree of control over appointments. In 2006, Russia, too, required 
rectors of state HEIs to be confirmed by the MoES. For autonomous institutions (AU), rectors were 
appointed by (state-controlled) boards and the rectors of MSU and SPBSU were directly appointed by 
the president. In Kazakhstan, the State never relinquished the power to appoint the HEI leadership.  
The internal governance structures of HEIs changed notably little during the 1990ies and 2000ies. In all 
case countries, rectors remained the most powerful actors whose formal and informal power over their 
HEI and collegial governance organs such as academic councils grew as HEIs gained greater operational 
autonomy, especially through financial and staffing autonomy.  
In all three countries, some form of advisory or governing boards were introduced during the 2010s, 
in all cases with reference to “international best practices” and with input from international organiza-
tions and consultants. Likewise, in all case countries, in their first iteration, these boards were to play an 
advising function, to support better linking HEIs with their local, business and societal stakeholders. 
Beyond this, the role that these boards play is ambiguous and still in flux. In Moldova, the rights of 
boards are potentially far-reaching and compass many areas of strategy, finance, and personnel, but their 
role vis-à-vis rectors and the MoE is unclear. In Russia, while the governing boards of autonomous 
institutions (AU) are involved in some respects concerning strategy and financial oversight of the HEI, 
the appointment of rectors is the exclusive responsibility of state. In Kazakhstan, governing boards co-
ordinate the process of vetting and proposing candidates for rector while a government commission 
takes the final decision. In all cases, the state is willing to delegate some aspects of operational manage-
ment and oversight to rectors and boards while retaining its ability to intervene at any time and take 
binding decisions.  
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A separate form of oversight appeared during from the mid-2000ies in Russia for those HEIs which 
participated in government programs (Federal Universities, National Research Universities, 5-100). 
These HEIs had to submit greater central oversight and accountability through evaluations of the imple-
mentation of their strategic development plans. A comparable approach to oversight appeared in Ka-
zakhstan in the 2010s, where rectors began to be held accountable for strategy development and success 
in its implementation in reports and yearly meetings with a government commission. No comparable 
accountability mechanism appeared in Moldova, although HEIs are required to have strategic develop-
ment plans as well.  
Regarding operational autonomy, there is a clear trend towards greater freedom in the areas of organ-
izational, financial autonomy, staffing, and academic autonomy, albeit in to very different degrees. 
Overall Russia and Kazakhstan grants most operational autonomy to its HEIs (respectively their leader-
ship), albeit the top leadership is de-facto appointed by the State. In this context, it is important to note 
that since the foremost task of the rector during the Soviet Union was the implementation of state strat-
egy, their decision-making powers had always been considerably greater than that of their western col-
leagues.  
The most pronounced area of autonomy is staffing autonomy. Regulation in this area which is common 
to all three countries is the verification of titles and degrees by a form of Higher Attestation Commission 
– VAK (in RU: VAK – in MD: CNEA – in KZ: CCES). As long as HEIs meet formal qualification 
requirements, they may recruit and dismiss staff as they see fit and determine their remuneration. 
Through changes to the legal form of HEIs, HEIs in Russia and Kazakhstan have become more flexible 
in defining their own remuneration and incentive systems, such as through the performance-based “ef-
fective contracts” in Russia.  
Organizational autonomy is most limited in state HEIs in Moldova where the MoE needs to confirm 
establishment, restructuring and suspension of faculties. In addition, the government ministry decides 
on the establishment, restructuring or liquidation of universities. Such decisions are prepared by the 
Ministry of Education, approved by the government and need the final promulgation of the President of 
the Republic. Until the new code of education in 2014, collaboration agreements with foreign universi-
ties and other organizations also required the permission of the Ministry of Education. In Russia and 
Kazakhstan, HEIs may decide more freely on organizational structures more freely, although the key 
governing bodies and powers of leadership functions are defined by the law.  
 
9.2.3 Regulation of access 
A common denominator of the post-Soviet higher education landscape has been the introduction of 
centralized admission exams (Drummond, T. W. & Gabrscek, 2014). These regulate the overall size 
of the eligible yearly study contingent, in other words, the size of the market for higher education. This 
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is certainly a major case of convergence across the post-Soviet space. The instrument of directly estab-
lishing quotas for study places is used less uniformly. While all countries provide a certain number of 
state-funded places, Moldova and Russia strictly regulate enrollment to tuition-based studies per study 
program, Russia tried to do so during the 1990ies and Kazakhstan does not centralize set a limit.  
9.2.4 Financing 
In the area of financing, there is a clear trend towards convergence of all case countries towards the 
“global model” propagating more competitive distribution of funding, a move towards global budgets 
and diversification of funding, although national path dependencies and particularities are clearly visi-
ble:  
The trend towards greater financial autonomy is visible in all countries. Full lump-sum budgets for 
state HEIs have been implemented only in a small, mostly elite segment of Russian HEIs and in Naz-
arbayev University in Kazakhstan. Income-diversification from tuition-fees and other sources plays a 
significant role in almost all countries of the post-Soviet Space since universal cost-sharing was intro-
duced in the early 1990ies (and thus in fact much earlier than in most European countries). The declining 
demographic trend in all case countries put pressure on income from tuition which decreases its rela-
tive importance vis-à-vis state funding. Competitive allocation of state funding is increasing. Kazakh-
stan stands out as the most radical example with the introduction of its money-follows-students scheme 
in 1999, but Russia introduced its own competitive system in 2013. In addition, both countries also 
renewed their investment in higher education, particularly through increased direct state funding for 
the elite tier of research universities87.  
In Kazakhstan, private funding in the form of tuition has become the primary source of income for the 
majority of HEIs, while state funding is concentrated among leading HEIs which win most grant-carry-
ing students. To a lesser degree, competitive allocation of state funding in Russia is likewise leading to 
a concentration in its elite universities. In Moldova, the system of allocating state funding remains un-
changed and does not focus public expenditure on HE, although the intention to introduce a money-
follows-student model of differentiated funding levels by discipline has been repeatedly stated. The 
money-follows-students model of financing is thus a strong model in all countries. The timing and de-
gree of its implementation seems to corresponded to the degree of power of the government to overcome 
resistance of university rectors who were, in their majority, against it.  
The individual country’s differences notwithstanding, in no case where competitive distribution of fund-
ing, lump-sum budgets, financial autonomy, or more diversified funding were introduced, have there 
there been developments in the reverse direction.  
                                                          
87 In Russia through its excellence initiatives, in Kazakhstan via the designation of National Universities and Naz-
arbayev University, the latter of which profits from substantial direct subsidies and full scholarships for all admit-
ted students. 
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9.2.5 Conclusion: Is there a common model of governance? 
After 25 years of transformation, the single Soviet model of higher education has clearly evolved into 
unique national systems, shaped by economic, cultural, and political forces, of national, regional and 
global nature. Judging exclusively by the evolution of instruments of governance employed in the vari-
ous HE systems over the past 25 years, one cannot but note a development towards the “global model” 
of university governance (Baker & Lenhardt, 2008) in all three case countries. As the following table 
shows, many features of the systems of governance of the three studied countries correspond to the 
“global model” of higher education governance: 
 
 „Global model“ Russia Moldova Kazakhstan 
Rela-
tionship 
of HE 
and the 
State 
a shift away from ‘‘state control’’ 
model and towards ‘‘state super-
vising’’  
steering from the distance”  
shift in state influence from ex-ante 
to ex-post control, with the state fo-
cusing on outputs and performance 
indicators rather than managing 
inputs, increasing their demands 
on HEIs for accountability  
State is highly ac-
tive in policy-set-
ting. State super-
vising, steering 
from a distance 
and ex-post con-
trol is visible for 
top tier of HE 
system 
Strong state con-
trol and interven-
tion for the lower 
tier 
 
State is not very 
effective at pol-
icy-setting and 
enforcing 
State remains di-
rectly engaged in 
large number of 
HEI decisions 
State supervis-
ing, steering 
from a distance 
and ex-post con-
trol is not wide-
spread; relega-
tion of control 
visible in some 
areas (QA) 
State remains highly 
active in policy-set-
ting but is with-
drawing from oper-
ational control 
Quality 
Assur-
ance 
External evaluation and control of 
performance by accreditation 
University and Subject Rankings 
create transparency for student 
choice of HEIs 
Study programs 
contents regu-
lated by Federal 
State Educational 
Standards 
(FSES) 
External evalua-
tion and control 
of performance 
by licensing & 
Study programs 
contents regu-
lated by National 
Qualification 
Framework and 
framework plan 
for study pro-
grams 
Study programs and 
their contents are 
regulated by the ed-
ucational standard, 
the state classifier, 
typical study plans, 
and qualification 
and licensing re-
quirements 
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accreditation and 
effectiveness 
monitoring  
Independent ac-
creditation wel-
comed but op-
tional 
National ranking 
of HEIs 
 
External control 
of licensing re-
quirements by 
MoE 
Accreditation of 
study programs 
by semi-inde-
pendent QAA 
No national 
ranking (yet) 
 
Compliance with 
standards is con-
trolled through state 
licensing, post-li-
censing controls, 
and unscheduled 
controls 
Study programs are 
accredited by inde-
pendent accredita-
tion agencies 
rankings of HEIs 
operated by QAAs 
Institu-
tional 
Govern-
ance and 
Auton-
omy 
Greater decision-making power 
to HEI leadership; Greater 
power to appoint, evaluate, re-
imburse and dismiss academic 
staff 
Greater organizational auton-
omy, discretionary control over 
collective resources, more 
clearly defined boundaries to 
the environment, greater self-
perception as an organization, 
hierarchies and internal man-
agement as well as ‘rationality’ 
(understood as having defined 
goals and measuring perfor-
mance)  
Adopting models of corporate 
governance such as appoint-
ment of rectors and presidents 
by boards rather than through 
election 
Considerable 
power of HE 
leadership further 
expended 
Appointment by 
state-dominated 
governing boards 
or the President 
in AUs, de-facto 
appointment of 
rectors by MoES 
in others 
Power to appoint, 
evaluate, reim-
burse and dismiss 
academic staff 
with HEI leader-
ship 
Advisory boards 
and state-domi-
nated governance 
boards 
Power of HEI 
leadership to ap-
point, evaluate, 
Considerable 
power of HE 
leadership since 
Soviet times 
Election of Rec-
tors by Senate 
and Strategic De-
velopment 
Councils (un-
clear), confirma-
tion by MoE 
Strategic Devel-
opment Councils 
with unclearly 
defined powers 
Power of HEI 
leadership to ap-
point, evaluate, 
reimburse and 
dismiss aca-
demic staff 
Considerable power 
of HE leadership 
since Soviet times 
Proposal of Rectors 
by boards of overse-
ers and appointment 
by government 
commission 
Boards of overseers 
with power to ap-
prove budgets and 
collaborate in ques-
tions of strategy, ad-
missions, hiring, 
and reimbursement  
Power of HEI lead-
ership to appoint, 
evaluate, reimburse 
and dismiss aca-
demic staff below 
vice-rectors taking 
into account state 
qualification re-
quirements 
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Involvement of external stake-
holders in university govern-
ance  
Promotion of strategic plan-
ning and strategic management  
reimburse and 
dismiss academic 
staff 
Financ-
ing 
higher 
educa-
tion 
decrease of itemized budgets 
and introduction of global 
budgets 
more competitive distribution of 
funding based on performance 
measures 
diversification of funding via tu-
ition fees, funding from enter-
prises, regional authorities 
lump-sum budg-
ets and financial 
autonomy for 
AU, line-item 
budgets for other 
state HEIs 
Competitive 
mechanism of al-
locating state-
funded study 
places 
Competitive par-
ticipation in gov-
ernment-pro-
grams (RU, 5-
100, flagship uni-
versities) 
Competition for 
students to fill 
places 
Income-diversifi-
cation from tui-
tion-fees and 
other sources 
 
Line-item budg-
ets from state 
funding; finan-
cial autonomy 
for other sources 
of income 
Allocation of 
state funding via 
study places as 
well as number 
of tuition-funded 
places by gov-
ernment decision 
Competition for 
students to fill 
places 
Income-diversi-
fication from tui-
tion-fees and 
other sources 
Line-items pre-
scribed for spending 
student grants, State 
funding via money-
follows-students 
scheme.  
Competition for stu-
dents to fill places 
Income-diversifica-
tion and financial 
autonomy for tui-
tion-fees and other 
types of income 
Regula-
tion of 
Access 
to HE 
Restricted through limited number 
of state-funded places  
some preferential admission  
criteria 
HEI admission exams 
Centralized test-
ing with EGE – 
exception for 
winners of state 
olympiads 
Centralized test-
ing with Baca-
laureat 
Number of fee-
paying students 
strictly regu-
lated, but mostly 
Centralized testing 
with UNT and CT 
Number of fee-pay-
ing students not reg-
ulated  
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Number of fee-
paying students 
regulated  
inconsequential 
due to demo-
graphic down-
turn 
Table 22: Comparison of governance systems in RU, MD & KZ and “global model” by 2015 
The growth (albeit slow) of independent accreditation, the use of university rankings, greater institu-
tional autonomy in organizational, staff, financial, academic matters (in the form of an empowered cen-
tral HEI leadership) and the creation of governing boards all seem to point into the direction of greater 
convergence towards the “global model”.  
In other areas, the commonalties of higher education governance of the three case countries clearly 
diverge from the “global model”: University autonomy in choosing and admitting students is very lim-
ited by state-controlled centralized examinations. Stakeholder governance, while introduced in all three 
case countries, does not play a decisive role in any, as the key decisions of strategic consequence, such 
as the selection and the appointment of rectors, are either directly made by the government or closely 
controlled by it.  
It becomes obvious then, that – at least on the surface – the governance of higher education systems 
does indeed appear to become more similar and that a process of convergence seems to be taking place. 
It is similarly clear, however, that the reality of governance in place in the three case studies does not 
correspond to the hands-off, steering-from-a-distance approach that the global model propagates. A cru-
cial difference to the ‘global model’ is that the dominating role of the state as the key actor has remained 
in place in all countries: In Russia, one cannot help but note how the state has employed instruments of 
New Public Management to re-centralized the HE system by establishing a differentiated steering model 
which applies incentives for the top tier of the HE sector and controls and sanctions for the lower tier. 
In Kazakhstan, the government is pursuing a modernization strategy based on OECD and World Bank 
recommendations, including their recommendations on stakeholder governance. While the elements of 
autonomy and stakeholder governance are slowly expanded (often, ironically, only via considerable 
intervention by the state), it is clear that the development of the national HE system is in great measure 
overseen and guided by the government. In Moldova, where state institutions are weak, the state acts as 
a controlling rather than a steering agent and generally distrusts HEIs to wield substantial autonomy. As 
a consequence, the instability of policy-making and executive priorities characteristic for the system do 
not lead to with greater HEIs independence from the state, but instead force HEI leaders to dedicate 
considerable resources to monitoring the political environment, maintaining good relations to all actors 
and defending their HEI’s interests in an ever-changing policy-environment.  
Universities all over the world devise diverse solutions in the face of global trends that may appear 
standard, but are never standardized in their effects, as they are adapted (Krücken et al., 2007). The same 
holds true for the studied higher education systems and their governance. It becomes visible that in the 
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face of the emergence of many new instruments of governance, the specific national governance ar-
rangements persist and continue to matter. This pattern corresponds to what Gornitzka and Maassen 
(2000, 284) observed for the changes in governance in Western European countries: 
“while the governmental rhetoric with respect to steering of higher education has changed to 
reflect in many ways a (super)market steering approach, the underlying institutions (rules, reg-
ulations, instruments) have not been adapted accordingly.”  
This finding reflects a key tenet in higher education research that in higher education, change, if it hap-
pens at all, generally does so incrementally and by adding new structures as addition layers to what 
already exists, rather than replacing old structures completely (Clark, B. R., 1983; Musselin, 2005). 
Thelen and Mahoney (2010) envisage four types of institutional change (summarized in Jungblut & 
Vukasovic, 2013): 
1. displacement, that is, removal of old and introduction of new rules, expected in situations of 
weak veto possibilities and low level of discretion in interpretation and enforcement;  
2. layering, that is, introduction of new rules on top of the old ones, expected in situations in which 
there are strong veto possibilities but low levels of discretion in interpretation and enforcement;  
3. drift, which refers to the situation in which the formal rules remain the same, but the institu-
tional environment is changed, expected when there is a high level of discretion and strong veto 
possibilities; and  
4. conversion, which implies that rules remain formally the same but their interpretation and ap-
plication by the relevant actors is different, occurring where there is a high level of discretion 
and weak veto possibilities. 
Processes of layering are most clearly visible in the case of the three post-Soviet country cases with 
displacement only in some isolated instances (e.g. the replacement of state attestation by accreditation 
in Kazakhstan). Indeed, the dominating control role of the state has remained in place in all countries. 
This is strongly reinforced by national-level institutions and mental models which affirm hierarchy as 
the legitimate principle in governance, accompanied by a widespread lack of trust between actors in the 
system. In all case countries, the mutual expectation of state and HEIs alike remains that the state should 
be steering the higher education sector, which it does (Russia and Kazakhstan) or attempts to do (Mol-
dova). Most clearly, the adoption of instruments of new public management does in no way represent a 
“retreat of the state” (Strange 1996). While the elements of autonomy and stakeholder governance are 
slowly expanded, even this very process is in great measure overseen and steered by the state.  
The last chapter will aim to explain these differences, considering actors on different levels as well as 
institutional factors of the higher education systems that are shaping development paths or are locking 
them into place.  
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9.3 The interplay of national, regional and global factors on the development 
of the governance of higher education 
As has been shown above, the “global model” of higher education governance has clearly exerted iso-
morphic pressure on all post-Soviet countries, promoted by international organizations like the World 
Bank, the OECD, and – since the 2000s – through the Bologna Process. As all three case countries are 
members of the European Higher Education Area and are likewise exposed to the “global model”, why 
has the governance of the higher education systems in the three case countries taken such different paths?  
Marginson and Rhoades (2002) propose to analyze isomorphic pressures and path dependencies on the 
global, the national and the local dimension. In order to retrace the complex reciprocal interactions of 
actors across levels and domains, they propose to study the “agencies,” (polities, entities or organiza-
tions) influencing developments, their geographical and functional spheres of influence and the relative 
strength of influences. In their model, the effects of these influences depend primarily on the degree of 
the (historical) embeddedness of the structures upon which they are exerting influence (layers and con-
ditions). The interaction of agencies of different levels, their respective strength, spheres of influence 
and the resilience of locally embedded structures can then help to explain how ideas and concepts travel 
and get transformed as they are implemented in different contexts.  
Bearing in mind the limitations of such an explanatory approach (see chapter 3.2.1), we will begin to 
explore this final aspect of the changes of governance in the following chapter.  
9.3.1 Global and European forces 
As is not surprising for global agencies and discourses, the concrete transmission vectors of ideas are 
often not clearly retraceable. Policy changes can be both promoted by international organizations as well 
as they can be perceived by policy-makers as an adequate response to similar goals and challenges. 
Likewise, the rhetorics of a specific policy change can be adopted without any change in actual practice. 
Nevertheless, influences are visible in the three case countries.  
9.3.1.1 Direct influence via international organizations 
The direct influence of international organizations such as the World Bank, the OECD, or private 
foundations (e.g. the Open Society Foundation) differs greatly between countries. Since 1991, these 
organizations financed projects and advised policy reform efforts in all three case countries, as did var-
ious Western governments and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and, increasingly, the European 
Commission.  
In Russia, during the 1990ies, international donors such as the Soros Foundation and the World Bank 
played a significant role in investment especially into Russian higher education, such as advising with 
curricular reform. The government had welcomed their involvement, against repeated attempts by Duma 
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deputies to ban them (Adrian et al., 2000). Direct pressure by the IMF and the World Bank related to 
their investments cannot be evidenced. Financial aid from these organizations was limited and its con-
ditionality, if present at all, was never enforced. In the 2000s, the activities of the World Bank and the 
OECD on higher education decreased in Russia, but greatly increased in Kazakhstan through projects 
and consulting work, which was greatly promoted by the government, as evidenced by the 
Worldbank/OECD evaluations of 2007 and 2017, which fed quite directly into the state programs for 
educational development. Likewise, such as in the area of quality assurance, key officials within the 
MoES had gained exposure to Western models of quality assurance through study visits and contributed 
these experiences to the drafting of the SPED (Interview KZ No. 4, 2017). In Moldova international 
agencies such as the World Bank & OECD were much less active in higher education than in the other 
two countries.  
9.3.1.2 Indirect influence of Anglo-Saxon institutions  
With or without direct influence of international organizations on governance reforms in Russia, neo-
liberal ideas such as those promoted by those organizations during the 1990ies began to heavily influ-
ence policy in the field of higher education in all case countries. The policies universally adopted across 
the post-Soviet space – cost-sharing between private households and the state in education financing, 
greater operational and financial autonomy of HEIs, the introduction of private HE, standard-based ac-
creditation for private and state HEIs alike – corresponded well to the “Washington Consensus” of the 
1990ies.  
Regarding quality assurance, influential individuals from all three countries all traveled to the United 
States and Europe to study QA practices. Beyond these commonalities, the transmission vectors for 
these ideas into the national HE systems differ considerably between countries:  
In Russia, the Centre for Strategic Research and the Higher School of Economics (HSE) can be identi-
fied as two such institutional vectors. HSE’s founding rector, Yaroslav Kuzminov, had been a member 
of the Council of the Center for Strategic Research and, together with Education Minister Vladimir 
Filippov, he headed the development of the section on "Modernization of Education" of the Gref Pro-
gram. He was also the co-leader of the expert group on "Labor market, professional education, migration 
policy" of the “Strategy for Socio-Economic Development of Russia until 2020” (“Strategy 2020”). HSE 
united among its staff many prominent authors and contributors of market-liberal reforms such as the 
EGE, the GIFO financing mechanism, and the targeted investment programs88. Via the Gref Program in 
2000, a number of liberal reforms were introduced into the governance of the Russian HE system, such 
as competitive financing based on performance and reduce corruption in university admission through 
                                                          
88 Since 2012, HSE founded the Institute of Education whose founding director, Isak Froumin, had been Lead 
Education Specialist at the Moscow Office of the World Bank since 1999 and had acted as an advisor to ministers 
Filippov, Fursenko, and Livanov. World Bank experts such as Jamil Salmi  closely cooperated with HSE and 
advised the Russian government. 
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the introduction of a centralized national admission exam. This policy had been supported with expertise 
by the World Bank (which supported similar models in many post-soviet countries) although Russia did 
not seek foreign donor support for the implementation of their new selection regimes (Drummond, T. 
W. & Gabrscek, 2014). Ministers of education and science Fursenko and Livanov continued to draw 
upon these policy ideas in promoting competition in the public sector, greater ‘hands-on professional 
management’, combined with more explicit standards and measures of performance and output controls 
and private-sector styles of management, such as governing boards. The growing importance of inter-
national rankings, of targeted programs drew inspiration from policy-initiatives abroad (such as the Ger-
man excellence initiative). This view seems to be widely shared among senior ministry officials. As one 
of them describes:  
 “I think [the origins of the policy ideas of Fursenko] go back to the generic World Bank blue-
prints which got domesticated, this idea of Flagship universities had a number of iterations from 
the first program, the ‘innovative universities’, up to ‘5-100’. The basic idea is that a) we are 
going to distribute funds competitively, and b) that extra money comes into the center, we will 
try to concentrate it among the strongest” (Interview RU No. 16, 2017) 
Therefore, for Russia, even though the involvement of international organizations themselves has been 
very limited after the 1990es, the policy ideas promoted by them have no doubt shaped Russian higher 
education policy indirectly.  
Kazakhstan 
Among the three countries studies, the government of Kazakhstan is possibly most eager to adopt what 
is understood locally as international and European “best practices”. Almost all interviewees related the 
changes to a desire to be “modern”, to be recognized in the wider and especially the western world. The 
following quote is fairly representative and illustrates this perception among many stakeholders of the 
inevitability of changes to this end:  
 “The times dictate that we must follow the worldwide trends in education if we want our diplo-
mas to be recognized. We need to all go into the same direction and follow the same require-
ments” (Interview KZ No. 20, 2017) 
Several transmission vectors can be identified. Among them international universities, policy consult-
ants, and graduates of the Bolashak scholarship program stand out. Private universities such as KIMEP 
(founded in 1992 by decree of Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of the Republic of Kazakhstan) or the 
Kazakh-British Technical university (founded in 2001) and Nazarbayev University in Astana (since 
2009), work with North American and British curricula, teaching staff, English-language teaching and 
models of university governance. The leading positions of Anglo-Saxon university in international uni-
versity rankings have also shaped policy priorities, as in regard to university autonomy:  
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“Simple analysis shows that the best education systems are those that are autonomous, where 
universities are autonomous. This is a simple conclusion. Just look at rankings. […] Our uni-
versities do not understand this. They are afraid that when the autonomy comes, they will not 
be given money anymore. But in the world, where there is autonomy, there is also good money.” 
(Interview KZ No. 8, 2017). 
The Kazakh governance has actively courted and invited international organizations to advise them on 
reforming their higher education system. Kazakhstan invited the OECD and the World Bank to conduct 
an evaluation of their university’s governance arrangements in 2006 and subsequently adopted most of 
that review’s recommendations into the State Programs for Education Development. On the impact of 
international organizations, a senior HEI leader comments: 
“[International organizations] conducted their audits and gave their conclusions and the MoES 
changed the rules of the game. The ministry spent a lot of our money on these audits and they 
were in principle justified. The ministry finds itself in such a position that it has to listen to other 
points of views.” (Interview KZ No. 21, 2017) 
Lastly, since the first Bolashak scholarships were granted to outgoing students in 1993, 11.126 Kazakh-
stani citizens have studied at the 200 most highly universities in 33 countries, most of them in the United 
States and Great Britain (Bolashak, 2017). After the foundation of Nazarbayev University, in 2011, 
scholarships were reallocated to graduate students in Master’s and PhD programs. In the meantime, 
many Bolashak graduates increasingly occupied leading positions in state and private organizations in 
Kazakhstan, mostly in Almaty and Astana (Perna, Orosz, & Jumakulov, 2015). Several stakeholders 
have stressed the fact that the last two ministers of education and Science, Aslan Sarinzhipov and Erlan 
Sagadiyev, had received parts of their higher education in the United States (Interview KZ No. 21, 2017). 
Interviewees repeatedly pointed out the how the wide-scale participation in academic mobility through 
Bolashak and other mobility programs is influencing mental models about academic governance, both 
within HEIs, as well as within the MoES itself (Interview KZ No. 21, 2017). These graduates thus rep-
resent important “transmission vectors” to international practices, as is the case of the Information-An-
alytical Center (IAC), a government think tank:  
“Now, this trend is intensifying. We now understand the international context very well, and we 
are studying it. And, by the way, at IAC, almost 70% of our staff are young people who studied 
abroad, at good universities. So they studied, for example, education. Somewhere around 30% 
are people who, like me, have worked in the system all their life, so they know what Kazakh 
education is. We hope that this mix will lead to some effect, because on the one hand we have 
people who know foreign practices and can communicate them there and, on the other hand, 
there are people [here] who are professionals. This it makes it now possible to study and com-
pare ourselves.” (Interview KZ No. 8, 2017). 
In Moldova, there are much fewer direct transmission vectors for the influence of global forces.  
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9.3.1.3 Impact of the Bologna Process 
Just as Anglo-Saxon university models had acted as a point of reference during the 1990ies, in all case 
countries, the Bologna Process became an important point of orientation during the 2000ies. However, 
while the Bologna Process has exerted a significant degree of “isomorphic pull” in Kazakhstan and 
Moldova, in Russia, the BP lacked strong proponents. In consequence, it had only a passing effect on 
the governance of the higher education system. While during the first half of the 2000s, the BP did 
inspire a number of policy initiatives such as merging attestation with accreditation in 2000, and tenta-
tive pushes towards greater multi-stakeholder involvement in the governance of the system. One such 
example is that during the early 2000s, there were attempts to establish an independent system of ‘pub-
lic-professional accreditation’ which would get certified by the State to the conduct accreditation inde-
pendently of the state, similar to the German system of accreditation. This, however, never came to 
fruition. Several independent quality assurance agencies were founded and continue to exist to this but 
never received official recognition and thus only play a marginal role. Since the second half of the 
2000ies, the Bologna Process did not figure as a noticeable influence on Russian HE policy. Integration 
into the common European Higher Education Area never was a top priority for the Russian government, 
which mainly hoped to improve the attractiveness of its universities to fee-paying foreign students 
through the mutual recognition of diplomas between Russia and the European Union (Tomusk, 2007).  
In contrast, in Kazakhstan, entering the Bologna Process became a government policy priority as part 
of a wider drive towards international recognition of modernization of the HE system. In consequence, 
the Bologna Process exerted a significant degree of “isomorphic pull” in the formulation of the State 
Program for Educational Development (SPED), which make integration into the international and Eu-
ropean higher education spaces their main objectives. The SPED explicitly relate changes to quality 
assurance and university autonomy to this goal. As one of the SPED’s authors concludes:  
“When we were developing the State programs, in order to identify to main directions, we al-
ways identified the main global trends, in the European Higher Education Area, in the Bologna 
Process, and precisely these priorities were always introduced in the events we organized and 
in the normative-legal acts, because, let’s say, the Yerevan Meeting of Ministers of 2015 estab-
lished priorities for the time until 2017, according to which the system of education of all coun-
tries which are part of the Bologna Process should develop, and since Kazakhstan participates 
in the Bologna Process we took on the responsibility to follow these priorities, for example 
student-centered learning, inclusive education, integration of education and production, these 
things became part of our national education programs. And now we include these aspects also 
in our normative-legal acts.” (Interview KZ No. 9, 2017) 
Interviewed rectors see the related measures as its legitimate and logical consequences of this policy 
goal:  
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“Looking at the management and governance of HEIs, it is visible we study the experience of 
European HEIs and very much of American HEIs. If we say that Kazakhstan wants to join the 
European Education space, which Kazakhstan has already done when we signed the Bologna 
Declaration in 2010, then, of course, the governance of Kazakhstan's Higher Education System 
now also must respect the principles of the Process. That means modernizations, that means 
ECTS credit technology, that means internationalization.” (Interview KZ No. 11, 2017) 
While policy formulation itself is far from tantamount to implementation, the SPED clearly acted as a 
strong transmission vector for (isomorphic) institutional change. Several interviewees highlight the role 
of the Bologna Process as instrumental in many changes of the governance structure. This is certainly 
retraceable for the advent of accreditation. Had it not been for the Bologna Process, there would have 
been few incentives to subscribe to the requirements of the ESG. Through national and international 
accreditation agencies, HEIs were suddenly assessed on the principles of transparency, the participation 
of students, the involvement of teaching staff in self-governance. Successfully passing accreditation 
became an incentive for changes in these areas (Interview KZ No. 21, 2017), with the final objective 
being international recognition. As one of the SPED’s co-authors points out “[The SPED] promoted 
HEI to international standards, and in particular to European ones. […] It created a powerful impetus 
and created the preconditions for the realization of the action lines of the Bologna Process. […] But 
participation in the Bologna Process was not our goal in and by itself. It was important to do this so 
that we would be noticed and understood in Europe and the world.” (Interview KZ No. 9, 2017).  
For Moldova, the relevance of the Bologna Process and supporting European Union activities is hard 
to overstate. The Bologna Process, EU Joint projects, and the conditions formulated in the association 
agreement have arguably instigated most of the policy reforms in higher education since Moldova began 
to prepare to join the Bologna Process in 2003: Aside from structural changes related to creating a com-
mon European Higher Education Area89, the Bologna Process was also an important impetus for change 
in the governance arrangements. The urging of European partners that Moldova adhere to the provisions 
of European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance (ESG) on the independence of a Quality 
Assurance Agency were instrumental for the Communist government to launch the foundation of an 
quality assurance agency outside of the Ministry of Education with first the Agenţia de Evaluare şi 
Examinare – AEE in 2006 and the Agenţie de Asigurare a Calităţii – AAC in 2008, although neither ever 
became active in the area of higher education. Because of the Bologna Process, the format of state 
standards (Plan Cadru) was changed. Lastly, as a direct consequence, the Bologna Process provided a 
strong argument in favor of the introduction of doctoral studies as the third cycle of higher education 
into Moldovan universities instead of the exclusive right of the Moldovan Academy of Sciences to award 
doctorate degrees.  
                                                          
89 Such as the introduction of Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees, modules as structural units of study programs and 
the use of ECTS 
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Many of these changes were prepared and supported by EU-funded TEMPUS projects. TEMPUS pro-
jects supported issues like updating and developing new curricula by exposing university staff to inter-
national examples, the implementation of quality management systems at universities, e-learning, and 
by equipping universities with modern equipment and promoting student and staff mobility. These pro-
jects played an important role in driving and informing legislation and did change structures and prac-
tices in (some) higher education institutions. Regarding the governance of the higher education system, 
new internal quality management systems were first tried out at a number of universities within the 
framework of Tacis SCM T005B05-2005 “The Development of a Quality Assurance System within 
selected Moldovan Universities” and the Tacis University Management 26091-2005 project “Imple-
mentarea sistemului institutional de gestionare a asigurarii interne a calitatii in invatamantul superior 
din Moldova”. The EUniAM, the ATHENA and the QUAEM projects contributed to the development 
of the 2014 code of education, the foundation of the new quality assurance agency ANACIP and some-
what greater university autonomy. The introduction of strategic advisory councils and the expansion of 
financial autonomy was accompanied by EU-funded projects on university autonomy. Several univer-
sity pro-rectors stated that without these EU-funded projects there would have been rather little change 
in Moldovan higher education. 
9.3.2 Regional forces  
Mutual influence between Russia and Kazakhstan in HE reforms 
The dynamics of global influences between Russia and Kazakhstan are worthy of note. In several in-
stances during the late 1990ies and early 2000ies, policies were developed and discussed in Russian 
expert circles, to be taken up and implemented more swiftly in Kazakhstan. This was the case with the 
development of the standardized testing and the money-follows-student scheme in HE financing (Inter-
view RU No. 13, 2017). From the Russian perspective, Kazakhstan thus became an experimental space 
for Russian policy-makers to observe the dynamics before implementing their own schemes. By the end 
of the 2000ies, this form of policy-transfer seems to have stopped, however, as Russia and Kazakhstan 
began to make different policy choices.  
Influence of Romania and Russia as models for Moldova 
Due to the cultural and linguistic proximity of Romania and Moldova and the significant number of 
Moldovan students studying in Romania90, it would be reasonable to assume for policy transfer to have 
taken place. This is documented for reforms in secondary education with the creation of lyceums and 
the national Baccalaureate, the centralized examination, which is a prerequisite to enter higher educa-
tion. While influences are clearly visible in Study programs imported from Romania (mostly in the arts 
                                                          
90 Romania provides many scholarships to Moldavian students and, indeed, many of Moldova’s political class 
have studied in Romania, mostly during the 1990ies. 
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and humanities), as well as from Russia (mostly in technical fields), a distinct influence on the govern-
ance of the higher education system is not visible. The Romanian government and Romanian experts 
did, however, support Moldova in adopting to the Bologna Process, such as in developing the structure 
of the new quality assurance agency ANACIP.  
9.3.3 National-level: Governments and Ministries responsible for higher education 
What all three country cases have in common that the state in the form of governments and ministries 
lays down a strong claim to steer the system (see chapter 9.3.6.1). The relative strength and capacity of 
the state in the governance of the three post-Soviet countries has waxed and waned over the past 25 
years.  
In Russia, during the 1990ies, the state considerably withdrew from steering the higher education sys-
tem and HEIs received substantial institutional autonomy. This was driven as much by policy as by 
necessity: “We cannot give you money but we can give you freedom” was the understanding between 
HEIs and the Ministry of Education (Interview RU No. 14, 2017). HEIs received considerable financial 
autonomy and the ability to generate their own income gave HEIs (respectively their rectors) consider-
able autonomy from the state. The government did not have a strong policy agenda and was not actively 
pursuing a development strategy (Interview RU No. 9, 2017) while funds were severely limited due to 
the economic crisis. This had given rise to a very powerful Russian Rectors’ Union (see chapter 9.3.4). 
The balance of power gradually shifted back to the State over the 2000ies, as the ‘power vertical’ of the 
Russian government strengthened. The cause of the shift in power was towards the state was economic 
as well as political. Since the 2000ies, the share of state funding increased relative to income from tuition 
fees. Through the introduction of the Unified State Exam, the State gained control over the size of the 
admitted student cohort and closed a highly profitable source of non-state income from (corruption in) 
university admissions. In addition, the shrinking student numbers resulting from overall demographic 
decline, reduced the potential income from tuition fees. Increased state support for leading universities 
in the Federal Universities, National Research Universities, “5-100”, and flagship universities pro-
grams came at the price of losing the right to elect their own rectors and submitting to a regime of regular 
evaluation of their implementation progress towards their HEI’s development program (Froumin, I. 
& Povalko, 2014). According to Forrat (2015), these funding programs for large HEIs serve to ensure 
the loyalty of the elite of the higher education system, and increase the State’s legitimacy in taking a 
more prominent role in the governance of the whole system. Aside from a much stronger state control 
over HEIs resources, the increased power of the state lies in the development of new instruments of state 
intervention in the form of licensing and accreditation, the state monitoring of performance indicators, 
state inspections and a campaign of closures and mergers of HEIs. The resurgence of the state as a 
steering and intervening actor, the governmental preference for using bureaucratic control and regula-
tions in top-down reform efforts, as well as the overall geopolitical isolation of Russia from the West 
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since 2012 can be seen as the key reasons why the Bologna Process did not exert its isomorphic pressure 
towards independent accreditation in Russia.  
In Kazakhstan, the role and strength of the state in higher education has developed quite differently 
from that in the Russian Federation. During the 1990ies, Kazakhstan went much less far in granting 
autonomy to its HEIs. Rectors were always appointed by the Ministry of Education and Science, and, in 
the case of National Universities, even by the President himself. Indeed, until 2004, successive ministers 
increased centralized control and oversight over the higher education system. The role of the state is 
also particular in that, in contrast to Russia, where neither President Yeltsin nor Putin took a personal 
interest in education, President Nazarbayev has actively shaped (higher) education policy almost since 
independence. In 1994, the Bolashak scholarship program was created and ever since the Kazakhstan 
2030 strategy in 1997, the Kazakh president actively promoted a modernization policy based on what 
was perceived as Western models. Reforms during the 1990ies and the 2000ies were implemented in a 
pronounced top-down fashion, often at great speed, as was the case with the Bologna Process and the 
replacement of the Soviet-style aspirantura und doktoratura with PhD degrees:  
“When we rushed to the Bologna process, it was a very big shock for universities. It was a 
particular shock for us, when we began to travel and representatives of European universities 
came, and we learned that this was a process. For us it was a one-day decision. All postgraduate 
studies needed to be closed, and in 2010, in November I defended my thesis. Imagine, I just 
managed to jump onto the last wagon. Otherwise my PhD would have been thrown out. I would 
have needed to start anew, can you imagine? That was again top-down, the decision was taken 
and in 2010, it entered into force” (Interview KZ No. 13, 2017) 
As the development of the governance of the higher education system in Kazakhstan shows, the key 
driving force behind the changes in the system have been the MoES and the presidential modernization 
agenda. An international higher education scholar at Nazarbayev University concurs that HEIs are de-
termined by the MoES’s steering and that the usual approach when wanting to change something is to 
ask the MoES to act:  
“One thing that you have to understand about Kazakhstan’s higher education system is that the 
government is in charge. Universities cannot really do much without this vertical governance 
going on. Within this framework we understand that the universities have been requesting cer-
tain changes that the ministry could respond to or at least consider. (Interview KZ No. 15, 2017) 
The development of the first State Program for Educational Development (SPED) in 2004 was exten-
sively based on the analysis of international models and international trends (Interview KZ No. 4, 2017) 
with the explicit and overarching government objective to bring Kazakhstan closer to international prac-
tices in education. This policy direction was far from shared among governmental elites: At the time of 
the preparation of the SPED, there was strong opposition within the MoES and the CCES to reducing 
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the level of state supervision and grant greater autonomy to HEIs. The move from attestation to accred-
itation was arguably possible only because during the preparation of the SPED, the President demanded 
that all ministries reduce the amount of oversight-related controls and the number of inspections in their 
areas (Interview KZ No. 4, 2017). The presidential strategies “Kazakhstan 2030”, “Kazakhstan 2050” 
and “100 concrete steps – plan for the nation” increasingly strongly stressed government reforms and 
pressed state bodies to reduce oversight and control and grant greater autonomy. The reforms in the area 
of university autonomy, the introduction of governance boards within HEIs and greater involvement of 
stakeholders such as the Atameken business association (itself founded by presidential order) were all 
enforced due to an active involvement of the presidential administration.  All interviewed parties point 
to the presidential authority of the SPED overriding the ministerial authority as key to securing its im-
plementation. As the MoES’s action plans need to be based on the SPED, these documents indeed 
wielded great authority. Most of the proposals included in the SPEDs were eventually implemented even 
against resistance and under different changing ministers of education with different policy priorities. 
As ministers of education and science had a fairly short tenure (2 years on average), the presidential 
SPED have created a form of policy continuity. It seems reasonable to assume that without the presi-
dential authority behind the SPED, this would not have happened. This belief is indeed shared by several 
interviewees when discussing the SPED:  
 “The state program is approved by the president. […] [Former minister of education] 
Zhumagoluov, said, that he put so much [content] in that it would not be possible for them [the 
opponents] to cancel it out. They do not have time to cancel it. But the question is not [whether 
it is difficult] to cancel, but also to understand it and to move the process forward faster! Ac-
creditation was included back then [in 2011]. And it is just starting now!” (Interview KZ No. 
12, 2017) 
The presidential authority was especially visible in the conflict over the shift from state attestation to 
independent accreditation which culminated in 2015 in an open confrontation of the chairman of the 
Ak-Zhol opposition party and Aslan Sarinzhipov, the then-Minister of Education and Science. The ma-
jority Nur Otan party supported the new law on education proposed by the MoES. The arguments made 
during this struggle all relate to the (presidential) authority of the SPED:  
“In the parliamentary working groups, there was of course nothing we could do. And when the 
bill was brought under discussion, our chairman gave a very tough speech. He emphasized the 
fact that they were changing the state program, the main document. If they changed that, then 
they should recognize that they had failed to implement it properly. They had decided on the 
changes already in 2008 and it was already 2015, so much time [had passed] and they still 
claimed that the [higher education] system was not ready. So, what had they been doing [during 
all this time]? […] He told them in this way: “Admit that you did not fulfill it [the SPED2011-
2020], and that is why you want to change it” (Interview KZ No. 19, 2017) 
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The personal backing of the president has allowed the SPED2005-2010 and SPED2011-2020 to become 
powerful transmission vectors for cross-national transfer of practices.  
Moldova 
Of the three countries, in Moldova, the role of the state is the most paradox. On the one hand, the Min-
istry of Education (MoE) it is the undisputed center of governance (and, in some cases, management) of 
the higher education system. On the other hand, it is prone to institutional capture by shifting political 
alliances and lacks in capacity to effectively steer the system. This pattern has stifled reforms in many 
instances, yet the MoE has also ensured the continuing operation of the higher education system and the 
maintenance of minimal standards against sometimes difficult odds.  
The legal centrality of the Ministry of Education in governance and management of the HE system is 
striking: The MoE develops legislation, monitors and enforces it. In legislation as recent as the 2014 
code of education, the MoE and even the extended Government remain the final decision-making organ 
for all major decisions. The MoE and the government remain the final instances to approve (or, there-
fore, to reject) any decisions of subordinate bodies. The government allocates state-funded places to 
HEIs and thus controls the financing of the majority of public HEIs91. The effect of this is that the 
particular ministers of education are perceived the decisive actors and true centers of power, much more 
than formal bodies and structures. Despite the high degree of centralization of hierarchical power within 
the Ministry of Education, effectiveness in policy-implementation has been very low on average. This 
can be at least partially explained by a combination of political instability, political influence, and a lack 
of capacity within both Ministry and HEIs caused by a lack of adequate resources.  
Political instability has made work of the MoE challenging by having to work with frequently changing 
policy priorities of different ministers and vice-ministers. These often entered office with a set of new 
policies without a good understanding the complexities and internal interrelatedness of the higher edu-
cation system. As one university leader points explains, these frequent personnel changes and power 
struggles in the past have hamstrung the MoE:  
 “Higher education is not so efficient because of the changing inside of the ministry of educa-
tion. Whenever you have a new minister, he just puts out the old people and they engage new 
people and they try to do something and they say ‘oh, my previous colleague (but he is always 
not a colleague but a competitor) he was wrong! It was not correctly done, we should change!’ 
and they just try to do in another way.” (Interview MD No. 3, 2016) 
A former long-serving official from the MoE concurs with this assessment:  
 “Different ministers saw different priorities for their mandates. And their mandates were short. 
And always in the beginning they put their accent on certain things and after half a year or a 
                                                          
91 Some public HEIs are under the remit of ministries other than the MoE, e.g. the Ministry of Health 
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year they changed and they never managed to realize their second priority because there comes 
another minister who will be there as well for half a year” (Interview MD No. 10, 2016)  
While tenure of ministers has been comparatively short in other countries, Moldova’s parliamentary 
democracy lacks other stabilizing factors in policy continuity such as the as one Kazakhstan’s president 
has played. Instead, political parties have tended to exert a large degree of political influence over the 
minister of education. As an acting vice-rector explains:  
 “Unfortunately [when a new] minister comes [..] all functionaries need to do what the minister 
says and the minister says what his political boss wants him to. For example: [They might say] 
“change the directors of the schools, and [install] as directors members of my political party”. Un-
fortunately, this happens. The politization of the Ministry of Education is our major default. […]. 
[This happens not only to distribute] positions [of power] but to keep their influence in pedagogi-
cal institutions. It means: “[when] the director is from our party […] when the elections come [I] 
will say “vote for my party and convince the parents of your students to vote for my party” (Inter-
view MD No. 3, 2016) 
Moldova is a small country and many individuals in leadership positions are connected to political par-
ties. The large role of political parties on legislation and the Ministry of Education makes it attractive to 
exploit such connections in favor of promoting individual interests. A former rector takes a pessimistic 
perspective: 
“In Moldova, every ministry, let’s take education, is subject to political influence. […] Now the 
liberals [party] leads the ministry, and they put there [in power] Minister [Corinna] Fusu and 
[they] make their policies. The minister by himself does not represent anything. The minister is 
nominated by the party. What did they [the political parties of the ruling coalition] do? They 
distributed the ministries amongst themselves and every party does what it wants [in their ar-
eas]. And the minister represents the party and does everything the party wants from him. […] 
At another time, [it will be] someone else. Today it is one, tomorrow another one come and he 
will destroy everything. […] The matter is that this strongly disorganizes the system. […] This 
mess which is going on, […] they [the parties] compete for the power. That is all. And that is 
why there is heavy corruption everywhere“ (Interview MD No. 12, 2016) 
Indeed, the history of Moldova’s HE system is full of examples of the influence of party politics and 
full of suspicions of rent-seeking behavior of certain actors92. Several private universities are well-con-
nected to political figures acting to safe-guard their interests (Interview MD No. 3, 2016). The existence 
                                                          
92 Two examples that were mentioned by several interview partners include the Moldovan State Institute of Inter-
national Relations and University of the Academy of Science. The former was founded in 2003 by the Communist 
government and the Minister of Education, Valentin Beniuc, became the first and to date only rector of the Insti-
tute. A second case is the University of the Academy of Science, of which the wife of the president of the Academy 
of Science became the founding and still-acting rector. 
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of such informal political networks, and the protection of private interests by political parties undermines 
and consistently threatens the coherence, stability and effectiveness of governance of the Moldovan HE 
system.  
The lack of resources of the department of higher education within the MoE is a second impediment 
for effective policy. As one former MoE official mentions: 
 “There were times when we were about 14 people in the department of higher education. Then 
there was a minister who said “we don’t need so many people. I can work also with half that 
number. And just like this he [reduced the] number of employees to five. […] So [since 2008] 
then there were five people taking care of the entire higher education system” (Interview MD 
No. 10, 2016) 
These five employees are responsible for a wide range of oversight tasks including licensing of study 
programs, coordinating and quality assuring the elaboration of qualification frameworks, drafting higher 
education policy, participating in international projects and conferences, among other day-to-day tasks93. 
What adds to the precarious position in which the MoE as the main oversight body for higher education 
finds itself, is that civil servants, even those in the ministries, receive very low salaries between 
3000MDL and 10000MDL (130€-500€) per month. These factors, together with a high workload and 
an often-stressful working environment leads to a frequent staff turnover and the continuous need to 
replace lost expertise. If it were not for the personal dedication of a small number of key officials, it 
hard to imagine how the higher education system could be governed in any semblance of professionality 
at all. As a key ministry official remarks:  
 “There were periods when I was just holding the system together, protecting it from attempts 
of the Communists to change something […] Can you imagine what will happen if I leave to-
morrow? There will be someone else, anyone else. Maybe he will be better than me but until 
then, you need time. Anybody else will need courage and time” (Interview MD No. 6, 2016) 
Unfortunately, the lack of available resources is a problem that concerns not only HEIs and the Ministry 
of Education, but extends to the wider governance architecture, such as the new QAA ANACIP.  
“Our [QA] agency is modeled after the Romanian agency. […] I believe that that this is not 
very good because the conditions of its establishment were different, […] they [the Romanian 
government] founded it in such a format with government support that was completely different. 
Here they founded it but the support…ask them yourself what their salary is. […] How can you 
demand objectivity from these people? […] They selected good people and they are all respon-
sible and they are all trying. But under our conditions, you need to somehow motivate people. 
                                                          
93 In addition, as of 2015, the MoE has taken it upon itself to verify the applications for doctoral theses at univer-
sities, assessing, according to themselves, the necessity of doctoral thesis topics, the quality of the proposals as 
well as the qualifications of doctoral students and supervisors. 
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Lower salaries as theirs [at the agency] don’t exist! These salaries are just not serious.” (Inter-
view MD No. 10, 2016) 
Given the circumstances, the MoE has quite a track record to show for between 2010 and 2015: It has 
driven the development of HEIs in many areas, drafting a series of recommendations on curriculum 
design, redacted subject-specific qualification frameworks, regulations on doctoral schools and pro-
grams as well as negotiated the development of a new code of education (see above).  
Lastly, an all-pervading problem specific to the small HE system of Moldova is that the overall number 
of individuals teaching at HEIs is comparatively small. This creates a web of strong actor interdepend-
encies. As a representative of the Moldovan QAA summarized: 
“The problem of our country is that it is small, people know each other. And especially in Chis-
inau, because the salaries are so low and the legislation does not outlaw it, people work in 
several HEIs, somewhere full-time and somewhere part-time, so they all depend on each other. 
Here, we need to recognize that as long as these are the conditions, […] people will continue to 
think that there is no other way [than to be corrupt] and that they need each other” (Interview 
MD No. 10, 2016) 
The economic necessity for teaching staff to work at several HEIs to make ends meet, creates problems 
of quality as well as a strong interdependence of everybody engaged in the HE system: 
“For us this is a really negative factor. Because it turns out that a person is head of department 
here, in another private HEI he is pro-rector, and in a third one he teaches. And this deteriorates 
the quality“ (Interview MD No. 2, 2016) 
The problem of low wages and strong interdependency between individuals pervades the entire higher 
education system, including buffer organizations and the Government institutions themselves: Not only 
do key employees of the new QAA work a second job at a university to make ends meet, but so do even 
some employees of the Ministry of Education. For a key oversight body such as an accreditation agency, 
this creates doubts on their true independence. As one dean mentions: 
 “I think to be independent and to take very hard decisions is important at the moment in Mol-
dova. Because the agency is not really independent. Still today the agency is dependent on the 
MoE. Because of the budget, because of the office and many, many other things. They are not 
independent to pay their own bills. […] They depend on the Ministry of Education. The influ-
ence, the internal influence and the political pressure will be used during the accreditation pro-
cess which will start soon. At the moment we are in the mist between needs and realities.” (In-
terview MD No. 2, 2016) 
The practice of multiple employments clearly does not mean that individuals in any of these institutions 
are corrupt – most interview partners believe in the meaningfulness of their work and work long hours 
for little pay. It does, however, create a structural risk to their independence and impartiality.  
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In summary, political volatility, political interventionism, a lack of adequate financing and staff capacity 
within governmental institutions, and strong actor interdependencies has left the HE system exposed to 
the volatilities of Moldovan political majorities and their particular individual interests and has weak-
ened the power of the Moldovan government to pursue an agenda of focused change. 
9.3.4 National-level: Stakeholder organizations  
Higher Education Institutions are far from restricted to being mere objects of governance arrangements. 
By leveraging their individual expertise or political standing and by forming coalitions, they are able to 
articulate their collective interests, to influence policy, and to engage in the governance of the system 
itself. In this sub-chapter, I will explore the role of stakeholder organizations in the evolution of govern-
ance arrangements in the three case countries, which have played very different roles in the development 
of the different case countries and fulfill different functions in the governance of the HE systems.  
In Russia, during the 1990ies, rectors, which had been powerful during Soviet times, had gained an 
even larger degree of control over their HEIs. They had consolidated their power within their HEIs and 
had created sources of income for their HEI and themselves personally, such as from their control over 
university admissions, from tuition income, or from renting out premises. By the end of the 1990s, 
rectors had developed “significant financial interests, and their association effectively became a union 
of owners and entrepreneurs.” (Adamskiy, 2000). While not wanting to lose their relative independence, 
privileges and access to rents, ideologically, they claimed to safeguard what remained of the excellent 
Soviet higher education system from further degradation, which gave them legitimacy in the eyes of 
teaching staff, members of the communist party and large parts of the population. During the 1990ies, 
the Russian Rectors’ Union around Viktor Sadovnichiy, the Rector of Moscow State University, formed 
a political alliance with the communist party, which gave it a political base and direct influence to fight 
off liberal reforms in higher education. In part due to the resistance of rectors, in 2005, the GIFO-fi-
nancing model was given up in favor of at least preserving the EGE against opposition. As Forrat (2015) 
shows, since the early 2000ies, however, the Rectors’ Union’s stance towards the toward state educa-
tional policy changed from one of opposition to negotiation and collaboration (see figure below).  
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Figure 15: Change in the position of the Rectors’ Union toward state educational policy based on analysis of EastView 
Russian Central Newspapers data by Natalia Forrat, taken from Forrat (2013) 
The shift in power away from rectors towards the state was related to greater state control over enroll-
ment, greater state funding as well as stronger state control over HE activities. This relegated the Rec-
tors’ Union to an advisory body which, while still a fairly influential in an advisory capacity, never 
recovered its position as a key policy-setting actor.  
In Kazakhstan, since rectors of public HEIs were directly appointed by the government, they took a 
much less independent stance. Consequently, during the 1990ies, public universities were far less orga-
nized than in Russia. Private universities, who enjoyed a much greater degree of autonomy, established 
the Association of Higher Educational Institutions of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 200294. Whereas 
their role in the governance of the HE system was fairly minor, this began to change with the SPED2011-
2020. Indeed, at the same time the state re-established its preeminence as a policy-setting actor in Russia, 
in Kazakhstan the state began experimenting with shared stakeholder governance. Since the 2010ies, 
Kazakhstan’s Business Association Atameken95 as well as the Association of Higher Educational Insti-
tutions are accredited with the MoES and are obligatorily involved in assessing and commenting on all 
changes to normative documents and legislation on higher education proposed by the MoES. Neither 
organization, however, developed policy-setting influence.  
In contrast to the more stable authoritarian governments in Kazakhstan and Russia, which eventually 
established themselves as the key actors in the governance of the higher education system, in Moldova, 
                                                          
94 By 2017, the association is comprised 77 private and state universities, which enroll more than 86% of all 
students. The association actively lobbies for the interests of HEIs and is respected by the government as a source 
to be consulted for expertise and the views of HEIs. 
95 The business association Atameken was established by Presidential decree to increase self-governance and cre-
ate a coordinated voice for the business community. 
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state institutions have shown themselves prone to institutional capture by political parties and their re-
spective special interests. The degree of political influence over the minister of education, the predomi-
nant model of hierarchical decision-making within Moldovan organizations, and the lack of professional 
and sufficiently independent civil-servants who could maintain a degree of stability and reliability leaves 
the Moldovan HE system exposed to the constant volatility of the often-shifting Moldovan political 
landscape. In this situation, the role and self-perception of the Moldovan Rectors’ Union has become 
that of 1) ‘defenders of the university sector’ against reforms by the Ministry of Education, 2) of lobby-
ing for the interests of universities against the powerful Academy of Science and its privileges in re-
search and 3) to serve as a partner for international (mostly European) cooperation projects. Its influence 
on vetoing policy-decisions has been substantial (e.g. on the role of new governing boards) but has 
mostly served the preservation of the status quo.  
9.3.5 National-level: Higher Education Institutions  
In Russia as well as Kazakhstan, some HEIs have emerged which have become change agents in the 
governance of the HE system not (only) through political lobbying but through the capacity building 
activities they offer to other HEIs.  
In Russia, among these are the Higher School of Economics (HSE) and the Moscow School of Manage-
ment SKOLKOVO. These institutions offer continuing education, trainings, consulting and facilitation 
to university leaders, advising them on strategy development and implementation and promoting a new 
view of the university governance and management. Since 2011, the Moscow School of Management 
SKOLKOVO has been offering “Rectors’ Schools” to train HEI leaders and top-level administrators, 
which have attracted a considerable number of university leaders. The HSE Institute of Education was 
established in 2012 and offers graduate programs on education management and research. While it is 
too early to judge their impact, these programs are creating new communities of practice promoting new 
ideas about institutional governance and management in Russia. This is particularly visible in HEIs 
participating in the various excellence programs, as they actively seek out consulting services from lead-
ing HEIs to develop and implement their strategic development plans.  
In Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev University (NU) was explicitly founded in 2009 to act as a model of a 
world-class university for Kazakhstan’s universities, promote international level research and contribute 
to the development of Kazakhstan’s capital Astana as a hub of international innovation (Hartley, Gopaul 
et al., 2016). The majority of its teaching and research staff received their education at leading univer-
sities world-wide, its governance structure is based on US-American models and every one of NU’s 
‘schools’ is co-managed by a corresponding faculty of a leading foreign HEI. In cooperation with the 
UK Leadership Foundation for Higher Education96 and University College London (UCL), the Gradu-
                                                          
96 https://www.lfhe.ac.uk/  
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ate School of Education conducts yearly ‘leadership schools’ and training programs for HE administra-
tors, HEI leadership, advisory board members on leadership, management and governance in universi-
ties. During the first three years of the programs existance, rectors and vice-rectors were trained. In 
2015, this was expanded to include faculty deans, heads of departments and representatives of the aca-
demic management. Altogether, NU acts as an important “transmission vector” of new governance prac-
tices in HE in Kazakhstan. As a senior MoES representative describes NU’s impact:  
“Of those people who passed their advanced training [at NU], some became rectors of univer-
sities. They developed as personalities. Today we have individual universities moving towards 
becoming a research university. Others are moving towards becoming an entrepreneurial uni-
versity. Another plus is that they gained experience in developing a development strategy for 
their universities. […] Step by step, gradually, we will become ready [to become part of the 
world community]. “ (Interview KZ No. 17, 2017)  
A former vice-rector concurs with this assessment: 
“As a university employee, I felt it […] in 2010. HEIs began to make strategic plans, for exam-
ple, based on some single approaches that were discussed and on which we were trained. […] 
All universities started writing strategies, and we were given detailed guidelines, how to write 
these strategies. Then it started with project management at the state level. They began to talk 
a lot about this. Now a lot of civil servants are being trained in project management. I believe 
that all these processes led to the understanding that, really, there should be monitoring and 
evaluation. Often even simple analysis shows that we do not really know how effective reforms 
are, that are not monitored or what effect they have. […] This is now changing” (Interview KZ 
No. 8, 2017) 
A similar role is played by the independent quality assurance agencies in Russia and Moldova. These 
use the European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance and thus act as transmission vectors 
into HEIs for topics such as student-centered learning, competence-based study program development, 
or stakeholder involvement. The fact that QAAs assess these criteria creates a pressure for HEIs to take 
them into account in their internal practices. QAAs also offer trainings on these topics which further 
support facilitate this change process.  
In Moldova, there is no national institution providing training for HEI leaders. There are, however, 
many EU-funded programs and projects which include similar activities (see 9.3.1.3).  
9.3.6 National-level: Institutional factors of path dependence  
While most of the above forces have acted to promote change, there are powerful forces resisting it. In 
this context, authors on path-dependency such as North (1990), Pierson (2000) or Marginson and 
Rhoades (2002) stress the importance (historically) embedded institutions, which maintain and reinforce 
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the status quo. Such factors are visible in all case countries (to differing degrees) and will be discussed 
in this final sub-chapter.  
9.3.6.1 Hierarchical mental model of governance 
The Soviet model of governance of was one of hierarchical management: The Ministry of Education 
established the normative base, set targets, monitored them, and enforced its procedural rules. Aside 
from at a small number of elite universities, rectors’ main responsibility was assuring compliance with 
legislation and implementing of the plans which they received from the ministerial center. In turn, they 
were the head of university administrations, had a large degree of discretion and control over university 
finances, and presided university academic councils. Academic councils, in their turn, are the supreme 
– and, with few exceptions the only – bodies to establish policy on teaching and learning and typically 
do not delegate any of their powers to other bodies. Since they are headed by the rector and do not 
themselves have a supporting infrastructure, rectors exert very powerful influence within them. This 
form of distribution of authority established during the Soviet period clearly remained in place in all 
three countries. The hierarchical model of governance continues within HEIs. As has been shown, due 
to their control over finances and appointments, if anything, rectors are more powerful than they were 
during the Soviet period.   
In all three countries, the principle of hierarchy is deeply engrained in the mental models actors have of 
governance of the higher education system. For both Moldova and Kazakhstan, most interviewees de-
scribed the pattern that incoming ministers of education would assume they should manage the HEIs 
under their purview in a hierarchical style of command and control (often disregarding or counteracting 
acting policies and legislation). Notably, even though they may criticize individual policies or behaviors 
of the Ministry of Education, only in a few isolated cases did rectors question the basic legitimacy of the 
Ministry’s direct steering of the higher education system. On the contrary, most interviewees supported 
the Ministry’s role of steering and guiding the higher education system. On the other side, many state 
HEIs tend to be reactive and expect regulations and orders from the Ministry rather than taking decisions 
independently. As one acting dean of a Moldovan University observes: 
 “Still today I think that the mentality is the biggest problem. Always they are saying ‘we have 
to ask the Ministry of Education. We are waiting for decisions from the Ministry of Education. 
We are waiting for the paper from the MoE.’ Everything is linked to the ministry of education! 
Still today when we have the new quality assurance agency, we have to wait for the decisions of 
the ministry of education. The Ministry of Education for the entire educational system is like a 
god!” (Interview MD No. 2, 2016) 
In all three case countries, it is a common strategy for rectors to lobby the ministry to issue a directive 
providing them with a government mandate to act in a certain way, even in cases where they have all 
  
page 237 
the formal authority to take decisions themselves. As a Kazakh rector and former MoES official de-
scribes his perception: 
“We always wait until someone allows or forbids something. […] Why are [university rectors] 
always trying to get the ministry to give them an order. [They should] be happy, when nothing 
is prescribed, because it means that [they] are free in this sphere! But universities demand, 
“give us a specific figure”, “how much should we…” or “give us a specific instruction” […] 
Not only [are orders given] from above, but also below, universities are waiting for some sort 
of regulation, and even ask for, demand this regulation.” (Interview KZ No. 13, 2017) 
In internal governance arrangements of HEIs, the principle of hierarchy is perpetuated in that rectors are 
simultaneously heads of university administrations, they control university finances and strategy and 
preside over university senates. The president of the Moldovan Academy of Science, Gheorge Duca 
summarizes this overall observation of the predominant cultural model in the following quote:  
„ Typically only one person decided [in the Soviet Union]. You went to one person, the party 
chairman then, and that was it. […] This keeps us in the past, because we are products of the 
Soviet Union. We were taught this way, they taught us to manage this way and this is how we 
live and manage. And as a matter of fact, out of the large Soviet Union we created many small 
ones. And we manage these in the same way. We need one more generation, and maybe another 
one, because the one that comes now is acting the same way that we, the older generation are 
acting, because that is what they learnt from us” “ (Interview MD No. 1, 2016) 
In principle, the majority of leaders in higher education in the case countries point to the downsides of 
the hierarchical governance model and most claim to be in favor of greater autonomy and a clearer 
differentiation between governance and management. The very nature of the existing system as well as 
mental models and established practices seem to lead them, however, to perpetuate the system they 
themselves criticize. As a quote representative of all three case countries, an acting vice-rector of a large 
private Moldovan university states: 
 “Unfortunately, […] we have a very uncomfortable Soviet heritage and even if today the new 
code of education says that universities are free to decide, we have very retrograde rectors. 
[They say] ‘If we should do something, the ministry should show us how we should do it. And 
only if the minister tells us what we should and how we should do it, maybe we will do it’. It is 
about mentality, and not only conservative mentality, but really, really we should change our 
Soviet heritage and it is very, very difficult” (Interview MD No. 3, 2016) 
Hartley et al. (2016) argue that the system of shared governance by boards of trustees which Kazakhstan 
plans to implement rests on practices and mental models shaped by participatory democracy, which 
academic leaders in Kazakhstan likely do not share due to the Soviet legacy of strong centralized state 
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control and which may indeed conflict with existing norms and values. In their study of responses of 
institutions and their leaders to these changes, they found that  
“in Kazakhstan, many academic leaders understand that a centrally planned system is one ap-
proach for ensuring fairness, efficiency, uniform quality, and eliminating corruption [which has 
been a significant issue since independence (Heyneman 2010)]. A prevailing assumption is that 
expertise resides at the top—whether at the central system in the form of the Ministry or at the 
institutional level in the person of the rector.” (Hartley, Gopaul et al., 2016) 
It is notable that even though all three countries have introduced some form of governance boards to 
expand stakeholder involvement, as of 2015, in no country have these boards yet received real decision-
making powers. In Moldova, rectors have fought strategic advisory boards whose powers remained un-
clear in legislation. In Russia, advisory boards have purely representative and advisory functions, while 
in governing boards, the HEI’s founder (usually the Ministry of Education and Science) has the final 
decision-making authority. In the case of Kazakhstan, legal contradictions complicate giving govern-
ance boards powers, as rectors are legally accountable for anything that happens within their HEI. As a 
senior higher education researcher from Kazakhstan noted: 
“The Idea of lay governance is a new idea in Kazakhstan, that has been used to having strong 
leaders, even historically, and then during the Soviet times with its totalitarian or authoritarian 
structures in place. So there hasn’t been much of a collegial decision-making in the context of 
the country. We can take the forms, we can take the structures, the thing is the culture that we 
need to change.” (Interview KZ No. 3, 2017) 
9.3.6.2 Lack of trust between actors 
Underlying the still-widespread hierarchical command and control approach to governance, seems to be 
a distinct mutual distrust between actors as well as between levels of the higher education system. In 
none of the government agencies of the studied country cases does there seem to be a general attitude 
of trust in HEIs to use greater autonomy for their own development. Instead, a suspicion is widespread 
that any easing of control will lead to corruption. As explained by Sagintayeva & Kurakbayev (2015) 
for the case of Kazakhstan, the State maintains central control for the sake of quality, a wariness of 
corruption and low confidence in the ability of university leadership to exercise new powers effectively’. 
The same seems true for Moldova and Russia as well. In addition to not trusting HEIs to act according 
to national and international standards, the ministries often doubt that HEIs would do something con-
structive with their autonomy without government control. The desire to control the proper implemen-
tation of policies and implement state strategy lies at the bottom of many legislative frameworks which, 
reserve the final decision-making rights on quality assurance (as in Moldova) or the appointment of 
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rectors (as in Kazakhstan) for the ministry. Within universities, there is an expectation (based on expe-
rience) that the ministries will probably not respect new governance arrangements. As one Moldovan 
vice-rector recounts: 
 “The law [the education code] says that universities are free to implement different study pro-
grams, to keep the value of academic freedom and autonomy. Now, after the adoption of the 
code [on education] we have our dear MoE who just elaborates the new regulations. If you 
compare these regulations with the previous, Soviet ones, they are identical! So the code says 
you are free, you should take decisions in the senate, decide about final exams, quality assur-
ance, etc. and after that they just elaborate norms and these norms are very, very coercive […] 
and it’s not easy” (Interview MD No. 3, 2016) 
Likewise, as a former minister of education of Kazakhstan stated, the legal framework notwithstanding, 
rectors are exposed to the ministry which retains the permanent option to intervene: 
 “You see, the minister is the minister. He has a lot of powers. […] To say that the minister 
could not remove a rector... Well, of course there are cases that he cannot. This relates to rectors 
of national universities, because the rectors of national universities are appointed by the presi-
dent. In this case it is difficult even for a minister. But the rector of a regional university. Why 
not? Any organization has some shortcomings, some mistakes are made, therefore ... […] If the 
minister wants to [get rid of a rector], he can. That is why he is the minister” (Interview KZ No. 
4, 2017) 
It would be misleading, however, to explain tight regulation with a desire to keep control. The ministry 
often simply does not trust the ability of the majority of universities to act according to national and 
international standards. They suspect (and, as accreditations carried out by EKKA and ARACIS in same 
cases confirmed) that many HEIs fail to follow the normative framework. The intervention is justified 
by HEIs not being able to do “the right thing” by themselves: 
 “Universities now have a large degree of autonomy but they do not know what to do with it!” 
(Interview MD No. 6, 2016) 
The desire of Ministries to maintain control and be the ultimate decision-making agency, seems to lie at 
the bottom of the legislative framework which, although foreseeing autonomy for HEIs and buffer bod-
ies such as Quality Assurance Agencies, seems to inform policy in a lot of areas.  
Interestingly enough, the mutual distrust extends into many universities. Academic staff usually do not 
trust university leaders to safeguard their academic freedom, and are often themselves wary of greater 
university autonomy, as more autonomy to the institution would in effect mean greater power for rectors 
over them. As Johnstone and Bain have observed in the case of Russia, academic staff “may resist a 
larger measure of autonomy […] if they perceive themselves or their jobs to be better protected by the 
ministry or the government than by their ‘own’ president, rector, or dean.” (Johnstone, B. & Bain, 
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2002). The same has been found by Sagintayeva & Kurakbayev (2015) for the case of Kazakh academ-
ics.  
9.3.6.3 Lack of self-steering capacity of HEIs 
During the Soviet period, academic autonomy of non-elite HEIs had been severely restricted. Curricula, 
text books, teaching materials, the format of assessment, etc. were centrally prepared and HEIs were 
expected to merely implement them. The only self-governance capacity HEIs needed was to organize 
time tables and room planning. The increased academic autonomy since the end of the Soviet period 
meant that HEIs had to develop the capacity to develop their own study plan, quality assurance mecha-
nisms, including complex tasks such as critical self-reflection, strategy development, leadership, and 
management. The hierarchical approach to governance had centralized these functions within Ministries 
or elite HEIs. The growth of institutional autonomy presupposes that HEIs would need to develop these 
capacities themselves. For this, they are often ill-prepared.  
In Moldova, as well as in rural regions of Russia and Kazakhstan, the majority of HEIs are too small 
and too poorly funded to become effective institutional actors. Their small size and precarious financial 
situation makes it difficult for them to employ and maintain the qualified staff necessary to develop the 
self-governance capacities required for broad university autonomy. In several cases, teaching staff are 
not paid living wages, forcing them to find a second or third source of income, often either in the private 
sector or through holding several concurrent positions at different HEIs. In the majority of cases, these 
conditions make regular staff development or research completely unrealistic.  
In interviews, several representatives noted that HEI staff do often not understand how to properly de-
velop study programs, based on the state standards. As a result, ministries do not trust in the capacity of 
universities and suspects (and, as accreditations carried out by EKKA and ARACIS in the case of Mol-
dova confirmed) that many HEIs do not follow the normative framework. This, in turn, contributes to 
the view within the MoE that HEIs are not ready for autonomy and that if, HEIs were to be left to their 
own devices, a decline in quality and the end of a unified higher education system would inevitably 
follow. For the case of Kazakhstan, a 2017 OECD review found that many HEIs do not deviate from 
the standard study plans (OECD, 2017), even if they could. The report relates this to a lack of capacity 
on the side of HEIs to develop their own study programs, as well as to the tradition of top-down steering. 
As one researcher comments: 
“I guess it is a part of path dependency. Universities are mostly used to do what was dictated 
by the ministry. So there is a standard and they develop their programs under the standards and 
that’s it, I mean, they are ready to go. When we visited universities, you can say that the staff 
who are doctors and kandidaty nauk are mostly elder people who have defended their disserta-
tions in Soviet times. There are few English-speaking young staff that could move along with 
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the demand from outside. It is mostly related to the [lack of] capacity I think” (Interview KZ 
No. 2, 2017) 
This is related to the rather low level of staff remuneration still prevalent at many public and private 
HEIs which makes the teaching profession unattractive to many graduates and forces many academics 
to accept very high teaching loads or take on additional employment elsewhere. The lack of capacity to 
invest in developing good study programs in some cases leads to detrimental effects on quality. As a 
Kazakh higher education researcher recounts:  
“Electives came out of nowhere, they were developed, just so that there are electives. This is 
linked to capacity and professional development of teachers. Now universities have the auton-
omy to develop their own programs, but the staff at department level does not have the capacity, 
they don’t know what to do. (Interview KZ No. 2, 2017) 
Recognizing the lack of capacity for self-governance in some HEIs, one may argue that the detailed 
regulations in the code of education, limiting academic, staff, and organizational autonomy, are adaptive 
in the sense that they standardize and regulate a fragmented higher education system of HEIs which are 
unable to internalize these functions due to a lack of the necessary financial and human resources.  
9.3.6.4 The appeal of historical models of higher education 
In contrast to Russia or other Eastern-European post-socialist countries, neither Kazakhstan nor Mol-
dova had a pre-communist tradition of higher education that could have provided an attractive model of 
governance to aspire to return to. Neither Moldova nor Kazakhstan had hosted centers of of academic 
excellence in the Soviet Union. For the majority of Moldovans who identified with Romania, joining 
the EHEA was mostly seen as a “return to Europe”. In Kazakhstan, the goal of becoming a part of the 
wider world and adopting “best practices” outweighed the identification with the Soviet model of higher 
education.  
In Russia, however, the idea of the Soviet system of education providing ‘the best education in the 
world’ was widespread among the conservative elites in HEIs. The notion that the system was not in 
need of any reform, but just of better funding (which found strong proponents in the Russian Union of 
Rectors) stood in direct opposition to adopting “foreign” practices. In no country was the Bologna Pro-
cess met with heavier resistance than in Russia, where it was labeled a form of “Western educational 
imperialism”. The decision to join the process anyway was therefore made by the political elite against 
the will of the academic elite which long continued to resist it (Tomusk, 2007). Since the predominant 
narrative in universities had it that despite of a severe lack of funding, Russian higher education was 
still of superb quality, the majority of HEI leaders saw little reason to actually implement the Bologna 
Process’s action lines, or other “Western” practices. In Russia, it was the “ranking shock” of the early 
2000s (when only one Russian university even figured among the best 100 HEIs worldwide) which first 
had a profound effect on the Russian elite universities, who found themselves far from being the leaders 
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near the bottom of league tables or absent altogether. The true shift in perspective took place among the 
universities participating in the various excellence programs, and the HEIs imitating them, with the hope 
of joining. The added funding these HEIs received, the accountability to develop university development 
plans, and the funding to implement them, has led to a change in thinking among elite HEIs.  
What becomes notable in the case of Kazakhstan, is its openness to international advice and deliberate 
imports of international governance models. Their influence was highlighted by a senior policy expert 
who noted on the topic of system governance: 
“By the way, when international experts started to visit us in the late 1990s, already then, they 
started telling us that we are too organized, that the system is too centralized. They told us this 
really often when they compared [systems of higher education]. They told this to us, to Russia, 
and to China, and to other Central Asian states. […] This has had an influence” (Interview KZ 
No. 8, 2017). 
As to the motivations for joining OECD and founding the Information-Analytical Center, a leading 
employee described: 
“Well, it's a question of prestige, of course, for politicians... But you know what's important: 
Here are 35 OECD countries, which are considered to be the club of the best countries. You 
can think for yourself how effective it is to study each experience, each country separately some-
how, from various sources, or to be able to participate in these committee meetings twice a year, 
to be able to communicate with them face to face, in one place, to prepare documents, to par-
ticipate in the discussions, and to have the opportunity to understand the ongoing trends. We 
have already realized how great this is. Because our employees went and participated in one 
meeting 2015. Just then the question was discussed here is the initiative of [Andreas] Schleicher 
education 2020. These mega competencies. And they brought such a package of very valuable 
documents. That is, here, what is born in the bowels of the OECD, of course, it is more effective 
to see this immediately there. And to communicate with experts in one place. Well, that's what 
this explanation seems to me.  
Although of course there is prestige for the country. But more importantly, we have recently 
been actively engaging in benchmarking in Kazakhstan. You must have noticed. We look at 
foreign experience. So now for us it is very important for us to see how things are done in the 
best countries, and to do it like this. In order to understand your place. Because for a long time 
we did not have this opportunity.” (Interview KZ No. 8, 2017). 
For Kazakhstan, the orientation at international models helped it to cast itself as the leader in its geo-
graphical neighborhood:  
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“If we compare how Kazakhstan is promoting these reforms with what is going on in Uzbekistan 
or Kyrgyzstan, then we can clearly see how serious we are taking this. Of course in the imple-
mentation there are then further difficulties but we manage and the country is learning” (Inter-
view KZ No. 11, 2017) 
“In general, in comparison to Germany, in Kazakhstan and the entire post-Soviet space is that 
ministries have more of a controlling function. But now related with the introduction of inde-
pendent accreditation, this control function is slowly receding from the MoES. This is a really 
difficult process, believe me. But this path is not present in Uzbekistan, in Kyrgyzstan, in Tajik-
istan, in Turkmenistan. Our independent agencies can and will control quality” (Interview KZ 
No. 11, 2017)  
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10 Discussion and Outlook 
The extensive review of the three case studies and the cross-country comparison has made clear that the 
isomorphic pressures of the “global model” of governance practices have exerted and continue to exert 
a considerable influence in each of the studied cases. The governance instruments promoted by OECD, 
WB and the EU are clearly recognizable in the 2015 governance arrangements in all three case countries.  
On the instruments-level, a process of convergence towards the “global model” is clearly visible. At the 
same time, this convergence does not represent a displacement of previous governance arrangements 
but rather a layering of new instruments and structures upon core features of a post-Soviet model of 
governance which all three countries share.  
How can these developments be explained? A key postulate of isomorphism according to DiMaggio & 
Powell (1983) is that systems adopt changes in order to gain or maintain legitimacy. This aspect is 
clearly visible in each country case: Russia uses global rankings to measure the effect of her investments 
in ‘world class’ research universities. Kazakhstan adopts OECD-recommendations and implements the 
Bologna Process in order to be ‘on the map’ globally. Moldova follows European policies in higher 
education in order to ‘join Europe’ and continue to profit from European funding. Yet the interplay of 
global, regional, and national polities, entities or organizations which has promoted, shaped and impeded 
changes is far more complex than that.  
During the 1990ies, the three studied countries had to cope with similar challenges. This fact, and the 
fact that they share a number of distinct interrelated cultural and institutional features such as a hier-
archical mental model of governance, a general lack of trust between actors, and a lack of self-steering 
capacity of HEIs may help to explain how the similarities identified as the “Post-Soviet Model” have 
emerged and were maintained.  
Characteristics of the actors promoting the change provide further insights. In both Russia and Kazakh-
stan, the main driving forces behind the changes are the state organs acting in alignment with supporting 
institutions for this change: The swift adoption of OECD-recommended policies in Kazakhstan would 
not be imaginable without presidential support for “Westernizing” reforms in the entire country, but also 
not without other vectors of influence such as returning Bolashak scholarship holders and, since 2009, 
the activities of Nazarbayev University. In Russia, influential national institutions such as the Higher 
School of Economics (HSE), the Centre for Strategic Initiatives, and the Moscow School of Manage-
ment SKOLKOVO promoted and supported the adoption of new governance mechanisms by an increas-
ingly assertive “power vertical”. In contrast, in Moldova, national-level factors such as political insta-
bility, and weak state institutions, underfunding, nepotism, and the high degree of interdependence be-
tween individuals have stifled the capacity of the higher education system to change and has led to a 
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gridlock between actors. This gridlock somewhat eased since the early 2010s, when EU-supported pol-
icies and funding came to shape the development trajectory of the country, although changes so far 
remain superficial.  
In all three countries, a key feature of the Soviet model of governance has thus remained: The centrality 
of the state in steering and managing the development higher education system.  
The more things change, the more they stay the same then?  
Yes and no. It seems that the activities of international actors towards promoting the ‘global model’ of 
university governance may actually have reinforced the power of the state. Firstly, by engaging in trans-
national influence on policy-making, international actors such as the OECD, the World Bank and the 
European commission typically address the nation-state as the legitimate actor in higher education re-
form. Through making perceived shortcomings visible via international comparisons, or via obligations 
from having entered international agreements such as the Bologna Process, transnational actors actually 
provide legitimacy to the nation state (Krücken et al., 2007). This is certainly happening in the case 
countries: International rankings and the promotion of “best practices” by organizations such as the 
OECD and the World Bank create legitimacy for the state to actively redistribute and focus funding into 
the top tier of HE systems and prospective “world class research universities”, or to establish evaluative 
systems for monitoring HEIs through new systems of quality assurance. Secondly, the steering instru-
ments promoted by the global model (such as the monitoring of performance indicators upon which 
funding and administrative measures can be based, expanding the power of HEI leaders at the expense 
of academics) provide a much more effective way of steering the system97. This finding is most visible 
in the case of Russia which is adopting indicator-based performance measures for steering the HE sys-
tem to a much larger degree than any Western European countries. It may well be that the NPM-inspired 
instruments were so quickly adopted in Russia precisely because they coincide so well with the existing 
authoritarian assumptions that an HEsystem should legitimately be steered from the hierarchical center.  
  
                                                          
97 Without making any statement about the quality of output and outcomes of HEIs thus steered.  
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10.1 Concluding reflections on the contribution of this study to the field of re-
search 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY. The present study provides, for the first time, a comprehensive 
overview of the changing governance of three post-Soviet higher education systems. By guiding the 
analysis with a common analytical- thematic framework, it is one of the few studies that has attempted 
a systematic comparison across such are large time span: 25 years of change. I have tried to re-trace 
global, European, and national-level factors and influences on these changes and to contextualize events 
in the complex interplay of these factors and influences. I have tried to contribute to a differentiated 
understanding of the factors driving, shaping and impeding changes, which too often are reduced to 
single factors of influence, such as the Bologna Process. Finally, the study may be of interest to HE 
researchers or policy-makers trying to make sense of the evolution of higher education in the post-Soviet 
space in a cross-national comparative perspective.  
AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH. Due to the scope of the project, it is inevitable that issues 
could not receive the attention they might deserve. Clearly, each of the theoretical perspectives em-
ployed in this study could be individually pursued in greater depth in further studies. Each of the indi-
vidual thematic dimensions included in this study would merit more a detailed analysis. By trying to 
consider the wider policy-context of the study, I hope to have contributed to laying the ground for such 
work.  
POLICY IMPLICATIONS. This study has tried to avoid taking a normative stance and has attempted 
to approach the subject of governance from a perspective of understanding the multi-causal “why” and 
“how” of changes, rather than the justification or merit of individual policy changes. This study, as 
others before it, has shown that new policies or institutions almost never replace previous ones, but are 
layered on top of each other. Indeed, even where policy recommendations are closely implemented into 
law, in their implementation they interact with local realities and institutions leading to conflict and 
contradiction. Where this occurs, more often than not, the status quo prevails. Policy change is more 
likely to be effective where it is supported by glonacal forces aligning to create pressure and legitimacy 
of change, as well as by changing mental models of actors within the system. The lesson for policy 
entrepreneurs is then to invest more time and work into a deep understanding of the different national 
institutional contexts, and the objectives and values of the actors shaping the respective governance 
system and to develop a holistic approach to change.  
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12 Annexes 
12.1 Annex 1: Russia - The governance of the higher education system 
12.1.1 Russia: Structure of the higher education system 
12.1.1.1 Structure of Educational programs 
Study programs are divided into professional “specialties” (Special’nosti), which are further divided 
into “specializations” (Specializacii), such as specialty engineering, specialization thermal power engi-
neering. Specialist (Specialist), Master (Magistr) and Bachelor (Bakalavr) study programs are grouped 
into study areas and study fields (Napravlenija). All study programs are assigned an identification num-
ber and name. Study programs of the same study area have the same ID number. The State Standards 
for higher education define contents and structure for study areas (see below). Among other aspects, the 
standards centrally regulate the number of hours by contact hours, seminar work; student work load, the 
length of internships, thesis writing and examinations; contents of study programs divided into 1) foun-
dation studies/core courses 2) basic professional courses 3) specialized courses. Generally speaking, 
foundation studies/core courses constitute the major part of the curriculum during the first 2 years, with 
basic professional and specialization subjects beginning in the third year. Core course requirements are 
the same for all specializations within the same study area.  
12.1.1.2 Differentiation of the higher education system  
The Russian Federation boasts a rather large number of both public and private HEIs. In addition, many 
of them have branches (filialy) across the country and abroad, mostly in CIS countries. Apart from na-
tional HEIs, there are HEIs funded and regulated by the RF’s regions and municipalities. The official 
classification of HEIs distinguishes institutes (instituty), academies (akademii) and universities (univer-
sitety). Universities offer a wide range of programs in many disciplines. Academies are specialized HEIs 
which offer study programs in specific domains. Institutes train specialists in a specific profession.  
12.1.1.3 Size and growth of the higher education system 
In the beginning of the 1990ies, the collapse of the Russian economy and the subsequent crisis of the 
state budget and subsequent budget cuts to HEIs, left them scrambling to cover even their day-to-day 
expenses (Motova, 2015). The economic contraction after the break-up of the Soviet Union, especially 
in the area of engineering and the declining salaries led to a devaluation of these skills, a loss of inter-
est in their studies and a pronounced brain-drain by emigration or changes of profession. During the 
early 1990ies, this led to a decline in interest in higher education, as prospective students and their par-
ents regarded higher education as out-of-date, expensive and irrelevant for the new capitalist society 
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(Adrian et al., 2000, p. 30). Between the late 1980ies and 1994-1995, enrollment numbers were actu-
ally declining. The decline in student numbers sharply reversed in the middle of the 1990ies, when 
high unemployment made gainful employment difficult and it became clear that higher education, es-
pecially in the new and prestigious areas such as economics and law represented a strong positional 
good on the labor market. HEIs tried to cope with the changing environment and the dramatic decrease 
in funding by opening new study programs in areas with the highest consumer demand and employ-
ment prospects for graduates (mostly social sciences, IT, and foreign languages), by expanding even-
ing and correspondence courses, and by establishing branches in other regions and localities (Kuzmi-
nov et al., 2015).  
 
Figure 16: Number of students enrolled in public and private HEIs 
The 1990ies saw a tremendous expansion of both enrollment as well as the number of HEIs. A number 
of formerly dependent “branches” of HEIs became independent HEIs in their own right. In addition, 
the numbers of new branches soared: While in 1993, state HEIs had less than 200 branches, in 2008, 
this number reached 2,096 (Motova & Navodnov, 2009).  
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Figure 17: Number of HEIs in Russia 
The relatively liberal regulation regarding existing HEIs for expanding enrollment and establishing 
branches as well as the establishment of new HEIs led to an unprecedented growth of the HEI system. 
At their peak in 2005, in Russia, there were 2201 branches of public and private universities.  
In total, since 1990, the number of HEIs doubled (from 600 to over 1200). while the number of stu-
dents enrolled in HE tripled from 2,5 million to 7,8 million (Motova, 2015). A similar expansion hap-
pened in the number of study programs (which rose from 10.200 to 32.500), especially in the social 
sciences. Most new study programs were opened in this area, both because they did not require a large 
investment in infrastructure and facilities as well as because the new market economy had a much 
larger demand for economist and lawyers. On the other hand, student demand for the teaching, medi-
cal and engineering professions dropped.  
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Figure 18: Number of students by mode of study 
As higher education degrees became more common and of more heterogeneous quality, their value on 
the labor market changed. Increasingly, employers made having a higher education degree a general 
prerequisite for hiring, which further increased the pressure to obtain any higher education qualifica-
tions. This fueled not only corruption in university admissions, but also contributed to the growth of 
low-quality HEIs and the enormous rise in part-time and correspondence students. In the eyes of many 
observers, the massive expansion had negative repercussions on the quality of the system (Motova 
& Pykkö, 2012). Not only were new programs set up primarily in “cheap” and popular disciplines 
such as economics, law and the humanities. These new programs were often staffed by academics 
teaching simultaneously at one or several other HEIs. The classification of HEIs also changed in an 
inflationary manner. In 1992, HEIs received the right to determine their own denominations, as a con-
sequence of which the classical distinction of universities, academies and institutes lost its meaning. 
Whereas in the Soviet Union, there had been only one classical universities per city and only in large 
cities, their number rose six-fold, the number of academies by a factor of 30 (Motova, 2015).  
After 2006, the trend towards expansion and massification of the higher education system started to 
gradually reverse, beginning with small, low-prestige private universities, and since 2007 also in the 
public sector (Abankina, I. et al., 2016). An important background factor for understanding the dy-
namics of higher education dynamics is demography. Natalist policies in the 1980ies had led to rising 
fertility rates, which decreased again after 1988. This affected the overall size of the student popula-
tion, by the end of 1990s (Platonova & Semyonov, 2018).  
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Figure 19: Population of Russia 1991-2013. Source: (Platonova & Semyonov, 2018)  
The two main reasons for this decline in demand for higher education were the general demographic 
decline on the one hand, and the financial and economic crisis since 2008 on the other (Abankina, I. et 
al., 2016). Since then, there has been a process of consolidation in the numbers of students and, in con-
sequence, HEIs.  
12.1.2 Actors and their capabilities 
12.1.2.1 State actors 
The Russian system of government is characterized by a duality of the government on the one hand, and 
the Presidential administration on the other.98 The Russian president, as a popularly elected head of the 
state, appoints (and dismisses) the Government. The president can set a policy agenda, and overturn or 
change any of the prime minister’s decisions by issuing decrees (ukazy and porucheniya) obliging the 
government to implement them. The Russian institutional set-up therefore relegates the government to 
policy-making in secondary areas and to performing technical, routine, and administrative functions, 
especially in areas in which the president has taken an interest.  
To maintain its policy-making capacity vis-à-vis the government, the Presidential administration dupli-
cates many ministry capacities. The President, as well as the ministries and the Duma maintain a series 
of advisory councils on a number of issues, staffed with figures representing the professional commu-
nities. The Presidential Administration maintains staff to oversee the implementation of presidential 
decrees. The conflict and competition often emerging from these two poles of policy-making represents 
a form of opinion pluralism which creates a degree of opposition in an otherwise effectively (if not in 
name and appearance) single-party political system (Interview RU No. 9, 2017).  
                                                          
98 For a detailed analysis of the Russian institutional design and its consequences for policy-making and the various 
principal-agents problems of this institutional arrangement see Gel’man & Starodubtsev (2016) 
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The administration of the president of the Russian Federation can thus be described as the strategic 
“power core” of the higher education system. As one former high-ranking public official describes:  
“I am not saying that they [the presidential administration] designed and ran everything. But 
the signal, that the country’s leadership thinks that we should move in this direction, sets the 
development vector, which is formulated in the yearly presidential address in front of the Fed-
eral parliament. After this the government and the ministries start their work in the realization 
of these instructions […]. Already in Soviet times it was like this” (Interview RU No. 3, 2015) 
Regarding higher education, aside from presidential orders, state strategies, which define priorities and 
directions, and federal programs of education development (federalnye programmy razvitiya obra-
zovaniya) are important instruments by which the government plans the mid- and long-term policy in 
the area of education. These programs are significant primarily because they are realized with a dedi-
cated budget for their implementation. The Ministry of Education of responsible for administrating and 
executing these programs and reports to the Presidential administration and to the State Duma.  
The initiator of new legislation is typically the Minister of Education who (with or without a presidential 
order or recommendation of one of the presidential committees) initiates the drafting of new legislation 
within the ministry. As in other authoritarian states (Gandhi, 2010), parliament and political parties 
perform only a secondary role in decision-making. The legislation is discussed and passed by Duma and 
the Federation Council, but rarely ever opposed. As one former member of the government explained:  
“What can the Duma do? Amendments to the law go through the Duma, but these amendments 
need to be coordinated with the government. If the government says that it does not support an 
amendment, in 99% of the cases, the Duma will block it. This is why the Duma is at this moment 
not independent, because [the state party] United Russia supports both the president and the 
head of the government”. […] “The real centers of power are the ministry and the government” 
(Interview RU No. 14, 2017)  
An additional characteristic of the Russian political culture is the important role of personal relationships 
between key actors. Personal loyalty is highly valued and drives many decisions of appointment of key 
personnel. This begins with the government which is nominated by the president (in formal coordination 
with the Duma) but extends downwards throughout the political and administrative hierarchy. It is very 
typical for the Russian political system that when the minister or the head of an agency is replaced, the 
incoming person replaces all of the key positions with personnel of his or her own choosing. While this 
helps to assure loyalty within organizations and sub-units, it has obvious negative repercussions for 
continuity and preserving organizational knowledge, which is lost in each transition. The low personnel 
continuity within institutions makes policy-making highly dependent on fluctuating relationships be-
tween the individuals heading the key institutions, such as the Minister of Education and Science, the 
chairman of the Duma Committee on Education, and the head of the education section of the Presidential 
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Administration and the head, as well as their individual access to the Presidential Administration and 
the President (Interview RU No. 14, 2017).  
The following actors play important roles in the governance of the Russian system of higher education: 
RF Ministry of Education and Science (Ministerstvo obrazovaniya i nauki Rossiyskoy Federatsii - 
MoES)99 and other RF ministries  
Since Soviet times, most State HEIs still fall under jurisdiction of 24 federal ministries. The majority of 
HEIs are affiliated to the RF Ministry of Education and Science (337 HEI), followed by the Ministry of 
Agriculture (58 HEI), the Ministry of Health and Social Development (47), the Ministry of Culture and 
Mass Communications (44). In addition, eight ministries are in charge of two higher education institu-
tions each (EACEA, 2012c).  
The Ministry of Education and Science establishes State Education Standards and formulates the general 
policy on education, including financial policy for all HEIs. Implementation of some aspects is delegated 
to regional education administrations (departments, Ministries or committees) and HEIs, which have 
significant autonomy to adopt their own regulations. Regional parliaments can adopt further legislation 
to align the activities of HEIs to regional needs (EACEA, 2012c).  
The Ministry of Education and Science is responsible for drafting and implementing government policy 
and legal regulation in the field of education, science, research and development and related innovation 
activities, nanotechnology, development of national research and high technology centers, national re-
search centers and academic towns, intellectual property, as well as guardianship and custody of minors, 
social assistance, social security for students, youth policy, and state services and state property man-
agement in the field of education, upbringing, science, research and development and related innovation 
activities. It has existed in its current form since 2004 after a merger of the Ministry of Education (Min-
isterstvo obrazovaniya) and the Ministry of Industry, Science and Technologies (Ministerstvo promysh-
lennosti, nauki I tekhnologii).  
While ministers during the 1990ies had a relatively short tenure, between 1998 and 2016, three ministers 
significantly shaped the work of the ministry:  
Vladimir Mikhailovich Filippov was Minister of Education of the Russian Federation in 1998–2004. 
Before his appointment, he served as Rector of Peoples' Friendship University of Russia. In 2001, he 
presented the program “Modernization of Russian education until the year 2010” which foresaw the 
introduction of the Unified State Exam, the introduction of targeted enrollment in universities, increased 
support for university dormitories, a new stratification of HEIs, into different categories of leading uni-
versities and the elaboration of a new generation of State educational standards. Filippov also lobbied 
for and achieved Russia’s accession to the Bologna Process in 2003.  
                                                          
99 http://xn--80abucjiibhv9a.xn--p1ai/  
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Andrei Alexandrovich Fursenko, a physicist and businessman, served as minister between 2004-2012. 
Before his appointment as minister, between 2001 and 2003 he had served as Deputy Minister of Indus-
try, Science and Technology. The most notable milestones during his tenure were the introduction of 
the Unified State Examination, the establishment of Federal Universities, the Research university pro-
gram as well as a program to fund attracting high profile international researchers to Russian HEIs.  
In 2012, Fursenko was succeeded by Dmitry Viktorovich Livanov, rector of the National University of 
Science and Technology (MISIS) who had been Fursenko's deputy from 2005 to 2007. In the time be-
tween 2012 and 2015 the struggle over low-quality higher education institutions became one of the 
major priorities for policy-makers. In 2016, Livanov was replaced by Olga Vasileva.  
Federal Inspection Service for Education and Science (Federal’naya sluzhba po nadzoru I 
kontrolyu v sfere obrazovaniya i nauki - Rosobnadzor)100 
According to the Russian legislation, Rosobnadzor is the federal executive power body, overseeing the 
education system. Rosobrnadzor emerged in 2004 from the former Department of Licensing, Accredi-
tation and Attestation and other state bodies. Among its tasks are the process of state licensing and 
accreditation, monitoring of the HE system, and conducting the Unified State exam.  
Formally, the tasks of Rosobrnadzor in the sphere of higher education are the control of compliance 
with legal norms, of licensing requirements, and of quality. Rosobnadzor is the only body that may 
award state accreditation certificates. It has delegated most of the practical operation to its subsidiary 
agency, the National Accreditation Agency, which is responsible for conducting the state accreditation 
procedure and preparing the analytical report to the Accreditation Board (ENQA, 2014a). The Accredi-
tation Board is another advisory body attached to Rosobrnadzor which issues recommendations on ac-
creditation. Its membership consists of representatives of HEIs leaderships, employers and students’ 
organizations. The board is chaired by the head of Rosobrnadzor, and the vice-chair of the board is the 
deputy head of Rosobrnadzor. Decisions taken by the board have the formal status of recommendations 
to Rosobnadzor. These recommendations are then considered by an Accreditation Collegium consisting 
of senior officials from Rosobrnadzor (ENQA, 2014a). The board meets 6 times a year. 8 of the 16 
members of the Accreditation Commission are representatives from NAA (ENQA, 2014a). Rosobnad-
zor retains all final decision-making rights, the approval of the criteria for state accreditation as well as 
for individual decisions on the nomination of experts and final accreditations. Since 2004, licensing and 
accreditation of HEIs have increasingly been transformed from a relatively toothless procedure in the 
hand of a relatively independent accreditation agency into powerful instruments of state steering and 
control in the hands of Rosobnadzor and, by extension, the Ministry of Education (Interview RU No. 
14, 2017).  
                                                          
100 http://www.obrnadzor.gov.ru/  
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Predecessor organizations were the Research and Information Centre of State Accreditation (Nauchno-
informatsionnyy tsentr gosudarstvennoy akkreditatsii – 1995, founded in Yoshkar-Ola) which assisted 
HEIs in preparing for accreditation and the Informational-methodological analysis center (Infor-
matsionno-metodicheskiy tsentr analiza – 2001, founded in Shakhty), which reviewed courses in terms 
of their compliance with the State Education Standards, before becoming part of Rosobrnadzor in 2004.  
National Accreditation Agency (Federal'noye gosudarstvennoye byudzhetnoye uchrezhdeniye 
«Natsional'noye akkreditatsi-onnoye agentstvo v sfere obrazovaniya» NAA (FBGU «Rosakkreda-
gentstvo») 
Under the influence of the Bologna Process, in 2005, the previous the Research and Information Centre 
of State Accreditation was renamed into the National Accreditation Agency emerged from (Chistokh-
valov, 2007).  
Until 2009101 NAA was responsible for collecting and processing information about the HEIs which 
have to undergo state licensing and accreditation. To do so, NAA maintained the “Central Database of 
State Accreditation” (CDSA), which contained information about the activity of higher education insti-
tutions, secondary vocational education and training institutions and institutions of further professional 
education. NAA collected information for the Database via a specially developed software. According 
to NAA’s website, the database contained information about the activities of 1416 HEIs and 2127 
branches, 2945 sVET institutions and 730 branches, 349 institutions of further professional education 
and 73 branches. The data was used for the preparation of final reports for the Accreditation Board.  
NAA organizes the site visits during the process of state accreditation. The site visits are conducted, 
however, exclusively by experts without the presence of NAA staff (ENQA, 2014a). Since 2009, NAA 
is also responsible for selecting experts for external evaluation panels. This is done by random selec-
tion for each panel (ENQA, 2014a). For this purpose, NAA maintains a pool of experts comprising of 
over 2300 people (NAA, 2015a). Before being admitted to the pool, experts need to be certified by 
Rosobrnadzor (ENQA, 2014a). To qualify experts, NAA conducts monthly training seminars which are 
a prerequisite for experts to participate in reviews. Upon completion of the training, participants are 
assessed through a test and an interview. According to ENQA (2014a) only around 60 % of candidates 
pass the certification test. All experts who participate in state accreditations have to be accredited by 
Rosobrnadzor (ENQA, 2014a).  
Between 2005-2009, NAA also conducted the assessment of student learning outcomes in terms of their 
compliance to the requirements of the State Educational Standards – SES. This was done via computer 
testing102.  
                                                          
101 Since 2009, any data collection is centralized within the MoES. HEIs now provide data exclusively to the MoES 
102 Since 2009, HEIs prepare their own tests to verify the learning outcomes which are then also used during state 
accreditation procedures 
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NAA is a member of the following networks INQAAHE (full membership since 2001); CEENQA (full 
membership since 2002); APQN (full membership since 2006); EAQAN (full membership since 2004); 
IAEA (full membership since 2007); ENQA (full membership since 2009). According to the 2014 
ENQA review, NAA has 13 structural units (12 departments and one branch) with a total of 101 staff. 
The 2013 budget was 88 million rubles (at the time ~EUR 1.8 million), while the budget of 2014 was 
increased to 270 million rubles (~EUR 5,3 million), which partly reflects the fact the expert fees had not 
been part of NAAs budget before (ENQA, 2014a). NAA is a non-profit organization but has the right to 
carry out for-profit consultancy activities as long as these remain compliant with the statutory purpose 
of the agency.  
Main State Center for Education Evaluation / National Information Center (Glavnyy gosudar-
stvennyy ekspertnyy tsentr otsenki obrazovaniya", FGBNU „Glaveksperttsentr“) 
The center was established in 1997 by the Ministry of Education. In 2005, it was transferred to Roso-
brnadzor. On behalf of Rosobrnadzor, the center collects and provides information on international ac-
ademic degrees and qualifications and assesses them for equivalence to degrees and titles of the Russian 
Federation. The formal decision on recognition is taken by Rosobrnadzor. A number of HEIs have the 
legal powers to recognize foreign qualifications without the involvement of the Center103. This concerns 
mostly National Research Universities and Federal Universities. The Center is the Russian member of 
the ENIC-NARIC network.  
Higher Attestation Commission (Vysshaya attestatsionnaya komissiya – VAK) 
The VAK controls the awarding of advanced academic degrees for all Russian HEIs with the exception 
of Moscow and Saint Petersburg State Universities (since 2008). Among its tasks is the coordination of 
dissertation councils in Russian universities and research institutes; promulgating regulations concern-
ing awarding of academic degrees; awarding the degrees of Candidate of Sciences and Doctor of Sci-
ences, upon the recommendation of the Dissertation Council in the university or research institute where 
the defense of the dissertation took place; awarding the academic rank of Professor; and taking decisions 
on equivalence of foreign degrees awarded to Russian citizens. The role of the VAK has practically 
remained constant since the break-up of the Soviet Union.  
12.1.2.2  (Semi-)public Agencies 
State-public Associations (gosudarstvenno-obshchestvennyye ob"yedineniya) 
A special feature of the Russian HE system is that the government itself sets up a number of non-gov-
ernmental organizations, dubbed "state-public" associations or organizations (Kouptsov & Tatur, 2001). 
According to the Law of the Russian Federation On Higher and Postgraduate Professional Education 
                                                          
103 For a list consult http://www.nic.gov.ru/en/proc/other  
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(1996), state administrative bodies are to a) consider the recommendations of these organizations as well 
as to b) render them support, including financial support. Among these are creative unions, professional 
associations, scientific and other societies, research associations, teaching and methodological associa-
tions, and various councils and commissions with both a Federal as well as a regional scope. Member-
ship in these organizations is voluntary yet prestigious since they partake in shaping HE policy.  
Teaching and methodological associations (Uchebno-metodicheskoye ob"yedineniye obra-
zovatel'nykh organizatsiy - UMO) 
Among state-public organizations, the teaching and methodological associations (UMOs) play a partic-
ular role in quality assurance. The UMOs are associations of universities offering study programs with 
a similar profile. For example, there are UMOs for medical, pedagogical, or agricultural study areas 
(napravleniye)104. Their membership is composed of representatives of HEIs, enterprises and quality 
assurance bodies. UMOs exist for different academic fields. They were first established in the 1980ies. 
Between 2001 and 2015, the number of UMOs grew from around twenty in 2001 (Kouptsov & Tatur, 
2001) to 80 in 2015. The UMO play a key role in the development of the federal educational standards 
(FSES) with all associated documents for different levels of post-secondary education. In addition, they 
develop programs of training and retraining of the teaching staff, conduct certifications for the awarding 
of the academic titles of professor (“professor”) and associate professor (“dotsent”), they review text-
books and manuals, and organize events on higher and postgraduate professional education for staff and 
students.  
They are, however, founded by the ministry, presided over by ministry staff and their members are 
chosen by the ministry. This makes them and other such councils maintained by the Ministry of educa-
tion semi-independent sources of input to be considered at the leisure of the Ministry:  
“Who becomes a member in the organizations? People who were nominated by the Ministry. I 
can always choose people who are comfortable to me, who will tell me that [what I am doing 
is] good. In this sense, the professional-public accreditation, societal [advisory] councils which 
are being founded, as a matter of fact, what kind of societal representation is that when I decide 
myself whom to include?” (Interview RU No. 14, 2017) 
In order to coordinate the activities of the state-public organizations, a Coordination Council composed 
of the Vice-Chairpeople of all associations and councils, methodological and research organizations as 
well as of representatives of the Ministry of Education was established. The Coordination Council for-
mulates goals and organizes working groups and commissions for particular tasks (Kouptsov & Tatur, 
2001).  
Center for Strategic Studies (Tsentr strategicheskikh razrabotok) 
                                                          
104 Since 2015, only individuals, not HEIs can become UMO members.  
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The Center for Strategic Studies was founded in 1999 under the government of the Russian Federation 
as a think tank to advise the government on economic policy. It is most famous for designing the eco-
nomic reforms of the 2000ies but continues to coordinate the strategies for economic development, 
among which is the human capital strategy, which lays out development and investment priorities for 
higher education.  
National Training Foundation (NFPK) (Natsional'nyy fond podgotovki kadrov) 
The National Training Foundation (NFPK) was founded in 1994 and conducts research, monitoring of 
government programs, consulting, and project coordination of projects related to the development of 
higher education. NFPK is also responsible for the monitoring of the implementation of the Bologna 
process and for coordinating all work in this field (decree no. 40 of the Russian Ministry of Education 
of 15 February 2005)” (Chistokhvalov, 2007). Among other projects, the NFPK has developed the mon-
itoring for the 5/100 program. It acts as a think tank for the MoES and others.  
12.1.2.3 Professional organizations 
There are a number professional organizations which are independent of the State, but only few who are 
interested in getting involved in setting and enforcing standards for educational programs in Russia 
(Interview RU No. 3, 2015). These are the Russian Rectors Union, associations of HEIs and employer 
organizations, as well as organizations offering professional-public accreditation.  
Russian Rectors' Union and other associations of HEIs 
The Russian Rectors’ Union was established in 1992 and represents the rectors of both state and non-
state HEIs. It has its own legal personality and organizes itself independent of the Government. It acts 
as a lobbying body primarily in issues of academic freedom, university autonomy, the economics of 
higher education, and the social protection of students and university teaching staff (Kouptsov & Tatur, 
2001). It became a very powerful organization during the 1990ies, but its influence waned during the 
2000s and 2010s. The MoES usually consults the Rectors’ Union on important questions and legislative 
initiatives. 
There are several other associations of HEIs. The biggest is the Association of Russian Higher Education 
Institutions (set up in 1992 with a current membership of 400). Smaller associations based on discipli-
nary focus or ownership such as the Association of Engineering Education (founded in 1993 with a 
current membership of 100 higher education institutions); the Eurasian Association of Universities (es-
tablished in 1989 and including fifty-three classical universities in Russia and in other Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) and Baltic countries); the Association of Civil Engineering Higher Educa-
tion Institutions (founded in 1993 and currently comprising more than 100 higher education institutions 
from all the CIS countries); the Association of Technical Universities (founded in 1992 and now com-
prising 90 technical universities); the Association of Russian Non-State Higher Education Institutions 
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(established in the framework of the Association of Russian Higher Education Institutions) (Interview 
RU No. 14, 2017; Kouptsov & Tatur, 2001). These associations are self-organized and act as lobbying 
bodies for their members, with various degree of access to the Ministry.  
Employer organizations  
Employer organizations include the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP)105, De-
lovaya Rossia106 and Opora Rossii107 (Chistokhvalov, 2007). The Russian Trilateral Commission for the 
regulation of social and labor relations is a government commission to coordinate legislation with trade 
union associations and national employers' unions. Contrary to the Russian Rectors Union and the var-
ious associations of HEIs who any formally guaranteed powers do not have, employer organizations 
play a somewhat more direct role. Employer organizations are represented in a dedicated council on 
qualifications under the President of the Russian Federation. The participation of Russian Union of 
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP) is mandatory in the development of state education standards.  
Organizations of public-professional accreditation 
Public-professional accreditation has been mentioned in the Russian laws on education since 1992. It 
bears no relation to state accreditation and does not grant any official privileges. There are possibly 
hundreds of accreditation agencies online which are not discernable from “accreditation mills” in that 
they do not seem to represent any particular constituency (Interview RU No. 3, 2015). A small number 
of agencies, which have gained a degree of recognition nationally and internationally. They did not play 
any significant role for the governance of the system, since only very few HEIs use their services and 
their accreditation does only in a few isolated cases have an effect on reputation, usually in connection 
to global quality seals for certain technical professions (Interview RU No. 3, 2015). In 2002, the asso-
ciation of engineering education (AIOR) was founded as the first independent accreditation agency. 
It was joined in 2005 by the Agency for education quality control and career development (Agency for 
Quality Control and Career Development – AKKORK), a not-for-profit organization established by 
two limited liability companies named “Obrazovanie cherez vsu zhizn” (Lifelong learning) and “Gar-
antii kachestva” (Quality assurance) and supported by an annual subsidy (ENQA, 2015). AKKORK 
offers public accreditation, evaluations and audits on behalf of “Opora Rossii” (All-Russian NGO rep-
resenting small and medium-sized businesses), the Russian Engineering Union, the Federation of Res-
taurateurs and Hoteliers, the Association of Russian Managers and the Russian Academy of Education 
(ENQA, 2015). The National Centre for Public Accreditation (NCPA), a non-profit organization of-
fering public accreditation, was established in 2009 by former staff of the national accreditation agency 
(NAC) when it was moved from Yoshkar-Ola to Moscow. NCPA was founded by the Guild of Experts, 
the journal ‘Accreditation in Education’, the Centre for training and Consultancy and Scientific and 
                                                          
105 http://rspp.ru  
106 http://www.deloros.ru/  
107 http://opora.ru  
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Research, and the Institute of the Education Quality Monitoring who are members of the organizations’ 
board. The National Accreditation Board (NAB) is responsible for granting accreditation within the 
processes of NCPA. It is composed of representatives of legislative bodies of the Russian Federation, 
Rectors and Presidents of the Russian leading HEIs, prominent scholars, and representatives of profes-
sional and student associations (ENQA, 2014b). Its 25 members are appointed by the National Confer-
ence of the Guild of Experts. By 2017, NCPA had become a full member of INQAAHE, ENQA, APQN, 
CEENQA and was officially listed in EQAR.  
Guild of Experts and Association “Rosakkreditatsiya” 
The “Guild of Experts” was founded in June of 2006 by experts that had undergone training on processes 
of external reviews in accreditation processes (Chistokhvalov, 2007). Its foundation had been supported 
by Rosobrnadzor which had intended to promote a self-organized pool of independent experts (Interview 
RU No. 15, 2017). This support ceased after a leadership change in Rosobrnadzor and the move of 
Rosakredagenstvo to Moscow, but the organization continued under the umbrella of NCPA.  
As of 2014, there were 970 experts organized within the guild, including 690 rectors, vice-rectors of 
HEIs, directors, and deputy directors of HEI branches (ENQA, 2014b). The Guild trains and certifies 
around 150 every year to act as external reviewers and was one of the stakeholder organizations that 
took part in the design of the 2013 law on education (ENQA, 2014b). The National Conference of the 
Guild of Experts appoints the 25 members of the National Accreditation Board (NAB) within NCPA 
(see above).  
12.1.2.4 International organizations 
International agencies and foundations such as the World Bank, the OECD and the Soros Foundation 
played an active role in policy-development, during the 1990ies, either through direct consulting, or via 
interaction through projects funded through them. The World Bank financed about 70 projects for the 
amount of 14.2 billion US$, among others the introduction of the Unified State Exam (Edinyi gosudar-
stvennyi ekzamen - EGE). Their marketization-based and corporate managerialist ideologies shaped sig-
nificantly shaped the Russian understanding of modernization of the higher education sphere (Gounko 
& Smale, 2007; Telegina & Schwengel, 2012).  
Since the early 1990ies, the European Union had funded a number of regional reform projects in higher 
education through their TACIS/TEMPUS programs, which allowed international exchange and mobility 
and have been described as a precursor for Russia’s accession to the Bologna Process (Telegina 
& Schwengel, 2012). The role of international organizations in the governance of the Russian higher 
education system greatly diminished during the 2000ies and, by 2015, is virtually nonexistent (Interview 
RU No. 9, 2017).  
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12.1.3 Instruments of higher education governance in Russia 
12.1.3.1 Educational Standards and Quality Assurance 
The Russian system quality assurance framework consists of a number of mechanisms and instruments. 
These include the Federal State Educational Standard of Higher Professional Education, professional 
qualification standards, State licensing and accreditation, the government efficiency monitoring, and 
public and professional accreditation.  
12.1.3.1.1 Federal State Educational Standard of Higher Professional Education (FSES) (gosudar-
stvennyy obrazovatel'nyy standart108) 
The FSES are a set of state educational standards and requirements which are binding for all levels 
educational programs (primary, basic general, secondary, secondary vocational education and higher 
professional education). HEIs are bound by law to comply with the FSES when offering study programs. 
Compliance with the FSES is a prerequisite for State Accreditation. Since 2008, Moscow State and St. 
Petersburg State universities have been given the right to offer study programs according to their own 
standards. In 2016, it was still being discussed to extend these rights also to National Research Univer-
sities (Interview RU No. 14, 2017). The FSES were first mentioned in the Federal Law On Education 
in 1992 (Kouptsov & Tatur, 2001). They are developed by associations of universities offering study 
programs with a similar profile, so-called teaching and methodological associations (UMOs). The de-
velopment of all standards by all UMOs is overseen by a coordination council. The FSES are then ap-
proved and put into force by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation.  
Contents of FSES 
Aside from describing the structure of HE system and that of state documents certifying graduation they 
formulate binding requirements of educational programs in terms of  
a) Which fields of study may be offered (list of “specializations”); 
b) Defined mandatory minimal components for study programs (“basic educational programs”). 
The mandatory minimum for the content of an educational program (basic educational program) 
constitutes the so-called federal component of the educational program defines the core ele-
ments of any specific specialty. It can be complemented by either regional components and/or 
components designed by the particular HEI.  
c) academic freedom of higher education institutions in the definition of the content of higher ed-
ucation 
d) academic load for students and teachers 
e) prerequisites to offer educational programs (faculty, financial, logistical)  
                                                          
108 The standards are published on http://fgosvo.ru/  
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f) Intended learning outcomes in terms of knowledge and skills to be demonstrated by graduates;  
g) information provision of the teaching and research process 
h) the procedure for the state requirements for the development and approval minimum content 
and level of training of graduates in specific directions (specialties) of higher education in as 
the federal component;  
i) the rules of state control over compliance with requirements State educational institution of 
higher professional standard education. 
Development of FSES 
Until 2010, there have been three “generations” of FSES. The first generation of standards entered into 
force in 1994-1995, the second in 2000-2001, and the third in 2010.  
The first set of the SES was developed between 1992 and 1996 and entered into force in 1994-95. It 
contained over 600 state standards for every education program being taught at HEIs at the time in 
Russia. They specified minimum contents of study programs as well as minimum requirements to be 
met by graduates. The contents in terms of taught disciplines were determined to 70% by federally 
mandated components and to 30% given over to the discretion of the regional bodies or individual HEIs.  
The 2nd generation of the FSES entered into force in 2000-2001. HEIs were now allowed to determine 
up to 20% of their educational program content themselves.  
After Russia joined the Bologna process in 2003 Russia, work on a third generation of SES began, 
featuring a competence-based approach (Fomin & Reznikova, 2006) and allowing a greater degree of 
academic freedom and better adapting curricula to regional labor market needs (EACEA, 2012c). In 
December 2004 the Council on State Educational Standards of Professional Education was created, 
which includes representatives of employer associations109.  
In 2010, the third generation of Standards entered into force. Besides a competence-orientation and the 
formulation of learning-outcomes, it introduced the possibility of a modular structure of curricula and 
allowed HEIs generally more freedom to flesh out the content of study programs. Universities were 
allowed to independently select half of their courses and curricula. All HEIs were required to offer 
optional courses in every study program. Up to 50 percent of student learning time was designated as 
reserved for independent study.  
As of 2014, FSES have been developed for Bachelor, Specialist and Master level programs and were in 
the process are being elaborated for programs of doctoral training (ENQA, 2014a). However, a moni-
toring conducted by the Association of Classical Universities of Russia (ACUR) of the effectiveness of 
FSES implementation across Russian HEIs showed that while competence and credit-based approach 
                                                          
109 decree of the Russian Ministry of Education and Science no. 152 of 30 December 2004 
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of curricular design was formally observed, HEIs showed little understanding of the instructional con-
cepts behind it (Tuning Russia, 2014).  
12.1.3.1.2 State licensing, attestation, and accreditation – 1992-2000 
The 1992 Law On Education granted HEIs the rights to accept additional students on tuition-fee basis, 
to open new study programs, including postgraduate education, and allowed the creation of non-federal, 
e.g. municipal and private HEIs and granted formerly specialized “institutes” the right to change their 
status to “academy” or “university” (Motova & Pykkö, 2012). To regulate the higher education sector 
and maintain a certain structure and order, compliance with the State Educational Standards, was to be 
ensured by a system of State licensing, attestation, and accreditation (litsenzirovaniye, attestatsiya i 
akkreditatsiya). This system covered State as well as private HEIs and has more or less stayed in place 
since it was established. The original system contained three steps: 
Licensing is a procedure to verify whether an HEI had sufficient facilities (premises, equipment, infor-
mation and library resources, and teaching staff) to carry out educational activities. Attaining a license 
meant that HEIs are authorized to deliver instruction and benefit from certain tax benefits (EACEA, 
2012c). The licensing process includes a review of a defined set of documents followed by a site-visit 
of the HEI by a group of experts. It was carried out first by the licensing department of the ministry, and 
since 2004 by Rosobrnadzor. Licensing needs to take place before any students have started their studies.  
Attestation consisted of verifying graduate’ performance on the dimensions outlined in State Educa-
tional Standards (SES). The State Attestation Service was charged with examining every State HEI every 
five years for compliance with the SES. Since the process required graduates it could only be conducted 
five years after the first cohort of students started their degree. Non-compliance could lead to a closure 
of the HEI.  
Accreditation is a process focusing on the institution leading to formal recognition of an HEI’s status 
by the State. A positive result grants the accredited institution the right to award nationally recognized 
diplomas of the state format and makes it eligible to participate in state budget funding mechanisms. 
Successful accreditation grants HEIs a status as either institute, academy or university, depending on 
their performance on a number of statistical indicators. It also exempts male students from obligatory 
military service until they have completed they studies. In case of a positive decision, the HEI is granted 
a Certificate of State Accreditation with a supplement which lists the accredited educational programs 
the HEI has the right to offer. The certificate is granted for the period of five years but can be withdrawn 
by Rosobrnadzor in case of infractions of norms and regulations. Contrary to licensing, which was man-
datory for both private as well as public HEIs, accreditation was formally mandatory only for public 
HEIs. However, since private HEIs also wish to enjoy the benefits described above, there is a strong 
incentive to apply for accreditation. In the 1995 system, the accreditation procedure was based on the 
results of licensing and attestation and the performance of the HEIs graduates. The first accreditation 
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procedure therefore could be carried out only three years after licensing, after the first cohort of students 
has graduated (EACEA, 2012c). Attestation and accreditation were merged into one procedure in 2000.  
Until the 2012 changes to the law on education, State accreditation had focused on the institutional level. 
Since the law came into effect in 2013, state accreditation exclusively refers to study programs, which 
are assessed on their compliance with the FSES while still taking into account characteristics of the 
institution (ENQA, 2014a).  
The process of state accreditation in 2014 
The following process is described in ENQA’s 2014 evaluation of NAA (ENQA, 2014a).  
1. An HEI applies for state accreditation on the basis of the Federal State Educational Standards.  
2. NAA selects a panel of experts to conduct the external review.  
3. The panel of experts analyses the data each HEI is obligated to regularly publish on its web-
site, and, optionally, the results of student testing carried out independently by NAA. 
4. The panel of experts conduct a site visit (lasting normally 5 days). During this process, experts 
assess the different study programs under review.  
5. Each expert individually writes his or her own report on the study programs they evaluated.  
6. NAA compiles an analytical report to the accreditation board, including a draft decision on 
compliance or non-compliance with the accreditation indicators. This report is based on  
a. The data submitted by the HEI according to the indicators of state accreditation of ed-
ucational institutions’ activities; 
b. results from student tests conducted as part as the state accreditation process; 
c. the report of the expert panel; 
7. The accreditation board assesses the report and makes a recommendation to the Accreditation 
Collegium consisting of senior officials from Rosobrnadzor. These take a decision.  
8. The conclusion of the panel is sent to the HEI for information by Rosobrnadzor, and Roso-
brnadzor also publishes the conclusion at its website. The HEI’s can challenge the outcomes 
of the state accreditation process only in court.  
9. HEIs, whose study programs did not pass accreditation have to re-apply after one year. Other-
wise the accreditation is valid for six years.  
Table 23 shows the types of information sources used in Russian State Accreditation as of 2014.  
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Table 23: Main documents used in Russian State Accreditation as of 2014 (ENQA, 2014) 
12.1.3.1.3 Government Efficiency Monitoring 
In 2012, when Dmitry Livanov was appointed Minister of Education and Science, he stated that gov-
ernment policy would be to fight low-quality HEIs. The framework of the Federal Program of Education 
Development 2016-2020 stated that the number of HEIs should be reduced by 40% overall and the 
number of branch campuses by 80% (Pravitel’stvo RF, 2014).  
In order to identify underperforming HEIs, in 2012–2013 a yearly evaluation procedure was introduced 
by the Ministry of Education and Science based on an indicator-based monitoring system (Froumin, I. 
et al., 2014). The monitoring uses institutional performance indicators from the areas education, re-
search, internationalization and others110. HEIs which do not meet the standards, are investigated by 
Rosobrnadzor. If found wanting, they are either closed or merged with other, more ‘effective’ institu-
tions in the vicinity.  
While the official justification for the quality monitoring and HEI mergers is to improve the quality and 
“effectiveness” of the Russian HE system, Semyonov points to demographic changes as an important 
driving force. Number of students has declined from a total of 7.5 million in 2008-09 to only 5.2 million 
in 2014-15 with population forecasts predicting a fall to just 4.2 million students in 2020 (Semyonov, 
2015). In this view the process is driven by the desire to consolidate an oversized yet underperforming 
                                                          
110 For the full list of indicators see http://indicators.miccedu.ru/monitoring/attach/%D0%90%D0%9A-
30_05%D0%B2%D0%BD_30.03.2015.pdf  
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HE system. In addition, the initiative is officially targeted mainly at private HEIs, many of which were 
opened in the 1990s and do not have adequate resources and teaching staff (Semyonov, 2015).  
12.1.3.1.4 Public and professional public accreditation of educational programs  
Public and professional public accreditation (obshchestvennaya i professional'no-obshchestvennaya 
akkreditatsiya) intends to verify and recognize compliance of a study program with specific professional 
standards or labor market requirements as defined by employer’s or industry associations. An example 
for professional accreditation is the National Agency of Professional Qualifications (NAPK) founded 
by RSPP, which accredits study programs according to professional standards for different fields and 
commercial activities.  
It was mentioned in the Russian laws on education since the 1990ies (Interview RU No. 14, 2017). In 
2002/2003, related to Russia’s ascension to the Bologna Process, it was planned that Rosobrnadzor 
would certify public professional accreditation agencies and recognize their accreditation as equivalent 
to state accreditation. The planned certification was never implemented, however (Interview RU No. 
14, 2017).  
The 2012 law on education mentioned “public-professional accreditation”, “public accreditation”, and 
“independent quality assessment” as optional quality assurance instruments that HEIs could participate 
in. As with state accreditation, since 2012, public-professional accreditation is exclusively granted at 
the study program level.  
While the government welcomes HEIs going through public professional accreditation and Rosobnadzor 
is supposed to take its results “into account”, public-professional accreditation is no substitute for state 
accreditation and does not entail any special status and no form of official recognition. The government 
does use some forms of incentives to encourage HEIs to undergo public-professional accreditation. The 
most powerful of those is their the inclusion of the percentage of accredited (through public-professional 
or international accreditation) study programs in the list of key performance indicators for HEIs partic-
ipating in the Federal University Program and the research university program (Interview RU No. 4, 
2015). Other “incentives” include its mention in the Government Development programs for education 
(FTSPRO) and the inclusion of existing/non-existing accreditation in government data collection tools. 
Accredited programs may be more likely to be granted more government-funded study places (Interview 
RU No. 4, 2015).  
Most actors agree with the following assessment: 
“Public-professional accreditation does not play a significant role yet. Why? Firstly, the gov-
ernment has not passed on that function. These structures exist, [but] they are voluntary, not 
mandatory ones. Secondly, the majority of them work in another segment, in the segment of 
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professional accreditation, not in the accreditation of higher education institutions. [But pri-
marily] since the government dominates in this function, they [the accreditation agencies] only 
play a secondary role.” (Interview RU No. 8, 2017) 
12.1.3.1.5 Information provision 
Annual self-evaluation of HEIs 
Each HEI is obliged to conduct an annual self-evaluation and provide data about its activity. This self-
evaluation includes an assessment of its educational activities, its management system, the contents and 
quality of students’ training, the organization of its educational processes, data on graduates’ employ-
ment, and the quality of faculty, teaching, library and information support, logistics, internal education 
quality assurance system, as well as an analysis of defined performance indicators (ENQA, 2014a). All 
Self-evaluation reports need to be published on the HEI’s website. The data collected in the annual self-
evaluation is the basis for an HEI’s application to State Accreditation and also collected by Rosobrnad-
zor.  
University Rankings 
Prior to the 2000ies, a university’s reputation was perpetuated through word of mouth and “common 
wisdom” placing certain state HEIs in Moscow and St. Petersburg at the top of the reputational ladder. 
The first ranking of Russian universities was published by the Kar’era magazine in 1999. In 2001, the 
Ministry of Education issued its own public HEI ranking111 which it continued to produce until 2009 
when it contracted the development of rankings out to the Interfax Group and Radio “Ekho Moskvy” 
(Forrat, 2012a). University Rankings further gained in significance in Russian higher education when 
ranking placements became key performance indicators (KPI) in the Federal University Program, the 
National Research University Program and, most prominently, the 5/100 program.  
Other organizations providing rankings ranging from media to professional and student associations, 
and the universities themselves appeared during the 2010ies such as rankings by Expert Ra112, the Mos-
cow Foundation for Training and the promotion of innovation activities113 (Moskovskiy Fond Podgo-
tovki Kadrov I Sodeystviya Razvitiyu Innovatsionnoy Deyatel'nosti) but according to higher education 
experts, these did not become to play become a significant influence in the governance of HEIs.  
                                                          
111 See Decree of the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation N 631 “O reitinge vysshikh uchebnykh 
zavedeniy (vmeste s vremennoy metodikoy opredeleniya reitingov spetsial’nostey i vuzov)” (On the ranking of 
higher education institutions [together with the temporary methodology of programs’ and institutions’ rankings]). 
February 26, 2001. Minobrnauki RF. (Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation) Reitingi vuzov 
Rossii 2001- 2009. (Ranking of Russian higher education institutions.) Access date: May 30, 2011. http://rat-
ing.edu.ru/Old.aspx. 
112 http://raexpert.ru/  
113 http://www.mfpk.ru/  
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12.1.3.2 Regulation of admission into higher education 
Unified State Exam (EGE) 
Prior to 2001, admission to higher education in Russia required having a secondary school leaving cer-
tificate (Attestat o srednem [polnom] obshchem obrazovanii). Applicants could then apply to individual 
institutions who conducted their own admission examinations. As in many Post-Soviet countries, how-
ever, admission to tertiary education had become one of the most corrupt interfaces of the higher edu-
cation system in Russia (Clark, N., 2005). In 2001, an admission reform was launched piloting a cen-
tralized Unified State Exam (EGE) for admission to universities. The EGE is a written form and includes 
several subjects which the students can chose to take, Mathematics and Russian language being com-
pulsory. The admission process under the EGE consists of two waves. In a first step, students can use 
their USE scores to apply to one or several study programs at one or more HEIs. After all applications 
have been collected, HEIs rank student’s scores and issue recommendations of whether or not to accept 
the students. Students can then choose their preferred study program. Those students who have not been 
accepted in the first wave, can wait for study places opening up during the second wave, when the study 
places who have not been filled become available to them. In addition, due to the availability of both 
budget-financed and tuition-based study places, students with lower grades may get the option to study 
on a tuition-fee basis. The nationwide state entry exam was intended to limit the possibility of corruption 
and the make access to HE easier and more transparent, particularly for cross-regional student migration. 
The EGE was extended across regions until, in 2009, university-specific entrance examinations were 
abolished altogether and replaced by the government-administered EGE. There is some evidence that 
the introduction of the EGE has improved the likelihood of students applying to several HEIs, regardless 
of family income and educational background of parents (Ampilogov, Prakhov, & Yudkevich, 2014) 
It should be noted that even after the EGE had been made compulsory, the Olympiad system was re-
tained as a university-admission track. Such nationwide academic “olympiads” had been held since So-
viet times in all school subjects. The winners of Olympiads are granted preferential enrollment to spe-
cific study programs, either without taking the USE score into account at all, or by getting an automatic 
perfect score for specific subjects. In general, since Olympiad winners are considered talented and well-
prepared for university, the number of students who are enrolled based on their results, is generally 
considered a sign of prestige and quality of a university (Kouzminov, 2002). The average EGE results 
of students as well as the number of students entering an HEI based on their results in olympiads were 
included as indicator in the university efficiency monitoring of 2012.  
After the EGE had become universal, it became an instrument for the government to regulate the number 
of students to admit into higher education through the establishment of a minimal “cut-off score” re-
quired for eligibility to study in any HEI, while HEIs themselves may set minimal scores on their own114. 
                                                          
114 In actual practice, only a small number of high-prestige HEIs use this possibility 
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These must always be higher than the minimal scores set by Rosobrnadzor. In addition to setting the 
minimal score for entrance to university, Rosobrnadzor also sets a minimal passing score for students 
to be awarded their secondary education diploma. The methodology and criteria Rosobrnadzor uses to 
set minimal passing scores is not publicly accessible.  
12.1.3.3 Institutional Governance and University Autonomy 
Autonomy of HEIs 
In 1992, the most significant change for university autonomy happened when the power to elect rectors 
passed from the supervising Ministry to the academic council of the HEIs themselves. HEIs also re-
ceived considerable autonomy to employ staff and manage their day-to-day academic affairs. Because 
of the budget contractions, during the 1990ies, this autonomy was used mainly for economic survival, 
rather than for innovation (Interview RU No. 9, 2017). Curriculum autonomy was still rather limited by 
relatively rigid State Standards, although unlike as during Soviet times, HEIs now had the freedom so 
use any textbook they liked.  
Since 1992, most HEIs are headed by a rector who is elected for five years by the academic council of 
the university115 and who may appoint a number of deputy/vice-rectors responsible for specific areas. 
An academic council composed of the rector, the vice-rectors and other HEI leaders (e.g. deans) decides 
on issues related to the development of the HEI. HEIs are structured in faculties that are composed of 
academic chairs and their staff (EACEA, 2012c) or in institutes, departments and schools, depending on 
the university’s charter. The academic council is also responsible for managing the non-budgetary funds 
of the HEI. However, academic councils can get quite large and 120 members are not unusual. In addi-
tion, while the majority of council members are proposed by the general staff based on a vote by secret 
ballot, they are appointed by the university rector. Since the rector is ex-officio also the council’s chair-
men and other ex-officio members such as vice-rectors, and directors of institutes are nominated by the 
rector, the rector plays the central role of the Councils, controls the agenda for meetings and dominates 
the decision making-process (Beliakov et al., 1999). While the majority of the academic council’s mem-
bers are elected, in many cases there are only single candidates for certain positions (Interview RU No. 
1, 2015). Working committees attached to the council are appointed by the Rector’s order. In general, 
academic councils are not a powerful body and rectors therefore control both the administrative as well 
the academic operations of universities (Interview RU No. 8, 2017). As one higher education expert 
notes:  
                                                          
115 Except for the rectors of Moscow and St. Petersburg State and the of the Federal Universities who are appointed 
by presidential/government decree for five years each. 
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“There not enough clearly outlined steering functions, which the academic councils perform 
themselves and their composition leads to the fact that there is a very large number of adminis-
trators, who are involved in the system of management [who themselves] depend on the rectors 
and vice-rectors and so on. […] this leads to a monopolization of power, with certain limits, 
because the academic council is still a limitation of the power of the university administration. 
However, it is a weak instrument.” (Interview RU No. 8, 2017) 
As a variant of the above model, since 2006, HEI can chose to become “autonomous institutions” which 
receive a block grant subsidy instead of a line-item budget and enjoy greater financial autonomy. Au-
tonomous institutions also have a board of trustees (nablyudatel’niy sovet) which appoints a president 
instead of a rector. Also in 2006, an important change in university autonomy took place, when an 
amendment to the law on education required that candidates for the post of rector had to be approved by 
a governmental committee. This meant that politically unreliable candidates could be excluded (Smolin 
& Nasibov, 2006). 
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, HEIs have gained increasing administrative, financial and aca-
demic autonomy. As summarized by EACEA (2012c), they may 
- Establish their own organizational structure 
- develop their own medium-term budget plans and decide on the use of their budget 
- identify goals and objectives of academic and research activities 
- determine admission quotas and procedures  
- establish the level of their tuition fees (but not less than the cost of state-funded places) 
- develop courses and identify areas of training (within the State Educational Standards)  
- recruit teaching staff (on a competitive basis) and conclude contracts of employment with 
them 
- implement up-skilling programs  
- engage in international cooperation 
Financial autonomy of State HEIs  
The 1992 Law on Education established HEIs as economically independent institutions. It established 
state funding rates per student and allowed HEIs to generate additional income from tuition fees, busi-
ness and other activities. HEIs were allowed to hold three types of assets: Assets contributed by the 
founder (Ministry) could be used by the HEI for use according to the educational mission. Assets, which 
HEIs developed on its own are under the full control of the HEI, as is land, who can be rented out but 
cannot not be sold (Beliakov et al., 1999). Until 2013, however, State HEI budgets needed to be ap-
proved each year by the respective sectoral ministry and they underlie certain restrictions (such as they 
may not take out loans).  
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In 2006 the Federal Law No.174-FZ9 established the possibility for HEIs to become “autonomous in-
stitutions” (AU). The funding scheme for these institutions works on the basis of a block grant subsidy 
instead of a per-student funding approved by the ministry. Autonomous institutions do not underlie the 
restrictions on financial activities, they may establish subsidiary business entities and gain capital profits 
but the State is also not secondarily liable for their debts (Klyachko, T. & Sinelnikov-Murylev, 2012). 
As another specificity, autonomous institutions have a board of trustees (nablyudatel’niy sovet) which 
appoints a president instead of a rector.  
Since 2013, all public institutions (HEIs, hospitals, kindergartens, etc.) received their budget in the form 
of a formula-based lump sum. This greatly increased transparency of financing and allowed gave HEIs 
the autonomy to create their own financial planning, independent of ministry interference (Interview 
RU No. 12, 2017).  
Intra-institutional monitoring and incentive mechanisms 
The highly standardized administrative governance of Soviet higher education relied on unified rules 
and procedures, among which comprehensive reporting played an important role (Beliakov et al., 1999). 
Statistical monitoring had long been used to assess the performance of HEIs and their staff. The indica-
tors used, however, had been mostly related to fulfilling quantitative quotas and adhering to plans, rather 
than innovative and development activities and staff remunerations since Soviet Times had varied de-
pending on seniority, functions and scientific degrees (Beliakov et al., 1999). In 2012, the new law on 
education introduced so-called “effective contracts” (these were introduced in the entire public sector). 
Effective contracts represent a mixed-model of fixed- and variable salary components which can be tied 
to the attainment of certain objectives set by the HEI leadership. The level of compensation is thus linked 
to the achievement of certain key performance indicators, typically based on scientific publications, 
evaluations of teaching or applied work. Effective contracts have a typical duration of 1-2 years after 
which they need to be renewed, shorter than the 3-5 years renewal periods which had been common 
since the Soviet era.  
HEIs began to use effective contracts widely, in part possibly in order to align the evaluation of staff 
with the indicators used in the government efficiency monitoring of HEIs (Interview RU No. 1, 2015).  
[If] we need to publish more, how do we force the staff to publish more? Some universities do 
more… well on the monetary basis, like if you publish more, you get some bonuses to your salary. 
Some universities do it on a kind of force basis like if you don`t publish enough, we just fire you. 
(Interview RU No. 1, 2015) 
Other observers, however, disagree with this assessment and do not see a relationship between the mon-
itoring and the introduction of effective contracts.  
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12.1.3.4 Financing of HEIs 
Russian HEIs derive their funding primarily from four sources: State financing via budget-funded study 
places, tuition funding from fee-paying students, state financing from special government programs, and 
private and state-funded R&D contracts (Since 1996, research projects are funded separately from edu-
cational activities).  
State Funding  
State HEIs obtain their funding primarily through the number of occupied state-subsidized study places. 
The maximum number of student places funded from the federal budget is limited and allocated among 
HEIs by the Ministry of Education or the respective ministry to which HEIs are subordinated. From the 
1990ies until 2007, the model of state funding remained structurally unchanged since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Public funding was organized by calculating line-item budgets for HEIs on the basis of 
past costs in combination with a state-mandated quota of specialists that were to be trained on the state 
budget. The funding varied considerably between HEIs, as expenses were calculated partly on past costs, 
partly on the number of students and partly on other considerations, such as the cost of maintenance of 
buildings, the cost of equipment, laboratory materials, books, etc.  
In 2002, a system of “money-follows-students” launched as an experiment (“state financial obligations 
to individuals” / gosudarstvennye imennye finansovye obyazatel’stva—GIFO), resting on the unified-
state exam (EGE). This was met with strong opposition was ultimately ceased in 2005 after a pilot phase. 
After the GIFO experiment was canceled, a new model of “normative financing” (normativnoe finansi-
rovanie) was developed. In 2012, the funding model was changed from an allocation by universities to 
a system of state subsidies based on a state order for the training of a number of specialists in certain 
disciplines, for which HEIs need to bid. HEIs does receive money for the number of students for whom 
they get a state order to train. The funding formula takes into account normative costs and a number of 
coefficients (regional, field of education, etc.).  
State funding is, however, the most important source of revenue for HEIs as, on average, 70-80 per cent 
of State HEIs’ budget is drawn from the State budget (EACEA, 2012c). In addition, State HEIs may 
have access to premises and housing facilities free of charge. On the other hand, they are restricted in 
taking up loans and to generate profits from the use of state property (EACEA, 2012c). Additional State 
funding can be generated from research contract or grants for pure and applied research. 
Income from tuition fees 
HEIs may derive non-State funding from tuition fees, the provision of supplementary services, consul-
tative services, state contracts for training and retraining certain target groups (e.g. civil servants or 
teaching staff of regional universities), capitalizing on their intellectual property; or by renting out state 
property managed by HEIs (EACEA, 2012c). Tuition income plays a significant role for most Russian 
HEIs: The proportion of students paying for their education rose from 41 % in 2000 to 63 % in 
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2010/2011, when it represented a third of all university incomes (Smolentseva et al., 2015). The number 
of fee-paying students that a state-subsidized university can accept is capped.  
Funding of private HEIs 
Until 2012, private HEIs did not receive any state funding and had to rely on tuition fees and their 
founders’ subsidies. Since the introduction of per capita funding, they participate in the same funding 
scheme as State HEIs (EACEA, 2012c). They are also allowed to compete for participation in all federal 
programs, contracts and projects on the same basis as State HEIs. In practice, however, no non-state 
HEI was so far included in large government funding programs (see below).  
Income from federal programs and grants 
Income generated from federal programs and grants such as the “federal program for development of 
education” and the “priority regional projects on education” is an important additional source of funding 
for both State as well as private HEIs and has increased in importance ever since the Federal University 
Program was launched in 2006.  
12.1.4 Competitive programs for investment and differentiation of higher education  
While the 1990ies were characterized by a massive quantitative growth of private and public HEIs and 
their branches, between 2004 and 2013, a process of significant top-down differentiation took place. 
Reflecting the preliminary result of this process, certain HEIs enjoy special status and privileges. These 
which comprise 9 Federal Universities, 29 National Research Universities (Natsional'nyye issle-
dovatel'skiye universitety). Moscow and St. Petersburg State Universities form a category of their own. 
In 2015, the differentiation process continued with the establishment of regional flagship universities.  
Innovative education programs (since 2004) 
The first example of targeted funding for competitively selected universities, the program “innovative 
education programs” provided special funding for 62 HEIs for the implementation of new innovative 
education programs.  
Federal Universities (since 2006) 
Federal Universities were established through the Federal University Program (2006-2011) by merging 
several regional universities. The mission of Federal Universities is to implement innovative study pro-
grams, modernize higher education, offer training and skills development for the socio-economic devel-
opment of the region, carry out basic and applied research, and bring it into application. Federal Uni-
versities were the first Russian HEIs who had to prepare a strategic development plan, have an advisory 
board, and develop their own education standards (Froumin, I. & Povalko, 2014). Between 2006 and 
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2015, a total of nine federal Universities were established by mergers of over 40 smaller universities116 
(Froumin, I. & Povalko, 2014). This was the first time that the Russian government made mergers of 
several HEIs a precondition to participate access program funding.  
Moscow and St. Petersburg State University gain special status and support by decree 
Since 2008, Moscow State University and Saint Petersburg State University, who had always been re-
garded as “flagships” of the Russian HE system and who boasted a good record of research, enjoyed a 
special legal status as well as significant resources for infrastructure development (Froumin, I. & Pov-
alko, 2014). Lomonosov Moscow State University and St. Petersburg State University also enjoy special 
privileges by presidential order exempting them from having to comply with the State Educational 
Standards.  
National Research Universities (since 2008) 
National Research Universities were selected through a national competition between 2008–2010. A 
total of 29 universities were awarded the title of National Research University for a period of 10 years 
(Fedyukin & Froumin, 2010). The selected universities received funding for implementing their re-
search strategies between 2009–2013117, as well as a number of privileges (Froumin, I. et al., 2014). The 
total additional funding for the National Research Development Program for the period 2009-2012 was 
34.825 billion RUB, most of which was invested in improving the material base and information re-
sources, but also into quality management and internationalization (Froumin, I. & Povalko, 2014).  
The new excellence initiative: The “5/100” Program 
The State Education Development Program of 2012 called for at least five Russian universities in the 
top one hundred in global university rankings by 2020. To achieve this ambitious goal a multi-year 
program called the “5/100 initiative” was launched, which provided three times more than the previous 
research universities program. Participating universities received greater autonomy in how to spend the 
program money, while their progress along their university development programs is monitored each 
year by a special Council on Global Competitiveness Enhancement of Russian Universities. HEIs that 
do not meet the goals laid out in their development plans may be expelled from the program. In 2013, 
                                                          
116 The Southern Federal University in Rostov-on-Don and the Siberian Federal University in Krasnoyarsk, The 
Northern (Arctic) Federal University in Arkhangelsk, the Kazan Federal University, the Ural Federal University 
in Ekaterinburg, the Far Eastern Federal University in Vladivostok and the North-Eastern Federal University in 
Yakutsk, the North-Caucasian Federal University in Stavropol and the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University 
in Kaliningrad.  
117 Two pilot universities National Research Nuclear University - Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (State 
University) and National Research Technological University - State Technological University “Moscow Institute 
of Steel and Alloys” were identified by the Decree of President D. Medvedev in 2008. Later in 2008 12 more 
universities were identified through competition (thus bringing a total to 14 universities), which were to obtain an 
amount of RUB 1.8 billion (approximately EUR 40.5 million) each for the years 2009-2018. In 2009 another 15 
universities were identified through competition, which received RUB 49.8 billion from the federal budget for the 
years 2009-2014. Co-funding of their development programs from extra-budgetary funds should amount to RUB45 
billion.  
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15 universities were selected into the program. In 2015, this number was raised 21 participating univer-
sities.  
Regional Flagship universities  
In 2015, the MoES launched the regional 'flagship' university program. Through mergers, regional uni-
versities could apply to receive the status of Flagship university", who are designated to become drivers 
of regional socio-economic development. Universities selected in a competition receive additional fund-
ing to implement their strategic development program." Flagship universities are intended to eventually 
exist in every Russian region. 
Except the Federal Universities and the designation of Moscow and St. Petersburg State Universities as 
federal Universities, all programs involved an open competition among HEIs in which they proposed 
development plans for funded. Success in the Federal and National Research Universities changed their 
official status and charter. Federal and National Research Universities were required to became to au-
tonomous institutions (AUs). The “Innovative Education” and 5–100 programs provided funding for 
universities’ development projects and in many cases overlapped with the National Research University 
program in the sense that many universities were successful in several programs. Of 67 universities 
involved in at least one program, 13 institutions participated in three programs and 18 more in two 
programs (Forrat, 2015). 
 
Figure 20: Overlap between the participants of support programs for leading universities, from Forrat (2015) 
According to observers and participants, the programs had a significant impact on the HEIs which par-
ticipated in them, and in this way on the differentiation of the higher education system:  
„What really changed universities were the development projects, beginning with the first pro-
gram “innovative universities” in 2004, the Federal Universities, the National Research Uni-
versities, 5/100 and now the Regional Flagship universities. They all, in this sense, were a lot 
more effective, a lot more helpful [than the effectiveness monitoring]. They really changed the 
picture of higher education today. It became more interesting, richer than 10-15 years ago. 
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There really appeared a group of leading universities, who really became universities, oriented 
towards work on global markets, participating in global networks, trying to conduct research. 
[…] They led to serious social change [in universities]”. (Interview RU No. 8, 2017) 
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12.2 Annex 2: Kazakhstan – The governance of the higher education system 
12.2.1 Kazakhstan: Structure of the higher education system 
12.2.1.1 Structure of Educational programs 
Study programs are divided into professional “specialties” (Special’nosti), which are further divided 
into “specializations” (Specializacii), such as specialty engineering, specialization thermal power engi-
neering. Since 2007, “specializations” were reorganized into 4-year Bachelor’s (Bakalavr) and 2-year 
Master’s (Magistr) programs. As in Russia, these are divided into study area and study fields (Naprav-
lenija). All study programs are assigned an identification number and name. Study programs of the same 
study area have the same ID number. The State classifier lists all study programs, HEIs are allowed to 
offer and defines contents and structure for study areas. The standards centrally regulate, the number of 
hours by contact hours, seminar work; student work load, the length of internships, thesis writing and 
examinations; contents of study programs divided into 1) foundation studies/core courses 2) basic pro-
fessional courses 3) specialized courses.  
Curricula are structured in general education disciplines, professional disciplines, basic (core) and pro-
file disciplines, as well as professional practical work in the specialty. As in Russia, foundation stud-
ies/core courses constitute the major part of the curriculum, with basic professional and specialization 
subjects beginning in the third year118. Core course requirements are the same for all specializations 
within the same study area. There is an optional component within which HEIs may realize their own 
focusses. 
12.2.1.2 Differentiation of the higher education system in Kazakhstan 
The institutional landscape of Kazakhstan’s HE system by 2015 is diverse. HEIs are differentiated based 
on two dimensions.  
Dimension 1: Scope of study programs 
Following their Soviet heritage, universities (universitety), academies (akademii) and institutes (insti-
tuty) are distinguished based on the number of fields of studies and study programs they offer. A Uni-
versity is defined as implementing educational programs of higher education, Master and doctoral pro-
grams in three and more groups of specialties, carries out pure and applied research, and is a scientific 
and methodological center. An academy implements educational programs of higher education with a 
narrow disciplinary focus (one or two groups of specialties). Lastly, institutes, implement professional 
                                                          
118 From 2017: In the first year 
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educational programs of higher education with a very narrow disciplinary focus (one group of special-
ties). 
Dimension 2: Ownership Status 
Based on the ownership of universities, state universities (fully owned by the state), private universities 
(fully owned by private individuals or companies) and joint-stock company universities can be distin-
guished. State universities used to have the legal status of “State-owned educational institutions” (ka-
zennyye predpriyatiya) before they became “state enterprises on the basis of economic management” 
(respublikanskoe gosudarstvennoe predpriyatie na prave khozyaistvennogo vedeniya) in 2013119. State 
Universities are generally the most highly regulated type of HEI. Private universities are owned fully 
by individuals or firms. A particular feature of Kazakhstan’s higher education landscape is that many 
leading universities have the legal status of joint-stock companies, which are owned in part by private 
investors and in part by the government. Private and joint-stock universities have, due to their legal 
form, always enjoyed greater organizational and financial autonomy than state HEIs. They may legally 
create and own other legal entities (such as spin-offs, subsidiaries or commercialization centers), they 
can retain any profit they make and use it for internal development, and they have always been governed 
by a governing board or board of directors.  
Dimension 3: Special status of universities 
Since 1992, there have been several government initiatives to establish innovative leading HEIs. These 
have included the Kazakh British Technical University (KBTU - established in 2000) and, most recently, 
Nazarbayev University (established in 2009), but also “national” state universities, who enjoy greater 
financing and greater autonomy.  
National Universities 
National Universities are leading scientific and methodological center in the country with a special status 
granted by presidential order. Staff receive higher salaries (75% more than in other HEIs) and the rector 
is appointed directly by the President. Among the national universities, there is a sub-group of National 
Research Universities which enjoy even greater curricular autonomy. 
  
                                                          
119 The 9 national universities instantly received this status giving them greater autonomy, especially regarding the 
use of their funds.  
  
page 301 
Autonomous University: Nazarbayev University 
Standing out in Kazakhstan’s HE system is Nazarbayev University in Astana (NU). It was founded on 
the initiative of the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev in 2010, is a fully English-language 
institution, with a high percentage of international faculty and staff. All undergraduate students attend 
free of charge and may receive additional stipends based on performance. The objective of NU is to 
become a leading international research university and a model for university development in the coun-
try. A further specificity is that its schools all maintain a cooperation with twinned departments at lead-
ing international universities. Regarding governance, NU operates based on its own law. It develops its 
own educational standards and is not subject to oversight by the Ministry of Education of Science, but 
by its governing bodies, the Executive Board, Board of Trustees and the Supreme Board of Trustees. 
The Chairman of the latter is the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan himself. NU is currently the 
only autonomous university. 
Non-civil Universities are public universities which are operated by military and security organs. There 
is currently one international university, the International Kazakh-Turkish University named. Other 
international universities operate as private HEIs120. The following table shows the number of HEIs per 
category: 
Type of legal status Number of HEIs 
National Universities (State) 9 
State Universities 31 
Private Universities 54 
Joint-Stock Universities121 16 
Non-civil Universities (State) 13 
Autonomous Universities 1 
International universities 1 
Table 24: Types and number of HEIs in Kazakhstan (by 2017).  
12.2.1.3 Size and growth of the higher education system 
After independence, the number of Kazakh HEIs rose swiftly, reading a peak of over 180 in 2001, before 
stricter legislation and quality assurance led some to disappear. The highest concentration of new HEIs 
appeared in Astana and Almaty, which still has the highest proportion of HEIs in the country.  
                                                          
120 The Kazakh-American Free University , Kazakh-German University, Kazakhstan-Russian Medical University, 
Kazakhstan-Russian International University, Egyptian University of Islamic Culture “Nur-Mubarak”, and the 
University of Central Asia 
121 All national and state HEIs will be transformed into non-commercial joint-stock companies 
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Figure 21: Number of HEIs in Kazakhstan (Source: CIS statistics http://www.cisstat.com/) 
The number of students peaked in 2005/2006. The mean reasons for the following decline are the price 
of higher education and emigration to Russia.  
 
Figure 22: Number of students in Kazakhstan 1991-2013 (Source: CIS statistics http://www.cisstat.com/) 
12.2.2 Actors and their capabilities 
12.2.2.1 State actors 
Ministry of Education and Science (Ministerstvo obrazovaniya i nauki Respubliki Kazakhstana – 
MoES)122  
                                                          
122 http://ortcom.kz/  
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The MoES is the prime actor in the education landscape of Kazakhstan. Its portfolio has remained rela-
tively unchanged during the decade from 1999, when the Ministry of Education, Health and Sports and 
the Ministry of Science and Higher Education were merged, until 2011, when a few of functions, such 
as accreditation, were delegated to buffer organizations. The MoES has remained, however, the key 
actor controlling and shaping the higher education system. It develops policies, legislation and regula-
tions governing the higher education system. All HEIs but the autonomous Nazarbayev University are 
regulated by legislation developed by MoES.  
Rectors of public universities report directly to the MoES, which, until 2016, had the power to appoint, 
evaluate, and dismiss them. It also plays an active role in monitoring and regulating HEIs, regulates the 
structure and procedures within HEIs, and coordinates the development of state educational standards 
and typical study plans. Through its subsidiary bodies, the MoES operates the licensing and attestation 
procedures of HEIs, maintains a register of recognized accreditation bodies, and of accredited education 
institutions and study programs. Its subsidiary bodies verify HEIs compliance with standards and regu-
lations. The MoES is instrumental in public financing of HEIs and establishes the procedures for the 
allocation of state funding to HEIs, sets the quota and rules of admission and transfer of students to 
HEIs.  
By 2017, the MoES was organized in three divisions by level of education, including the department for 
higher and professional education. Independently of the departments, it maintains three committees:  
• The Committee of Control in the Sphere of Education,  
• the Committee on the Protection of children, and  
• the Science Committee 
The latter formulates government research policy, administer grant competitions and their implementa-
tion, and control national research centers. By 2017, the following institutions were subordinated to the 
department for higher and professional education: 
• The National Register of Accrediting Bodies 
• The National Testing Center (Natsional'nyy tsentr testirovaniya - NTC)123 
• The Bologna Process and Academic Mobility Centre under the Ministry of Education and 
Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
Committee for Control in the Field of Education and Science (komitet po kontrolyu vo sfere obra-
zovaniya i nauki - CCES) 124 
The Committee for Control in the Field of Education and Science (CCES) as a subsidiary of the Ministry 
is responsible for the licensing of HEIs and study programs, the monitoring of licensing requirements, 
                                                          
123 http://www.testcenter.kz  
124 http://control.edu.gov.kz/  
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state attestation (until 2017), the selective external assessment of the implementation of study programs 
and the monitoring of compliance with national legislation (ENQA, 2017). It oversaw the Unified Na-
tional Test (UNT), the Comprehensive Test (CT) (until 2017), and the Mid-Term Assessment (vneshnaya 
otsenka uchebnhkh dostizhenii - VOUD). Likewise, the committee is in charge of confirming and issuing 
scientific degrees and titles on the basis of their own evaluation of scientific quality of dissertations. 
CCES emerged from and continues to fulfill the function of the Soviet VAK.  
Until 2012, it was responsible for nostrification (delegated to the Bologna Process and Mobility center). 
Until 2017 the UNT was under the CCES. Since 2017, school graduation exams were conducted sepa-
rately from the UNT again, uncoupling the functions of university entrance and school leaving exam. 
As the UNT was not regarded any more as a form of control, but part of the application process to HE, 
responsibility was passed from the committee of control into the responsibility of the department of 
higher education within the MoES. Likewise in 2017, the administration of the register of accredited 
quality assurance agencies, HEIs, and study programs was passed to the department for HE within the 
MoES.  
Bologna Process and Academic Mobility Centre under the Ministry of Education and Science of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan (Tsentr Bolonskogo protsessa i akademicheskoy mobil'nosti) 
In 2012, when accreditation became independent, the former National Accreditation Centre were reor-
ganized into the Bologna Process and Academic Mobility Center, a state enterprise subordinated to the 
under the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Burkitbayev & Ibrayeva). 
The Center was founded to act as a center of expertise for supporting universities in adapting to the 
Bologna process, to monitor the Bologna Process’ implementation within the HE system, as well as for 
conducting the recognition and nostrification of foreign degrees and diplomas. The center holds different 
seminars for universities on issues relevant to study reform and develops recommendations on topics 
such as ECTS, student assessment, or the new national qualifications framework (Interview KZ No. 5, 
2016).  
Other ministries  
Other RF ministries and their local agencies still play an important role for those HEIs which fall under 
their remit. Notable examples include the Health Ministry, the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of 
Agriculture which oversee its respective HEIs and the Interior Ministry which oversees its non-civil 
HEIs.  
The presidential administration 
While the MoES is formally responsible for higher education, within the Kazakh political system, the 
president and his administration are the final authority. According to Ahn et al. (2018), the most signif-
icant changes such as the establishment, merger or dissolution of HEIs, have been instituted by presi-
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dential order, sometimes with little stakeholder involvement or public debate. The presidential admin-
istration is also ultimately responsible for the State Programs in Education, which the government is 
obliged to carry out. The presidential administration maintains a monitoring of the implementation of 
the programs according to the dates foreseen in the program and the different ministers need to report 
on the programs’ implementation. The presidential administration also maintains regional inspectorates 
which conduct inspections of state bodies, although this rarely happens in higher education.  
The presidential administration is the supreme arbitrator and takes the final decisions on budgetary is-
sues and strategies. The president also appoints the rectors of the influential national universities125.  
In 2017, the president devolved some of this powers to cabinet and parliament. As one expert describes 
the relationship between the presidential administration and the government:  
“If the presidential administration says something, then the ministry subordinates itself. Now 
they have made some changes, delegated some powers to the government and parliament. 
Maybe the prime minister will already sign the next state program” (Interview KZ No. 4, 2017) 
National Accreditation Centre (Natsional'nyy akkreditionnyy tsentr - NAC) – dissolved in 2011 
The National Accreditation Center of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakh-
stan (NAC) was created in 2005 as a subsidiary body of the MoES, as part of the State Program on 
Development of Education 2005-2010. Its purpose was to develop and conduct institutional accredita-
tion of HEIs and accreditation of study programs, based on European and US practices, to participate in 
international networks of quality assurance agencies, and to administer the recognition of certificates 
and nostrification of foreign degrees. In 2012, when accreditation became government-independent, the 
NAC was transformed into the Bologna Process and Mobility Center.  
National Register of Accrediting Bodies 
The National Register of Accreditation Bodies lists all recognized Quality Assurance Agencies. It is a 
subsidiary of the MoES and was established in 2011, modelled after EQAR. All registered QAAs are 
subject to ‘re-certification’, based on an external review, every five years. HEIs are free to choose any 
of the registered QAAs. As of 2016, Ten agencies, two national and eight international ones, are listed 
on the Register.  
National Testing Center (Natsional'nyy tsentr testirovaniya - NTC)126 
The “Republican State Enterprise” National Testing Center is subordinated to the Ministry of Education 
and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan. It was created as National Centre of State Standards for 
Education and Tests in 1992. The center maintains a basis of experts who develop the testing materials 
for the Unified National Test (UNT) and the Comprehensive Test (CT) in Kazakhstan, the testing of 
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students of the second/third year of university and was also involved in the testing of students during 
state attestation of HEIs. Until 2011, it was also responsible for the development of State Standards for 
education (gossudarstvennye standarty obrazovaniya po spetsial’nosti), which was ceased when the 
more flexible typovye uchebnye plany replaced the highly detailed state standard study programs.  
Republican Commission on distribution of educational grants (respublikanskaya komisiya po raz-
predeleniyu gosudarstvennih obrazovatel’nih grantov)127 
The Republican Commission on distribution of educational grants is a committee of the department of 
higher and post-graduate education at the MoES. Its membership consists of rectors of HEIs, represent-
atives of Ministries and trade union and is in charge of awarding state grants to HEI applicants based on 
their UNT scores.  
12.2.2.2 (Semi-)public Agencies 
Information-Analytical Center (Informatsionno-analiticheskiy tsentr - IAC) 
The IAC is a think-tank in the form of a joint-stock company, owned 100% by the MoES. It was estab-
lished by the government of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2011 for purposes of monitoring and evalu-
ation of the State Program of Education Development 2011-2020 and was accredited as a “scientific 
organization” by CCES. It was founded to strengthen the element of monitoring and evaluation in edu-
cational policy in Kazakhstan. IAC in its 2017 form resulted from the merger with the National Centre 
of Education Statistics and Evaluation (before 2012: National Centre for Educational Quality Assess-
ment - NCEQA) in 2015.  
The Center supports the MoES through information, research and analysis and regularly produces stud-
ies, policy briefs and recommendations on all topics of education for the MoES, on ministry commis-
sions (e.g. on university autonomy, building world-class research universities) for which it bids in public 
contracting procedures. The IAC is also the main coordinator of all OECD projects in education, such 
as international studies PISA, TIMSS, PIRLS, and ICILS. The IAC has a statistics department which 
collects and processes national education statistics and produces an annual national report on the status 
and development of the system of education of Kazakhstan.  
Through its policy advice and its collaboration with the OECD, the IAC has attained a relatively high 
centrality in the system of HE. The Head of IAC directly reports to the Minister of Education and Sci-
ence and The MoES turns to the center for advice and analysis on different questions and integrates its 
recommendations in state programs (Interview KZ No. 2, 2017), such as in to the SPED 2016-2019 and 
the “100 concrete steps” state program to develop public service sectors.  
                                                          
127 A national scientific-technologic counsil (natsional’niy nauchno-issledovatel’skiy sovet) fulfills a similar func-
tion for research grants.  
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12.2.2.3 International organizations 
International agencies as the World Bank and the OECD have played an active role in policy- analysis 
and consulting in Kazakhstan and have provided policy advice to the development of the state programs 
for educational development (Interview KZ No. 3, 2017).  
The World Bank 
In contrast to the Russian Federation, in Kazakhstan, international agencies have continued to play an 
active role in advising and evaluating changes to higher education governance throughout Kazakhstan’s 
independence. Notable examples include the advisory work of the world bank leading up to the intro-
duction of the Unified National Exam in 1999 and the joint analysis of Kazakhstan’s tertiary education 
sector by the OECD and World Bank in 2006 (World Bank & OECD, 2007), which has informed the 
reforms undertaken in the ‘‘State Program for Education Development 2011–2020” (Hartley, Gopaul et 
al., 2016).  
OECD 
The OECD has conducted a number of reviews of education in Kazakhstan, most notably a joint review 
with the World Bank in 2006/2007 and in 2017. Many of the findings and recommendations of the 
review found its way into the State Program of Education Development for 2011–2020” (SPED 2011-
2020) and policy initiatives.  
The goal stated in of Kazakhstan’s 2030 and 2050 strategies aim at joining the ranks of the most devel-
oped economies. OECD membership represents a prestigious milestone for the government of the coun-
try (Interview KZ No. 8, 2017). Pursuing the ultimate goal of OECD membership, since 2011, Kazakh-
stan has joined a number of OECD comparative research projects such as TALIS, PIACC, and PISA 
and has begun joining different committees of OECD, including the committee on educational policy. 
A new structure, the Information-Analytical Center (IAC) was established for monitoring and evaluation 
of the education system and conducting OECD reports. In 2015, Kazakhstan and the OECD began a 
two-year Country Program, to support a set of reforms of Kazakhstan’s policies and institutions, cover-
ing areas such as public-sector integrity and governance, environment, health, taxation, competition and 
business climate, and statistics. The program was envisioned to lead to over 20 policy reviews, co-
operation in capacity building projects, an increased level of participation in six OECD Committees, 
and possible adherence to 28 OECD legal instruments, including the Declaration on International In-
vestment and Multinational Enterprises. As part of this program, in 2016/2017, the OECD conducted a 
review of the higher education system which led to recommendations, which noticeable have led to 
policy efforts to address the social selectiveness of student grants, the separation of the UNT school-
leaving and university entry test function in 2017 and the widening of university autonomy, a key theme 
in all OECD evaluations.  
The European Union 
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Since the early 1990ies, the European Union had funded a number of regional reform projects in higher 
education through their TACIS/TEMPUS programs, which allowed international exchange and mobil-
ity. TEMPUS programs have contributed to institutional development, institutional quality management, 
the development of study programs, commercialization of research and other areas. In the case of Ka-
zakhstan, TEMPUS projects may not have a direct discernable impact on changes on government policy 
on system governance (Interview KZ No. 17, 2017), they did, however support capacity building and 
networking. As one of its actions, the European Union supports a network of Higher Education Reform 
Experts (HEREs). This network comprises a pool of experts supporting the modernization of higher 
education in countries neighboring the EU. Their activities are financed through the Erasmus+ program 
and coordinated at the local level by the National Erasmus+ Offices (NEOs). As by the action’s website 
“these experts, appointed by the national authorities in the former Tempus Partner Countries, constitute 
a pool of expertise to promote and enhance the modernization of higher education. They participate in 
the development of policies and reforms in their countries and contribute to the training of local stake-
holders. Their activities consist, for example, in organizing and participating in seminars, writing arti-
cles and reports, or providing advice to individual institutions and policy makers” 128. In Kazakhstan, 
the group of HERE experts comprise acting and former directors of the higher education department in 
the MoES, HEI rectors, vice-rectors and other key stakeholders who regularly meet, conduct seminars 
and formulate policy recommendations which influence policy-development.  
International Quality Assurance Agencies (QAAs) 
Since 2012, both national and international QAA can legally operate in Kazakhstan, provided that they 
meet the requirements of and are registered by the National Register of Accreditation Bodies. As of 
2017, ten agencies, two national and two international ones were listed on the National Register, down 
from eight international agencies as of 2016 (ENQA, 2017), due to stricter requirements regarding in-
volving local experts.  
12.2.2.4 Professional organizations 
Association of Higher Education Institutions (Assotsiatsiya vysshikh uchebnykh zavedeniy Respu-
bliki Kazakhstan)129 
The Association of Higher Educational Institutions of the Republic of Kazakhstan was established in 
2002 as an independent association of mostly private HEIs. By 2017, it comprised 77 private and state 
universities, which enroll more than 86% of all students of the Kazakhstan. It is accredited with the 
MoES and is obligatorily involved in assessing and commenting on all changes to normative documents 
and legislation on higher education, such as changes of qualification and licensing requirements. It is 
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also engaged in cooperation projects such as on a common internet access, student cards and electronic 
libraries.  
Rectors' Council (Sovet Rektorov)130 
The central national Rectors Council was established by order of the Ministry of Education in May 2015 
and is supposed to become an authoritative consultative body for Kazakhstan’s higher education system. 
The Council is hosted by the Eurasian University in Astana, the rector of which is first acting president 
of the council. The Council has five sub-councils in different regions of Kazakhstan.  
Independent Kazakh Agency for Quality Assurance in Accreditation (Nezavisimoe Kazakh-
stanskoe agenstvo po obespecheniyu kachsetva v obrazovanii - IQAA)  
IQAA is the oldest independent quality assurance agency in Kazakhstan. It was founded in 2008 by 
Sholpan Kalanova, the former head of the National Accreditation Center (NAC), following the adoption 
of the 2007 Law on Education which first introduced voluntary accreditation in Kazakhstan. The Na-
tional Association “Expert”, which brings together 200 experts, acts as a minority owner since 2015 
(ENQA, 2017). It continues to operate Kazakhstan’s first ranking of HEIs which its founder had 
launched in 2006. Since 2012, IQAA is registered in the National Register of Accreditation Bodies. 
Since 2017, IQAA is full member of European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education 
(ENQA), and a member of many other QA-related associations. It has been engaged in a number of 
World Bank, EU-funded and bilateral projects to promote quality assurance in Kazakhstan (ENQA, 
2017). The Independent Quality Assurance Agency (IQAA) is the leading QAA in terms of the number 
of reviews conducted (ENQA, 2017). It is financed almost entirely from fees for accreditation services.  
Independent Agency for Accreditation and Rating (IAAR)  
In 2011, when the National Accreditation Center (NAC) ceased to offer accreditations, the Independent 
Agency for Accreditation Rating (IAAR) was established as a second non-governmental quality assur-
ance agency with the task of ranking HEIs, supporting their competitiveness, and conducting institu-
tional accreditations. It continued to use the accreditation methodology and standards of NAC. IAAR 
was officially founded by experts who had conducted accreditation reviews for NAC (Interview KZ No. 
14, 2017). Since 2013, IAAR is also conducting a yearly national ranking of HEIs. IAAR is registered 
in the National Register of Accreditation Bodies. IAAR became a full member agency of the European 
Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA) in 30 November 2016.  
Other Quality Assurance Agencies 
In 2017, further QAAs were being formed. As of the writing of this study, they did not yet play a sig-
nificant role in the governance of the HE system.  
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Educational and methodological associations (uchebno-metodicheskie ob’edineniya - UMO)  
UMOs exist for each discipline (napravleniye) and are composed of representatives of all HEIs which 
offer study programs in this particular discipline. Each UMO is organizationally “based” at a particular 
HEIs (the so-called “profile” HEI). The MoES determines which HEI will act as the profile HEI for 
each UMO and all UMOs are, in turn, organized in the so-called “Republican educational-methodolog-
ical council” (Respublikanskiy uchebno-metodicheskiy sovet - RUMS) under the MoES. The members 
of the RUMS are determined by the MoES and include representatives of UMOs as well as employer 
representatives, associations of HEIs and other representatives of civil society. All State Standards and 
“typical study plans” are confirmed by RUMS and enter into force by order of the MoES.  
The National Chamber of Entrepreneurs „Atameken“ (Natsional'naya palata predprinimateley 
RK)131 
The national chamber of entrepreneurs in its current form was founded following a presidiential order 
in 2013. In 2015 it was officially re-registered in the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs of Kazakhstan 
"Atameken". By law all professional associations of entrepreneurs (association of mining, banking 
companies) were mandated to unite in one organization which gives Atameken a weighty voice 
politically. Its objective is the creation of favorable conditions for business development through 
effective partnership between business and the authorities. While it is founded as an association of 
businesses, the Government of Kazakhstan has the right to veto decisions of its general asssembly.  
Since 2008, its predecessor organization had been involved in the development of state programs of 
education development, in the development of state standards in education, in accreditation and its 
members are often represented in the governing boards of universities as well as of accreditation 
agencies. Likewise, since 2008/2009, Atameken is obligatorily involved in assessing and commenting 
on all changes to normative documents and legislation on education as well as in the development of 
qualification frameworks and state educational standards. Although the focus of its work is on vocational 
education, the chamber has been one of the strong proponents of a system of independent accreditation 
(Interview KZ No. 19, 2017). 
12.2.3 Instruments of higher education governance in Kazakhstan 
12.2.3.1 Educational Standards and Quality Assurance 
The Kazakh quality assurance framework consists of a large number of mechanisms and instruments of 
standard setting and assessment. Standards include the State Educational Standards, the state classifier, 
typical study plans, qualification and licensing requirements. Assessment is conducted in the form of 
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state licensing, post-licensing controls, unscheduled controls, state attestion (until 2017) and state ac-
creditation (until 2011) and independent accreditation. Increasingly, information provision via rankings 
plays a role in the system and there are two national ranking providers.  
12.2.3.1.1 State Educational Standards, state classifier and typical study plans 
Since 1994, State Educational Standards (gosudarstvennye obsheobyazatel’nye standarty obrazovaniya 
- SES) are used to regulate contents and structure of educational programs. Their role is even fixed in 
Article 30 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which states that "The state establishes 
universally binding standards of education". In Kazakhstan’s HE system, the SES are intended to assure 
homogeneity and minimal standards of study programs. Compliance with the standards is assessed in a 
whole range of quality assurance procedures, among them state licensing, state attestation, and interim 
state control.  
Between 1994 and 2011, State Standards existed for each study program (gossudarstvennye standarty 
obrazovaniya po spetsial’nosti - GoSO). These highly detailed documents prescribed, aspects of the 
education process, which subjects to teach in which order, detailed contents of the compulsory subjects, 
the hours each subject would be taught, which abilities students should possess after the educational 
program. Each standard included a mandatory core curriculum in the form a list of subjects and the 
number of credit points to be obtained by students of that study program. Each standard defines “general 
education disciplines”, “basic disciplines” and “profile disciplines” and contain both a compulsory, as 
well as an elective component, made up of a list of possible disciplines (with minimum credit points) 
which could be offered to students and studied by them at their leisure during their study program. HEIs 
did initially have very little freedom to diverge from the plans, although the percentage of the “elective 
component”, which HEIs could determine themselves rose.  
The study programs which can be offered by HEIs and their obligatory and elective components are 
listed in a “state classifier” (gosudarstvennyy klassifikator). Neither private nor public HEIs may offer 
study programs not included in this list. By 2007, there were 342 such 342 state classifiers (World Bank 
& OECD, 2007).  
Evolution of standards 
Between independence and 2017, there have been many iterations and changes of the State standards. 
The first generation of SES were developed in 1994-1995 by educational and methodological associa-
tions (uchebno-metodicheskie ob’edineniya - UMO) which also distributed them among HEIs. This first 
generation of standards were highly detailed regulations concerning both content as well as processes 
of higher education and were experienced by many academics as excessive regulation limiting academic 
freedom (Kalanova, S. & Omirbayev, 2009).  
The 1999 edition of the law "On Education" passed the power to develop and endorse SES to the MoES. 
The development of SES was organized on a competitive basis. Kalanova & Omirbayev (2009) describe 
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the process of development of standards as follows: The MoES assembles a commission composed of 
employees of the MoES, the national center for state standards and testing, as well as of prorectors of 
HEIs and reputable academics, all which are selected by the MoES. The commission announces an open 
competition to develop/rework standards. Applications to this competition are forwarded to “leading 
experts” in the field to be graded for their quality, based on which the winner is selected by the commis-
sion. The developed standards were then approved by the MoES and registered with the national center 
for educational state standards and testing and published. The second generation of SES were developed 
in this way and introduced in 2001-2002.  
As part of granting increasing autonomy to HEIs, in 2011, the State Educational Standards for each 
study program were abolished and replaced by more general framework state standards for the Bachelor, 
Master’s and PhD level which defined the generic basic structure of study programs of each level. On 
the level of the individual study programs foreseen in the state classifier, only “typical study plans” 
(typovye uchebnye plany) remained, which continued to be developed for each study program (spet-
sial’nost’) by educational and methodological associations (uchebno-metodicheskie ob’edineniya - 
UMO). These plans only contain the list of compulsory subjects to be studied as well as the number of 
credits and teaching hours. In addition, HEIs may develop their own subjects within the foreseen block 
of “elective” subjects. These third-generation SES also foresaw formulating key competencies, that stu-
dents should have acquired after graduation. Also, the number of HE-specific optional subjects was 
expanded. As by 2017, HEIs may define up to 55% (70% in the case of national research universities).  
12.2.3.1.2 State control via licensing, attestation, and accreditation  
State control in higher education lies in the hands of the MoES and its subsidiary body, the Committee 
of Control (CCES). It is conducted in two forms. Forms of scheduled controls (planovaya proverka) 
include state licensing, post-licensing controls, the comprehensive national mid-term test, state accred-
itation (until 2011), and (until 2017) state attestation. Unscheduled controls (neplanovaya proverka) are 
conducted by the CCES when there are indications of irregularities, such as a very low performance of 
students in the interim testing or if complaints reach the committee of control. Both licensing and attes-
tation as procedures existed in similar forms since the Soviet period (Interview KZ No. 16, 2017). The 
frequency of reforms depends on a procedure of assessment of risk.  
Licensing 
All HEIs regardless of ownership status need a license from the MoES to operate. The license includes 
the study programs they are permitted to offer. To offer a new program, the license must therefore be 
amended. To receive a license, HEIs need to document compliance with the so-called “qualification 
requirements” and the SES. These contain standards concerning infrastructure requirements, financial 
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resources, and staff qualifications. When standards are not met, a license may be suspended or with-
drawn altogether. The CCES further has the authority to conduct post-licensing controls, to verify that 
the HEI still meets the licensing requirements.  
Attestation (until 2017) 
For those HEIs who had been granted a license to operate, state attestation was carried out every five 
years, in order to assess whether the HEI operates according to the state educational standards and meets 
its goals. The first attestation in newly established HEIs would be carried out after the first graduates 
had completed their education. The attestation process was conducted by the CCES. During the attesta-
tion process, compliance with the State Educational Standards, the “qualification requirements”, as well 
as further quantitative criteria is checked. The key function of attestation was control and oversight 
(Interview KZ No. 14, 2017) and the process did not foresee issuing recommendations for development 
or conditional attestation. In case attestation was not granted, an HEI’s license was withdrawn and the 
rector of the HEI could be liable to administrative proceedings. Since 2017, in accordance with the state 
program on education development 2011-2020, attestation was discontinued and replaced with (volun-
tary) independent accreditation.  
State Accreditation (until 2011) 
State Accreditation first appeared in Kazakhstan in the 2001 Law on Education, which introduced a 
process of state accreditation based mainly on assessing quantitative indicators without the involvement 
of experts. This procedure was widely criticized as not fit-for-purpose and the state accreditation was 
suspended until 2005 when the National Accreditation Center was established within the MoES and 
developed a new procedure based on international standards.  
The 2007 law on education reintroduced accreditation as a voluntary procedure without consequences 
for HEIs. The new approach of state accreditation thus was a process similar to attestation in that it was 
an external evaluation conducted by peers intended to document that an HEI meets certain quality stand-
ards. However, while attestation was focused on compliance and quantitative as well as qualitative in-
dicators, and always concerned the whole HEI at an institutional level, accreditation was conducted at 
institutional as well as at study program level. The most significant different was that both state and 
independent accreditation were voluntary, paid for by the HEIs themselves, and were improvement-
oriented, more qualitative peer assessment exercises. State Accreditation was carried out by the National 
Accreditation Center (NAC) between 2005 and 2011 when it was discontinued.  
Risk assessment and unscheduled controls by the CCES 
Based on a number of indicators such as accreditation, compliance with state educational standards, 
number of full-time staff, material and technical base, external assessment of learning achievements of 
students and the results of inspections, complaints by students or employers, the Committee for Control 
(CCES) places HEIs in categories of high, average or insignificant risk (EACEA, 2012b). In cases of 
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“high risk” the committee conducts unscheduled controls (neplanovaya proverka). The Committee on 
control can likewise conduct licensing controls (litsensionnaya proverka) to verify whether the HEI is 
in compliance with the licensing requirements. These controls may for example concern the licensing 
and qualification requirements, the compliance with admittance regulations, or financial management.  
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12.2.3.1.3 Independent (international) Accreditation 
The 2007 law on education had reintroduced accreditation as a voluntary option for HEIs but had not 
attached any formal recognition to it. Nevertheless, in 2008, anticipating the growing role for accredita-
tion after Kazakhstan’s accession to the Bologna Process, the Independent Quality assurance Agency 
(IQAA) was founded by Sholpan Kalanova - the former director of NAC - and conducted its first re-
views.  
In March 2010, Kazakhstan signed the Bologna Declaration. One of the so-called “action lines” of the 
Process was quality assurance and the European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance had 
been developed as a common basis for quality assurance in the EHEA.  
The State Program on Education Development for 2011-2020 (SPED2011-2020) was passed in 2010 
and in 2011, state accreditation was discontinued. On the basis of the former NAC, the Independent 
Agency for Accreditation Rating (IAAR) was founded in 2011. In addition, Only HEIs which had suc-
cessfully passed institutional accreditation by a recognized accreditation agency would be eligible to 
enroll students on state grants and HEIs which had passed accreditation, would be exempted from state 
attestation (EACEA, 2012b).  
Since 2015, in order to be recognized, accreditation agencies needed to be full members of the interna-
tional networks of quality assurance (INQAAHE, ENQA, APQN). As of 2016, there were two Kazakh 
(IQAA and IAAR) and eight international Quality Assurance Agencies (QAAs) licensed to conduct 
accreditations in Kazakhstan. In 2017, attestation has been fully discontinued and only (voluntary) ac-
creditation remains.  
12.2.3.1.4 Comprehensive National Mid-Term Test 
The perceived low standards of many universities motivated the MoES in 2003 a national “Comprehen-
sive National Mid-Term Tests” (vneshnaya otsenka uchebnhkh dostizhenii - VOUD) after the second 
year of studies, in which students would are assessed on the compulsory basic disciplines as by the state 
standards (World Bank & OECD, 2007). If students do not reach a minimal level of knowledge, they 
are not allowed to continue their studies in the third year. The VOUD is operated by the CCES. Low 
performance on the VOUD is a risk indicator and can trigger an unscheduled control by the CCES.  
12.2.3.1.5 Information provision – National rankings 
In 2006, Sholpan Kalanova, then director of the National Accreditation Center, published the first rank-
ing of Kazakh HEIs. The Independent Kazakhstan Quality Assurance Agency for Education (IQAA) 
continued to develop and conduct yearly rankings of higher education institutions of Kazakhstan132. 
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Since 2013, the Independent Agency for Accreditation Rating (IAAR) is conducting a separate yearly 
national ranking of HEIs133.  
Students and employers pay increasing attention to ranking results when applying to universities (Inter-
view KZ No. 20, 2017). Local authorities such as Akimats also pay attention to rankings when assigning 
additional funding to HEIs from local budgets (Interview KZ No. 14, 2017)  
12.2.3.2 Regulation of admission into higher education 
Regulation of access via the Unified National Test (Edinoe Nacional'noe Testirovanie – UNT) 
Prior to 1999, each HEI held their entrance examinations to admit students to their programs. Since 1999 
these exams were replaced with a Unified National Test (Edinoe Nacional'noe Testirovanie - UNT). In 
2004, they also replaced both school-leaving examinations and became obligatory for all school gradu-
ates as a single high-stakes test.  
The UNT is conducted simultaneously in all of Kazakhstan as a three-hour-long exam administered to 
all 11th grade students. It covers five subjects, including the student’s mother tongue (Kazakh or Rus-
sian), Kazakh history, the language of instruction, mathematics and ‘profile’ subject which is chosen by 
the student based on their future study orientation.  
The MoES sets a minimal required cut-off score for admission into higher education. HEIs may not 
accept students with values below this value, but may, as is typically the case for very prestigious private 
HEIs, set a higher entry requirement. When the UNT was first introduced, the pass score was set at 40 
out of 120. In 2006 it was raised to 50 and further increases are periodically discussed. Students often 
prepare themselves for the UNT during the final two years of secondary education and private tutoring 
is widespread among those families who can afford it financially (OECD, 2017). 
Until 2017 the UNT was administered by the Committee for Control in the field of education and science 
(CCES) and the National Centre of State Standards and Testing, as it was regarded as a form of control. 
Since 2017, school graduation exams were conducted separately from the UNT again, uncoupling the 
functions of university entrance and school leaving exam. For those students wishing to receive a state 
grant, both their UNT as well as their school leaving scores are taken into consideration.  
The Complex test (CT) 
Students who have failed the UNT, have graduated prior to the UNT’s introduction, graduates of initial 
and secondary vocational schools, graduates of secondary schools who have studied abroad and others 
may take an equivalent exam called the Complex Test (CT). Students who have failed the UNT may 
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take the CT at the earliest one year later. The number of students taking the CT rose from 29,141 in 
2011 to 78,248 in 2015. In 2015, around half of test-takers failed the CT (OECD, 2017).  
Regulation of the number of students in study programs 
The MoES only determines the number of grants per study program for the entire country. While there 
are no formal criteria which assign an upper limit to the number of admitted students, the SES and 
qualification requirements include norms regarding the necessary infrastructure per number of students.  
12.2.3.3 Institutional Governance and University Autonomy 
Internal governance of HEIs 
Since independence, the governance structures of higher education in Kazakhstan have been highly cen-
tralized and dependent upon the government.  
Each HEI is headed by a rector and various deputy and vice-rectors. Until the implementation of boards 
of overseers (nablyudatel’nye sovety) in 2016, in state HEIs the rector was the final authority regarding 
strategy, personnel and financial questions. He/she still is the ultimate authority in everyday manage-
ment of the HEI. While the rector is the managing authority, he or she is also the chairperson of the 
Academic (Scientific) Council as a collegial body composed of academic staff, administrative staff stu-
dents, and representatives of public bodies. The composition of the Academic Council is prescribed by 
bylaws approved by the government but its members are elected according to institution-specific rules. 
Academic Councils can sometimes have up to 100 members, with an average of 65-70 per university 
(EACEA, 2012b), which makes them rather large. Before the implementation of boards of overseers, 
they were formally responsible for approving the structure of an HEI, its charter/statute, approving de-
velopment plans and evaluating reports of the institution’s leaderships. Due to the size the academic 
councils and them being chaired by rectors, power in state HEIs was until 2016 usually highly concen-
trated in the hand of the rector, which has “in many cases resulted in their domination over major insti-
tutional decisions, with low levels of transparency and collegiality” (Bilyalov, 2016) with university 
councils acting “either as a formal “rubber stamp” or as an advisory body to the rector” (Bilyalov, 2016). 
Universities in the legal form of joint-stock companies always had a council of directors as a governing 
boards taking final decisions on a lot of matters.  
Appointment of rectors and accountability to the MoES 
Until 2016, the rectors of public HEIs were nominated by the Government based on the proposal of the 
Ministry of Education and Science (MoES) while the rectors of national HEIs are nominated by the 
President of Kazakhstan directly. Deputy rectors are nominated by rectors and approved by the MoES. 
Since 2016, the boards of overseers (nablyudatel’nye sovety) play a stronger role in the vetting and 
selection of potential rectors, although the final decision is still taken by a government committee.  
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Within the election and appointment process of rectors, particular attention is paid to the strategic de-
velopment plans which exist on different levels in the state: The fundamental document informing state 
policy are the national State Programs for Educational Development which have been updated every 
five years since 2005. Based on the SPED, the MoES formulates its own goals, development strategy 
and road map. The MoES tries to coordinate its own development plans with University Development 
Strategies. Since 2016, Rectors are required to apply with their own development strategy. One of the 
criteria the “Republican Commission on the selection of rectors” uses in taking its decisions, is the 
degree to which the proposed university development strategies help to realize the wider MoES Strategy.  
After appointment, each rector has to provide a yearly public account on the HEI’s activities. Likewise 
once per year rectors need to present a report on financial accounting and the implementation of the 
university’s development strategy to the “large commission” of the MoES (bol'shaya komissiya) which 
is made up of the heads of departments, the vice-minister and the responsible secretary.  
Boards of trustees and boards of overseers (popechitel’skie sovety and nablyudatel’nye sovety) in 
state HEIs 
The State Program of education development for 2011-2020 (Ministry of Education and Science of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan[MoES], 2010) foresees granting more institutional autonomy to state HEIs by 
establishing Boards of Trustees through involving employers, public bodies, parents and learners and 
implementing principles of corporate management in HEIs (EACEA, 2012b). It was planned to grant 
“full autonomy” to national research universities by 2015, to other national higher education institutions 
by 2016 and to all other HEIs by 2018 (EACEA, 2012b). It is also foreseen to replace the appointment 
of rectors with elections by boards.  
In 2007, the first boards of trustees were instituted. Such boards were established at virtually all public 
HEIs within a few years. Since rectors were not accountable to the boards, however, boards had no say 
over budgetary matters, and as Bilyalov (2016) pointed out, board by-laws – defined by the HEIs them-
selves – in almost all cases allowed them merely to suggest, discuss, and advise, thus withholding any 
real formal authority, making them sounding boards and forums for consultation with employers and 
the regional community rather than governing boards.  
In 2012, the government reacted to this state of affairs and introduced “boards of overseers” with clearly 
stated responsibilities guaranteed under the Law on State Assets that regulates public universities. Since 
2016, their powers formally include selecting and proposing candidates for rector, approving budgets; 
defining strategy and admissions criteria, creating faculty hiring policies, and even set the senior lead-
ership team’s salaries (Bilyalov, 2016).  
Joint-Stock HEIs always had boards of directors as highest decision-making organs.  
Autonomy of HEIs  
  
page 319 
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, State HEIs in Kazakhstan have increasingly gained organiza-
tional, financial, staffing and academic autonomy, albeit in small steps. One notable exemption is Naz-
arbayev University which is governed by its own law and has substantial autonomy in all areas. Certain 
national universities also enjoy greater autonomy. Private HEIs enjoy more autonomy as their founders 
can appoint their own rectors and they own land and buildings, and can purchase equipment and learning 
materials independent of the MoES (World Bank & OECD, 2007).  
The following situation describes HEI autonomy in 2017: In terms of organizational autonomy, state 
HEIs may establish internal structures and processes, and develop and approve certain internal regula-
tions. They may not select their own executive head. They manage their facilities and equipment but 
may not sell or mortgage their property. In terms of financial autonomy, state HEIs have their own 
budgets and freedom to spend them within the parameters established by the ministry. They may estab-
lish salary scales, additional payments, premiums and bonuses, other payments to staff within the limits 
of their own financial resources. provide goods and services in line with their license on a fee-basis. 
They may source additional financial and material resources to implement activities in line with their 
license. In terms of staffing autonomy, state HEIs can appoint and dismiss all staff below the level of 
vice-rectors. They are limited by qualifications requirements spelled which are necessary to receive a 
license. Academic autonomy for both public and private HEIs is limited by state standards and accred-
itation. HEIs may determine the elective components of curricula. They may introduce new study pro-
grams foreseen in the state classified but require a government license to do so. HEIs may set a higher 
minimal score of UNT results in student admission but they are required to accept to enroll any students 
carrying a state grant.  
12.2.3.4 Financing of HEIs 
Kazakhstani HEIs derive their funding primarily from four sources: From the state via state-funded 
study places, from tuition via fee-paying students, from special government programs (such as for in-
viting foreign professors or equipping new laboratories), and from private & state funded R&D contracts 
and other paid services (limited by legislation), from loans, sponsoring, donations and grants (EACEA, 
2012b). Income from tuition fees plays the most significant role for Kazakhstan’s HEIs, through almost 
universal cost sharing in public universities and colleges, the large size of the private HE market and the 
partial privatization of public universities (World Bank & OECD, 2007).  
Public HEIs  Private HEIs 
Tuition Fees 
Grants for Operational Expenses (Voucher 
Scheme) 
Tuition Fees  
Grants for Operational Expenses (Voucher 
Scheme) 
Grants from State programs (e.g. for mobility) 
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Investment Funds from the government and 
grants from State programs (e.g. for mobility) 
Research Funds from the government 
 
Table 25: Sources of Funding for Public and Private TEIs in Kazakhstan (Source: OECD/World Bank 2007) 
These four sources of income will be presented in more detail in the following paragraph.  
State Funding via educational grants 
Between independence and 1999, state funding for HEIs was distributed via line-item budget transfers 
that were drawn up yearly by the MoES for each HEI, based on an estimate of each HEI’s need (based 
mostly on historical funding) and a process of negation between the MoES and each HEI.  
In 1999, the government replaced the former system of state funding with voucher-like education grants 
which were awarded to high achieving students who chose to apply to study programs for which there 
are grants available. Students become eligible for state grants on the basis of their scores on the Unified 
National Test (UNT) or the Complex Test (CT). Using their test results, they apply for a grant in a 
certain study program. The grants themselves consist of a sum covering tuition fees as well as a living 
stipend. Furthermore, these grants are portable, so long as students choose to study a grant-carrying 
subject.  
In May of each year, the “Republican Commission on distribution of educational grants” (respublikan-
skaya komisiya po razpredeleniyu gosudarstvennih obrazovatel’nih grantov), a committee of the de-
partment of higher and post-graduate education at the MoES, consisting of rectors of HEIs, representa-
tives of Ministries and trade unions (EACEA, 2012b) announces the “state-educational order” (gosu-
darstvenno-obrazovatel'nyy zakaz). The order establishes the number of grants per field of study, based 
on an assessment of demand for certain specializations. After graduation, in June or July, school-leavers 
take the UNT, also choosing a subject in which they want to participate in a nation-wide competition 
for state grants. Based on their UNT results, grants are then awarded to the highest-scoring students in 
each field of study. The successful students can then enroll to any HEI of their choice into the field of 
study for which they were awarded a state grants. The students that were not successful in securing a 
grant may also enroll at any university on a tuition-basis, if they reached the minimum required number 
of points on the UNT. Finally, on September 1, all HEIs report the number of grant-carrying students 
they have enrolled to the MoES and are awarded the corresponding state grants.  
While students can freely choose a university, in practice, most chose to enroll in HEIs with the highest 
prestige. In 2011, only 85 out of 146 HEIs were awarded state education grants (EACEA, 2012b). In 
addition, since 2011, only accredited HEIs may enroll grant-carrying students.  
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From the economic perspective of HEIs, state funding represents a substitution for student tuition fees. 
For some very prestigious HEIs, enrolling grant-carrying students may economically not even be the 
most profitable choice, as they may charge higher tuition from self-paying students. HEIs, however, are 
generally very interested to attract grant-holding students, which is as much a source of funding as it is 
a sign of prestige (World Bank & OECD, 2007).  
The system sets clear incentives for universities to strive to be attractive to the best students. HEIs con-
firm that the grant-financing mechanism is one reason why they pay great attention to national and 
international rankings (Interview KZ No. 17, 2017; Interview KZ No. 6, 2017).  
It should be noted, however, that in 2017, HEIs still did not have the financial autonomy to use income 
from state grants as they saw fit. While the overall funding is allocated to HEIs on the basis of state-
funded students, the MoES still allocates it on a line-item level. HEIs thus cannot re-allocate funds to 
other areas strategically and provides little incentive to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their 
use (Hartley, Gopaul et al., 2016). Thus, paradoxically, HEIs in Kazakhstan generate most of their in-
come independently of government funds (via tuition fees), yet, have limited control over how this 
money is spent. At the same time, neither public nor private HEIs are required to be audited inde-
pendently (World Bank & OECD, 2007).  
Income from tuition fees 
Income from tuition fees represents the most significant part of HEIs income and Kazakhstan has be-
come one of the countries with the highest level of private funding worldwide (World Bank & OECD, 
2007). In 2011, only 20 % of the students received state grants while 80 % of the overall budget of HEIs 
came from tuition (EACEA, 2012b). This is only slightly down from 2004/2005, when 84% of students 
self-financed their studies (World Bank & OECD, 2007).  
Tuition fees per student may not be lower than state grants. As an (likely unintended) consequence of 
this constraint, any increase in state grant size currently automatically increases the minimal tuition fees, 
making higher education less accessible to fee-paying students. Some HEIs, especially in the economi-
cally less developed South of the country, sometimes do not comply with this requirement and do set 
lower tuition fees (Interview KZ No. 16, 2017).  
The MoES further establishes minimum amounts that universities should spend per student on providing 
courses. Many universities regard these rates as fees they should charge students (World Bank & OECD, 
2007), although they are free to charge higher fees up to a maximum set by the MoES (Alpysbayeva 
& Akhmetzhanova, 2016). HEIs may independently decide how many fee-paying students they accept, 
as long as they dispose of the corresponding infrastructure.  
Income from federal programs and grants 
For the vast majority of HEIs, fees from students (out-of-pocket or via state scholarships) represent the 
only, for all HEIs the most significant source of funding.  
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As in other countries, the government may provide special funding through strategic development pro-
grams or to support individual HEIs in the realization of their mission. Often such funds (e.g. for large-
scale renovations or expensive equipment) are allocated by the republican budget commission (respu-
blikanskaya byudzhetnaya komissiya). A small number of leading universities such as the public national 
universities, the private Kazakh British Technical University and Nazarbayev University, particularly 
benefit from the allocation of additional resources. These take the forms of higher student grants, addi-
tional funding for facilities and equipment, funding for the recruitment of foreign visiting professors or 
privileged access to research grants and contracts directly or via linked research institutes (World Bank 
& OECD, 2007). The allocation of these additional funds to HEIs is often based on ministerial decisions, 
rather than on open competitions (World Bank & OECD, 2007) and the criteria for the distribution of 
these resources are not in an apparent way related to performance indicators of the receiving institutions 
or of their proposals (Makridi et al., 2007)  
Except in the case of certain joint-stock universities, private HEIs must earn virtually all their money 
through student tuition. Research funding is very low in absolute as well as in relative terms, standing 
at 0.18% of GDP in 2013 (UNESCO Institute of Statistics, 2017). Of the public funding that exists for 
R&D activities, only less than a third is directed to HEIs, the rest going to research institutes (World 
Bank & OECD, 2007).  
12.3 Annex 3: Moldova – The governance of the higher education system134 
12.3.1 Moldova: Structure of the higher education system 
12.3.1.1 Structure of the education system in the Republic of Moldova 
Study programs are divided into professional “specialties”, which are further divided into “specializa-
tions”. The graduates receive a Diploma of License (I. cycle), which gives access to Master degree, or 
Diploma of Master (II. cycle), which gives access to doctoral study in a certain subject area. After joining 
the Bologna Process in 2005 Moldova reorganized its higher education system, around a two-cycle de-
gree system by 2011 (Turcan, R. V. et al., 2015, p. 19), consisting of Bachelor’s (Diploma de Licenţă) 
and Master’s degrees (Diploma de Master). The duration of university studies was reduced from 5 years 
(specialist education) to 4 years (Bachelor’s Degree) and 2 years (Master’s degree). Study programs can 
be organized either as day, evening or extramural programs and the duration of studies is 4-6 years, 
depending on the specialization and type of degree: first cycle lasts from three to four years and second 
cycle lasts from one to two years. Higher education finalizes with graduation exams and a Diploma 
thesis.  
                                                          
134 Disclaimer: In this section I am using ideas and formulations which have been published in Tofan & Bischof 
(2016)  
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The 2014 new Code of education (Republica Moldova Parlamentul, 2014) extends the cycles of tertiary 
education introducing the cycle III: Higher Education/PhD. Doctoral studies remain separated into two 
stages: Doctor and Doctor Habilitate. Doctoral programs last from three to four years of study and 
research activity, completed by the public defense of an original research work (thesis). Doctor Habili-
tate is the postdoctoral study and represents the highest scientific degree conferred in all fields, for the 
original scientific contribution, completed also by the public defense of doctor habilitate thesis.  
12.3.1.2 Size and growth of the higher education system 
Private and public higher education in Moldova 
Until 1989 all HEIs of the MSSR had been state institutions and exclusively funded by state. In 1989 
the first groups of students were enrolled on a tuition basis in a special English-language engineering 
and technical program designed as a private entity within an existing state institutions at the Polytech-
nic Institute in Chisinau135. In September 1992 the first two private educational institutions opened 
their doors in Chisinau almost simultaneously – the University of Humanities and the Free Interna-
tional University of Moldova (Galben & Cogan, 2003, pp. 28–30). This marked the actual start of a 
process of institutional diversification of the national higher education system. By 2000 the number of 
private HEIs had risen to 32 vs. only 15 public ones and the small country had a total 47 different 
HEIs.  
 
Figure 23: Number of public and private HEIs in the Republic of Moldova 
                                                          
135The initiator of this first initiative was professor Ion Groza, who in the past had benefited of a series of fellow-
ships in the United States, France and United Kingdom. On the basis of these first two students groups the first 
private higher education institutional structure had been created by an official Government decision within the 
auspices of a public institution. However, this private sub-division (named as „private university”) of a public 
university existed for only three years and had to suspend its activity because of legal contradictions and the per-
sonal opposition of the university administration. 
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The emergence in 1990s of private HE as an alternative to public HE was a response to the pressures of 
socio-economic and political demand and new opportunities at a time of rapid economic and social 
change. The institutional mission of the first private HEIs was to train specialists for the market-oriented 
economy and under (new) conditions of the market-oriented economy. Over the years the environment 
which generated the transformations of HES has changed as has the strategic focus of many private 
HEIs. Only one private HEI (The Free International University of Moldova) corresponds to the profile 
of a „classical” comprehensive university. The rest of the private sector seems to be guided primarily 
by economic considerations which seem to be the decisive factor in establishing new graduate degree 
programs.  
Also state HEIs, however, changed their behavior in similar ways as did private ones. The Law of Edu-
cation (1995) provided that state education is generally tuition free ("free of charge”), but in fact insuf-
ficient state funding forced HEIs to find new sources of income to fill this gap (Secrieru, 2007, pp. 12–
14). State HEIs did this since 1993-1994 by enrolling students on a “contract basis”, which required 
those students to pay tuition fees. The following graph illustrates these developments:  
 
Figure 3: Development of the total number of students enrolled on a budget and tuition-fee basis (in 
both private and public HEIs) 
As of 2015/2016, there were 30 HEIs in operation in Moldova, 19 of them state institutions and 11 
private institutions. However, not all universities received official accreditation. The Moldovan Ministry 
of Education lists 29 universities in the country, of which 18 are state universities and 11 are private136. 
                                                          
136 http://www.edu.gov.md/ro/content/institutiile-de-invatamant-superior last accessed 2016/2/19 
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In the 2013-2014 academic year, private HEIs in Moldova made up 39% of the total number of HEIs 
while only enrolling around 20% of all students. Their role is thus comparatively modest.  
 
12.3.2 Actors and their capabilities 
After independence, the higher education system in Moldova consisted of only those HEIs, which had 
existed at the dissolution of the USSR, as well as the Moldovan branch of the Soviet Academy of Sci-
ence. In this chapter, an overview is given on the actors which emerged and constitute the institutional 
landscape of the Moldovan higher education system by 2015.  
12.3.2.1 State Actors 
 
Figure 24: Structure of the Moldovan HE and Research sector in 2014 (Source: Ţurcan & Buhaian, 2014) 
The Ministry of Education (MoE) was founded in 1990. It is responsible for formulating educational 
policy and monitoring its implementation. All HEIs are subordinated to a particular ministry and most 
are subordinated to the Ministry of Education, with some specialized institutions being subordinated to 
different respective “branch ministries”. The MoE is responsible for higher education policy develop-
ment, the recognition of degrees, and the final approval of all decisions regarding evaluation and ac-
creditation. In addition, the MoE determines admission rules and sets quotas for the allowed number of 
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students for each HEI137, both for state-funded as well as tuition-based places. As of 2015, according to 
the 2014 code of education, the quality in higher education at the national level is to be ensured by the 
Ministry of Education (MoE) and the National Agency for Quality Assurance in Professional Education 
(ANACIP). In practice ANACIP had not started to take up its work and the MoE remains the key actor 
in the governance of the higher education system in Moldova.  
The Government of the Republic of Moldova is responsible for the confirmation of almost all decisions 
taken by the MoE, which it decides upon by vote. The president of the Moldovan Academy of Sciences 
(ASM) is an ex-officio member of the government, responsible for research, which gives him a strong 
degree of influence in the system.  
The Moldovan Academy of Sciences (ASM) inherited the research institutes of the Moldovan branch of 
the Soviet Academy of Science. The ASM is the decisive actor in the R&D system in Moldova. It is the 
main policy-making institution on R&D in Moldova and the president of the ASM is ex-officio a member 
of the Government. While the Moldovan Government is responsible for approving the R&D budget, the 
ASM distributes it through two agencies, the Agency for Innovation and Technology Transfer (AITT) 
for innovation funding and the Centre for Fundamental and Applied Research Funding (CFCFA) for 
public funding. Research managed by the ASM is conducted in institutes of the ASM, as well as its 
affiliated public and private universities and a few private companies that perform research activities. 
The ASM is therefore simultaneously the main policy-making body, funding body and recipient of this 
funding, of which it takes the lion’s share. Over three quarters of all Gross Domestic Expenditure on 
R&D is performed in the research institutes of ASM, whereas R&D in universities and businesses stands 
at 11.6% and 11.3% respectively (Cuciureanu, 2014, p. 8). This conflict of interests creates perpetual 
tension and conflicts with Moldova’s universities, which feel that their development is hampered by the 
ASM’s control of and quasi-monopoly on research. The ASM is politically well connected and has a 
high degree of centrality in the political sphere. As one interviewee points out: 
The Academy of Science has tradition. In Moldova it kept the status it already had in the Soviet 
Union as a center of scientific preparation of leaders etc. It is difficult to change its status be-
cause a large number of people who hold these scientific degrees, such as doctor habilitat, all 
attempts to change the academy of science are perceived as attempts to attack them and their 
privileges which they have because of their degrees […] such as bonuses to their salaries and 
a lot less teaching hours.” (Interview MD No. 10, 2016) 
The National Council on Accreditation and Attestation (Consiliul Naţional pentru Acreditare şi Atestare 
– CNAA) is a quality assurance body responsible for university research and scientific and academic 
titles, which was created in 1999. CNAA is a governmental body, responsible for the evaluation and 
accreditation of HEIs as research organizations, for recognizing diplomas and certificates issued by 
                                                          
137 Based on a plan of projected labor force needs which is developed by the Ministry of Economy 
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public authorities of other states, as well as for conferring scientific degrees and titles to highly qualified 
staff. The most important substructures are the department and the commission for evaluation and ac-
creditation; the department and commission for attestation; and the department for doctorate policy and 
monitoring. Accreditation by CNAA is a precondition for HEIs to receive State funding for research by 
becoming partner or affiliated institutes of the Academy of Science.  
The National Agency for Quality Assurance in Professional Education (Agenţia Naţională de Asigurare 
a Calităţii în Învățământul Profesional - ANACIP) is the national Moldovan quality assurance agency 
and was created in 2014-2015. ANACIP is intended as an independent agency responsible for authori-
zation and accreditation of institutions and study programs in higher and vocational accreditation. Ac-
cording to the 2014 code on education, its tasks include the authorization and accreditation of study 
programs and institutions in vocational, higher and continuous education. Its decisions as well as its 
methodology require government approval to enter into force. Likewise, while ANACIP develops its 
own methodology of assessment and accreditation of the institutions which is approved by the Govern-
ment. When ANACIP was founded in 2015, all of its staff and the majority of its governing council 
consisted of persons who had been trained within the TEMPUS QUAEM project.  
12.3.2.2 Stakeholder Organizations  
The Moldovan Council of Rectors (Consiliul Rectorilor din Republica Noldova – CNRCM), founded in 
1997, is a public non-governmental organization, which unites the rectors of 27 state and private higher 
education institutions. It is funded by its member universities in relation to their student enrolment. The 
Council of Rectors is a discussion and lobbying organization where university rectors can discuss de-
velopments and coordinate their position. The Council of Rectors has a high degree of centrality in the 
higher education system in Moldova, because typically, all proposals which are developed in the MoE 
are submitted to the Council of rectors for discussion (Interview MD No. 10, 2016). The president of 
the Council of rectors, as a rule, is also a member of the College of the Minister of Education. In addition, 
the Council has also developed into a point of liaison for the national TEMPUS office. Likewise, the 
results of international projects are frequently presented and discussed in here.  
The European Union has played an important role in shaping the development of the higher education 
system in the country. Moldova joined the European Union’s TEMPUS program in 1994 and a total of 
83 projects were developed until 2013, worth about 43 million Euro (National Erasmus+ Office in Mol-
dova, 2016). The program’s focus was primarily on university management, curriculum development, 
and training teaching staff. In the period between 2006 and 2015 there were six projects related to inter-
nal and external quality assurance, accreditation, and the development of qualification frameworks. Ac-
cording to the EU’s impact study, the TEMPUS program had become a key instrument for university 
reform in Moldova which was used to explore and test elements of the Bologna Process before they 
were implemented at the national level (European Commission, 2012).  
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Other International organizations also played an important role in the development of higher education 
by funding scientific publications, international conferences, curricula modernization and research 
travel grants (Padure, 2009b). The Soros Foundation was active especially during the second half of 
the 1990s and continually increased its budget, from annually USD 1 million in 1993, to 8.3 million in 
1998 (Padure, 2009b). The Council of Europe sporadically organized seminars, mainly upon the re-
quest of the Moldovan Ministry of Education. Topics were quality assurance and qualifications frame-
works. Often, these activities happened in cooperation with the European Training Foundation. The 
World Bank has been an important international agency in supporting projects in reforming pre-tertiary 
education. It did not play a large role in higher education reform in Moldova.  
Different European nations contributed to support reforms and institution-building. Regarding quality 
assurance, two noteworthy examples have been the capacity building projects for the new Quality As-
surance Agency ANACIP between 2014 and 2016 which were supported by the governments of Roma-
nia and Estonia. The government of Romania in particular has provided experts and funding for ex-
changes and capacity building on several occasions.  
12.3.3 Instruments of higher education governance in Moldova 
12.3.3.1 Educational Standards and Quality Assurance 
During the Soviet period, there was almost no academic autonomy. Curricula, text books, teaching ma-
terials, the format of assessment, etc. was centrally prepared and prescribed for all universities to follow. 
The increased academic autonomy or, in other words, the absence of any regulations at the end of the 
Soviet period meant that Moldovan universities had to develop the capacity to develop their own study 
plan, quality assurance mechanisms, etc. At the beginning of the transition period universities continued 
“by inertia” (Interview MD No. 8, 2016). Then, step by step, new instruments for quality assurance were 
introduced until by 2015, the Moldovan system quality assurance framework had developed a number 
of mechanisms and instruments which will be discussed in this chapter.  
12.3.3.1.1 State Educational Standards  
Until 1996, there were no official standards governing the structure and contents of study programs. 
Most universities, however, continued to use the old contents “by inertia” (Interview MD No. 8, 
2016).This situation was codified in 1996 when the original Soviet study plans and norms for teaching 
loads were translated into Romanian and entered into force as Moldovan standards (Interview MD No. 
10, 2016). This situation remained until 2000, when a framework plan (plan cadru) was issued. After 
Moldova joined the Bologna Process in 2005, the standards were subsequently revised to include Mas-
ter’s, and PhD degrees as well as reformulated to correspond to the ECTS user’s guide. As of 2015, the 
range of State Standards encompasses structural standards (plan cadru), subject-specific content and 
competence standards (national qualifications framework), and accreditation standards.  
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Common study domain nomenclature (Nomenclatorul domeniilor de formare profesională şi al 
specialităţilor) 
The domain nomenclature for study programs assigns a code for each “specialty” (study program) and 
situates it in an educational and professional domain. It was launched in 1998 in its first variant and was 
adapted in 2009 to correspond to the EUROStat classification of study programs (Interview MD No. 10, 
2016). The nomenclature is used for statistical and planning purposes and for planning the number of 
state-funded (budgetnye) study places. 
Framework plan for higher studies (Planul-cadru pentru studii superioare – plan cadru) 
The framework plan for higher studies defines common features for study programs in Moldova. It 
contains general provisions on issues such as the structure and contents of study plans, the length of the 
academic year, the use of ECTS, types of student assessment and on other structural issues. It also con-
tains a provisions on the number and type of obligatory modules to be taught in all Bachelor level study 
programs (which include, for example, foreign language, IT, Romanian language, professional ethics, 
and physical education). It also specifies the percentage-wise distribution of general, specialized and 
applied subjects.  
The Plan Cadru as a document first appeared in 2000 (Interview MD No. 10, 2016). Before that the 
original Soviet study plans in their Romanian-language version were the only documents regulating 
higher education. In 2005 it was reworked to include ECTS and in 2007 and 2014 respectively, provi-
sions for Master’s and doctoral programs were added. For the Master’s and PhD level, obligatory mod-
ules are formulated more broadly.  
The plan cadru also makes quite detailed descriptions about HEI-internal processes, for example on the 
steps a new study program needs to pass within the university in order to be approved in the final step 
by the MoE or – according to the 2014 code of education – by ANACIP138.  
Subject-specific qualifications frameworks (Plan Cadru Național al Calificărilor Învăţămînt Su-
perior) 
Since 2006/2007, Moldova has worked on developing a so-called “National Framework of Qualifica-
tions in Higher Education” (Cadrul National al Calificarilor Învăţămînt Superior)139. Not to be confused 
with the overarching national qualification framework currently in development (see below), the cadru 
national represents subject-specific standards, intended to ensure the transparency in the higher educa-
tion, academic mobility and recognition of diplomas at the international level (Education code of the 
Republic of Moldova, 2015). On the context of their development, one respondent pointed to the need 
for common standards for popular disciplines: 
                                                          
138 As of June 2016, however, this was still done by the MoE 
139 An example can be found here: http://edu.gov.md/sites/de-
fault/files/cnc_22_31_32_33_34_38_42_44_55_85.pdf  
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 “Economic specialties were very high in demand among students and practically all students 
tried to realize training in these specialties. […] These programs [sometimes did not] have 
anything in common. […] And in order to assure at the very least the core parts [of study pro-
grams], there should be a framework which all HEIs which are offering these programs are 
obliged to respect, in order for at least 50% of the results to be common, while there remains a 
field for the autonomy of HEIs” (Interview MD No. 10, 2016)  
The cadru national prescribes certain mandatory elements regarding the structure, contents and intended 
learning outcomes for the respective study domain. Study programs have to correspond to these stand-
ards. As of 2014, the contents of these subject-specific QF include: a description of the professional 
fields of employment; description of qualifications and occupations; c) generic and specific competences 
as intended learning outcomes; level descriptors by higher education cycles (BA/MA/PhD) with asso-
ciated workload in ECTS; a list of BA-level modules and how they contribute to individual intended 
learning outcomes/competences; teaching, learning and assessing methods; and procedures for quality 
assurance in higher education. 
The subject-specific qualification framework is officially developed by the Ministry of Education and 
then approved by the Government. In practice, the standards are elaborated by groups of academics and 
professionals from the field and then approved by the ministry and the government. The Ministry of 
Education maintains a National Register of Qualifications in Higher Education, which contains all sub-
ject-specific QFs. According to the 2014 code of education, the National Agency for Quality Assurance 
in Professional Education (ANACIP) is to be responsible for the development of the QFs. As of 2016, 
they elaboration is still, however, to be coordinated with the relevant ministries (in most cases the MoE).  
Overarching National Qualifications Framework in the Republic of Moldova  
Semantically almost identical, but independent from the Cadrul National al Calificarilor Învăţămînt 
Superior, the National Qualifications Framework is part of the commitments Moldova entered with its 
accession to the Bologna Process in 2005. Its development between 2005 and 2015 has been rather slow. 
In 2010, a concept on an 8-level NQF was adopted140, but not implemented except for in the area of 
higher education. In 2013, with the support of the European Training Foundation (ETF) – and a corre-
sponding EU grants – a concept focusing on VET and lifelong learning was developed to update the 
2010 concept. As of 2015, the situation is unclear. The subject-specific qualifications frameworks (see 
above) are developed quite independently from those in the area of VET. According to the 2014 code 
of education, the Cadrul National al Calificarilor Învăţămînt Superior represents the higher education 
section of the National qualifications framework141. However, the relationship between the two NQF's 
– for higher education and for VET and lifelong learning – as of 2015 was rather unclear and it is not 
                                                          
140 Ministerial Order no. 934 of 29.12.2010 
141 NQF HE approved by Ministerial Order no. 968 of 10 September 2014 
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clear, whether or how they will be integrated. The elaboration of NQF started by the Ministry of Edu-
cation Decision from October 2006 and was approved by decision of the Ministry of Education Council 
at 24.12.2010.  
12.3.3.1.2 Assessment 
Licensing of HEIs 
Since 1995 private HEIs needed to receive a license from the MoE to take up operations. This license 
was granted on the basis of a government decision. Between 2001 and 2010, the responsibility for the 
licensing of all education activities (kindergardens, schools, universities) was transferred to the Licens-
ing chamber of Moldova under the Ministry of Economy before it was transferred back to the MoE142 
in 2010.  
Provisional authorization of study programs  
Since 1995, before HEIs could offer a study program, it needed to receive provisional authorization 
from the Ministry of Education. In 2015, during the authorization process, the compliance with the plan 
cadru, the qualifications frameworks and the accreditation criteria are assessed, the same criteria which 
also form the basis of accreditation. Changes in study programs also require authorization. 
According to the 2014 code of education, HEIs require a provisional operation authorization to carry 
out study programs and admit students. If the authorization is refused, the government is to withdraw 
the HEI’s license to operate or offer particular study programs until the shortcomings leading to the 
negative assessment results are remedied.  
According to 2014 code of education, this provisional authorization143 is to be carried out by ANACIP. 
As of 2016, however, the MoE continues to conduct this control.  
Accreditation of institutions and study programs 
Accreditation is a process of external evaluation by which an HEI receives the right to operate as an 
institution (institutional accreditation) or offer certain study programs (study program accreditation). 
During the authorization process, the compliance with the plan cadru, the qualifications frameworks 
and the accreditation criteria are assessed. Accreditation and accreditation standards were first imple-
mented in Moldova in 1999 in a semi-independent agency, then integrated into the Ministry of Education 
in 2002 and ceased due to a lack of a corresponding agency in 2008. Since 2014 it is to be conducted 
again by the newly founded National Agency for Quality Assurance in Professional Education 
(ANACIP).  
                                                          
142 Law on the Licensing of Certain Types of Activities (2001) 
143 The 2014 code of education sometimes speaks of „authorization“ and sometimes of „accreditation“ referring to 
the process of external assessment followed by granting the right to offer study programs 
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According to the 2014, the decision on provisional authorization, accreditation, non-accreditation is to 
be adopted by the Government upon the proposal of the Ministry of Education, based on the results of 
the assessment performed by the National Agency for Quality Assurance in Professional Education 
(ANACIP).  
The process of external quality assessment is to be performed by the National Agency for Quality As-
surance in Professional Education (ANACIP) or by another quality assessment agency listed in the Eu-
ropean Quality Assurance Register for Higher Education (EQAR). 
Verification of diplomas 
Until 2014, the MoE retained the right to issue diplomas for Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees. Doctoral 
degrees were issued by CNAA. Before issuing a diplomas, the MoE checks whether the students who 
are to receive the diplomas have fulfilled their graduation requirements and enters the issued diploma 
into a diploma data base maintained by the MoE. The purpose of this process is to be able to identify 
falsified diplomas.  
According to the 2014 code of education, accreditation grants the right to organize the graduation exam, 
as well as the right to issue diplomas, certificates, and other study documents recognized by the Ministry 
of Education. As of 2016, no such accreditation has yet been carried out and the MoE still takes care of 
this task.  
Information provision 
Information provision does not play a role as an instrument of quality assurance in the Republic of 
Moldova (Interview MD No. 3, 2016). According to the 2014 code of education, it is foreseen that the 
new quality assurance agency ANACIP will gather the data to prepare a ranking of Moldovan HEIs. As 
of 2016, however, no steps have yet been taken in this regard.  
Regulation of admission into higher education 
Access to higher education in Moldova is regulated by formal requirements (having the appropriate 
school leaving qualification) and a numerus clausus / numerus fixus system by which the number total 
study places is limited by a quota imposed by the State. Depending on the score obtained in school 
leaving certificates and the number of study places as determined by the state, applicants can enroll 
either on state-funded places or on tuition fees-based places. The share of the state funded places is 
considerably smaller; about one third of students are financed by the state, whereas the rest pay tuition 
fees (self-financed) (Ruffio, Giorgio, Gierach, & Ballart, 2012). Entrance procedures are the same for 
all HEIs in Moldova, regardless of ownership status.  
In principle, the limitation of maximum student intake by the government, may mean that not all those 
who fulfill the formal requirements have a chance a chance to actually enter higher education in Mol-
dova. In practice, since the second half of the 2000’s, the demographic downturn and plentiful options 
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to study outside of Moldova means that even many state-funded places in certain disciplines and uni-
versities stay vacant.  
State regulation of maximum student intake per discipline 
Since independence, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Labor each 
year determine the total number of study places. Based on the overall predictions of needed graduates 
for the national economy per field of training, the Ministry of Education then establishes the number of 
both state-funded (budgets) and tuition-based study places for each accredited disciplines for all study 
cycles (BA/MA/PhD), thus limiting the allowed student intake per year and discipline.  
The rationale behind this approach is macro-steering the economy: 
“You know, there are these tendencies in the world, that young people prefer to study fashion-
able disciplines. But the government needs to keep in mind the needs for specialists also in 4 
years. Now it is fashionable to study law and economics, but we also need statisticians and 
teachers and engineers” (Interview MD No. 11, 2016) 
At the moment, this process is experienced as intransparent by HEIs.  
Introduction of Centralized Testing 
Already in 1990, experiments were conducted with developing the bacalaureat as a national centralized 
test for university admission, as was conducted in Romania. The firsts bacalaureat exams were held in 
1996. Between between 1996 and 2005, the test was rolled out to an increasing number of lyceums in 
Moldova.  
It became mandatory for lyceum graduates in 2006 and was operated by the Agenţia de Evaluare şi 
Examinare which later became the Agenţia Naţională pentru Curriculum şi Evaluare.  
Until 2011, admission to higher education was possible for graduates from general secondary schools, 
for holders of Certificate of studies (Atestat) and for holders of bacalaureat Diplomas. In 2011, by 
ministerial order144 the bacalaureat Diploma became the exclusive entry requirement for higher educa-
tion. As several HEIs initially ignored this ministerial order, it became part of the new law on education 
of 2014.  
12.3.3.2 Institutional Governance and University Autonomy 
The academic, organizational, financial, and personnel autonomy of Moldovan HEIs has steadily grown 
over time. Internally, Moldovan universities are characterized by a high degree of centralization of 
power in the hands of the rector. With the 1995 law on education, the power to elect a rector was de-
volved to university senates. The Rector, however, is the Chair of the Senate by which he is elected. The 
                                                          
144 Ministerial Order nr. 891 of 24.12.2009 
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rector, the vice-rectors, and a scientific secretary, together represents the senate bureau. The large size 
of senates (sometimes consisting of over 100 people) makes them inefficient and ineffective (Turcan, 
R. & Buhaian, 2014). In most Moldovan universities this leaves power relatively uncontested in the 
hands of the Rector and his management team.  
Universities in Moldova have a relatively large degree of organizational autonomy in determining their 
internal structures and working relationships between and within faculties and departments. In 2013, 
universities received financial autonomy, notably the right to open their own bank accounts, to carry 
over unused funds and to use their facilities and other avenues to generate their own funds.  
The government plays an important role nevertheless. Elected rectors needed to be confirmed by the 
MoE and the Government. By 2002, the Ministry of Education also still confirmed vice-rectors, deans, 
vice-deans, directors of study services, and chairpersons (Tiron et al., 2003, p. 59). The Ministry of 
Education needs to confirm any decisions on the establishment, restructuring and suspension of faculties 
as well as the Rectors once elected by the Senate. In addition, the government ministry decides on the 
establishment, restructuring or liquidation of universities. Such decisions are prepared by the Ministry 
of Education, approved by the government and need the final promulgation of the President of the Re-
public. Until the new code of education in 2014, collaboration agreements with foreign universities and 
other organizations also required the permission of the Ministry of Education.  
12.3.3.3 Financing of State HEIs 
Allocation of state-funded study places 
Higher education is financed from a combination of public and private sources. For public HEIs, the 
primary source of funding are state-funded study places, the distribution of which among Moldova’s 
many HEIs follows a multi-stage process:  
The overall number of state-funded study places in Moldova is determined yearly by the government. 
In particular, the Ministry of labor projects the number of needed HE places based on the projected need 
of graduates within eight fields of training (e.g. pedagogy, economics, natural sciences). The plan is 
adapted to the cost per student in a certain discipline (in turn calculated based on labor costs at prede-
termined rates, contributions to social insurance, student scholarships and partial funding of utilities), 
and the possibilities of the budget. This plan is approved by the government. The universities then apply 
for a certain number of budget places per discipline. Afterward, the MoE distributes the number of 
budget places within each specialty (study program) among the accredited universities, taking into con-
sideration their intake during the previous years (Interview MD No. 6, 2016). To the academic commu-
nity, these criteria are not transparent (Cotelnic A. et al., 2014).  
Income from tuition fees 
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In addition to public funding, all State universities supplement their budgets with income from tuition 
or training fees and research and development (national and international). Universities are restricted in 
the amount of tuition they are allowed to charge. As a matter of fact, HEIs receive more funding from 
state-funded study places than from tuition-funded places. The latter are attractive to maintain, however, 
because the uses of these funds are not predetermined by the government and universities are able to 
use these funds for renovations, new laboratory or research equipment. In addition, some funding is 
acquired through national and international research grants and other international projects (Interview 
MD No. 8, 2016).  
Prior to 2013, HEIs had a predetermined annual budget of revenues, which had to be strictly observed. 
In 2013, a reform of university financial autonomy came into effect. Since 2013, universities may man-
age their funds independently, may carry over unused funds into the next year and collect interest on 
bank deposits, and are allowed to receive funding from donations, sponsorships, as well as lease and 
rental contracts of their property (Cotelnic A. et al., 2014).  
Since 2013, the official policy is that state-funding of HEIs should be transformed into a “money-fol-
lows-students”-model based on cost-estimates for each type of study program. This funding scheme is 
intended to generate competition among universities (Cotelnic A. et al., 2014). As of June 2016, how-
ever, this has not happened yet.  
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12.4 Annex 4: The European “infrastructure” of quality assurance 
Within the Framework of the Bologna Process, a number of instruments and networks were developed 
and endorsed by the European Ministers responsible for Higher Education. In 2001 Ministers called 
upon universities, national quality assurance agencies and the European Network of Quality Assurance 
in Higher Education (ENQA) and corresponding bodies to establish a common framework of reference 
and to disseminate best practice. In 2003, ministers agreed that the primary responsibility for quality 
assurance should lie with higher education institutions and laid down minimal elements of national qual-
ity assurance145.  
European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance (ESG) 
In 2005, the European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance (ESG) were adopted based on 
these standards (ENQA, 2005a). The ESG are therefore a genuine product of the Bologna Process and 
were developed by a consortium of umbrella organizations of different HE stakeholder groups, the so-
called “E4” (consisting of ESU, ENQA, EUA, and EURASHE). On the one hand, the ESG consider the 
“European dimension” by addressing aspects of internationalization, transparency and accountability 
while at the same time also taking into account national characteristics, aims and responsibilities for 
higher education (Stensaker, Harvey, Huisman, Langfeldt, & Westerheijden, 2010). The philosophy is 
that the ESG should establish guidelines and standards that provide a core common methodology and a 
small number of core standards for quality assessment while leaving enough room for national and in-
stitutional particularities. 
The ESG are a set of guidelines on internal QA (ESG part 1), external QA (ESG part 3) and on QA of 
QAAs themselves (ESG part 3). While being more of a set of guidelines for how QA should be con-
ducted rather than a set of standards for defining or assessing quality, the ESG introduced important 
new norms into European HE such as establishing that “Student assessment procedures are expected to 
be designed to measure the achievement of the intended learning outcomes…” (ENQA, 2005a). As 
Enders & Westerheijden (2014) rightly point out, taking this seriously would imply a complete overhaul 
of the way students are assessed in the majority of HEIs in Europe. As a necessary precondition to fulfill 
this criterion, HEIs would not be able any more to confine the definition of intended learning outcomes 
to a paper exercise, as they would be needed for the examination process. This seemingly innocuous 
detail in an otherwise procedure-heavy document established a new norm which is still “diffused” to 
European HEIs via their national QAAs. “Substantial compliance” with the ESG has become a prereq-
uisite for full membership in ENQA, the umbrella organization of QAAs, as well as for membership in 
EQAR (see below). This creates a strong incentive for QAAs to orientate their own methodologies at 
                                                          
145 These included systems including an evaluation of programs or institutions by internal assessment and external 
review, the participation of students, the publication of results; a system of accreditation, certification or compa-
rable procedures, as well as international participation, cooperation and networking (European Ministers Respon-
sible for Higher Education, 2003) 
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the ESG. The impact of the ESG on QAAs of EU countries was analyzed by Stensaker at al. (2010) and 
found to be substantial.  
Qualifications Framework for the EHEA  
One of the earliest achievements in the QA action line was the formulation a set of brief descriptors for 
first-cycle and second-cycle levels expected learning outcomes which became known as the ‘Dublin 
Descriptors’ (Westerheijden, D. F. & Leegwater, 2002a). Building on them, in 2005, the ministers en-
couraged the development of National Qualifications Frameworks (NFQs) and pledged to develop an 
overarching Qualifications Framework for the EHEA (QF-EHEA) aiming to develop a system of clas-
sification which describe what a learner knows, understands and is able to do on the basis of a given 
qualification (European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education, 2005). The qualification frame-
work should be designed in a way that they facilitate greater mobility and employability of students and 
teachers (European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education, 2007). Qualifications standards as an 
instrument in quality assurance is described in greater detail in chapter 3.1.  
The European Quality Assurance Agency Register (EQAR) 
In 2007 the establishment of the European Quality Assurance Agency Register (EQAR) was agreed 
upon (European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education, 2007). In 2008, EQAR was founded as a 
register of credible and legitimate QA agencies operating in Europe in order to improve transparency of 
the quality of higher education provision in Europe and thus to promote trust among QAAs, States, 
students, HEIs, the labor market, and society in general. EQAR seeks to act as a whitelist of credible 
QAAs also in order to reduce opportunities for “accreditation mills146” and to gain credibility in Europe, 
thus further enhancing the confidence of stakeholders in the quality of higher education provision in 
Europe. The core criterion for inclusion is substantial compliance with the European Standards and 
Guidelines for Quality Assurance (ESG), which needs to be proven through an external review process. 
EQAR is open to agencies based in Europe or outside. By 2017, EQAR lists 45 QAAs which are certified 
as using the ESG147.  
  
                                                          
146 A “degree mill” is a bogus accreditation agency which usually „accredits“ bogus higher education institutions, 
known colloquially as „degree mills“.  
147 http://eqar.eu/register/  
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Multidimensional transparency tools: u-multirank 
In order to provide more detailed information about higher education institutions across the EHEA, the 
ministers requested the development of „multidimensional transparency tools”. Such tools should relate 
closely to the existing Bologna Process instruments, in particular to QA and recognition (European Min-
isters Responsible for Higher Education, 2009). After two precursor projects and a large-scale feasibility 
study, in 2014 the first multidimensional tool for information provision on HE called “u-multirank” was 
launched148. U-multirank is a subjects-based, multidimensional ranking based on the methodology of 
the German CHE Ranking that evades several of the problems of “classical” institutional rankings. Its 
development was strongly driven and financed by the European Commission.  
The following diagram shows the time of adoption of QA tools in the context of the overall develop-
ments in the Bologna Process and beyond. 
 
 
Since 2012, no new goals regarding QA were formulated, but more efforts regarding the legal basis for 
cross-border activities of EQAR-registered QAAs, the development of NQFs, transparency, and recog-
nition were called for. Also, a stress was laid on a meaningful implementation of learning outcomes, 
highlighting their strong links to recognition, qualifications frameworks and quality assurance. Further-
more, it was decided to develop an updated version of the ESG (European Ministers Responsible for 
Higher Education, 2012). In 2015, the ESG were revised.  
                                                          
148 www.u-multirank.eu  
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Figure 25: Time of adoption of various QA instruments within the Bologna Process and the European Commission 
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